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2026:HHC:44114
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 149 of 2026
Reserved on: 30.9.2026
Date of Decision: 8.10.2026.
Ashok Kumar Ahluwalia
…. Petitioner
Versus
M/s Horizon Music & Gift Gallery & ors.
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
For the Petitioner
:
Mr
Munish
Advocate.
For the Respondents
:
M/s Ashok Kumar Tyagi and
Divya Rajta, Advocates.
Dhatwalia,
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing the order dated 27.03.2025, passed by the learned
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nahan, District Sirmaur, in
Complaint No. 198 of 2025, registered for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (in short ‘NI Act’). (Parties shall hereinafter
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:44114
be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was
asserted that the complainant is a proprietary concern dealing in
mobile phones. Accused No. 1 is a private limited company, and
Accused Nos. 2 to 4 are its directors responsible for dealing with
the complainant. Accused Nos. 2 and 4 came to the complainant’s
shop
and
requested
₹30,00,000/-
(Rupees
to
provide
Thirty
financial
Lakhs).
They
assistance
of
assured
the
complainant that they would return the amount within two
years. The complainant paid ₹30,00,000/- to the accused on
different dates by transferring the money into their account. The
accused failed to repay the money or the interest thereon. The
complainant made repeated demands for the return of the
money, and the accused issued a cheque for ₹30,00,000/towards the repayment of the amount to the complainant. The
complainant deposited the cheque for encashment, but it was
dishonoured with the endorsement "funds insufficient". The
2026:HHC:44114
complainant issued a legal notice to the accused demanding
payment within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice. The
accused failed to pay the amount despite service of notice; hence,
the complainant filed a complaint against the accused before the
learned Trial Court for taking action as per law.
3.
The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused vide order dated 27.03.2025.
4.
Being aggrieved by the summoning order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the
present petition for quashing the complaint and the summoning
order passed against him. It was asserted that only general and
vague allegations were made in the legal notice and the
complaint. The summoning order does not disclose the
application of mind. The petitioner/accused had not put his
signature on the complaint, and he had no connection with the
company.
The
petitioner/accused
had
resigned
from
the
directorship of the company on 17.12.2022, and Form DIR-12 had
been duly filed. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the summoning order passed by the learned Trial
Court be quashed and set aside.
2026:HHC:44114
5.
I have heard Mr Munish Dhatwalia, learned counsel
for the petitioner/accused, and M/s Ashok Kumar Tyagi and
Divya Rajta, learned counsel for the respondent(s).
6.
Mr Munish Dhatwalia, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court passed
a cryptic order while summoning the accused, which is bad in
law. The petitioner had resigned from the post of Director in the
year 2022 and could not have been held liable for the dishonour
of the cheque after his resignation. The continuation of
proceedings against him amounts to an abuse of the process of
the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the petition be allowed.
7.
Mr Ashok Kumar Tyagi, learned counsel for the
respondent, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly
summoned the accused. The disputed questions of fact regarding
the resignation of the director cannot be decided at this stage.
The complaint contains specific averments against the accused.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.
2026:HHC:44114
9.
The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised
some
of
the
principles
under
which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers
2026:HHC:44114
under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
order of a Magistrate within the purview of
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable based on which no prudent person
can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings, and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
2026:HHC:44114
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the
CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10.
This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature
of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of
process or where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of
several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-
2026:HHC:44114
empting the Prosecution from building its case before the
Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia,
contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal
complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR
represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie
offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v)
the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations;
and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the
dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp
(1) SCC 335).
11.
A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State
of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:
“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear
that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of
any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the
ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only
empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its
inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new
power on the High Court but rather saves the power which
the High Court already possesses, from before the
enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very
existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate
for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the
High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it
may lead to abuse of the process of court, and quashing of
the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”
12.
The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13.
The complainant asserted in para-1 of his complaint
that Accused No. 1 is a private limited company and Accused Nos.
2 to 4 are its directors and responsible for dealing with the
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complainant. It was further asserted in para-3 that the accused
Nos. 2 and 4 (the present petitioner) came to the complainant’s
shop in May, 2022, and sought financial assistance of
₹30,00,000/- in their business.
14.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the liability of
the Company and its Directors in Pawan Kumar Goel v. State of
U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1598 and held that only a person who is
in charge of and responsible to the Company for its affairs can be
summoned and punished under Section 138 read with Section 141
of the NI Act. It was observed:
“22. A two-judge Bench of this Court in the case of K.K.
Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2005) 8 SCC 89, after analysing the
provisions contained in Section 141 of the Act, observed as
under:—
“16. Having regard to section 141, when a cheque issued by
a company (incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956)
is dishonoured, in addition to the company, the following
persons are deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be
liable to be proceeded against and punished:
(i) every person who, at the time the offence was
committed, was in charge of and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of the business of the
company;
(ii) any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer
of the company with whose consent and connivance,
the offence under section 138 has been committed;
and
2026:HHC:44114
(iii) any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer
of the company whose negligence resulted in the
offence under section 138 of the Act being committed
by the company.
While the liability of persons in the first category arises
under sub-section (1) of Section 141, the liability of persons
mentioned in categories (ii) and (iii) arises under subsection (2). The scheme of the Act, therefore, is that a
person who is responsible to the company for the conduct
of the business of the company and who is in charge of the
business of the company is vicariously liable by reason only
of his fulfilling the requirements of subsection (1). But if the
person responsible to the company for the conduct of
business of the company was not in charge of the conduct
of the business of the company, then he can be made liable
only if the offence was committed with his consent or
connivance or as a result of his negligence.
17. The criminal liability for the offence by a company
under section 138 is fastened vicariously on the persons
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 141 by virtue of a
legal fiction. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly.
Penal statutes providing constructive vicarious liability
should be construed much more strictly. When conditions
are prescribed for extending such constructive criminal
liability to others, courts will insist upon strict literal
compliance. There is no question of inferential or implied
compliance. Therefore, a specific averment complying with
the requirements of section 141 is imperative. As pointed
out in K. Srikanth Singh v. North East Securities Ltd. (2007) 12 SCC 788, the mere fact that at some point of
time, an officer of a company had played some role in the
financial affairs of the company will not be sufficient to
attract the constructive liability under section 141 of the
Act.
18. Sub-section (2) of section 141 provides that a Director,
Manager, Secretary or other officer, though not in charge of
the conduct of the business of the company, will be liable if
the offence had been committed with his consent or
2026:HHC:44114
connivance or if the offence was a result of any negligence
on his part. The liability of persons mentioned in
subsection (2) is not on account of any legal fiction but on
account of the specific part played-consent and connivance
or negligence. If a person is to be made liable under subsection (2) of section 141, then it is necessary to aver
consent and connivance, or negligence on his part.”
23. The scope of Section 141 of the NI Act was again
exhaustively considered by this Court in S.M.S
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2005) 8 SCC 89:
“10. ….What is required is that the persons who are sought
to be made criminally liable under Section 141 should be, at
the time the offence was committed, in charge of and
responsible to the company for the conduct of the business
of the company. Every person connected with the company
shall not fall within the ambit of the provision. It is only
those persons who were in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the time of
the commission of an offence who will be liable for
criminal action. It follows from this that if a director of a
Company was not in charge of and was not responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant
time, he or she will not be liable under the provision. The
liability arises from being in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant
time when the offence was committed, and not on the
basis of merely holding a designation or office in a
company. Conversely, a person not holding any office or
designation in a Company may be liable if he satisfies the
main requirement of being in charge of and responsible for
the conduct of business of a Company at the relevant time.
Liability depends on the role one plays in the affairs of a
Company and not on designation or status. If being a
Director or Manager, or Secretary was enough to cast
criminal liability, the Section would have said so. Instead of
“every person”, the section would have said “every
Director, Manager or Secretary in a Company is liable”, etc.
The legislature is aware that it is a case of criminal
2026:HHC:44114
liability, which means serious consequences so far as the
person sought to be made liable is concerned. Therefore,
only persons who can be said to be connected with the
commission of a crime at the relevant time have been
subjected to action…
18. To sum up, there is an almost unanimous judicial
opinion that necessary averments ought to be contained in
a complaint before a person can be subjected to criminal
process. A liability under Section 141 of the Act is sought to
be fastened vicariously on a person connected with a
company, the principal accused being the company itself.
It is a departure from the rule in criminal law against
vicarious liability. A clear case should be spelt out in the
complaint against the person sought to be made liable.
Section 141 of the Act contains the requirements for making
a person liable under the said provision. That the
respondent falls within the parameters of Section 141 has
to be spelt out. A complaint has to be examined by the
Magistrate in the first instance on the basis of the
averments contained therein. If the Magistrate is satisfied
that there are averments which bring the case within
Section 141, he would issue the process. We have seen that
merely being described as a director in a company is not
sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Section 141. Even a
non-director can be liable under Section 141 of the Act. The
averments in the complaint would also serve the purpose
that the person sought to be made liable would know what
the case which is alleged against him. This will enable him
to meet the case at the trial.” (emphasis supplied)
15.
