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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC010484362026
+
W.P.(C) 14863/2026 & CM APPL. 69612/2026 and CM APPL.
69613/2026
ASHUTOSH K R PANDEY
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Saaket Jain, Ms. Shivangi
Anand, Mr. Sarthak Kumar Meena and Mr.
Ankur Singhal, Advs.
versus
UNION PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ravinder Agarwal, Mr.
Manish Kumar Singh, Mr. Vasu Agarwal
and Mr. Emmanuel Benny, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
07.10.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
This writ petition assails the following order dated 25 March
2026 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in MA
4888/2025 as well as OA 3698/2025:
“M.A. No. 4888/2025(COD)
Heard Mr. Saaket Jain, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr.
Sinha, learned counsel for respondent No. 1, and Mr. Agarwal,
learned counsel for respondent No. 2.
“the Tribunal” hereinafter
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The present application has been filed seeking condonation of
delay of 938 days in filing the O.A. The applicant is aggrieved by
the communication/letter dated 13.08.2020 issued by respondent
No. 2, whereby the applicant was required to submit an EWS
certificate for the year 2017–2018. The applicant did not submit the
said certificate, and consequently, his candidature was cancelled.
The applicant had earlier challenged the said communication by
filing O.A. No. 1148/2020 on 24.08.2020. The said O.A. was
dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 07.12.2020 passed by the
Division Bench of this Tribunal. Thereafter, the applicant waited
for more than five years and has again approached this Tribunal
challenging the very same communication dated 13.08.2020.
In our view, the present O.A. is not maintainable inasmuch as the
earlier O.A. seeking similar relief was dismissed as withdrawn. It is
true that liberty was granted to the applicant to pursue his remedies
in accordance with law, however, the applicant did not avail any
such remedy and has again approached this Tribunal after an
inordinate delay. Mr. Saaket Jain, learned counsel for the applicant,
submits that the order passed in the earlier O.A. was not on merits,
however, the said submission does not come to the aid of the
applicant in the present case.
So far as the delay is concerned, the applicant has made the
following averments in paragraph 6:
“6.
That subsequently the Applicant appeared for
attempts in 2021 & 2025 but did not qualify for IAS and
meanwhile he continued serving in IRS. As it is said that
better wisdom prevails over time, the Applicant got to
know that only remedy that is available to him for
fulfilment of his dream is approaching the Tribunal again
since he had a good case on merits and he had already got
the liberty vide order dated 07.12.2020. Though he is aware
that the best course would have been to keep pursuing the
OA initially filed by him but in all bonafide at that time he
believed that it would be better to focus on studies than to
continue with the case. This is nothing but an attempt to
give one last try to get his job dream as he had already
qualified for IAS under EWS category in 2019.”
The applicant is an IRS officer and, after disposal of the earlier
O.A., he appeared in the Civil Services Examination in the years
2021 and 2025, but did not qualify for the IAS. Even excluding the
Covid period, there is a delay of 938 days. In the absence of any
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satisfactory explanation, we are not inclined to condone the delay.
Mr. Jain has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst.
Katiji & Ors.2, C.A. No. 460/1987, and submitted that the applicant
has a good case on merits and, therefore, the delay should be
condoned. The Supreme Court in Collector Land Acquisition,
Anantnag (supra) held that the Courts should approach with a
liberal and justice-oriented approach and no discrimination should
be made merely because the state is filing an appeal against a
decision enhancing compensation for land acquisition for public
purpose. There is no dispute with regard to the proposition laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said judgment.
However, in the present case, the applicant has failed to furnish any
satisfactory explanation for condonation of the inordinate delay of
938 days.
Taking into consideration the overall facts and circumstances of the
case, we are not inclined to condone the delay. Accordingly, the
M.A. is dismissed.”
2.
MA 4888/2025 sought condonation of delay of 938 days in
filing OA 3698/2025.
3.
As the Tribunal has correctly observed, the only ground that the
petitioner sought to urge was that he has a good case on merits and
had been granted liberty to re-approach the Tribunal by an earlier
order dated 7 December 2020.
4.
