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2026:HHC:3335
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) Nos. 2602 & 2725 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
_____________________________________
1. Cr.MP(M) No. 2602 of 2025
Harshdeep Thakur
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
______________________________________
2. Cr.MP(M) No. 2725 of 2025
Anshuman
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner(s)
:
Mr Arvind Sharma, Advocate in
Cr.MP(M) No. 2602 of 2025 and Mr
N.S. Chandel, Senior Counsel,
assisted by M/s V.K. Gupta and
Shwetima Dogra, Advocates in
Cr.MP(M) No. 2725 of 2025.
For the Respondents/State:
Mr Lokender Kutlehira, Additional
Advocate
General,
for
the
respondents/State, in both the
petitions.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3335
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petitions
seeking regular bail, in FIR No. 216 of 2024, dated 25.11.2024,
registered at Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P.,
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20, 25
and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 (NDPS Act). Since both the petitions have arisen out of the
same FIR, they are being taken up together for disposal.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police were on patrolling duty on 25.11.2024 near Tapowan near
Vidhan Sabha Chinmay Ashram. They intercepted a vehicle
bearing registration No. HP-01D-8971. Another vehicle bearing
registration No. HP-73-5202 reached the spot, whose driver tried
to reverse it after seeing the police. The police intercepted the
vehicle. The driver revealed his name as Anshuman. The person
sitting beside the driver revealed his name as Harshdeep Thakur.
The police searched the vehicle and recovered 1108 grams of
charas. Anshuman disclosed that charas was supplied by Vicky @
Bango. The police arrested Vicky @ Bango. The petitioners were
falsely implicated, and there is no material to connect them to the
commission of the crime. The prosecution has cited 16 witnesses,
2026:HHC:3335
out of whom only three have been examined. The trial is not likely
to conclude soon. The police have filed the chargesheet before the
Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the
petitioners in custody. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail.
3.
The petitions are opposed by filing separate status
reports asserting that the police had set up a naka at Tapowan on
24.11.2024. The police were checking the documents of the
vehicles bearing registration No. HP-01D-8971 at about 10:20 am.
A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-73-5202 arrived on the
spot, whose driver tried to reverse the vehicle after seeing the
police. The police became suspicious and stopped the vehicle. The
driver identified himself as Anshuman, and the person sitting
beside the driver identified himself as Harshdeep Thakur. The
police searched the vehicle and recovered a bag containing 1108
grams of heroin kept near Harshdeep Thakur’s feet. The police
arrested the occupants of the vehicle and seized the charas. FIR
No. 62 of 2023 was registered against the petitioner, Anshuman.
The chargesheet was filed before the Court, and the matter was
listed for prosecution evidence on 09.01.2026. The petitioners
2026:HHC:3335
would indulge in a similar offence if released on bail. Hence, the
status report.
4.
I have heard Mr Arvind Sharma, learned Counsel for
the petitioner Harshdeep Thakur and Mr N.S. Chandel, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by M/s V.K. Gupta and Shwetima Dogra,
learned counsel for the petitioner Anshuman, and Mr Lokender
Kutlehria,
learned
Additional
Advocate
General
for
the
respondents/State.
5.
Mr Arvind Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner
Harshdeep Thakur, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and
he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the
petitioner to the commission of the crime. The petitioner was the
occupant of the vehicle, which was being driven by Anshuman,
and he cannot be connected to the contraband recovered from the
vehicle. The police have filed the charge sheet before the Court,
and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the
petitioner in custody. The petitioner would abide by the terms
and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
2026:HHC:3335
6.
Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner Anshuman, submitted that the bag was found near
Harshdeep Thakur’s feet, and the petitioner had no concern with
it. Section 105 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires
that the proceedings be video-graphed and submitted to the
Magistrate. These provisions are mandatory. The police failed to
comply with these requirements, which vitiated the proceedings.
He relied upon the judgments of Shadab vs. State of U.P. 2026 SCC
Online AII 5, Kalu S.K. vs. State 2022 SCC Online Cal 4556, Shafi
Mohammad vs. State of H.P. (2018) 5 SCC 311 and Sanjay Kumar vs.
State of Bihar & Ors in Criminal Appeal No. 13646/2025 in support
of his submission.
7.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners
are residents of the same District. They were travelling in the
same vehicle from which the recovery was effected. Therefore,
they would be in possession of the contraband. The quantity of
charas recovered by the police was commercial, and the rigours of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The
petitioners have failed to satisfy the twin condition laid down
2026:HHC:3335
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and they are not entitled to bail.
Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern
Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court
considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with
witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the
process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in
this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who
2026:HHC:3335
is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record,
particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to
habituals, it is part of criminological history that a
thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the
opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of
society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the
criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise
in irrelevance.” (emphasis supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner.
While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support
thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction
will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of
the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of
the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the
witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the
public or State and similar other considerations. It has also
to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail
the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for
believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself)
as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused
and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie
evidence in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
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course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case
to case. While the placement of the accused in society,
though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding
factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always
be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant
of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic
considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is
the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC
528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although it is
established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order granting
bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought
to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also
been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere
with an order passed by the High Court granting or
rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
2026:HHC:3335
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this
Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had committed the
offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing
of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight
of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or
2026:HHC:3335
vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material
brought on record to enable a court to arrive at a prima
facie conclusion. While considering an application for the
grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by
reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration
must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature
of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
10.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11.
