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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. - 24753 of 2026
Ashutosh Tripathi
…..Petitioner(s)
Versus
Union of India and 5 others
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Petitioner(s)
Counsel for Respondent(s)
: Kranti Kiran Pandey
: A.S.G.I., G.A., Manoj Kumar Singh,
Sushant
Court No. - 48
HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
HON'BLE TARUN SAXENA, J.
Hon’ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J. (ORAL)
1.
By way of the instant writ petition, filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks for issuance of a
writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari, quashing the
impugned summons dated 18.09.2026, bearing Summon No.
PMLA/SUMMON/LKZO/2026/5565, issued by the Directorate of
Enforcement under Section 50(2) and 50(3) PMLA. The petitioner
further seeks for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from taking any
coercive action against the petitioner pursuant the aforesaid
summons dated 18.09.2026.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
submitted that a first information report dated 17.10.2025, was
lodged at Police Station Karwi Kotwali Nagar, District Chitrakoot
for the offence under Sections 319(2), 318(4), 338, 336(3),
340(2), 316(5) and 61(2) of BNS in connection with alleged scam
related to treasury office, Karwi/Chitrakoot. As per the F.I.R., the
allegation against the accused persons are for irregularising the
fund transactions relating to pensioners/family pensioners in the
Treasury Department Karwi, Chitrakoot. In the F.I.R., it is stated
that an audit team inspected the treasury record from 06.10.2025
to 10.10.2025 and found certain irregularities in the treasury
fund. The petitioner was not named in the F.I.R. dated
17.10.2025. During investigation, the name of the petitioner was
specifically came into the picture with an allegation that an
amount of approximately Rs. 17,00,000/- was credited into his
bank account. It is submitted that the petitioner neither operated
the
alleged
treasury
transaction
nor
participated
in
the
preparation of any forged document, electronic record or
fraudulent transaction.
3.
Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that the
petitioner has challenged the aforesaid criminal proceedings
before this High Court and was granted interim protection vide
order dated 23.02.2026 passed in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
26009 of 2025 in connection with Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No.
1448 of 2026. Subsequently, the investigating agency has
submitted the charge-sheet in the predicate case. The petitioner
was also granted an anticipatory bail vide order dated 02.09.2026
in Criminal Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/s 482 BNSS No.
8046 of 2026.
4.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
further submitted that subsequently, the petitioner has received
impugned summons on 25.09.2026 issued by the Directorate of
Enforcement (hereinafter referred to as “ED”) under Sections
50(2) and 3 PMLA and also asked for certain documents. The
respondents/ED did not disclose the petitioner precise scheduled
offence, alleged proceeds of crime and specific transactions
forming the basis of PMLA proceedings.
5.
It is next submitted that the petitioner is completely non-
connected with the alleged scam. The ED, only for the purpose of
harassing the petitioner, has issued the impugned summons and
called him to the Zonal Office, Lucknow.
6.
It is submitted that the action of the respondent authority is
arbitrary mala-fide and contrary to the established legal
principles. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
next submitted that prima-facie no criminal offence against the
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
petitioner is made out and the present prosecution has been
instituted with mala-fide intention for the purpose of harassment.
The impugned summons does not disclose the specific role
attributed to the petitioner. The impugned summons states that
the petitioner’s attendance is necessary for giving evidence and
for production of records but does not, on its face, disclose the
precise scheduled offence relied upon; the precise property
alleged to constitute proceeds of crime.
7.
Learned counsel next submitted that in view of the
aforesaid facts, the impugned summons may be quashed by this
Court while allowing the instant writ petition.
8.
Per-contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents vehemently opposed the writ petition and submitted
that the instant writ petition has been filed at a premature stage.
The ED has only issued a show cause / summons to the petitioner
to provide certain information/documents related to the proceeds
of crime. It is further submitted that it is a settled law that a writ
petition seeking quashing or stay of summons is not maintainable.
9.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the ED next
submitted that therefore the instant writ petition is liable to be
dismissed on maintainability itself.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
10.
Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner,
learned A.G.A. for the State of U.P., learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the Directorate of Enforcement, perused the contents of
the writ petition and material available on record.
11.