The order dated 7 December 2020, to which reference is
contained in para 6 of the application for the condonation of delay
filed by the petitioner, read thus:
“Learned counsel for the applicant sought permission to withdraw
the OA. Permission is accorded. O.A. is dismissed as withdrawn. It
is left open to the applicant to pursue the remedies in accordance
(1987) 2 SCC 107
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with the rules.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
Clearly, unlike what is stated in para 6 of MA 4888/2025, no liberty
was reserved with the petitioner, by the order dated 7 December 2020
passed by the Tribunal in the first round of litigation, to re-approach
the Tribunal.
5.
There is not a whisper of an explanation for the period between
2020 and 2025, when the petitioner decided to re-approach the
Tribunal.
6.
Mr. Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner, cites the often
quoted decision of Supreme Court in Katiji, from which he has
specifically adverted to Clause 2 in para 3 of the said decision which
reads as under:
“Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter
being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being
defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing
the parties.”
7.
Katiji is a case which dealt with condonation of delay in
proceedings instituted by the government. We deem it reproduce para
3 of the decision in its entirety thus:
“3.
The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay
by enacting Section 53 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within
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order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by
disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause”
employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the
courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves
the ends of justice — that being the life-purpose for the existence
of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court
has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted
in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated
down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal
approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
“1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would
be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be
applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there
was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of
the appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seeking
such period.
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condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including
the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law
is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for
according a step-motherly treatment when the “State” is the
applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact experience
shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in
charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought
to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and
passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to
understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the
State which represents the collective cause of the community, does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts therefore have to
be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the
course of the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause”. So
also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to
matters at hand with the end in view to do even-handed justice on
merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on
merits. Turning to the facts of the matter giving rise to the present
appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay.
The order of the High Court dismissing the appeal before it as
time-barred, is therefore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the
matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now
dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable
opportunity of hearing to both the sides.”
8.
Clause 2 in para 3 of the judgment cannot be read in isolation.
9.
Katiji has been noticed, significantly, in subsequent decisions of
the Supreme Court. The following passages, from the most recent
decision which considers Katiji, State of Odisha v. Managing
Committee of Namatara Girls High School4, clarify the legal
position:
“13. However, since there is a long line of decisions of this
Court propounding the law that the expression ‘sufficient cause’
employed by the legislature in Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
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1963 is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice and in
view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have considered it
appropriate to consider the matter in some depth.
14.
Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag v. Mst Katiji, a coordinate Bench noting that the
justifiably liberal approach which this Court has been adopting in
matters instituted before it is not being followed by the courts
lower in the hierarchy, mandated that a justice oriented approach is
indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of delay as
distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15.
Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Justice M.N.
Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate Bench in G.
Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer5 had referred to Katiji
(supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted the following passage
therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical considerations are
pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account
of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected
to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it was held as
under:
15.
In litigations to which Government is a party there
is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If
appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults,
no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate
analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of
Government are collective and institutional decisions and
do not share the characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16.
The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a
private citizen as for governmental authorities.
(1988) 2 SCC 142
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Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility
for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat
different complexion is imparted to the matter where
Government makes out a case where public interest was
shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith
on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers
were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17.
Therefore, in assessing what, in a particular case,
constitutes “sufficient cause” for purposes of Section 5, it
might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from
the considerations that go into the judicial verdict, these
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process of
their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear
responsibility of Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within reasonable
limits — is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be
rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put government and private parties on the
same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the
very nature of governmental functioning is procedural
delay incidental to the decision-making process. In the
opinion of the High Court, the conduct of the law officers
of the Government placed the Government in a
predicament and that it was one of those cases where the
mala fides of the officers should not be imputed to
Government. It relied upon and trusted its law officers. …
16.
Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) were consistently
followed by this Court until adoption of a different and seemingly
strict approach while dealing with applications for condonation of
delay during the last decade and a half became discernible starting
with the decision in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Ltd6, where a delay of 427 days in filing the relevant special leave
petition was not condoned. University of Delhi v. Union of India7
is another decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court) where
delay of 916 days was not condoned. While upholding the decision
of the relevant high court under challenge refusing to condone the
delay of 5659 days in presentation of an appeal under Section 54 of
(2012) 3 SCC 563
(2020) 13 SCC 745
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the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the heirs of a deceased
landowner, a coordinate Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v.
Collector(LA)8 very recently reiterated that the law of limitation is
founded on public policy, the object is that a legal remedy is put to
an end so that no litigation remains pending for an indefinite
period. It was also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the stage of considering
the application for condonation of delay.
