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2026:HHC:11480
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No.182 of 2025
Date of Decision: 09.04.2026
__________________________________________________________________________
Arun Chauhan
……...Petitioner
Versus
Vikrant Sharma
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Mr. Naresh K. Sharma, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Instant criminal revision petition filed under Section 438 read
with Section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, lays
challenge to judgment dated 23.05.2024, passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, in
Criminal Appeal No.32-10 of 2016, titled Arun Chauhan Vs. Vikrant
Sharma, affirming judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
22.07.2016, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court
No.II, Ghumarwin, Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, in criminal case No.8-2 of
2013, whereby the learned trial Court while holding the petitioner-accused
(hereinafter, “accused”) guilty of having committed offence punishable
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short the “Act"),
convicted and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period
2026:HHC:11480
of six months and pay fine to the tune of Rs.8,00,000/- to the respondentcomplainant.
2.
Precisely, the facts of the case, as emerge from the record are
that respondent-complainant (hereinafter, ‘complainant’) instituted a
complaint under Section 138 of the Act, in the competent Court of law,
alleging therein that in the month of June 2012, accused borrowed sum of
₹4,00,000/- from the complainant and with a view to discharge his liability,
issued Cheque No.638177, dated 17.12.2012, amounting to ₹4,00,000/-.
However, fact remains that afore Cheque on its presentation to the Bank
concerned, was dishonoured with the remarks “Funds Insufficient”. After
receipt of aforesaid return memo, complainant served accused with a legal
notice calling upon him to make the payment good well within stipulated
time. However, since petitioner-accused failed to make the payment good
within the time stipulated in the legal notice, respondent/complainant was
compelled to initiate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act in the Court
of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.II, Ghumarwin,
Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh.
3.
Learned trial Court on the basis of material adduced on record
by the respective parties, vide judgment/order dated 22.07.2016, held the
petitioner-accused guilty of having committed offence under Section 138 of
the Act and accordingly, convicted and sentenced him, as per the
description given hereinabove.
2026:HHC:11480
4.
Though, at the first instance, accused preferred an appeal in
the Court of
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghumarwin, District
Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, however, same was dismissed vide judgment
dated 23.05.2024. In the aforesaid background, petitioner-accused has
approached this Court by way of instant proceedings, seeking therein his
acquittal after setting aside the judgments of conviction recorded by the
Courts below.
5.
Vide order dated 25.03.2025, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
stayed the substantive sentence imposed by the learned Court below,
subject to petitioner/accused depositing 30% of the compensation amount
and furnishing personal and surety bonds in the sum of Rs.25,000/-,
however, fact remains that despite repeated opportunities, aforesaid order
was never complied with.
6.
Today during proceedings of the case, learned counsel
representing the petitioner fairly stated that since petitioner/accused is not
coming forward to impart instructions and he has not complied with the
order dated 25.03.2025, this Court may proceed to decide the petition on
its own merits.
7.
Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
material adduced on record, vis-a-vis reasoning assigned in the impugned
judgments, this Court sees no reason to agree with Mr. Sanket Sankhyan,
learned counsel representing the petitioner, that Courts below have fallen
2026:HHC:11480
in grave error while appreciating the evidence, rather this Court finds that
both the Courts below have meticulously dealt with each and every aspect
of the matter and there is no scope left for interference.
8.
In the case at hand, complainant examined himself as CW1. He
tendered evidence by way of affidavit Ex.CW1, reiterating therein averments
contained
in
documentary
the
complaint.
evidence
such
Apart
as
from
Cheque
above,
he
Ex.CW1/A,
also
tendered
bank
memos
Ex.CW1/B, Ex.CW1E and Ex.CW1/F, legal notice Ex.CW1/C, postal receipt
Ex.CW1/D. Besides examining himself, complainant also examined Mr.
Dharam Dass, Manager, PNB, Ghumarwin as CW2 and Mr. Anchal Kumar,
Clerk of Bank of Baroda as CW3. Cross-examination conducted upon afore
witnesses, if read in entirety, nowhere suggest that accused was able to
extract anything contrary to what these witnesses stated in their
examination-in-chief.
9.
In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused
denied the case of the complainant. He set up a defence that Cheque in
question was given to an old person, however, same has been misused.
