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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 24th September, 2026
Uploaded on: 30th September, 2026
CNR No. DLHC010435632026
RFA(COMM) 614/2026 and CM APPL. 62501/2026, CM APPL.
62502/2026
ANU MANGLANI
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Sushil K Tekriwal and Dr. Mamta
Tekriwal, Advs.
versus
SURESH ARORA AND ANR
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Suresh Chand Singhal, Mr.
Saideep Kaushik and Mr. Parth
Mahajan, Advs. (M: 9810061558)
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUSTICE DINESH BHATT
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
1.
This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2.
The present appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 96 read with Order XLI
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, inter alia, challenging the
impugned order dated 16th May, 2026 passed by the ld. District Judge
(Commercial Court)-03, South East District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS
(COMM) No. 891/2023. Vide the impugned order, a decree has been passed
against the Appellant for possession and for mesne profits.
3.
The suit filed by the Respondents has been decreed by the Trial Court
in the following terms:“33. The present suit is, therefore, decreed for
possession of the suit shop bearing no. G-20, Ground
Floor, South Extension -I Market, New Delhi as shown
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
in the site plan Ex.P1 in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant. The defendant shall handover the
peaceful, physical, vacant possession of the suit
property to the plaintiffs within a period of 60 days from
the date of this Order. The defendant shall have the
liberty to remove the fitments installed by him in the suit
shop before handing over of its physical, vacant
possession to the plaintiffs without causing structural
damage to the property.
34. The suit is also decreed in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants for recovery of arrears of rent for
the period from 01.01.2023 to 12.04.2023 @ Rs
3,60,000/- per month and recovery of mesne profits/user
and occupation charges for the period from 13.04.2023
till the date of filing of the present suit i.e. 03.10.2023
@ Rs 3,60,000/- along with applicable taxes. Since the
suit property is commercial in nature, pendentelite and
future interest@ 12% per annum on the total
outstanding arrears of rent till realization of decretal
amount is granted in favour of the plaintiff and against
the plaintiff. The amount towards admitted rent already
deposited in the Court by the defendant and released to
the plaintiffs in terms of Order dated 14.07.2025 of
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in CM(M) 3661/2024 &
CM. APPL 61682- 61683/2024 & CM APPL
70550/2024 & CM APPL 10236- 1023 7/2025 titled as
Anu Manglani vs Suresh Arora & Anr shall be adjusted
towards the abovesaid arrears.”
4.
The brief background of the present case is that the Respondents are
the owners of commercial property bearing no. G-20, Ground Floor, South
Extension-I Market, New Delhi-110049 (hereinafter, ‘premises’). The
Appellant, who was the Defendant in the suit, is the sole proprietor of a wellknown garment shop chain by the name ‘Meena Bazar’.
5.
A registered Lease Deed was entered into between the parties dated 14 th
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
October, 2021 bearing Registration No. 5166 in Book No. 1 Volume No. 1746
on Pages 76-88.
6.
The execution of the said Lease Deed is admitted in the written
statement filed by the Appellant/Defendant in paragraph 4(a) and 4(b) which
read as under:“4. That the preliminary submissions in the instant suit
are hereunder:
a. That the subject property i.e., Shop No. G-20, Ground
Floor, South Extension 1 Market, New Delhi 110049
admeasuring approximately 550 Sq Fts. was purchased
in two parts by the deceased Ramji Das Arora whose
LRs are not made a party herein along with P1 and P2
herein. The half of the subject property was purchased
by deceased Ramji Das Arora whose LRs are not a made
a party herein and P1 herein wherein other half of the
subject property was purchased by deceased Ramji Das
Arora whose LRs are not a made a party herein along
with P2 herein by way of registered Sale Deeds dated
12.12.2003 from one Mohan Devi, vendor therein. This
averment has been made based on the factual matrix
and the copy of respective sale deeds being averred and
filed by P1 and P2 in the instant commercial suit herein.
b. That much subsequent to the aforesaid, the deceased
Ramji Das Arora whose LRs are not made a party herein
along with P1 and P2 herein and defendant herein,
jointly and collectively, entered and executed one
registered Lease Deed dated 12.10.2021 (registered
vide registration no. 5.166 in Book No. I, Vol. No.
1746, on page 76 to 88 on 14.10.2021). That the
defendant lessee herein was paying the rent to the
deceased Ramji Das Arora whose LRs are not made a
party herein along with P1 and P2 herein, jointly and
collectively, at a ratio of 20:40:40 percent respectively
in the joint bank account held by all three lessors. The
detail of bank account is HDFC Bank, D9, South
Extension Part II, New Delhi-110049, Bank Account
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
No. 50100466445421. The rent was paid as such- Rs.
72,000/-- in favor of deceased Ramji Das Arora
(without GST), Rs. Rs. 1,44,000/-- in favor of P1
excluding GST and Rs. 1,44,000/-- in favor of P2
excluding GST.
Similarly, Security Deposit amount of Rs. 10,80,000/-which is still lying with the deceased Ramji Das Arora
whose LRs are not made a party herein along with P1
and P2 herein, jointly and collectively, and the same
was paid by the defendant herein to the deceased Ramji
Das Arora whose LRs are not made a party herein along
with P1 and P2 herein and defendant herein, jointly and
collectively, in their joint names out of which Rs.
7,20,000/- was paid vide Cheque no. 254157 dated
08.10.2021 Axis Bank, Safdarjung Enclave, Delhi
110029-Account no. 913020021711445 and Rs.
3,60,000/-- was paid vide Cheque no. 254158 dated
08.10.2021 Axis Bank, Safdarjung Enclave, Delhi
110029- Account no. 913020021711445; and the
cheque was in all the three names. Thus, the holding of
the Security Deposit amount is furnished in equal
proportion i.e., Rs. 3,60,000/- each.”
7.
The case of the Respondents/Plaintiffs was that there was a lock-in
period for a period of the twelve months in the Lease Deed. However, after
the expiry of the lock-in period, since there was non-payment of the rent, the
Respondents/Plaintiffs issued a termination notice on 12th January, 2023
through its ld. Counsel. The same was replied to on 17th January, 2023 and
the Appellant/Defendant refused to vacate the premises.
8.
The Respondents/Plaintiffs attempted pre-litigation mediation under
Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, however, the same did not
fructify which led to the filing of the suit by the Respondent/Plaintiff.
According to the Respondents/Plaintiffs, the Appellant/Defendant is an
unauthorised occupant after 13th April, 2023. The agreed monthly rent
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
initially was a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- with increase as agreed in the Lease Deed.
9.
In the suit, after completion of pleadings, the Respondents/Plaintiffs
filed an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (hereinafter, ‘CPC’), pursuant to which the impugned order/decree has
been passed.
10.
The submission of Mr. Sushil K. Tekriwal, ld. Counsel appearing for
the Appellant/Defendant is two fold:i)
That the interpretation of the Lease Deed has been incorrectly
done by the Trial Court as termination of the same without assigning
reasons is contrary to law. Further, according to the ld. Counsel, the
Lease Deed is unconscionable and therefore, the suit requires to be sent
to trial.
ii)
It is further his submission that considering the monthly rent and
the location of the premises, the Trial Court did not have the pecuniary
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
11.
Reliance is based upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushpa &
Ors. v. Dayawati & Ors., 2026 INSC 603 to argue that there are disputed
questions of fact and law which have been raised and therefore, a decree on
admissions ought not to have been passed. The suit and the counter claim
ought to be tried by the Trial Court. A decree in the facts of this case is not
tenable as per ld. Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant.
12.
On the other hand, Mr. Suresh Chand Singhal, ld. Counsel appearing
for the Respondents/Plaintiffs submits that the Lease Deed being an admitted
document, the clauses in the same are also admitted. As per ld. Counsel, after
the initial lock-in period, there is no further obligation if the
Appellant/Defendant does not pay the rent to the Respondents/Plaintiffs to
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
continue the tenancy. The Appellant/Defendant admittedly stopped paying the
rent because of which the termination notice was issued by the
Respondents/Plaintiffs and the suit was filed.
13.
Even in pre-litigation mediation, the Appellant/Defendant did not agree
for a settlement. As on today, according to Mr. Suresh Chand Singhal, ld.
Counsel for the Respondents/Plaintiffs, Rs. 7 to 8 lakhs per month is the
market rent which can be fetched for the premises. The increased rent in terms
of the Lease Deed was also not being agreed by the Appellant/Defendant,
leaving no choice to the Respondents/Plaintiffs, but to terminate the tenancy.
14.
It is his further submission on behalf of the Respondents/Plaintiffs that
the Trial Court clearly records that the Lease Deed, the landlord-tenant
relationship, the rate of rent, the terms of tenancy, etc. are all admitted by the
Appellant/Defendant and hence, the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the
CPC has been rightly allowed.
15.
Heard ld. Counsel for the parties. This Court had, on the first day of
hearing when the appeal was listed, heard the matter in some detail and after
hearing the matter the Appellant/Defendant was given an opportunity to seek
instructions if the Appellant/Defendant would be willing to hand over vacant
possession after the festive season and the wedding season i.e., the
Appellant/Defendant can continue in the premises for about 3 to 4 months.
The said proposal was not agreed to by ld. Counsel for the
Appellant/Defendant.
16.
At that stage, the TCR was requisitioned by the Court and it was also
directed that both parties shall bring their respective calculations of the
outstanding amount payable.
17.
Today, ld. Counsel appearing for the Appellant/Defendant, at the
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
outset, submitted that the calculations could not be finalised due to nonavailability of the Accountant.
18.
However, the matter was, thereafter, heard on merits. At the outset, it
would be relevant to extract the portions of the Lease Deed dated 14 th October,
2021 which read as under:“11. TERMINATION
11.1 Both Parties agree that the Lease cannot be
terminated during the initial Twelve (12) months of the
Term (‘Lock-in Period’) save and except in the case of
breach of the covenants of any of the Parties. If Lessee
vacates the Premises before the expiration of Lock-in
Period, then the Lessee shall be liable to pay the Rent
for the balance term of the Lock-in Period, along with a
severance/termination fee (as specified hereunder).
After the expiry of the Lock-in-Period, the lessee and
lessor reserve the right to terminate the Lease Deed
without issuing any reason after giving a prior notice
of 3 months to the other party in writing. The Lessee
shall pay the Lease Rent along with other applicable
charges for the notice period.
11.2 The Lease Deed may be terminated under any of
the following circumstances:
(i) by the Lessor at any time during the Term pursuant
to non-payment of Rent as contemplated in Clause 2.1
above.
(ii) by the Lessor in the event that there is a breach of
terms of this Lease Deed by the Lessee and which breach
has not been cured (if capable of being cured) by the
Lessee within the period of 30 days from the date of
issue of notice to rectify the breach.
(iii) by the Lessee if the Demised Premises is severely
damaged or destroyed or rendered unfit for use or
occupation on account of any Force Majeure Event by
giving a written notice to this effect to the Lessor as
contemplated in Clause 10.2 above.
(iv) by the Lessee in the event that there is a breach of
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
terms of the Lease Deed by the Lessor and which breach
has not been cured (if capable of being cured) by the
Lessor within the period of 30 days from the date of
issue of notice to rectify the breach.
11.3 Notwithstanding what is herein stated, it has been
expressly agreed by and between the Parties hereto
that post Lock-in period the Lessor and Lessee has the
right to terminate this Lease Deed, without assigning
any reason whatsoever by giving 3 months written
notice, at any time during the course of Term or any
extension/renewal thereof. However, in case this Lease
Deed is terminated by the Lessee during the first 12
(twelve) months of the Term without assigning any
reason, then the Lessee shall be liable to pay to the
Lessor, the Rent for the unexpired period of the Lease.”
19.
In the written statement, the Appellant/Defendant does not challenge
the execution of the Lease Deed at all. The only ground raised by the
Appellant/Defendant is that Clause 11.3 of the Lease Deed which has been
agreed upon between the parties is unconscionable as it permits the
Respondents/Plaintiffs to terminate the Lease Deed without assigning any
reasons.
20.
A perusal of the Lease Deed itself would show that under Clause 11.1,
the parties have agreed that initially for a period of twelve months the lease
would not be liable to be terminated by either of the parties. However, during
the lock-in period, if the Appellant/Defendant wishes to vacate the premises,
the remaining rent for the balance period of the lock-in period would have to
be paid as severance/termination fee.
21.
Apart from the lock-in period, both the parties had the right under
Clause 11.1 i.e., sub-clause therein that without issuing any reason, to
terminate the lease deed with prior notice of three months. Clause 11.2 also
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
permits the termination of the Lease Deed due to non-payment of the rent or
other defaults of either of the parties. Clause 11.3 would be significant as it
acts as a non-obstante clause wherein the parties can terminate the Lease Deed
without assigning any reasons whatsoever by giving a three months’ notice.
22.
A conjoint reading of the various sub-clauses in Clause 11 makes it
adequately clear that both the parties are equally placed under Clause 11.
There is no distinct advantage given either to the Respondents/Plaintiffs or to
the Appellant/Defendant and, therefore, the argument that the Lease Deed is
unconscionable is completely bereft of any merit. Accordingly, the only fact
remains that for whatever reason till January, 2023 the rent was paid and,
thereafter the Appellant/Defendant had not paid the rent which led to the
issuance of termination notice and the filing of the suit.
23.
Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that there was any doubt
as to the landlord tenant relationship, the amount of rent, the nature of the
property being a commercial property. The Lease Deed itself has been
admitted and merely because an untenable defence of unconscionable contract
is raised by the Appellant/Defendant does not mean that the said clauses are
unconscionable.
24.
Commercial properties in a prime area of South Delhi are of high value.
Non-payment of rent can thus be a major breach by the Appellant. Even after
the suit was filed, the attempt of the Appellant, as is gleaned from the record,
was to delay the adjudication in some way or the other.
25.
The suit itself was filed in 2023 and the decree has been passed three
years later on 16th May, 2026. A perusal of the order sheets shows that
initially, the summons was issued on 03rd October, 2023. On 30th November
2023, the Appellant/Defendant had moved an application seeking extension
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
of time to file the written statement as the statutory period to file the same had
already lapsed. The Appellant further moved an application under Order VII
Rule 11 of the CPC. On the very same day i.e., 30th November 2023, the
Appellant/Defendant had made a statement that he shall not create any thirdparty interest in the premises in question. Accordingly, the Trial Court
directed status quo to be maintained in respect of the possession of the
premises.
26.
Thereafter, an application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC was filed
by the Respondents/Plaintiffs on 21st December 2023. The written statement
was filed by the Appellant/Defendant on 12th December, 2023 but was taken
on record subject to payment of costs as it was quite delayed. Vide order dated
4th January 2024, Rs. 4000/- costs were imposed and the Trial Court observed
as under:
“WS filed on behalf of defendant on 12.12.2023 along
with affidavit of admission denial and an application
seeking condonation of delay in filing WS. Statement of
truth filed on behalf of defendant today. Copy supplied.
At this stage, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff submits that he
has no objection in case the application seeking
condonation of delay filed by defendant is allowed
subject to heavy cost.
Heard. Ld. Counsel for defendant has submitted that
defendant was traveling when service was effected and
further submitted that thereafter, the defendant
contacted him but he was not keeping good health,
hence, delay has been caused in filing WS.
At this stage, Ld. Counsel for plaintiff submitted that
even though he has conceded the application, but as
matter of record the affidavit in support of written
statement the affidavit is dated 27.11.2023. However,
from perusal of said affidavit it is found that there is
over-writing on 27.11.2023 with 11.12.2023 and the AR
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
of defendant has also signed affidavit of 11.12.2023.
Considering the entire facts and circumstances,
particularly the fact that application has not been
contested, the application stands allowed and written
statement filed by defendant is taken on record, subject
to payment of cost of Rs.4000/- by defendant to
plaintiff. Cost not paid. Be paid on NDOH.”
27.
The suit was then transferred to another jurisdiction. The
Appellant/Defendant had also filed counter-claims in the suit. Repeated
opportunities were given to the Appellant/Defendant to file the replies to the
applications under Order XVA of the CPC and under Order XII Rule 6 of the
CPC. However, the same were not filed.
28.