17.
Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj Singh v.
Union of India9 authoring the judgment for a coordinate Bench
adopted the view taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and
a host of other decisions following the same while not interfering
with an order of condonation of delay passed by the relevant high
court. However, it was observed that a distinction ought to be
drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ that is proffered
as cause for condonation of delay. It was also emphasized that a
different approach has to be adopted while this Court is
considering an application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal over a
discretionary order of the high court granting the prayer for
condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to
condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of
grant of the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18.
However, what perhaps remained unnoticed in any of the
decisions post Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra) adopting a
liberal approach is the exasperation and consequent lament
expressed by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI.
in course of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay10 and
admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of the decision
in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than quoting the same
in its entirety hereunder:
1.
We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda, learned senior
counsel for the Revenue.
2.
This special leave petition filed on November 16,
1993 is delayed by 264 days. For quite some time in the
past, this Court has been making observations as to the
(2024) 12 SCC 336
(2023) 10 SCC 531
1994 Supp (2) SCC 603
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grave prejudice caused to public interest by appeals brought
on behalf of the Government being lost on the point of
limitation. Such observations have been made for over a
few years in the past. But there seems to be no conspicuous
improvement as is apparent in the present petition which is
filed in November 1993. The explanation for the delay, had
better be set out in petitioner's own words:
“(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special
leave petition drafted from the drafting Advocate
and sent the same for approval to the Board on June
24, 1993 along with the case file. (h) The Board
returned the case file to the Advocate-on-Record on
July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to the Board on
September 20, 1993 requesting that draft SLP was
not approved by the Board. The Board after
approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS on
October 1, 1993.”
This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this Court
made in several cases in the past, we hoped that the
matters might improve. There seems to be no
visible support for this optimism. There is a point
beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant is Government which is itself
under the shackles of bureaucratic indifference.
Having regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed, in the
case of the former the decisions to present and
prosecute appeals are not individual but are
institutional decisions necessarily bogged down by
the proverbial red-tape. But there are limits to this
also. Even with all this latitude, the explanation
offered for the delay in this case merely serves to
aggravate the attitude of indifference of the
Revenue in protecting its common interests. The
affidavit is again one of the stereotyped affidavits
making it susceptible to the criticism that the
Revenue does not seem to attach any importance to
the need for promptitude even where it affects its
own interest.
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4.
The application for condonation of delay is,
accordingly, dismissed. The special leave petition is,
therefore, dismissed as barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19.
Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur Riders (supra),
one after the other, leaves none in doubt that it did not take much
time for this Court to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law
was laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra),
with much optimism that matters would improve. Their Lordships,
however, found no visible support for such optimism and the
Court's patience having been tested to the extreme limit, held that
there is a point beyond which even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
20.
We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly lethargic,
tardy and indolent not only before the High Court but also before
this Court. Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as timebarred by the High Court, this Court has been approached by the
State of Odisha four months after expiry of the period of limitation.
21.
Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a matter of
right. It is entirely the discretion of the Court whether or not to
condone delay. Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”,
we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought to be shown here
by the State of Odisha is not an explanation but a lame excuse. No
case for exercise of discretion has been set up.
22.
The applications for condonation of delay in filing the
special leave petition and condonation of delay in re-filing the
same, thus, stand rejected, with the result that the special leave
petition stands dismissed as time-barred.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10.
Katiji, thus, has clearly weathered many a winter, and can no
longer be regarded as an insurance against delay and laches.
11.
In Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley11, the Supreme Court
held:
(2024) 15 SCC 215
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“9.
Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the
facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view
that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other
words the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground
of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court
belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a
considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought
not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This
Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or
laches is one of the factors which should be borne in mind by the
High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court
may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part
of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action
to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the
lapsed cause of action.
10.
The discretion to be exercised would be with care and
caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ
court is explained which would appeal to the conscience of the
court, in such circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting
party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned.
There may be myriad circumstances which gives rise to the
invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on
facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in
a straitjacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate
discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts
that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
11.
For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed
period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be
seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked
and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause
of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural
death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches
alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be
non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay
and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that
sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in
permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own
wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental
right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article
226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into
consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in
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approaching a writ court.
12.
This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.12 has
held to the following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right.
But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under
Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court
takes into account certain factors and one of such
considerations is delay and laches on the part of the
applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that
power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds
for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches.
57.
If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest
reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in
making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground
for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to encourage
agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have
already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of
third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai13, Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Court14 and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India15). This
principle applies even in case of an infringement of
fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B.
Munshi16, Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and
Exports17 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
India18 ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to
when a person can approach a court. The question is one of
discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before
the court depending on and varying from case to case. It
will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and
the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay
(2009) 1 SCC 768
AIR 1964 SC 1006
AIR 1967 SC 1450
(1992) 3 SCC 136
(1969) 1 SCC 110
(1969) 1 SCC 185
(1970) 1 SCC 84
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arose.”
13.
It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this
Court in Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan19
whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to
exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or
omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been
further held thereunder:
“6.
Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke
its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or
omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even
where fundamental right is involved the matter is still
within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga
Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports20. Of
course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and
reasonably.
7.
What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong
Hurd21 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v.
Industrial Court22 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant
Regular Motor Service23. Sir Barnes had stated:
‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is
not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it
would be practically unjust to give a remedy either
because the party has, by his conduct done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put
the other party in a situation in which it would not
be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
(2006) 4 SCC 322
(1969) 1 SCC 185
(1874) LR 5 PC 221
AIR 1967 SC 1450
AIR 1969 SC 329
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otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere
delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar
by any statute of limitation, the validity of that
defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances always important in
such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature
of the acts done during the interval which might
affect either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as it relates to the remedy.’
8.
It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of
this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in
relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that
what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a
fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath
Bose v. Union of India24 that no relief can be given to the
petitioner who without any reasonable explanation
approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate
delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a
guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the
intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should
disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed
after inordinate delay.
9.
It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal25
that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on
the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily
explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and
grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated
that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High
Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion
and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not
only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third
parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of
third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether
or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
(1970) 1 SCC 84
(1986) 4 SCC 566
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14.
Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle
the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in Chennai
Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali
Babu26 has held:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be
lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,
the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or
not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In
certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but
in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the
court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a
litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms,
namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and
second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a
phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to
the lis.”
12.
The Supreme Court has, therefore, clearly held that a writ court
is bound to take into consideration the delay and laches while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
13.
Mr. Jain has prayed that the petitioner may be put to costs but
that his OA should not be dismissed on the ground of limitation.
14.
If we accept this submission, it will set an unhealthy precedent,
which would become an example for all future OAs filed before the
(2014) 4 SCC 108
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Tribunal. Our decision could be cited by every applicant, who
approaches the Tribunal in a belated manner, irrespective of the length
of the delay, to contend that the delay should be condoned subject to
payment of costs.
15.
It is well settled the Court can advert to the merits of the matter
only after condoning delay. A proceeding which is barred by
limitation and laches cannot be examined on merits, if no sufficient
cause to condone delay is made out.
16.
We are exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, which is governed by following parameters laid
down in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan27:
“7.
The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in
that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or
tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court
or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot
be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.
In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
AIR 1964 SC 477
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certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said
finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible
and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as
an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In
dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear
in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points
cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that
the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to
issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari
Vishnu Kamath v Syed Ahmad Ishaque28, Nagandra Nath Bora v
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam29
and Kaushalya Devi v Bachittar Singh30.
8.
It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe
what an error of law apparent on the face of the record means.
What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; hut it
must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is
apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear
that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or
Tribunal is based on an obvious mis-interpretation of the relevant
statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be,
even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which
are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so
plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no
difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said
error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be
that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious
or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need
an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt
that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law
and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as
would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face
of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably capable of two
constructions and one construction has been adopted by the inferior
(1955) 1 SCR 1104
(1958) SCR 1240
AIR 1960 SC 1168
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Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily or always be
open to correction by a writ of certiorari. In our opinion, it is
neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to
describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately
described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record.
Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an error of
law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the
nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have
been misconstrued or contravened.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17.
Within the limitations of our jurisdiction, we find no cause to
interfere with the impugned order of the Tribunal.
18.
The writ petition along with the pending applications is
accordingly dismissed in limine.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
OCTOBER 7, 2026/rt
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