However, afore defence taken by him never came to be probabilise by
leading cogent and convincing evidence. If the pattern of cross-examination
conducted upon complainant as well as other witnesses is perused, it can
be safely concluded that accused virtually accepted factum of issuance of
Cheque as well as his signatures thereupon. In his cross-examination, he,
2026:HHC:11480
while admitting that he works as a priest, submitted that he was having a
shop of readymade clothes and he did such business from 2008 to 2014 in
the name of Honey Fasion Point. He deposed that he was having a loan of
₹20,00,000/- and same was returned. He admitted that he studies with
accused. He denied that through accused, he had given blank Cheque
No.638177 and Cheque No.638179, as security Cheques to Joginder Pal.
He denied that accused paid the amount of Joginder Pal, but he retained
the Cheques. He admitted that he still have three blank Cheques of
accused. He admitted that he also filed case against the accused with
respect to Cheque amounting to ₹4,60,000/-.
10.
Though accused attempted to carve out a case that Cheque in
question was never issued to the complainant, rather same was issued to
some Joginder Pal and same has been misused by the complainant, but no
evidence ever came to be adduced on record to prove the aforesaid defence.
Best person to prove the aforesaid defence could be Joginder Pal, who never
came to be examined. Accused also attempted to set up a case that Cheque
in question was issued as a security Cheque, but such defence of him was
also not proved in accordance with law. Once factum with regard to
issuance of Cheque as well as signatures thereupon never came to be
refuted, no illegality can be said to have been committed by both the Courts
below while invoking Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, which speak about
presumption in favour of the holder of the Cheque that Cheque was issued
2026:HHC:11480
towards discharge of a lawful liability. No doubt, aforesaid presumption is
rebuttable, but to rebut such presumption, accused either can refer to the
documents and evidence led on record by the complainant or presumption
can be rebutted by leading positive evidence, if any. However, in the case at
hand, accused was unable to point out from the documents as well as
evidence adduced on record by the complainant that Cheque issued by him
was not issued towards discharge of lawful liability.
11.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Laxmi Dyechem V. State of
Gujarat, 2013(1) RCR(Criminal), has categorically held that if the accused
is able to establish a probable defence which creates doubt about the
existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail.
To raise probable defence, accused can rely on the materials submitted by
the complainant. Needless to say, if the accused/drawer of the Cheque in
question neither raises a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, statutory presumption under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, regarding commission of the offence
comes into play. It would be profitable to reproduce relevant paras No.23 to
25 of the judgment herein:“23. Further, a three judge Bench of this Court in the
matter of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan [3] held that Section
139 is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been
included in furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While
2026:HHC:11480
Section 138 of the Act specifies the strong criminal
remedy in relation to the dishonour of the cheques, the
rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. The Court
however, further observed that it must be remembered
that the offence made punishable by Section 138can be
better described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil
wrong whose money is usually confined to the private
parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a
scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the
construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses
and the defendant accused cannot be expected to
discharge an unduly high standard of proof”. The Court
further observed that it is a settled position that when an
accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139,
the standard of proof for doing so is all preponderance of
probabilities.
24.
Therefore, if the accused is able to establish a
probable defence which creates doubt about the existence
of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution
can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted
by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it
is inconceivable that in some cases the accused may not
need to adduce the evidence of his/her own. If however,
the accused/drawer of a cheque in question neither raises
a probable defence nor able to contest existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability, obviously statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act regarding
commission of the offence comes into play if the same is
2026:HHC:11480
not rebutted with regard to the materials submitted by the
complainant.
25.
It is no doubt true that the dishonour of cheques in
order to qualify for prosecution under Section 138 of the
NI Act precedes a statutory notice where the drawer is
called upon by allowing him to avail the opportunity to
arrange the payment of the amount covered by the cheque
and it is only when the drawer despite the receipt of such
a notice and despite the opportunity to make the payment
within the time stipulated under the statute does not pay
the amount, that the said default would be considered a
dishonour constituting an offence, hence punishable. But
even in such cases, the question whether or not there was
lawfully recoverable debt or liability for discharge whereof
the cheque was issued, would be a matter that the trial
court will have to examine having regard to the evidence
adduced
before
it
keeping
in
view
the
statutory
presumption that unless rebutted, the cheque is presumed
to have been issued for a valid consideration. In view of
this the responsibility of the trial judge while issuing
summons to conduct the trial in matters where there has
been instruction to stop payment despite sufficiency of
funds and whether the same would be a sufficient ground
to proceed in the matter, would be extremely heavy.”
12.
Since factum of issuance of Cheque by the accused as well as
his signatures thereupon was never disputed, presumption as available
under Section 118 and 139 of the Act rightly came to be invoked in the case
of the petitioner that Cheque in question was issued in discharge of lawful
2026:HHC:11480
liability. Since no evidence worth credence ever came to be led on record to
rebut the presumption, no illegality can be said to have been committed by
the
Courts
below
while
holding
petitioner/accused
guilty
for
the
commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Though,
defence came to be taken at the behest of the petitioner/accused that
Cheque in question was issued as a security, but the same may not be of
any help to the accused, for the reason that by now, it is well-settled that
Cheque, even if issued as a ‘security’ can also be presented for encashment,
if amount taken or promised to be repaid is not paid.
13.
Jharkhand,
Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Sripati Singh v. State of
Criminal
Appeal
No.
1269-1270
of
2021,
decided
on
28.10.2021, has held as under:
“16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper
under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its true sense is the
state of being safe and the security given for a loan is
something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited
or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to
which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a
transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to
repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan
amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if
there is no other understanding or agreement between the
parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is
issued as security would mature for presentation and the
2026:HHC:11480
drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same.
On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the
consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other
provisions of N.I. Act would flow.”
14.
Needless to say, expression “Security cheque” is not a
statutorily defined expression in the Negotiable Instruments Act, rather
same is to be inferred from the pleadings as well as evidence, if any, led on
record with regard to issuance of security cheque. The Negotiable
Instruments Act
does not per se carve out an exception in respect of a
“security cheque” to say that a complaint in respect of such a cheque would
not be maintainable as there is a debt existing in respect whereof the
cheque in question is issued, same would attract provision of Section 138
of the Act in case of its dishonour.
15.
Having scanned the entire evidence adduced on record by the
respective parties, this Court finds that all the basic ingredients of Section
138 of the Act are met in the case at hand. Since Cheque issued by accused
towards discharge of his lawful liability was returned on account of
insufficient funds in the bank account of accused and he despite having
received legal notice failed to make the payment good within the stipulated
time, complainant had no option but to institute proceedings under Section
138 of the Act, which subsequently rightly came to be decided by both the
Courts below on the basis of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on
record by the respective parties.
2026:HHC:11480
16.
Moreover, this Court has a very limited jurisdiction under
Section 397 of the Cr.P.C to re-appreciate the evidence, especially in view of
the concurrent findings of fact and law relied upon by the Courts below. In
this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in case “State of Kerala Vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan
Namboodiri” (1999) 2 Supreme Court Cases 452, wherein it has been held
as under:“In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and
examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of
satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of
any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction
is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional
power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court
nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High
Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own
conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been
appreciated by the Magistrate as well as Sessions Judge in
appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of
the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross
miscarriage of justice.”
17.
Since after having carefully examined the evidence in the
present case, this Court is unable to find any error of law as well as fact, if
any, committed by the Courts below, while passing impugned judgments,
there is no occasion, whatsoever, to exercise the revisional power.
2026:HHC:11480
18.
True it is that the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krishnan and
another Versus
Krishnaveni and another, (1997) 4 Supreme Court
Case 241; has held that in case Court notices that there is a failure of
justice or misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure, sentence or order is
not correct, it is salutary duty of the High Court to prevent the abuse of
the
process
or
miscarriage
of
justice
or
to
correct
irregularities/incorrectness committed by inferior criminal court in its
judicial process or illegality of sentence or order, but learned counsel
representing the accused has failed to point out any material irregularity
committed by the Courts below while appreciating the evidence and as
such, this Court sees no reason to interfere with the well reasoned
judgments passed by the Courts below.
19.
Consequently, in view of the discussion made hereinabove as
well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court sees no valid
reason to interfere with the well reasoned judgments recorded by the
Courts below, which otherwise, appear to be based upon proper
appreciation of evidence available on record and as such, same are upheld.
20.
Accordingly, the present criminal revision petition is dismissed
being devoid of any merit. The petitioner is directed to surrender himself
before the learned trial Court forthwith to serve the sentence as awarded by
the learned trial Court, if not already served. Bail bonds of the petitioner, if
2026:HHC:11480
any, are cancelled. Interim order dated 25.03.2025 stands vacated. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma),
Judge
April 09, 2026
(Rajeev Raturi)
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