This position was reiterated in Rajesh Viren Shah v.
Redington India Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 305: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 143,
wherein it was observed:
“3. The position of law as to the liability that can be
fastened upon a Director for non-realisation of a cheque is
no longer res integra. Before adverting to the judicial
2026:HHC:44114
position, we must also take note of the statutory provision
— Section 141 of the NI Act, which states that every person
who at the time of the offence was responsible for the
affairs/conduct of the business of the company, shall be
held liable and proceeded against under Section 138 of the
NI Act, with the exception thereto being that such an act, if
done without his knowledge or after he has taken all
necessary precautions, would not be held liable. However,
if it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have
been done with the connivance or consent or may be
attributable to (i) a Director; (ii) a Manager; (iii) a
Secretary; or (iv) any other officer — they shall be deemed
to be guilty of that offence and shall be proceeded against
accordingly.
4. Coming to the judicial position, we notice a judgment of
this Court in Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat
[Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 7 SCC
15: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1857] wherein it was observed that: (SCC
pp. 18-19, para 6)
“6. … The primary responsibility is on the complainant
to make necessary averments in the complaint to make
the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the
criminal liability, there is no presumption that every
partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of
the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was
committed, they were not in charge of and were not
responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business
of the firm, would arise only when first the
complainant makes necessary averments in the
complaint and establishes that fact.”
5. A Bench of three learned Judges in S.M.S.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla [S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1975]
observed: (SCC p. 102, para 18)
“18. To sum up, there is an almost unanimous judicial
opinion that necessary averments ought to be
contained in a complaint before a person can be
2026:HHC:44114
subjected to criminal process. … A clear case should be
spelt out in the complaint made against the person
sought to be made liable. Section 141 of the Act contains
the requirements for making a person liable under the
said provision. That the respondent falls within the
parameters of Section 141 has to be spelt out.”
6. We also notice this Court to have observed, in regard to
the exercise of the inherent powers under Section
482CrPC, in cases involving negotiable instruments that
interference would not be called for, in the absence of
“some unimpeachable, incontrovertible evidence which is
beyond suspicion or doubt or totally acceptable circumstances
which may clearly indicate that the Director could not have
been concerned with the issuance of cheques and asking him
to stand the trial would be abuse of process of Court.
(Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya case [Ashutosh Ashok
Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd., (2023) 14 SCC
770: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 915], SCC para 24)” This principle,
as held in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals [S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1975],
was followed in Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v. Gharrkul
Industries (P) Ltd. [Ashutosh Ashok Parasrampuriya v.
Gharrkul Industries (P) Ltd., (2023) 14 SCC 770: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 915].
16.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Susela
Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 311,
that a person can be vicariously liable if he is in charge and
responsible to the Company for the conduct of its business. It was
observed:
“18. In the case of State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal (1998)
5 SCC 343, this Court observed thus:
“8. Nonetheless, we find that the impugned judgment
of the High Court has got to be upheld for an altogether
2026:HHC:44114
different reason. Admittedly, the three respondents
were being prosecuted as directors of the
manufacturers with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Act,
which reads as under:
“34. Offences by companies.—(1) Where an offence
under this Act has been committed by a company,
every person who at the time the offence was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of the business of the
company, as well as the company shall be deemed to
be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this subsection shall render any such person liable to any
punishment provided in this Act if he proves that
the offence was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence
to prevent the commission of such offence.”
It is thus seen that the vicarious liability of a person for
being prosecuted for an offence committed under the
Act by a company arises if, at the material time, he was
in charge of and was also responsible to the company
for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person
is a director of the company, it does not necessarily
mean that he fulfils both the above requirements so as
to make him liable. Conversely, without being a
director, a person can be in charge of and responsible
to the company for the conduct of its business. From
the complaint in question, we, however, find that
except for a bald statement that the respondents were
directors of the manufacturers, there is no other
allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that they were
in charge of the company and also responsible to the
company for the conduct of its business.”
19. It could thus be seen that this Court had held that
simply because a person is a director of the company, it
does not necessarily mean that he fulfils the twin
2026:HHC:44114
requirements of Section 34(1) of the said Act so as to make
him liable. It has been held that a person cannot be made
liable unless, at the material time, he was in charge of and
was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its
business.