The status report mentions that the police intercepted
the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-73-5202 and found the
petitioners travelling in it. The police recovered 1108 grams of
charas from the vehicle during its checking. The petitioners are
residents of Chamba and were found travelling together in the
vehicle at Dharmshala, a different District. In Madan Lal versus
State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC
OnLineSC 874, the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it
was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in
conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle,
2026:HHC:3335
and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each
other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how
they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must
be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may
carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja
[(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to
work out a completely logical and precise definition of
“possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the
context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan
2026:HHC:3335
v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2
WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from
possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
12.
Therefore, prima facie, the petitioners were in
possession of the charas, and the burden would shift upon them
to show that they were not in conscious possession as per
Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act.
13.
In Sanjay Kumar (supra), a submission was made
before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the driver had picked up
the passengers on the way, and he cannot be fastened with
liability. In the present case, there is no material on record to
show that the vehicle being driven by the petitioner, Anshuman,
was a commercial vehicle or that he had picked up another coaccused on the way. Therefore, no advantage can be derived from
the cited judgment.
2026:HHC:3335
14.
It was submitted that the police had failed to comply
with the requirements of Section 105 of BNSS. No such plea was
taken in the bail petition, and it is difficult to adjudicate the same
without allowing the police to reply to it. Further, the police
specifically mentioned the status report that the photography and
the videography of the incident were conducted by HC Vijay
Kumar. Whether the video recording was sent to the nearest
Magistrate or not was mentioned in the absence of any plea
regarding the violation of Section 105 of BNSS. Therefore, the
judgments in Shadab (supra), Kalu S.K. (supra) and Shafi
Mohammad (supra) will not help the petitioner.
15.
The status report mentions that 1108 grams of charas
were recovered by the police, which is a commercial quantity.
Hence, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case.
16.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
2026:HHC:3335
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognisable.
(b) No person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A
and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
17.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
2026:HHC:3335
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
18.
(1)
The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2)
that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder
case, the accused commits the murder of one or two
persons, while those persons who are dealing in
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narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or
in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent
young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they
are released temporarily, in all probability, they
would continue their nefarious activities of
trafficking
and/or
dealing
in
intoxicants
clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy.
Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among a
sizeable section of the public, particularly the
adolescents and students of both sexes and the
menace has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in
order to effectively control and eradicate this
proliferating
and
booming
devastating
menace, causing deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on society as a whole,
Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective
provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985
specifying
mandatory
minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the person
accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not
be released on bail during trial unless the
mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
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(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not abiding
by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the
release of the respondent accused on bail.
Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of
the harmful socio-economic consequences
and health hazards which would accompany
trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the
court should implement the law in the spirit
with which Parliament, after due deliberation,
has amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated
in the provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. In the case at hand, the High Court seems to have
2026:HHC:3335
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37
that, in addition to the limitations provided under the
CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force,
regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the
matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
19.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity
are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty
of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable
grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in
Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari,
(2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that: (SCC pp.
801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means something
more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief
contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such
facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged.
2026:HHC:3335
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child's toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para
7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, which depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
2026:HHC:3335
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
and recording a finding of not guilty.”(emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused has not committed an offence and whether he
is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the
seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and
in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the
country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under
the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
20.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down
therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence
while on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow:—
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
2026:HHC:3335
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19 or section 24 or
section 27A, and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely
to commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on
bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
21.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to
ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)
(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:—
2026:HHC:3335
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus:—
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with
regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it
was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
2026:HHC:3335
offence while on bail it was held therein that they are
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the
NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the
scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the
exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further,
it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring the
mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible.
Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused
under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing
orders on such applications.”
22.
In the present case, the petitioners were prima facie
found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas. There is
nothing on record to show that they would not indulge in the
commission of an offence if released on bail. Hence, they have
failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act and are not entitled to bail.
2026:HHC:3335
23.
It was submitted that the grounds of arrest were not
communicated to the petitioners, and their arrest is illegal. This
submission is not acceptable. Hon’ble Supreme Court held in
Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2356
that the communication of the grounds of the arrests in all the
offences would apply prospectively from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment. It was observed:
“58. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding
requirement
mandating
the
written
communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Holding as above, in our view, would ensure
implementation of the constitutional rights provided to an
arrestee as engrafted under Article22of theConstitution of
India in an effective manner. Such clarity on obligation
would avoid uncertainty in the administration of criminal
justice. The ends of fairness and legal discipline, therefore,
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests henceforth.” (Emphasis supplied)
24.
This judgment was followed by a co-ordinate bench of
this Court in Kabir Khan vs State 2025:HHC:39246, wherein it was
observed:
“7. In light of the fact that in the said judgment, Hon’ble
Supreme Court has been pleased to clearly hold that as
previously there existed no consistent or binding
requirements mandating written communication of the
grounds of arrest for all the offences, the ends of fairness
and legal discipline, therefore, demand that this procedure
as affirmed shall govern arrests henceforth, this means
2026:HHC:3335
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to make
directions issued therein prospective.”
25.
In the present case, the petitioners were arrested
before the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mihir
Rajesh (supra), and the requirement of communicating the
grounds of arrests will not apply to their case.
26.
It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioners are entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioners, as
they are prima facie involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act involving
the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the rule and its
grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of this
Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the accused
shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of bail is the
rule, and its grant is an exception. While considering the application for bail, the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory
in nature. The recording of findings as mandated in Section
2026:HHC:3335
37 is a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused involved in the offences under the said Act.”
27.
No other point was urged.
28.
In view of the above, the present petitions fail, and it is
dismissed.
29.
The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petitions and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
23rd January, 2026.
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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