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Serial No.04
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No.39/2022
Date of order: 17.11.2022
Ardwin Lyngdoh & 65 ors
Vs.
State of Meghalaya & ors
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants
:
For the Respondents :
Mr. S. Khurshid, Sr.Adv with
Mr. P. Yobin, Adv
Ms. Lubna Naarz, Adv
Mr. K.V. Kharlyngdoh, Adv
Mr. L. Syiem, Adv
Mr. W. Bynnud, Adv
Mr. S. Singpho, Adv
Ms. B. Ramsiej, Adv
Mr. A. Kumar, Advocate General with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, GA
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The respondents have not been called upon.
2.
Two primary issues have been raised by the appellants in assailing
an order dated August 17, 2022 by which the writ petition filed by the 66
appellants was dismissed. Of the 66 appellants, it is the case of 46
appellants that they have been unduly discriminated against on the
ground of age. A further case has been made out in respect of 12 other
appellants to the effect that they were unfairly marked by the highpowered committee while reconsidering the original assessment made.
As far as the remaining appellants are concerned, no special case has been
made out in their favour. In a sense, the dismissal of the appeal qua the
balance eight writ petitioners has been accepted.
3.
As to the erroneous marking of the 12 candidates, the appellants
rely on the records before the Single Bench. A chart had been prepared
where the individual grievances of the 12 candidates had been indicated.
4.
At the outset, it may do well to appreciate the principle before
embarking on the assessment on such aspect. A Court is not an expert to
assess the competence of participants at a public examination for a
particular appointment; far less to go into the adequacy, or the lack
thereof, as to the marks alloted. The Court is excited to look into any
erroneous marking if it plainly appears to be absurd in the sense that no
reasonable person in the position of the examiner could have assessed it
in the manner it has been. It is a high test that a person questioning the
assessment has to pass before the Court requires a reassessment to be
made. A mere mistake or the failure to dot a few i’s or cross a few t’s
would not prompt the Court to require the assessment to be gone into
afresh.
5.
In all fairness, it must be recorded that the cases of the first three
on the list of 12 were pursued. As regards writ petitioner No.2, the highpowered committee which re-examined the marks allotted indicated that
the candidate did not deserve to get eight additional marks because of the
quality of the certificate course undergone by such candidate and the
requirements in terms of a notification of November 24, 2008. To justify
that the candidate was entitled to the eight additional marks originally
allotted, it is suggested that the candidate had undergone two consecutive
years of training as a block resource person and was, as such, entitled to
a certificate equivalent to BTC.
6.
These are matters which are not justiciable. As long as it is
evident that the authority tasked with a duty had applied its mind to the
matter and had taken relevant considerations into account, the Court in
exercise of its authority under Article 226 of the Constitution will not act
as an appellate forum.
7.
In respect of the writ petitioner No.19, the high-powered
committee observed that such candidate did not possess a graduation
certificate as on the date of the advertisement, though at the time of
presentation of papers post the selection process, a graduation certificate
was produced. Ordinarily, the principle is that when certain qualifications
are specified entitling candidates to apply for a particular post, such
qualifications ought to have been obtained by the stipulated date, if there
is any specification in such regard, or by the time the application is made.
The subsequent acquisition of any essential or additional qualification
would not be taken into consideration.
8.
In the case of the writ petitioner No.19, the high-powered
committee observed that though the candidate did not possess any
graduation certificate on the date of the advertisement yet he was given
marks for graduation. Strictly speaking, since the advertisement did not
specify the date within which the additional qualification had to be
obtained, the committee should have considered the candidate eligible to
receive additional marks for graduation if the candidate had obtained
such additional qualification by the time that he applied for the post.
However, it is evident from the justification of the candidate indicated in
the relevant chart that the candidate did not possess the qualification on
the date of the advertisement and obtained the requisite qualification only
before the interview was conducted. Implicit in such statement is the
admission that the relevant candidate had not obtained the additional
qualification at the time of application.
9.