20. In the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), this
Court was considering the question as to whether it was
sufficient to make the person liable for being a director of
a company under Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881. This Court considered the
definition of the word “director” as defined in Section
2(13) of the Companies Act, 1956. This Court observed
thus:
“8. ……. There is nothing which suggests that simply by
being a director in a company, one is supposed to
discharge particular functions on behalf of a company.
It happens that a person may be a director in a
company, but he may not know anything about the
day-to-day functioning of the company. As a director,
he may attend meetings of the Board of Directors of the
company, where they usually decide policy matters and
guide the course of business of the company. It may be
that a Board of Directors may appoint sub-committees
consisting of one or two directors out of the Board of
the company, who may be made responsible for the
day-to-day functions of the company. These are
matters which form part of the resolutions of the Board
of Directors of a company. Nothing is oral. What
emerges from this is that the role of a director in a
company is a question of fact, depending on the
peculiar facts in each case. There is no universal rule
that a director of a company is in charge of its everyday
affairs. We have discussed about the position of a
director in a company in order to illustrate the point
that there is no magic as such in a particular word, be it
director, manager or secretary. It all depends upon the
respective roles assigned to the officers in a company.
…..”
2026:HHC:44114
21. It was held that merely because a person is a director of
a company, it is not necessary that he is aware of the dayto-day functioning of the company. This Court held that
there is no universal rule that a director of a company is in
charge of its everyday affairs. It was, therefore, necessary
to aver as to how the director of the company was in
charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company or
responsible for the affairs of the company. This Court,
however, clarified that the position of a managing director
or a joint managing director in a company may be
different. This Court further held that these persons, as
the designation of their office suggests, are in charge of a
company and are responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company. To escape liability, they will
have to prove that when the offence was committed, they
had no knowledge of the offence or that they exercised all
due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence.
22. In the case of Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of
Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 1, this Court observed thus:
“17. …… Every person connected with the Company will
not fall into the ambit of the provision. Time and again,
it has been asserted by this Court that only those
persons who were in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the Company at the time of
the commission of an offence will be liable for criminal
action. A Director, who was not in charge of and was
not responsible for the conduct of the business of the
Company at the relevant time, will not be liable for an
offence under Section 141 of the NI Act. In National
Small Industries Corpn. [National Small Industries Corpn.
Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330; (2010) 1
SCC (Civ) 677; (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1113] this Court
observed: (SCC p. 336, paras 13-14)
“13. Section 141 is a penal provision creating
vicarious liability, and which, as per settled law,
must be strictly construed. It is therefore not
sufficient to make a bald, cursory statement in a
complaint that the Director (arrayed as an accused)
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is in charge of and responsible to the company for
the conduct of the business of the company without
anything more as to the role of the Director. But the
complaint should spell out how and in what manner
Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to
the accused Company for the conduct of its
business. This is in consonance with the strict
interpretation of penal statutes, especially where
such statutes create vicarious liability.
14. A company may have a number of Directors and
to make any or all the Directors as accused in a
complaint merely on the basis of a statement that
they are in charge of and responsible for the conduct
of the business of the company without anything
more is not a sufficient or adequate fulfilment of the
requirements under Section 141.” (emphasis in
original)
18. In Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta [Girdhari Lal
Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189: 1971 SCC (Cri) 279:
AIR 1971 SC 2162], this Court observed that a person “in
charge of a business” means that the person should be
in overall control of the day-to-day business of the
Company.
19. A Director of a company is liable to be convicted for
an offence committed by the company if he/she was in
charge of and was responsible to the company for the
conduct of its business or if it is proved that the offence
was committed with the consent or connivance of, or
was attributable to any negligence on the part of the
Director concerned (see State of Karnataka v. Pratap
Chand [State of Karnataka v. Pratap Chand, (1981) 2 SCC
335: 1981 SCC (Cri) 453] ).
20. In other words, the law laid down by this Court is
that for making a Director of a company liable for the
offences committed by the company under Section 141
of the NI Act, there must be specific averments against
the Director showing how and in what manner the
2026:HHC:44114
Director was responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company.
21.
In
Sabitha
Ramamurthy
v.
R.B.S.
Channabasavaradhya [Sabitha Ramamurthy v. R.B.S.