The application filed by the Appellant/Defendant under Order VII Rule
11 of the CPC was dismissed on 23rd July 2024. Even at that stage, the
Appellant/Defendant did not file the replies to the applications under Order
XVA of the CPC and under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. On 4th September
2024, the application filed under Order XVA of the CPC was allowed in the
following terms:
“9. The defendant is obliged to make the payment of rent
in terms of lease deed dt. 14.10.2021 @ Rs. 3,60,000/alongwith GST and other applicable tax till date. The
lock-in period got expired on 13.10.2022, thereafter,
vide notice dt. 12.01.2023, the plaintiff terminated the
tenancy and in the meanwhile, the defendant has not
paid any rent from 01.12.2023 till date. The plaintiff
though claiming the mesne profit/ damages @ Rs. 5
Lacs per month after 12.04.2023, however, this court
has discretion to grant the mesne profit, market rent or
the rent in terms of the lease deed for the said period.
The defendant cannot remain in the property by
refusing to pay the rent on the ground that the notice
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
of termination is bad or the terms and conditions of the
contract are unconscionable. In terms of the provision
of Section 15A CPC r/w Section 151 CPC the
defendant is liable to pay the rent to the plaintiff for
being in possession. The defendant has not paid the
rent since 01.01.2023.
10. Accordingly, the defendant is directed to deposit the
rent @ Rs. 3,60,000/- per month plus GST and other
applicable taxes from 01.12.2023 till date within 2
months before this court and also liable to deposit
monthly due @ 3,60,000/- plus GST and other
applicable taxes till the defendant remains in possession
of suit property. The application U/s 15A r/w Section
151 CPC filed by the plaintiff is allowed and disposed
off accordingly”
As can be seen from the above order, the Defendant had not paid rent since
1st January 2023 and was enjoying the property. It was after the above order
was passed that the Appellant started depositing the rent before the Court.
29.
A revision petition challenging the order dated 4th September 2024 was
also dismissed vide judgment dated 14th July, 2025 in CM(M) 3661/2024
titled ‘Anu Manglani v. Suresh Arora & Anr.’ in the following terms:
“2. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order passed by
learned District Judge (Commercial Court) under
Order XVA CPC.
3. This Court has gone through such impugned order
dated 04.09.2024 and since the execution of lease deed
in question was not in dispute, after hearing arguments
from both the sides, the learned Trial Court allowed the
abovesaid application and directed the petitioner herein
to deposit rent @ Rs.3,60,000/- per month plus GST and
other applicable taxes from 01.12.2023 within two
months. There is also a direction to deposit future rent
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
on monthly basis till the defendant remains in
possession of the tenanted premises.
4. The Court has gone through the lease date dated
14.10.2021 which is a registered one.
5. Admittedly, the abovesaid rent has already been
deposited by the petitioner herein, till the present month.
6. The question whether the lease could have been
terminated in the manner it has been, is subject matter
of trial and has no bearing with respect to the impugned
order passed under Order XVA CPC, particularly,
keeping in mind the stand taken by the respective
parties.
xxxx
15. Accordingly, it is also clarified that, as and when,
any such application moved under Order XII Rule 6
CPC is taken up by the Court and is decided, the learned
Trial Court, it shall dispose of the same in accordance
with law, without being influenced by the observations
appearing in the impugned order.”
30.
In the application filed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs under Order XII
Rule 6 of the CPC, the Appellant/Defendant filed a reply only on 20th
September 2024. On 21st November 2024, the ld. Counsel for the
Appellant/Defendant sought deferment in the application under Order XII
Rule 6 of the CPC on the ground that he has challenged the order dated 4th
September 2024 passed under Order 15A of the CPC in CM(M) 3661/2024.
31.
On the said date, the Appellant/Defendant was also directed to submit
a fresh FDR for a sum of Rs 86,44,320/-. The Respondents/Plaintiffs had also
made applications for the enhancement of rent.
32.
On
11th
February
2025,
the
application
filed
by
the
Respondents/Plaintiffs for the release of rent was allowed by the Trial Court
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
in the following terms:
“9. Ld. Counsel for the defendant opposed this
application on the ground that no inherent power U/s
151 CPC could be invoked for present relief, however,
this is no hurdle in granted relief on present application
as there is a specific provision U/o XV A(3) of CPC as
narrated above wherein it has been prescribed that the
amount deposited under this order shall be paid to the
plaintiff/ lessor after being deposited in the court. This
provision comes into picture only after deposition of
rent in terms of Order XV A(1) CPC. Merely the fact that
this court has not directed the said amount to be
released to the plaintiff in order dt. 04.09.2024 do not
disentitle the plaintiff from the benefit of the order XV A
(3) of CPC, thus there is no force also in the argument
that this application is hit by principle of resjudicata.
