Service Law:
Compulsory Retirement – Of Judicial Officers – Challenged in Writ Petition before Supreme Court – As per direction of Supreme Court, Screening Committee of High Court approved earlier action to compulsorily retire the officers – Resolution of Screening Committee approved by Standing Committee of High Court – Held: In respect of one officer against whom there had been complaints that during training of Civil Service probationers, in his lectures he had used highly sexist language and that he had hurt a washerman with hot iron – The two instances are sufficient to decide the case against him – In respect of second officer, his reputation and integrity have been doubted on more than one occasion, his knowledge of law and procedure had been found to be average, relations with bar members were not very good – Adverse entries with regard to integrity do not lose their sting at any stage – Judicial officer’s integrity should be of higher order, even a single aberration is not permitted – Senior Judges of the High Court who were members of the Screening and Standing Committees have taken considered and well-reasoned decisions on two occasions – Supreme Court cannot exercise its power of judicial review unless there is allegation of mala fides or there are facts so glaring that the decision of compulsory retirement is unsupportable.
Compulsory Retirement of Judicial Officer – Effect and criteria for its consideration – Discussed.
Dismissing the writ petitions, the Court
HELD : 1. The law on the subject of compulsory retirement, especially in the case of judicial officers may be summarised as: (i) An order directing compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is not punitive in nature; (ii) An order directing compulsory retirement of a judicial officer has no civil consequences;(iii) While considering the case of a judicial officer for compulsory retirement the entire record of the judicial officer should be taken into consideration, though the latter and more contemporaneous record must be given more weightage; (iv) Subsequent promotions do not mean that earlier adverse record cannot be looked into while deciding whether a judicial officer should be compulsorily retired; (v) The ‘washed off’ theory does not apply in case of judicial officers specially in respect of adverse entries relating to integrity; (vi) The courts should exercise their power of judicial review with great circumspection and restraint keeping in view the fact that compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is normally directed on the recommendation of a highpowered committee(s) of the High Court. [Para 16][1031-B-E] Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha (1970) 2 SCC 458 : [1971] 1 SCR 791 ; State of Gujarat v. Suryakant Chunilal Shah (1999) 1 SCC 529 : [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 293 ; Baikunta Nath Das v. Chief Distt. Medical Officer (1992) 2 SCC 299 : [1992] 1 SCR 836;
Chandra Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2003) 6 SCC
545 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 674 ; Syed T.A. Naqshbandi v. State of J&K (2003) 9 SCC 592 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 114, Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand (2010)
10 SCC 693 : [2010] 11 SCR 216 ; Rajendra Singh Verma v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 10 SCC 1 : [2011] 12 SCR 496 ; R.C. Chandel v. High Court of M.P. (2012) 8 SCC 58 : [2012] 7 SCR 205; Rajasthan SRTC v. Babu Lal Jangir (2013) 10 SCC 551 : [2013]
11 SCR 159; High Court of Judicature of Patna v. Shyam Deo Singh (2014) 4 SCC 773 : [2014] 4 SCR
541 ; D. Ramaswami v. State of T.N. (1982) 1 SCC 510 : [1982] 3 SCR 75 – relied on.
2.1 So far as the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) No. 190 of 2018 is concerned, there are two very serious allegations against him. The first is that when he was working as Deputy Director, Administrative Training Institute at Ranchi, as many as 10 ladies, who were Civil Service Probationers, made allegations that he was using unwarranted and objectionable language during his lectures, citing indecent examples and using words having double meaning, thereby causing embarrassment to the lady officers. The complaints show that the language used by the petitioner during his lectures, was highly sexist. [Para 18][1031-H; 1032A-B]
2.2. There is also another allegation that he had physically hurt a washerman by placing a hot iron on the head of the washerman who had allegedly not ironed his clothes properly. The Principal District Judge had reported to the High Court that the victim had personally approached him immediately after the occurrence and he (the Principal District Judge) found that the victim had sustained burn injuries and he got the victim treated. It is true that the petitioner was exonerated by the successor judicial officer before whom the complainant denied having suffered any injury, but the successor Principal District Judge did not even care to examine his predecessor Principal District Judge, who had not only been approached personally by the washerman, but who had himself noted the burn injuries and had got the victim treated. Therefore, the Screening Committee was right that the victim may have been put under some pressure to withdraw his complaint. [Para 19][1032-C-E]
2.3 The aforementioned two instances are sufficient to decide the case against the petitioner. As regards the plea that the Screening Committee had only taken the entries from 19921993 to 2004-2005 and had ignored the entries from 2005-2006 to 2016-2017, it has been explained by counsel for the High Court that all the ACRs were before the Screening Committee but in the order it is only the adverse entries which have been noted. Even if these adverse entries are ignored, the petitioner cannot be granted relief for the reasons aforesaid. [Para 20][1032-F-G]
3. So far as the petitioner in Writ Petition (C) NO. 391 of 2018 is concerned, his record on many counts is not at all good. His reputation and integrity have been doubted more than once in the years 1996-1997, 1997-1998 and 2004-2005. Some adverse remarks have been conveyed to him. In the year 2015-2016, even his knowledge of law and procedure is found to be average and his relation with the members of the Bar was found not very good. There are also allegations against him of having granted bail for illegal gratification and substance has been found in this allegation in the report of the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi (who is equivalent to the Principal District Judge). The petitioner had granted bail by noting in the order that Section 327 of the Penal Code, 1860 was bailable whereas the offence is non-bailable and an unrecorded warning regarding the integrity of the judicial officer was issued to him in 2012. [Para 21][1032-H; 1033-A-C]
4. Adverse entries with regard to integrity do not lose their sting at any stage. A judicial officer’s integrity must be of a higher order and even a single aberration is not permitted. [Para 22][1033-C-D]
5. In the present cases, the matter has been considered by the Screening Committee on two occasions and the recommendations of the Screening Committee have been accepted by the Standing Committee on both occasions. The action taken is not by one officer or Judge, it is a collective decision, first by the Screening Committee and then approved by the Standing Committee. Senior judges of the High Court who were the members of the Screening Committee and Standing Committee have taken a considered and well-reasoned decision. Unless there are allegations of mala fides or the facts are so glaring that the decision of compulsory retirement is unsupportable this court would not exercise its power of judicial review. In such matters the court on the judicial side must exercise restraint before setting aside the decision of such collective bodies comprising of senior High Court Judges. [Paras
22 & 23][1033-D-F]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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