Channabasavaradhya, (2006) 10 SCC 581 (2007) 1 SCC
(Cri) 621], it was held by this Court that: (SCC pp. 58485, para 7)
“7. … it is not necessary for the complainant to
specifically reproduce the wordings of the section,
but what is required is a clear statement of fact so as
to enable the court to arrive at a prima facie opinion
that the accused is vicariously liable. Section 141
raises a legal fiction. By reason of the said provision,
a person, although is not personally liable for the
commission of such an offence, would be vicariously
liable therefor. Such vicarious liability can be
inferred so far as a company registered or
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 is
concerned only if the requisite statements, which
are required to be averred in the complaint petition,
are made so as to make the accused therein
vicariously liable for the offence committed by the
company.” (emphasis supplied)
By verbatim reproducing the words of the section
without a clear statement of fact supported by proper
evidence, so as to make the accused vicariously liable,
is a ground for quashing proceedings initiated against
such person under Section 141 of the NI Act.”
23. It could thus clearly be seen that this Court has held
that merely reproducing the words of the section without
a clear statement of fact as to how and in what manner a
director of the company was responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company, would not ipso facto make
the director vicariously liable.
24. A similar view has previously been taken by this Court
in the case of K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora (2009) 10 SCC 48.
2026:HHC:44114
25. In the case of State of NCT of Delhi through Prosecuting
Officer, Insecticides, Government of NCT, Delhi v. Rajiv
Khurana (2010) 11 SCC 469, this Court reiterated the
position thus:
“17. The ratio of all these cases is that the complainant
is required to state in the complaint how a Director who
is sought to be made an accused was in charge of the
business of the company or responsible for the conduct
of the company's business. Every Director need not be
and is not in charge of the business of the company. If
that is the position with regard to a Director, it is
needless to emphasise that in the case of non-director
officers, it is all the more necessary to state what were
his duties and responsibilities in the conduct of the
business of the company and how and in what manner
he is responsible or liable.”
26. In the case of Ashoka Mal Bafna (supra), this Court
observed thus:
“9. To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 of the
Act on a person, the law is well settled by this Court in a
catena of cases that the complainant should specifically
show as to how and in what manner the accused was
responsible. Simply because a person is a Director of a
defaulter Company does not make him liable under the
Act. Time and again, it has been asserted by this Court
that only the person who was at the helm of affairs of
the Company and in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business at the time of the commission
of an offence will be liable for criminal action. (See
Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra [Pooja
Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16
SCC 1: (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 384: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 378: AIR
2015 SC 675].)
10. In other words, the law laid down by this Court is
that for making a Director of a Company liable for the
offences committed by the Company under Section 141
of the Act, there must be specific averments against the
2026:HHC:44114
Director showing as to how and in what manner the
Director was responsible for the conduct of the
business of the Company.”
27. A similar view has been taken by this Court in the case
of Lalankumar Singh v. State of Maharashtra 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1383, to which one of us (B.R. Gavai, J.) was a
party.
17.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Siby Thomas v.
Somany Ceramics Ltd., (2024) 1 SCC 348 that the primary
responsibility to make the averment that the accused is in charge
and responsible for the firm for its affairs lies upon the
complainant, in the absence of which the accused cannot be held
liable. It was observed:
9. Bearing in mind the averments made in the complaint
in relation to the role of the appellant and sub-section (1)
of Section 141, we will have to appreciate the rival
contentions. Going by the decision relied on by the
respondent in the S.P. Mani case [S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy
v. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685: (2024) 1 SCC
(Cri) 203], it is the primary responsibility of the
complainant to make specific averments in the
complaint, so as to make the accused vicariously liable.
Relying on para 58.2 of the said decision, the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent would also submit
that the complainant is supposed to know only generally
as to who was in charge of the affairs of the company or
firm, as the case may be, and he relied mainly on the
following recitals thereunder: (SCC p. 716, para 58)
“58. … 58.2. The complainant is supposed to know
only generally as to who was in charge of the affairs
of the company or firm, as the case may be. The
other administrative matters would be within the
2026:HHC:44114
special knowledge of the company or the firm and
those who are in charge of it. In such circumstances,
the complainant is expected to allege that the
persons named in the complaint are in charge of the
affairs of the company/firm.”
10. We are of the considered view that the respondent
has misread the said decision. Under the sub-caption
“Specific averments in the complaint”, in para 51 of S.P.
Mani case [S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha
Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 203] and
paras 34.1 and 34.4 of Gunmala Sales case [Gunmala Sales
(P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ)
433 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 580] as also in para 52 of S.P. Mani
case [S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan,
(2023) 10 SCC 685 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 203], it was held in
the decision in S.P. Mani case [S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v.
Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 : (2024) 1 SCC
(Cri) 203] thus : (SCC pp. 714-715, paras 51-52)
“51. In Gunmala Sales [Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu
Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 433 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 580], this Court, after an
exhaustive review of its earlier decisions on Section
141 of the NI Act, summarised its conclusion as
under : (SCC pp. 126-27, para 34)
‘34. … 34.1. Once in a complaint filed under
Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act,
the basic averment is made that the Director
was in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the
relevant time when the offence was
committed; the Magistrate can issue a process
against such Director.
34.2.-34.3. * * *
34.4. No restriction can be placed on the High
Court's powers under Section 482 of the Code.
The High Court always uses and must use this
power
sparingly
and
with
great
2026:HHC:44114
circumspection to prevent, inter alia, the
abuse of the process of the Court. There are no
fixed formulae to be followed by the High
Court in this regard, and the exercise of this
power depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The High Court at
that stage does not conduct a mini-trial or
roving inquiry, but nothing prevents it from
taking unimpeachable evidence or totally
acceptable circumstances into account which
may lead it to conclude that no trial is
necessary qua a particular Director.’
52. The principles of law and the dictum as laid in
Gunmala Sales [Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta,
(2015) 1 SCC 103 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 433 : (2015) 1 SCC
(Cri) 580], in our opinion, still hold the field and
reflect the correct position of law.
11. In the light of the afore-extracted recitals from the
decision in Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta [Gunmala
Sales (P) Ltd. v. Anu Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103 : (2015) 1 SCC
(Civ) 433 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 580], quoted with agreement
in S.P. Mani case [S.P. Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha
Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 : (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 203] and
in view of sub-section (1) of Section 141 of the NI Act, it
cannot be said that in a complaint filed under Section 138
read with Section 141 of the NI Act to constitute basic
averment it is not required to aver that the accused
concerned is a person who was in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the
company at the relevant time when the offence was
committed. In para 53 of the S.P. Mani case [S.P. Mani &
Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685:
(2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 203], it was held thus: (SCC p. 715)
“53. In the case at hand, we find clear and specific
averments not only in the complaint but also in the
statutory notice issued to the respondent.”
2026:HHC:44114
It is thereafter that in the decision in S.P. Mani case [S.P.
Mani & Mohan Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10
SCC 685: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 203] in para 58.1 it was held
that the primary responsibility of the complainant is to
make specific averments in the complaint so as to make
the accused vicariously liable.
12. Bearing in mind the afore-extracted recitals from
the decisions in Gunmala Sales [Gunmala Sales (P) Ltd. v.
Anu Mehta, (2015) 1 SCC 103 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 433 : (2015)
1 SCC (Cri) 580] and S.P. Mani case [S.P. Mani & Mohan
Dairy v. Snehalatha Elangovan, (2023) 10 SCC 685 : (2024) 1
SCC (Cri) 203], we have carefully gone through the
complaint filed by the respondent. It is not averred
anywhere in the complaint that the appellant was in
charge of the conduct of the business of the company at
the relevant time when the offence was committed. What
is stated in the complaint is only that Accused 2 to 6,
being the partners, are responsible for the day-to-day
conduct and business of the company. It is also relevant
to note that an overall reading of the complaint would not
disclose any clear and specific role of the appellant.
18.
This position was reiterated in K.S. Mehta v. Morgan
Securities & Credits (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 492, wherein it
was observed:
“16. This Court has consistently held that non-executive
and independent director(s) cannot be held liable under
Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act unless
specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement
in affairs of the company at the relevant time.
16.1. This Court in National Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. v.
Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330 observed:
“13. Section 141 is a penal provision creating vicarious
liability, and which, as per settled law, must be strictly
construed. It is therefore not sufficient to make a bald,
2026:HHC:44114
cursory statement in a complaint that the Director (arrayed
as an accused) is in charge of and responsible to the
company for the conduct of the business of the company
without anything more as to the role of the Director. But
the complaint should spell out how and in what manner
Respondent 1 was in charge of or was responsible to the
accused Company for the conduct of its business. This is in
consonance with the strict interpretation of penal statutes,
especially where such statutes create vicarious liability.
22. Therefore, this Court has distinguished the case of
persons who are in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company at the time of the
offence and the persons who are merely holding the post in
a company and are not in charge of and responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company. Further, in order to
fasten the vicarious liability in accordance with Section
141, the averment as to the role of the Directors concerned
should be specific. The description should be clear, and
there should be some unambiguous allegations as to how
the Directors concerned were alleged to be in charge of and
were responsible for the conduct and affairs of the
company.