Ld. Counsel also submitted that Hon'ble Delhi High
Court in Raghubir Rai case (Supra) directed the amount
so deposited be not released to the landlord, however
the said condition is passed in the peculiar
circumstances of that case, therefore no help to the
defendant in present facts and circumstances. The plea
that the defendant will suffer the financial prejudice
because of his investment in the tenanted property and
the security deposit already given is not relevant for
deciding the present application in view of Order XV A
(3) of CPC. It is reiterated that Order XV A (3) of CPC
mandates the release of deposited rental amount to the
plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff is allowed to
withdraw the rental amount deposited in terms of order
dt. 04.09.2024 and 21.11.2024 by way of FDRs i.e.
bearing no. 43568587650 dt. 28.11.2024 for a sum of
Rs. 90,20,160/-, bearing no. 43685888008 dt.
04.01.2025 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,840/- and bearing no.
43797149535 dt. 06.02.2025 for a sum of Rs. 3,75,840/by the defendant. Defendant is directed to keep on
depositing rent in terms of order dt. 04.09.2024 and
21.11.2024 till he remains in possession. Application
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
allowed and disposed off accordingly.”
Thus, until February 2025, the landlord was not able to obtain the rent for two
years, while the Appellant continued to enjoy the property and earn
monetarily by running its business.
33.
Thereafter, orders were sought by the Appellant/Defendant to restrain
the Respondents/Plaintiffs from withdrawing the FDR for a period of three
working days as recorded in order dated 14th February, 2025. Subsequently,
adjournments were sought again and costs were also imposed. An application
for striking off of the defence was also filed by the Respondents/Plaintiffs.
The monthly rents were then released in favour of the Respondents/Plaintiffs.
34.
The application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC was repeatedly
adjourned at the request of the Appellant/Defendant. The suit was finally
decreed on 16th May, 2026 under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC.
35.
The Trial Court record reveals that the Appellant/Defendant had to be
directed to pay even the admitted rent as per the Lease Deed for several
months. There was no justification in the non-payment of the rent. The
landlord-tenant relationship was also fully admitted by the Appellant/
Defendant and the execution of the Lease Deed was also admitted.
36.
Even in terms of the judgment Pushpa & Ors. (Supra) which is relied
upon by Mr. Sushil K Tekriwal, ld. Counsel for the Appellant/Defendant,
unless and until there are disputed questions of fact or any substantial question
of law, the matter need not be sent to trial.
37.
The Supreme Court, in the decision in Pushpa & Ors. (Supra) had
considered and discussed the scope and principles governing the passing of a
decree on the basis of admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. The
Digitally Signed
By:DHIRENDER KUMAR
17:50:22
RFA(COMM) 614/2026
relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:
“33. A plain reading of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC
indicates that the provision confers a discretionary power
upon the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of
admission made either in pleadings or otherwise however
the exercise of such power is conditioned upon the
existence of a clear admission of fact. The object of the
provision is to enable a party to obtain speedy relief where
there is no substantial dispute requiring trial. At the same
time, the provision cannot be invoked in a manner so as to
deprive a party of adjudication where the controversy
involves disputed questions of fact requiring evidence.
34. The term “admission” has been defined under Sections
17 and 18 of the Evidence Act, 1872, an admission is a
statement which suggests any inference as to a fact in issue
or relevant fact and is made by a party to the proceeding
or by a person authorised by such party however every
statement made by a party cannot automatically result in a
decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. Thus, the
admission
must
be
categorical,
unambiguous,
unconditional and unequivocal.