As a general principle on entertaining a writ petition against
a “show-cause notice”, relying on a series of earlier decisions, in
Union of India vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana1, the Supreme Court
has held that the discretionary writ jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not ordinarily
be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice unless it is found
to have been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so,
since a mere show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of
action. The Supreme Court has also held that mere issuance of a
show-cause notice does not amount to an adverse order affecting
the rights of any party. In this view of the matter, it has been held
that since a writ petition lies when some right of a party is
infringed, even entertaining a writ petition against a show-cause
notice may be premature. To be clear, Kunisetty Satyanarayana
(Supra) was a case which was arose from a service dispute and
not from any criminal proceedings.
(2006) 12 SCC 28
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
12.
In Special Director vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse 2, which was a
matter under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and the
Foreign Exchange Management Act 1999, the Supreme Court had
this to say:
“3. According to the appellants, the writ petition is thoroughly
misconceived as it challenges a show-cause notice and in any event
the final relief as sought for by Respondent 1-writ petitioner in
relation to the show-cause notice should not have been granted by an
interim order of the nature passed by withholding any further action
in this regard. It was pointed out that Respondent 1 is responsible for
financial irregularities involving nearly Rs 270 crores and documents
have been forged, accounts have been manipulated; and in any event
Respondent 1 was free to canvass all the points that were taken in
the writ petition before the authority issuing the notice. Instead of
doing that, he rushed to the High Court and unfortunately the High
Court not only entertained the writ application but also granted
interim relief which was in effect allowing the writ petition even
before it was heard on merits. The final relief sought for itself, in
substance, was granted by the interim order. ..... The High Court
should have thrown out the writ petition at the threshold.
*****
“5 [Ed. : Para 5 corrected vide Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./40/2004
dated 2-4-2004] . This Court in a large number of cases has
deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions
questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as
proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with
the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High
Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the
eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to
even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained
for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner
should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and
take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show
cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional
issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such
issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice
initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. Further, when
the court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the
statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the
purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide
(2004) 3 SCC 440
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be
finally granted in the writ petition is not accorded to the writ
petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection granted.”
13.
The above position has also been echoed in order dated
20.11.2014 made by the Supreme Court in Kirit Shrimankar vs.
Union of India3, where the petitioner had filed a writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India expressing
apprehension that he would be arrested. The apprehension arose
from alleged threats of arrest extended by some officers in
proceedings under the Customs Act, 1963 during a search
conducted at the residential premises of the petitioner’s ex-wife.
In those circumstances, the Supreme Court found that the writ
petition was premature and was based on flimsy averments,
observing that such averments could not form the basis for a
prima-facie apprehension of arrest. The writ petition in that case
was thereupon withdrawn, with the Supreme Court observing as
follows :
“3. ...… we are convinced that the petitioners can be permitted to
withdraw these writ petitions with the right to work out their remedy
as and when any appropriate situation arises for working out such
remedy. ...…”
14.
In the context of summons issued by the ED under section
50 of the PMLA, Delhi High Court in the case of Virbhadra Singh
vs. Enforcement Directorate & Ors.4, has observed as follows :
(2018) 12 SCC 651
2017 SCC OnLine Del 8930
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
“143. … The powers conferred on the enforcement officers for
purposes of complete and effective investigation include the power to
summon and examine “any person”. The law declares that every such
person who is summoned is bound to state the truth. At the time of
such investigative process, the person summoned is not an accused.
Mere registration of ECIR does not make a person an accused. He
may eventually turn out to be an accused upon being arrested or
upon being prosecuted. No person is entitled in law to evade the
command of the summons issued under Section 50 PMLA on the
ground that there is a possibility that he may be prosecuted in the
future. The law declared in Nandini Satpathy (supra) concerning the
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. recorded by the police, and in
other pronouncements concerning similar powers of officers of the
Customs Department, as noted earlier, provide a complete answer to
the apprehensions that have been expressed.”
Arising from the foregoing perspective, the court held that
there was nothing from which it could be inferred that the
issuance of summons by the ED in exercise of its statutory powers
of investigation into the ECIR, had caused or would have the
effect of causing, any prejudice to the petitioners in those cases;
and the petitions were accordingly dismissed as being devoid of
substance.
15.
On point of fact, it is a common ground that in the present
case, what the petitioner is aggrieved of is essentially the
potential threat of being arrested on the basis of the summons
received from the ED; for which reason he seeks quashing of the
summons.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
16.