The test that is applied by the Court is to see whether one of several
possible views was taken by the relevant authority whose decision is
questioned. The view that the qualification should be in place as on the
date of the advertisement is a possible, and even plausible, view. At any
rate, it is evident that the candidate was not eligible to apply as a graduate
but obtained such additional qualification during the selection process
and presented the certificate only at the interview. Clearly, the candidate
was not entitled to the benefit of his graduation in the relevant selection
process.
10.
As far as the writ petitioner No.39 is concerned, the high-powered
committee observed that she should have been given only two marks for
passing the HSSLC in third division but had been unfairly given an
additional mark in the original assessment. The argument put forth on
behalf of the candidate is that after improvement she secured a second
division and, therefore, she may have been entitled to the additional mark
allotted. More importantly, this is what the candidate suggests: “… on
top of that, she was allotted marks by the examiners of their own wisdom
and there is no allegation of manipulation against her.” The suggestion is
as facetious as it is indicative of a guilty mind.
11.
At this stage, it may require a bit of history to be recounted. The
matter pertains to a selection process of the year 2008 for the post of
Assistant Teachers in government schools in the State. Upon a challenge
to the selection process on the ground of corrupt practices adopted, the
matter culminated in the selection processes undertaken at several of the
centres being annulled in the sense that the successful candidates were
required to be reassessed by a high-powered committee. It is the case of
the appellants herein that though these appellants did not belong to the
centres which were tainted, so to say, since the candidates at the other
centres had been given an opportunity for their marks to be reassessed,
the appellants also sought and obtained a similar order pursuant to which
the appellants’ cases were also re-examined by the high-powered
committee.
12.
In the light of the hopeless cases of the writ petitioner Nos.2, 19
and 39, the similar specious reasons for seeking a reassessment of the
remaining nine of the 12 candidates in such category have not been
pursued. At any rate, the grounds put forth in the relevant chart relied
upon by the appellants in respect of such nine other candidates are no
better than the grounds already noticed in respect of the three others
specifically referred to hereinabove.
13.
The discussion has now to move to the other 46 candidates who
complain that they have been discriminated against on the ground of age.
The contention is that the consideration in such regard was flawed and
contrary to Subsidiary Rules and the specific rule in such regard in the
notification pursuant to which the advertisement for the recruitment
process was issued.
14.
For such purpose, SR 6 notified in this State in 1984 has been
relied upon:
“S.R. 6
Except as otherwise provided by rules governing recruitment to a
particular service a person whose age exceeds twenty-seven years
(on the 1st January of the year in which the recruitment is made)
may not ordinary be admitted into service of the State Service
without the sanction of Government. This ordinary limit is
extended to:(a)
Thirty years in case of (i)
appointments to teaching posts in college in
Meghalaya Education Service.
(ii) Appointment to teaching post on non-technical
subjects in Engineering and technical institution.
(iii) Twenty nine years in the case of appointment of
Medical graduates in the State Service.
(iv) Thirty five years in respect of candidates in employ in
aided schools for appointment of Meghalaya School
Service provided they are eligible for the same
otherwise and have acquired necessary experience.”
15.
The appellants also rely on the notification that preceded the
advertisement in respect of the recruitment process. Such notification of
November 24, 2008 provided as follows in clause 28 thereof pertaining
to the age of the candidates:
“28. Interested and eligible candidates may bring their certificates
and testimonials in support of their educational qualification, age,
community, etc., and appear at the interview: Provided that the
candidate should be within the following age limits as on the 1st
January of the year on which the post is advertised :(i)
In the case of candidates who have been mentioned at subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of paragraph 1 of this notification, the
candidate should not be less than 18 years of age and should not
have crossed 27 years of age (relaxable upto 32 years in the case
of SC/ST candidates);
(ii)
In the case of candidates mentioned at sub-paragraph
(iii) of paragraph 1 of the notification, the candidate should have
first entered service (contractual or otherwise) within the age limit
mentioned at sub-paragraph (i) of this paragraph;”
16.
The relevant advertisement was issued on December 10, 2008.
Clause 1 of such advertisement, published in pursuance of the notification
of November 24, 2008, specified the eligibility and educational
qualifications. The relevant clause is set out:
“1)
Educational Qualification:
a) HSSLC or Pre-University Passed candidates who have
cleared SET during 2006-07.