35. This Court in several decisions has consistently held
that before passing a decree on admission, the Court must
be fully satisfied that the admission relied upon leaves no
room for controversy and if the alleged admission
requires interpretation, inferential reasoning or
examination of surrounding circumstances, the matter
ought to proceed to trial and it is similarly well settled that
where substantial triable issues arise, the parties cannot
be denied the opportunity to lead evidence. Recently, this
Court in Vikrant Kapila v. Pankaja Panda (supra)
reiterated the principles under Order XII Rule 6 of the
CPC, the relevant paragraph reads as under:
“40. In Himani Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. [Himani
Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd., (2011) 15 SCC 273 :
(2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 376] it is held that “Admissions”
should be categorical and intentional, as Order 12
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Rule 6CPC allows discretion rather than obligation.
Admissions result in judgments without trial which
permanently deny any remedy to the defendant, by way
of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless the
admission is clear, unambiguous, and unconditional,
the discretion of the court is not exercised to deny the
valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim.
Hence, discretion should be used only where there is
a clear and unequivocal admission. The relevant
paragraphs read thus: (SCC pp. 276-77, para 11)
“11. It is true that a judgment can be given on
an “admission” contained in the minutes of a
meeting. But the admission should be
categorical. It should be a conscious and
deliberate act of the party making it, showing an
intention to be bound by it. Order 12 Rule 6
being an enabling provision, it is neither
mandatory nor peremptory but discretionary.
The court, on examination of the facts and
circumstances, has to exercise its judicial
discretion, keeping in mind that a judgment on
admission is a judgment without trial which
permanently denies any remedy to the defendant,
by way of an appeal on merits. Therefore, unless
the admission is clear, unambiguous and
unconditional, the discretion of the Court should
not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a
defendant to contest the claim. In short the
discretion should be used only when there is a
clear “admission” which can be acted upon.
There is no such admission in this case.”
(emphasis supplied) ”
The Lease Deed itself being registered and being an admitted document, the
suit has been decreed on the basis of the admitted Lease Deed.
38.
Thus, it cannot be said that there was no admission. The written
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statement filed by the Appellant/Defendant admits the execution of the Lease
Deed. There is no argument of forgery or fabrication which is being raised by
the Appellant/Defendant.
39.
Under such circumstances, the Lease Deed by itself is sufficient to pass
the decree which has been passed by the Trial Court. The Trial Court is right
in observing that in such contractual relationships, when both parties are
parties of means, the argument of unconscionability cannot be entertained.
The relevant observations of the Trial Court in this regard are set out below:
“15.
Defendant is the sole proprietor of
Meena Bazar. The plaintiffs are also persons of
means. The landlord – tenant relationship
between two businessmen/persons of means
having thriving business/income can hardly be
called one where one of the parties is in a position
to dominate the will of the other. No doubt,
similar economic conditions of both the parties
may not be material while considering an
unconscionable term but it gains significance in
landlord-tenant relationship such as the one in
the present suit. By Clauses 11.1 and 11.3, both
the parties have given themselves the right to
terminate the Lease Deed without issuing any
reason after giving a prior notice of 3 months to
the other party in writing. It is not as if the
Lessors reserved this right for themselves only.
Lessors as well as the Lessee both had the right
to exercise this option. Such a clause can hardly
be called unconscionable or unfair.
16.
The scheme of clauses 11.1, 11.2 and
11.3 would show that the right of both the parties
to terminate the lease without any cause any time
after the expiry of the 12 months lock-in period
was a major stipulation expressly agreed between
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them and the conditions mentioned in clause 11.2
were the additional circumstances in which the
Lease could be terminated. The parties have
specifically used the phrase "Notwithstanding
what is herein stated, it has been expressly agreed
by and between the Parties hereto... "in Clause
11.3. The Clause 11.3 clearly shows that it has an
over-riding effect on Clause 11.2 which
constitutes additional grounds of termination
only. The plaintiffs have, thus, validly exercised
their right under the clause 11.1 and 11.3 of the
Lease Deed. There is nothing to show that the
Termination clause in the Lease Deed is violative
of any applicable law.
17.
The defendant has also not explained
anywhere what undue influence was exercised by
the plaintiffs while incorporating Clauses 11.1
and 11.3 specifically when right under these
Clauses is available to both the parties.”
40.
The present appeal is bereft of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
All pending applications are also disposed of, if any.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH
JUDGE
DINESH BHATT
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 24, 2026/MR/SS/CK
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