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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 579 of 2025
Decided on : 19.05.2026
Anoop Kumar
...Petitioner.
Versus
General Public
..Respondent.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the petitioner:
Mr. Deepak Gupta, Advocate.
For the respondent:
Nemo.
Romesh Verma, Judge(oral)
The present petition arises out of the impugned order
as passed by the learned Additional District Judge-I, Shimla
dated 05.09.2025, whereby it was held that petition filed
under Section 7 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 shall
be adjudicated by
the District Court at Mandi, HP and
consequently, the petition filed by the present petitioner was
returned with liberty to file the same in the competent Court
of jurisdiction i.e. the
District Court at Mandi in accordance
with law and in the proper form, as prescribed under Section
10 of said Act.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2.
The facts of the case are that the present petitioner
filed a petition Under Section 7 of the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890
for the appointment of the guardian
of the
persons, namely, Ms. Sonika and Mr. Pankaj Gupta, daughter
and son of late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta, and their property.
3.
As per the averments, as made in the petition, late Sh.
Kailash Chand Gupta was the owner of land and building
comprised in Khewat No. 190, Khatuni No. 270, Khasra Nos.
1196 and 1197, Kitas 2, measuring 110-71 square meters as
shown in the Jamabandi for the year 2016-2017. It was
averred that Ms. Sonika Gupta and Pankaj Gupta are also
co-owners with late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta with respect to
the land comprised in Khewat No. 119, Khatauni No. 197,
Khasra Nos. 368, 370 to 375, 378, 380, 388, 390, 391, 394,
397, 398 and 408, Kitas 15, measuring 04-10-19 hectares in
Mohal Rahada, Tehsil Nihari as depicted in the Jamabandi
annexed with the petition. It was averred that the aforesaid
persons along with their father late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta
was also co-owners in land comprised in Khewat No. 154,
Khatauni No. 289, Khasra No. 2155/459 measuring 00-10-00
hectares, Khewat No. 154, Khatauni No. 299, Khasra Nos.
365, 393, 395, 400, 405 and 406, Kitas 6 measuring 01-11-19
hectares along with the land comprised in Khewat No. 154,
Khatauni No. 301, Khasra Nos. 364/1, 384, 396, 399 and 407,
Kitas 5, measuring 02-01-00 hectares.
4.
As per petitioner, father of Ms. Sonika and Mr. Pankaj
Gupta had expired on 02.12.2022 and copy of death
certificate has also been appended with the petition. After the
death of late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta, Ms. Sonika and Mr.
Pankaj Gupta succeeded his estate. The aforesaid persons
are not mentally sound and incapable of understanding their
good and bad and protecting their rights. During the lifetime of
Late. Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta, the present petitioner was
taking care of both the aforesaid persons, who are mentally
infirm. The petitioner is son of Smt. Radha Thakur, who was
god-sister of late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta.
5.
During the lifetime of late Sh. Kailash Chand Gupta,
Smt. Radha Thakur, mother of the petitioner was having
cordial relation
with him and
she was
looking after the
deceased Kailash Chand Gupta and his children Ms Sonika
and Mr. Pankaj. As the petitioner has nothing adverse against
the rights of the aforesaid persons, therefore, under such
circumstances, the petition was preferred before the Court of
learned Additional District Judge-I, