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Serial No. 01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Date of Decision: 23.04.2021
Shri Ashok Sharma & Anr. Vs. Shri Ramesh Kumar Jhunjhunwala
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H. S. Thangkhiew, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr. K. Paul, Sr. Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
:
Mr. A.S. Siddiqui, Adv. with
Mr. S. Pandit, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
This application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil
Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been
preferred by the petitioner (herein referred as the defendant) being
aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order dated 04.07.2017
passed by the learned District Judge, East Khasi Hills, Shillong in Title
Civil Appeal No. 1 (H) 2014 dismissing the appeal and upholding the
judgment and decree dated 30.05.2014 passed in T.S. No. 10 (H) of
2008 by the Assistant District Judge wherein, a decree of eviction had
been passed against the defendant, to quit and vacate the suit premises.
CRP No. 18 of 2017
2.
The brief facts are that the respondent (hereinafter referred
to as the plaintiff) had filed a suit for ejectment against the petitioner
(hereinafter referred to as the defendant) in respect of the suit premises
situated at Police Bazar Shillong where the defendant is a tenant
carrying on a business of wool and woolen garments in the name M/s
Sharma. The tenancy was created by (Late) Bhagwan Das
Jhunjhunwala, the father of the plaintiff vide an agreement dated
21.08.1973. It appears that by a family agreement dated 04.01.2007 the
suit premises fell into the share of the plaintiff and on the ground of
bona fide requirement, the plaintiff had sought for a decree of eviction
and for handing over of vacant possession by way of the Title Suit T.S.
No. 10 (H) of 2008.
3.
The trial Court framed 8(eight) issues for determining the
case of which issue No. 3 dealt with the question of bona fide
requirement. The plaintiff examined 4(four) witnesses (PW-1 to PW4) and the defendant examined himself as DW 1. By judgment and
order dated 30.05.2014, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of the plaintiff with an affirmative finding on the issue of bona
fide requirement. Being aggrieved thereby the defendant then preferred
an appeal being Title Civil Appeal No. 1 (H) 2014 before the Court of
the learned District Judge who by order dated 04.07.2017 dismissed
the appeal and upheld the judgment and order of the trial Court.
4.
Mr.
K.
Paul,
learned
Senior
counsel
for
the
defendant/petitioner in his submissions has firstly strongly contended
that there was an inordinate delay in passing the impugned order dated
04.07.2017 which was in violation of the stipulation as contained in
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Order 20 Rule 1 of the CPC, inasmuch as, the appeal had been heard
on 02.12.2016 and judgment was rendered only on 04.07.2017 which
was a delay of 7(seven) months and that the lower Appellate Court in
passing the judgment had completely lost track of the arguments
advanced. Learned counsel submits that the lower Appellate Court had
based its judgment on conjectures and surmises by coming to a finding
which was not based on the evidence on record, such as, by recording
that ‘there is no dispute of ownership’ when he contends is erroneous,
as the same was arrived at by placing reliance on the family
arrangement dated 04.01.2007, which was never produced nor
exhibited by the plaintiff. Further, learned counsel submits that by not
annexing or producing the deed of family arrangement which forms
the foundation of the claim for ejectment of the defendant, Section 101
of the Evidence Act has not been complied with, inasmuch as, it
enjoins that whosoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any
legal right or law which is dependent on the existence of the facts
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
5.
Learned counsel further submits that the lower Appellate
Court has erred in relying on the evidence tendered by PW-3 and PW4 in spite of the admission of PW-3 that he has been tutored by the
plaintiff; and also of PW-4 who is clearly an interested witness being
the employee of the plaintiff. He also submits that no notice of eviction
was ever served upon the tenants as contemplated under Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act and further the lower Appellate Court
has not appreciated the points of determination nor has it passed a
reasoned order as stipulated by Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC.
CRP No. 18 of 2017
6.
Learned counsel in support of his submissions on the point
of a reasoned speaking order and on delay on pronouncement of
judgment, has relied upon the cases of Director Horticulture Punjab
& Ors. vs. Jagjivan Parshad reported in (2008) 5 SCC 539 and Anil
Rai & Anr. vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2001 SC 3173. On the
point of burden of proof and its onus, as also Section 101 of the
Evidence Act, reliance has been placed on Corporation of City of
Bangalore vs. Zulekha Bi & Ors. reported in (2008) 11 SCC 306 and
Rangammal vs. Kappuswami & Anr. reported in AIR 2011 SC 2344,
and on the responsibility of the first Appellate Court as per Order 41
Rule 31 CPC has relied upon U. Manjunath Rao vs. U.
Chandrashekar & Anr. reported in (2017) 15 SCC 309.
7.
Mr.
A.S.
Siddiqui,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent/plaintiff in reply to the submissions of the counsel for the
petitioner submits that the fact that the plaintiff is the landlord and
owner of the suit property was never disputed by the defendant and in
fact in the instant revision petition itself at Page-6, it has been stated
that the defendant is a tenant under the plaintiff. Similarly, the learned
counsel submits that in the written statement itself, the defendant has
made averments that the plaintiff is the owner of several shop premises
at Police Bazar and that the defendant is only one of the several tenants
in the ground floor. In this context, learned counsel has taken this Court
to Paras 7, 11 & 16 of the written statement and also to the deposition
of the defendant before the trial Court, to substantiate the fact that the
plaintiff was the landlord and the absolute owner of the suit premises,
which was never disputed by the defendant, and who is now seeking to
CRP No. 18 of 2017
make a case of the title of the plaintiff, on failing before both the Courts
below.
8.
Learned counsel further submits that the finding of the
first Appellate Court on the status of the plaintiff as landlord and that
the family arrangement was not a subject matter in the case, is a correct
finding as even in the memorandum of appeal itself, the defendant had
referred to the plaintiff herein as the owner. On the finding on bona
fide requirement which was answered in favour of the plaintiff, learned
counsel submits that the plaintiff has established his case by his
deposition which was also corroborated by the other witnesses, and had
stood unshaken in the cross-examination. Learned counsel has referred
to the deposition of the plaintiff as well as two other witnesses, to show
that the plaintiff required the suit premises as he was running his
business from rented premises in the name and style of B.R. Furnishing
& Textiles and needed to shift to the suit premises for the said business.
Moreover, he submits, the defendant himself in his cross-examination
has deposed that he is also engaged in another business apart from
owning a building in Thana Road, Police Bazar which has been given
up on rent and that the business in the suit premises is not his only
source of livelihood. Learned counsel refers to the judgments in the
cases of Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. vs. Vimalabai
Prabhulal & Ors. reported in (2005) 8 SCC 252, Rishi Kumar Govil
vs. Maqsoodan & Ors. reported in (2007) 4 SCC 456 and Mohd. Ayub
& Anr. vs. Mukesh Chand reported in (2012) 2 SCC 155 to underline
this point with regard to bona fide requirement.
CRP No. 18 of 2017
9.
Learned counsel submits that though much has been made
about the title of the plaintiff over the suit property and whether the
same can be determined without the said family arrangement being
produced as evidence during the trial, the very fact that admissions
have been made by the defendant consistently in the plaint and appeal
apart from the fact that the rent was paid to the plaintiff, is enough to
settle the issue in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel to buttress
his arguments has also relied upon Section 116 of the Indian Evidence
Act and submits that by application of law, the defendant/tenant is
estopped and is not permitted to deny title to such property by the
landlord. In conclusion, learned counsel submits that a delay in
pronouncing the judgment will in no way disable the appellate
judgment or upset the concurrent findings that have been arrived at by
both the Courts below. Learned counsel submits that no grounds have
been made out for setting aside the impugned judgment and that the
revision application is liable to be dismissed.
10.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone
through the records. It is not in dispute that the defendant had been
carrying on a business of wool & woolen garments in the name and
style of M/s Sharma and that the tenancy was created by the father of
the plaintiff vide agreement dated 21.08.1973 for a period of 8(eight)
years which was renewed from time to time. The plaintiff on the
ground of bona fide requirement and also that the defendant had
violated the terms and conditions of the tenancy agreement, had
instituted Title Suit No. 10 (H) 2008 against the defendant who upon
receipt of notice contested the suit and filed written statement raising
CRP No. 18 of 2017
various objections, such as the existence of any family agreement as
also on cause of action.
11.
The learned Trial Court then framed as many as 8(eight)
issues of which issue No. 2 and 3 respectively dealt with whether there
was a cause of action and whether the plaintiff was in bona fide
requirement of the suit premises. The trial Court by judgment and order
dated 30.05.2014, after the parties adduced evidence and were heard
extensively, allowed the prayer of the plaintiff and passed a decree for
eviction. Thereafter, an appeal being Title Civil Appeal No. 1 (H) 2014
was filed before the Court of the District Judge, East Khasi Hills,
Shillong, who then by order dated 04.07.2017 dismissed the appeal and
upheld the judgment and order dated 30.05.2014.
12.
The defendant’s primary grounds for assailing the
appellate order before this Court centres around the two issues of bona
fide requirement and cause of action but a ground has also taken that
the judgment has been passed after a long delay of around 7(seven)
months which is in violation of Order 20 Rule 1 CPC and further that
the same is not a reasoned order.
13.
At this juncture before considering the other grounds of
challenge which are based on facts and evidence, it would be apposite
to first deal with the question as to whether there was an inordinate
delay in the delivery of the judgment which would render it liable to
be adjudged invalid. The ground as stated by the defendant is that the
hearing was concluded on 02.12.2016 and the impugned judgment and
order was passed on 04.07.2017 i.e. after a period of over 7(seven)
months which would render the judgment bad and liable to be set aside.
CRP No. 18 of 2017
I have gone through the records of the lower Appellate Court,
especially the order sheet to determine whether such delay had been
caused. Firstly, it is noted that on 02.12.2016, the lower Appellate
Court had recorded as follows: “02.12.2016
Record put up. Appellant is represented by
Shri. K. Paul. Respondent is represented by Shri.
S. Pandit. Heard at length argument of the Ld.
Counsels for the parties.
Fix 21.12.16 for necessary order.
Sd/District Judge
Shillong”
Thereafter on 21.12.2016, copies of decisions were
directed to be supplied which were supplied it seems, on the next date
fixed just before the winter vacations on 23.12.2016. Thereafter,
records were put up 13.02.2017 and re-fixed on 07.03.2017 as the
Presiding Officer was not in station as he was attending a training
course at the LNJN National Institute of Technology and Forensic
Science, Delhi. Thereafter, it appears that on 08.03.2017, as the
Presiding Officer was holding dual charge of West Jaintia Hills
District, he could not take up the matter. On the next date the Presiding
Officer was on leave and the matter was put up on 17.04.2017 and after
two subsequent dates on 21.04.2017 and 24.04.2017, by order dated
01.05.2017 which is reproduced herein below, the appeal was posted
for judgment.
“01.05.2017
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Record put up. Both parties are present.
Case posted for Judgment.
Fix 08.05.2017 for judgment.
Sd/District Judge
Shillong”
The appeal in the presence of both the parties, it is seen
was fixed on 08.05.2017 for passing of judgment, which however
finally came to be pronounced on 04.07.2017.
14.
At this stage it would be relevant to refer to Order 20 Rule
1, which after its amendment now reads as follows: “1. Judgment when pronounced- [(1) The Court, after
the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment in
an open Court, either at once, or as soon thereafter as
may be practicable and when the judgment is to be
pronounced on some future day, the Court shall fix a
day for that purpose, of which due notice shall be given
to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided that where the judgment is not
pronounced at once, every endeavour shall be made by
the Court to pronounce the judgment within thirty days
from the date on which the hearing of the case was
concluded but, where it is not practicable so to do on the
ground of the exceptional and extraordinary
circumstances of the case, the Court shall fix a future
day for the pronouncement of the judgment, and such
day shall not ordinarily be a day beyond sixty days from
the date on which the hearing of the case was concluded,
and due notice of the day so fixed shall be given to the
parties or their pleaders.]”
The amendment as brought about enjoins that an
endeavour shall be made to pronounce the judgment within 30(thirty)
days as opposed to 15(fifteen) days before the amendment and that the
same shall not ordinarily be a day beyond 60(sixty) days as opposed to
30(thirty) days before the amendment. The second proviso requiring
the reasons be recorded for the delay in pronouncing judgment
however, by the amendment no longer exists.
15.
In the instant case as observed above, the order sheet
reflects that arguments were advanced on 02.12.2016, but it does not
reflect or record that the hearing was concluded on that date itself, nor
was a date of judgment fixed, but only that it was to be posted on
CRP No. 18 of 2017
21.12.2016 for necessary orders. On the subsequent date i.e. on
21.12.2016 when the records were put up, an order was passed for
supply of copies of decisions as the copies supplied were not legible.
Thereafter, it seems on 23.12.2016, the said decisions were supplied as
directed. It appears that after 13.02.2017 when the records were put up,
due to the pre-occupation of the Presiding Officer who was also
holding dual charge of another Judgeship namely; West Jaintia Hills
and also who had to undergo training, the matter was not taken up and
it was only on 01.05.2017 after a few dates, that the matter was fixed
on 08.05.2017, in the presence of both the parties for pronouncement
of judgment, which however came to be pronounced on 04.07.2017.
What can be discerned from the order sheet is that though undoubtedly,
a certain period of time elapsed before the final pronouncement of the
judgment, the effective date from when the date of conclusion of the
proceedings can be said to be reckoned from, cannot be said to be
definite, as it is only in the order dated 01.05.2017 that it is clearly
recorded that the matter was fixed for pronouncement of judgment on
08.05.2017. Reasons for delay though not spelt out, justifications for
the said delay or reasons thereof necessarily will have to be arrived at
or determined from the records. It is also noted that the plaintiff had
approached this Court praying for disposal of the appeal by way of a
Miscellaneous Case being MC(CRP) 3/2017, and this Court by order
dated 12.06.2017 had directed that the Appeal be disposed of within
15(fifteen) days of receipt of the order.
16.
The record of proceedings not showing a definite date from
when the matter was fixed for judgment until the order dated
CRP No. 18 of 2017
01.05.2017, it cannot be conclusively said that the Presiding Officer
kept the matter in cold storage, or thereafter disregarded the orders of
this Court, if it is taken that the date posted for judgment of the case
was on 08.05.2017, which was however pronounced on 04.07.2017. In
the opinion of this Court, this will not amount to an inordinate delay to
render the impugned judgment ‘non est’ in law. The provisions as
contained in Order 20 Rule 1, therefore in the circumstances of the
instant case also cannot be said to have been violated, moreover when
the phrase ‘shall not ordinarily’ as it appears in the provision, connotes
that the stipulation is directory and not mandatory in nature.
17.
In view of the position as placed above, to set aside and
remand the matter for re-hearing will not serve the cause of justice and
as such the objections raised by the defendant on the question of delay
of pronouncement of judgement is disregarded.
18.
On coming to the other grounds of challenge that the
findings were not based on evidence on record especially on a point of
dispute as to ownership of the suit premises as the said family
arrangement dated 01.04.2007 was not produced, an examination of
the records especially the written statement and depositions speak
otherwise. The defendant in the written statement himself has not
disputed that the plaintiff is not the landlord and owner of the suit
premises, as the statements in paras 7, 11 and 16 show, the relevant
portions of which are extracted below: “7. That with regards to the averments made in Para 1
the Defendant states the Plaintiff is the owner of the
several shop premises at Police Bazaar and the
Defendant is only one of the several tenants in the
ground floor and is paying a monthly rent of Rs. 6,100/-
CRP No. 18 of 2017
(Rupees six thousand and hundred) only for the
tenanted premises.
11. That the Defendant vehemently denied the
averments made in Para 5 of the plaint and the Plaintiff
is put to the strictest proof thereof. On the contrary the
Defendant states that the Plaintiff is the absolute owner
of several shop premises situated at Police Bazaar,
Shillong and had let out all his shop premises to
different tenants on rent and the tenants had been
running their business from the shop premises such as
“Assam Diary”, “Pan Shop”, “Archery Counter”,
“Artificial Jewellery”, “M/s Singhania”, “Bardhan’s”,
“Music Instrument Shop”, “Shree Durga Store”, “M/s
Sharma’s”, Hawkers in front of the Municipal Drains”.
The Defendant also states that apart from the above
mentioned shops the Plaintiff himself is running his
business by the name and style “B.R. Furnishing” above
Regal Restaurant at Police Bazar, Shillong and also M/s
Pride Furnishing, Akram Market, situated at Fancy
Bazaar, Guwahati, Assam. Both the shops which are
owned and managed by the Plaintiff are located at Prime
location and are above 1000 sq. ft. approximately. As
such the plea of bonafide requirement, taken by the
Plaintiff is malafide and not sustainable in law.
16. That the averment made in Para 10 of the Petition is
vehemently denied by the answering Defendant. In this
regard the answering Defendant submits that there was
a leakage of water inside the shop premises as a result
of which the goods and materials kept inside the shop
premises was damaged and the answering Defendant
has been suffering huge loss and as such the answering
Defendant with prior permission, consent and
knowledge of the Plaintiff has repaired the same
therefore the question of violating the terms and
conditions of the Tenancy Agreement does not arise”.
19.
It is also to be noted that the defendant in his examination-
in-chief which is on affidavit has categorically stated in para 2 and 6
as follows: “2. That the deponent states that the plaintiff herein is
the owner of several shops premises at Police Bazar and
the Deponent is only one of the tenant in the ground
floor which the Plaintiff had tenanted to his predecessor
in interest in the year 1970 and on payment of monthly
rent which is at present fixed @ Rs 6100/- (Rupees Six
Thousand One Hundred) only per month which the
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Deponent has been paying regularly without any
default.
6. That the Deponent states that the Plaintiff is the
absolute owner of several shops premises situated at
Police Bazar, Shillong which has been let out to
different tenants on rent and all tenants had been
running their business from the shop premises such as
“Assam Diary, Pan Shop, Archery counter, artificial
jewellery, M/s Singhania, Bardhan’s, Musical
instrument shop, Shree Durga store, M/s Sharma’s,
Hawkers etc. which generates substantial income for the
Plaintiff. Besides the Plaintiff himself is running his
business by the name and style of “B.R. Furnishing’s
above Regal Restaurant at Police Bazar, Shillong and
also Pride Furnishing’s Akram Market situated at
Fancy Bazar, Guwahati, Assam. Both the shops are
owned and managed by the Plaintiff and are located at
prime location and are above 1000 sq. ft. approx. As
such plea of bonafide requirement is malafide and not
sustainable in law”. [Emphasis supplied]
These statements reflect that the defendant accepted that
the plaintiff was the owner and during the subsistence of the tenancy
has never disputed the ownership of the plaintiff over the suit premises.
20.
It is also observed that the above, has been the consistent
stand of the defendant, inasmuch as, this fact is stated in para 3 of the
Memo of Appeal before the lower Appellate Court and also in para 3
of the instant revision petition, which effectively negates the
contention of the defendant that the non-production of the family
arrangement is fatal to the case of the plaintiff in establishing that he is
the owner of the suit premises. Coupled with this, is the fact that the
defendant paid or tendered to the plaintiff, which is also evidenced by
his deposition in cross examination where he states: “It is a fact that since 2008 I have not been tendering
rent to the plaintiff directly but I have been depositing it
in Court”.
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Though this deposition was made by the defendant on the
question of whether he was a defaulter, it reinforces the fact that the
defendant did not dispute that the plaintiff was the owner and landlord
of the suit premises.
21.
Apart from the findings as recorded above with regard to
the question of title, Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, on
a point of law comes to the aid of the plaintiff, where in a suit of
eviction by the landlord, the tenant is estopped from questioning the
title of the landlord. For the sake of convenience Section 116 of the
Evidence Act is quoted herein below: “116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in
possession- No tenant of immovable property, or person
claiming through such tenant, shall, during the
continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the
landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the
tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no
person who came upon any immovable property by the
licence of the person in possession thereof, shall be
permitted to deny that such person had a title to such
possession at the time when such licence was given.”
In this context, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in series of
judgments has dwelt on this principle and it is settled law that Section
116 puts an embargo on the tenant of an immovable property, during
continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the
beginning of his tenancy, however, defective the title of such landlord
could be, as was held in the case of S. Thangappan vs. P. Padmavathy
reported in (1999) 7 SCC 474. In the case of Anar Devi (Smt) vs.
Nathu Ram reported in (1994) 4 SCC 250, on this principle at Paras
11, 12 & 13, it was held as follows: -
CRP No. 18 of 2017
“11. "Doctrine of tenant's estoppel" which governs the
relationship of landlord and tenant is founded on a
contract of tenancy entered into by them, is well settled.
Jessel, M.R., who adverted to that doctrine in Stringer's
Estate, Shaw v. Jones-Ford' explains it thus:
"Where a man having no title obtains possession of land
under a demise by a man in possession who assumes to
give him a title as tenant, he cannot deny his landlord's
title, as, for instance, if he takes for twenty-one years and
he finds that the landlord has only five years' title, he
cannot after five years set up against the landlord the Jus
tertii, though, of course, the real owner can always
recover against him. That is a perfectly intelligible
doctrine. He took possession under a contract to pay rent
so long as he held possession under the landlord, and to
give it up at the end of the term to the landlord, and
having taken it in that way he is not allowed to say that
the man whose title he admits and under whose title he
took possession has not a title. That is a well-established
doctrine. That is estoppel by contract."
12. Indeed, the said doctrine of tenant's estoppel, finds
statutory recognition in Section 116 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, for short 'the Evidence Act', in that,
it states that "no tenant of immovable property, or person
claiming through such tenant, shall during the
continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the
landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the
tenancy, a title to such immovable property".
13. This Court in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, has
also ruled that in a suit for eviction by landlord, the
tenant is estopped from questioning the title of the
landlord because of Section 116 of the Act. The Judicial
Committee in Kumar Krishna Prasad Lal Singha Deo v.
Baraboni Coal Concern Ltd., when had occasion to
examine the contention based on the words 'at the
beginning of the tenancy' in Section 116 of the Evidence
Act, pronounced that they do not give a ground for a
person already in possession of land becoming tenant of
another, to contend that there is no estoppel against his
denying his subsequent lessor's title. Ever since, the
accepted position is that Section 116 of the Evidence Act
applies and estops even a person already in possession as
tenant under one landlord from denying the title of his
subsequent landlord when once he acknowledges him as
his landlord by attornment or conduct. Therefore, a
tenant of immovable property under landlord who
becomes a tenant under another landlord by accepting
him to be the owner who had derived title from the former
landlord, cannot be permitted to deny the latter's title,
CRP No. 18 of 2017
even when he is sought to be evicted by the latter on a
permitted ground.”
22.
Therefore, in view of the stated position of law as
discussed above, the defendant’s challenge to the title of the landlord
has little relevance, and cannot be in any manner considered a factor
that will defeat the case of the plaintiff.
23.
On the question of bona fide requirement, examination of
the depositions of the plaintiff, plaintiff’s witnesses and also of the
defendant establishes beyond doubt that the plaintiff was in bona fide
requirement of the suit premises. The fact that the plaintiff is running
his business named B.R. Furnishing & Textiles from rented premises
is uncontroverted. PW-1, in his examination-in-chief has stated that: “I have not been left with any place of carry on my
business as all the shops room in the building which are
of very small size except the suit premises. Thus I require
the suit premises for my personal bonafide requirements
for my business purpose as presently I am running my
business name and styled “B.R. Furnishing & Textiles”
situated at Police Bazar, Shillong, from the premises
which I have taken on rent from one Mr. D. Marbaniang
and paying monthly rent to him and so also I am
running another business in the name and style of
“Pride Furnishing” at Guwahati from the premises
which is on rent and I intend to shift my business to the
suit premises”.
24.
PW-2, has also on cross-examination corroborated the
fact that the plaintiff had expressed his wish to shift his present
business at Police Bazar to the suit premises because he wants to save
on rent. PW-3 had also deposed that the plaintiff has not been left with
any place to carry on his business as all the shop rooms in the building
are very small except for the suit premises and that the plaintiff is
running his business named ‘B.R Furnishing & Textiles’ from rented
premises and also another business at Guwahati in the name of ‘Pride
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Furnishing’ which is on rent which he intends to shift to the suit
premises.
25.
The defendant as DW-1 in his cross-examination has
stated as follows: “It is a fact that the suit premises is bigger than the other
shops mentioned in Para-6……”
“…… I have one building at Thana Road which is
about 4 storied. There are 5 small shops in the ground
floor of the building. All the shops are rented out and I
am not running any business from the said building. I
am engaged in a partnership business with my brother
by the name Hotel Greenland at Jail Road, Shillong. It
is a fact that my statement in Para-7 of my deposition of
examination-in-chief that the suit premises being the
only source of livelihood of me and my family is false”
The issue of bona fide requirement of the suit premises by
the plaintiff is further fortified by the further deposition in the crossexamination of the defendant who stated as follows:
“It is a fact that the plaintiff has taken on rent a shop
above Regal Restaurant for running his business in the
name and style M/S B.R. Furnishing but I do not know
who the landlord is. It is a fact that my statement in Para
6 of my examination in chief regarding Pride
Furnishing at Fancy Bazaar, Guwahati is also on rental
basis”.
Considering that the bona fide requirement of the plaintiff
being a dire necessity, having been proven and the same being a
question of fact, there is no scope whatsoever to interfere with the said
concurrent findings by the Courts below.
26.
The other contentions and grounds raised by the defendant
that there was no appreciation of the points in issue by the lower
Appellant Court and that the findings arrived at, were not reasoned,
and the evidence not weighed, are of no significance, inasmuch as, on
a thorough examination, it is clearly seen that the findings, of the
CRP No. 18 of 2017
Courts below, are based on the pleadings, depositions and other
materials, which has conclusively proved the case of the plaintiff and
as such no interference is called for. The judgments relied upon by the
defendant in this backdrop as also the other points raised such as the
implications of Section 101 of the Evidence Act and Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, therefore are of little assistance to his case
and as such are not discussed.
27.
In view of the facts and circumstances, this revision
application is liable to be dismissed and accordingly stands dismissed.
The lower Courts judgments are upheld, as also the directions
contained in the order of the lower Appellate Court.
28.
Send back the lower Court records.
29.
No order as to costs.
JUDGE
Meghalaya
23.04.2021
“V. Lyndem-PS”
CRP No. 18 of 2017
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