(OR)
b) BA/B.Sc/B.Com passed candidate of any recognized
University established by an Act of Parliament or State
Legislature having secured a minimum of 45% marks.
(OR)
c) Person who have successfully completed the course of
training for LP School teachers conducted by DIET. Normal
Training (NTC) Basic Training Centre (BTC) Cherra
Teacher Training Centre (CTTC) and obtained the Junior
Teacher Training Certificate/Diploma in Elementary
Teacher Education (DETE) or Diploma in Education
(D.Ed)/CPE Course conducted by IGNOU.
(OR)
d) Persons who possess the minimum qualification
(HSSLC/PUC) prescribed for appointment as LP School
Teacher who have been teaching in the Government LP
Schools for a continuous period of not less than 5 (five)
years as on 24-11-2008 are also eligible to apply provided
they entered service within the prescribed age limit of 27
years.”
17.
It is evident on a plain reading of the aforesaid clause that the
normal rule as to the age and qualification would apply in respect of those
governed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the educational qualifications.
In other words, those governed by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause 1
of the advertisement would be governed by the age requirement as
indicated in clause 28 of the notification of November 24, 2008. There is
no doubt that clause 28 of the notification would be governed by SR 6,
subject, however, to the caveat at the beginning of SR 6. There is no
dispute that clause 28 of the notification conforms to SR 6. Indeed, clause
2 of the advertisement, which applies to the general candidates covered
by sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause 1 thereof, reaffirms such position.
18.
As per the advertisement of December 10, 2008, an additional
benefit was conferred to a class of persons who possessed the
qualification of being five years in continuous service in teaching in
Government LP schools provided that as on November 25, 2003, which
was five years prior to the date of the governing notification, they
possessed the ordinary age qualification. For clarity, the ordinary age
qualification would be 18 to 27 years, relaxabe to the higher limit of 32
years in respect of scheduled caste and scheduled tribe candidates.
19.
Since the consideration here pertains to the upper age-limit, it is
such aspect which may be looked into. Clause 1(d) of the advertisement
permitted candidates who were in five years’ continuous service in
Government LP schools to apply for the post provided they had not
crossed the age-limit of 32 (the maximum possible) as on November 25,
2003. Clause 1(d) was an exception to clause 28 of the notification of
November 24, 2008 and clause 1(d) would also pass muster in terms of
SR 6 since such rule gives authority to additional or other specifications
being stipulated as to age as long as it is not in derogation of SR 6.
20.
By no stretch of imagination may clause 1(d) of the relevant
advertisement be seen to be in derogation of SR 6. If the upper age-limit
of an eligible candidate had been abridged to below 32 years and, as such,
contrary to what was provided in SR 6, that would have been an
aberration. If the upper age- limit has, in effect, been extended by way of
clause 1(d) as a concession granted in respect of a class of candidates who
were already in service, neither SR 6 nor clause 28 of the notification of
November 24, 2008 would come to the aid of the candidates who were
overaged as on November 25, 2003 for them to be considered for the
appointment.
21.
In simple terms, when a class of persons is conferred a benefit
which it would not have otherwise been entitled to and the benefit is
hedged with certain conditions, it is the entirety that has to be accepted
or not at all. The benefit cannot be divorced from the conditions attached
thereto. There is no merit in the contention put forth on behalf of the
relevant 46 appellants.
22.
By the judgment and order impugned, the Single Bench found no
reason to interfere with the reassessment exercise undertaken by the highpowered committee. As indicated above, the case of eight of the original
petitioners has not been espoused in this appeal. In respect of 12
candidates, the contention was that they had been marked erroneously.
Such aspect of the matter has been dealt with hereinabove. In respect of
the balance 46 candidates, the contention that by virtue of SR 6 or clause
28 of the notification of November 24, 2008, the date of reckoning the
upper age-limit should have been January 1, 2003 instead of November
25, 2003 does not hold any water.
23.
There is no substance in the appeal and WA No.39 of 2022 is
hereby dismissed.
24.
There will, however, be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
17.11.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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