39. From the above discussion, the following principles
emerge: (i) The primary responsibility is on the
complainant to make specific averments as are required
under the law in the complaint so as to make the accused
vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there
is no presumption that every Director knows about the
transaction. (ii) Section 141 does not make all the Directors
liable for the offence. The criminal liability can be fastened
only on those who, at the time of the commission of the
offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the
conduct of the business of the company. (iii) Vicarious
liability can be inferred against a company registered or
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 only if the
requisite statements, which are required to be averred in
the complaint/petition, are made so as to make the accused
therein vicariously liable for the offence committed by the
2026:HHC:44114
company, along with averments in the petition containing
that the accused were in charge of and responsible for the
business of the company and by virtue of their position
they are liable to be proceeded with. (iv) Vicarious liability
on the part of a person must be pleaded and proved and
not inferred. (v) If the accused is a Managing Director or a
Joint Managing Director, then it is not necessary to make a
specific averment in the complaint and, by virtue of their
position, they are liable to be proceeded with. (vi) If the
accused is a Director or an officer of a company who signed
the cheques on behalf of the company, then also it is not
necessary to make a specific averment in the complaint.
(vii) The person sought to be made liable should be in
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of
the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as
a fact as there is no deemed liability of a director in such
cases.”
16.2. In N.K. Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 481, this
Court in Para 8 observed:
“To launch a prosecution against the alleged Directors,
there must be a specific allegation in the complaint as to
the part played by them in the transaction. There should be
a clear and unambiguous allegation as to how the
Directors are in charge and responsible for the conduct of
the business of the company. The description should be
clear. It is true that precise words from the provisions of the
Act need not be reproduced, and the court can always come
to a conclusion in the facts of each case. But still, in the
absence of any averment or specific evidence, the net result
would be that the complaint would not be entertainable.”
16.3. In S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8
SCC 89, this Court laid down that mere designation as a
director is not sufficient; specific role and responsibility
must be established in the complaint.
16.4. In Pooja Ravinder Devidasani v. State of Maharashtra,
(2014) 16 SCC 1, this Court, while taking into consideration
that a non-executive director plays a governance role they
2026:HHC:44114
are not involved in the daily operations or financial
management of the company, held that to attract liability
under Section 141 of the NI Act, the accused must have
been actively in charge of the company's business at the
relevant time. Mere directorship does not create automatic
liability under the Act. The law has consistently held that
only those who are responsible for the day-to-day
conduct of business can be held accountable.
16.5. In Ashok Shewakramani v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
(2023) 8 SCC 473, this Court held:
“8. After having considered the submissions, we are of the
view that there is non-compliance on the part of the
second Respondent with the requirements of Sub-section
(1) of Section 141 of the NI Act. We may note here that we
are dealing with the Appellants who have been alleged to
be the Directors of the Accused No. 1 company. We are not
dealing with the cases of a Managing Director or a wholetime Director. The Appellants have not signed the cheques.
In the facts of these three cases, the cheques have been
signed by the Managing Director and not by any of the
Appellants.”
16.6. In Hitesh Verma v. Health Care At Home India Pvt. Ltd.,
Crl. Appeal No. 462 of 2025, this Court held:
“4. As the appellant is not a signatory to the cheque, he is
not liable under Section 138 of the 1881 Act. “As it is only
the signatory to the cheque who is liable under Section 138,
unless the case is brought within the four corners of Section
141 of the 1881 Act, no other person can be held liable….”
5. There are twin requirements under sub-Section (1) of
Section 141 of the 1881 Act. In the complaint, it must be
alleged that the person who is sought to be held liable by
virtue of vicarious liability, at the time when the offence
was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of the business of the
company. A Director who is in charge of the company and a
Director who was responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business are two different aspects. The
2026:HHC:44114
requirement of law is that both the ingredients of subSection (1) of Section 141 of the 1881 Act must be
incorporated in the complaint. Admittedly, there is no
assertion in the complaints that the appellant, at the time
of the commission of the offence, was in charge of the
business of the company. Therefore, on a plain reading of
the complaints, the appellant cannot be prosecuted with
the aid of sub-Section (1) of Section 141 of the 1881 Act.”
19.
In the present case, the complaint specifically
mentioned that the accused no. 2 & 4 (the present petitioner)
came to the complainant’s shop and borrowed money from him.
It has also been stated that the accused no. 2 & 4 (the present
petitioner) were responsible for dealing with the complainant. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mansi Finance
(Chennai) Ltd. v. M. Lalitha, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 949, that if the
complaint discloses the factual basis of the liability, the person
can be held liable even if it was not specifically stated that he is in
charge and responsible for the affairs of the company. It was
observed:
29. At the same time, in a recent decision in HDFC Bank
Limited v. State of Maharashtra (2025) 9 SCC 653 : (2025)
258 Comp Cas 557 at Para 27, this Court clarified that the
complaint need not mechanically reproduce the exact
phraseology of Section 141 of the NI Act if the substance of
the allegations, read as a whole, discloses the factual basis
for such liability. The emphasis, therefore, is not on form
but on substance in the sense that the criminal liability
under Section 141 of the NI Act is person-specific and
2026:HHC:44114
cannot be imposed merely by association. The complaint
must, therefore, disclose sufficient factual foundation qua
each accused and the role attributable to each must be
independently discernible.
20.
It was further held that if the accused had dealings
with the company, he would be liable. It was observed:
34. The present case, insofar as respondent Nos. 1 (M.
Lalitha - Vice President), 2 (M. Rekah - Treasurer) and 4
(R. Murugan - Manager) are concerned, stands on a
materially different footing. The complaint refers to
antecedent borrowings, execution of promissory notes
and the MoU acknowledging the liability and stipulating
the terms of repayment. These antecedent transactions
constitute the substratum of the legally enforceable debt
against which the cheque in question came to be issued.
35. The material placed on record prima facie indicates that
respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were themselves signatories to
some of the antecedent financial documents forming part
of the transaction. The MoU bears the signature of
respondent No. 1. The dishonoured cheque itself bears the
signature of respondent No. 2. The promissory notes and
allied payment documents disclose participation of
respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4. These are not matters of mere
designation but constitute prima facie material linking
them to the underlying transaction.
36. The documentary material forming part of the
complaint furnishes the factual foundation necessary for
continuation of the prosecution at this stage. Such
participation in the transaction giving rise to the debt
constitutes a relevant and proximate circumstance while
considering whether respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 were in
charge of and responsible for the affairs of the Society
within the meaning of Section 141 of the NI Act.
2026:HHC:44114
21.
In the present case, it was specifically stated that the
petitioner had borrowed money from the complainant and had
promised to repay it. Hence, there was a factual basis for
summoning the accused.
22.
It was submitted that the allegations in the complaint
are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was held
in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983,
that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC
has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was
observed: “29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, the
Court must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely
according to its whims or caprice.”
23.
It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: -
2026:HHC:44114
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of
quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C.
However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if
taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of
an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the
cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made
in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do
not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a
case against the accused. We are of the considered view
that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the
position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. v.
State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23,
this Court, while deciding the question of whether
the High Court could entertain the Section 482
petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet
was filed by the police during the pendency of the
Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even prima
facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the
charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single
2026:HHC:44114
Judge [Joseph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007
SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant's FIR, chargesheet, documents, etc. or not.”
24.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a minitrial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed on page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v.
Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379].
The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC,
the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed
further against the accused for which the accused is
required to be tried or not’.”
25.
This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan
(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: -
2026:HHC:44114
22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under
Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., it is settled that at the stage of
quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial.
Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C.
with respect to quashing is somewhat limited, as the Court
has to only consider whether any sufficient material is
available to proceed against the accused or not. If
sufficient material is available, the power under Section
482 should not be exercised.
Xxxx
27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law
by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the
credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the
complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it
must be shown that there exists no prima facie case
against the accused persons…”
26.
A similar view was taken in Mansi Finance (supra)
wherein it was observed:
41. At the stage of quashing, the Court does not adjudicate
upon the truthfulness of the allegations nor does it
embark upon appreciation of evidence. Whether
respondent nos. 1, 2 and 4 were in fact in-charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the affairs of the Society is
ultimately a matter of evidence to be established at trial,
as explained in S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla
(2005) 8 SCC 89. The sufficiency of such evidence is not the
subject matter of inquiry at this stage; the existence of
foundational material alone is.
27.
Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to
conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the
complaint are correct or not.
2026:HHC:44114
28.
It was submitted that the petitioner had resigned
from the company and he cannot be held liable. This submission
will not help the petitioner. The petitioner relied upon the
photocopies of the documents showing that he had ceased to be a
director with effect from 17.12.2022. The complainant also filed a
document showing that the petitioner is still a director of
Dynamic Mega Mart Private Limited. The authenticity of these
documents cannot be ascertained at this stage, and it is a matter
of trial. Hence, the complaint cannot be quashed on the averment
that the petitioner had ceased to be a director of the company.
29.
No other point was urged.
30.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
21.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the merits of the case.
8th October, 2026
(Chander)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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