In this regard, a brief reference to the celebrated decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan
Lal5, would be useful :“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the
exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent
powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way
of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any
precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other
materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala
fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
As observed by the Supreme Court, the above categories of
cases are only illustrative and not exhaustive.
17.
It is also noteworthy that the impugned summons have
been issued under section 50 of the PMLA, which provision
therefore requires a closer look and it reads as under :“50. Powers of authorities regarding summons, production of
documents and to give evidence, etc.—(1) The Director shall, for the
purposes of Section 13, have the same powers as are vested in a civil
court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) while trying
a suit in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(a) discovery and inspection;
(b) enforcing the attendance of any person, including any officer of a
reporting entity, and examining him on oath;
(c) compelling the production of records;
(d) receiving evidence on affidavits;
(e) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses and
documents; and
(f) any other matter which may be prescribed.
(2) The Director, Additional Director, Joint Director, Deputy Director or
Assistant Director shall have power to summon any person whose
attendance he considers necessary whether to give evidence or to
produce any records during the course of any investigation or proceeding
under this Act.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
(3) All the persons so summoned shall be bound to attend in person or
through authorised agents, as such officer may direct, and shall be
bound to state the truth upon any subject respecting which they are
examined or make statements, and produce such documents as may be
required.
(4) Every proceeding under sub-sections (2) and (3) shall be deemed to
be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Section 193 and Section
228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(5) Subject to any rules made in this behalf by the Central Government,
any officer referred to in sub-section (2) may impound and retain in his
custody for such period, as he thinks fit, any records produced before
him in any proceedings under this Act:
Provided that an Assistant Director or a Deputy Director shall not
(a) impound any records without recording his reasons for so doing;
or
(b) retain in his custody any such records for a period exceeding
three months, without obtaining the previous approval of the Joint
Director.”
18.
To wit, section 50 of the PMLA confers upon specified
officers of the ED, the powers vested in a civil court trying a suit;
including the power to enforce the attendance of any person for
recording statements on oath, with a mandate that any person so
summonsed shall be bound to attend, to answer and make
statements truthfully; to compel discovery, inspection and
production of documents and records; and to impound and retain
records, by giving reasons in writing.
19.
To be sure, the power to arrest is conspicuously absent in
Section 50 of the PMLA.
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
20.
Though Section 19 of the PMLA empowers designated
officers of the ED to arrest any person, subject to satisfying the
conditions mentioned in that provision, it is clear that the power
to arrest does not reside in section 50 nor does it arise as a
natural corollary of summons issued under section 50.
21.
For completeness, Section 19 of the PMLA may also be
extracted here:
19. Power to arrest.—
(1) If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other
officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by
general or special order, has on the basis of material in his
possession, reason to believe (the reason for such belief to be
recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence
punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as
soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.
(2) .....
(3) Every person arrested under sub-section
(1) shall, within twenty-four hours, be taken to a Special Court or
Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be,
having jurisdiction: Provided that .....
22.
The power under section 50 of the PMLA to issue summons
to a person and to require the production of documents and
record statements, which is akin to the powers of a civil court, is
different and distinct from the power under section 19 to arrest a
person. These are two separate and distinct provisions. The
exercise of the powers under one, cannot be restrained on the
apprehension that it could lead to the exercise of powers under
CRLP No. - 24753 of 2026
the other. If that is permitted, any and every person summonsed
under section 50 of the PMLA, to produce documents or give a
statement on oath, could resist such summons expressing mere
apprehension that he may face arrest at the hands of the ED, in
exercise of the powers under section 19 of the PMLA. Such a
position would be antithetic to the statutory scheme.
23.
Based on the provisions and precedents referred-to above;
on a bare perusal of section 50 of the PMLA under which
summons have been issued to the petitioner; and the fact that
the petitioner is not an accused in the proceeding under the
PMLA, this court is not persuaded to agree with the petitioner ‟s
apprehension that he may be subject to coercive measures.
24.
For the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not deem it
necessary to entertain the present writ petition seeking quashing
of the impugned summons.
25.
The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.
(Tarun Saxena,J.) (Chandra Dhari Singh,J.)
October 27, 2026
Saurabh
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
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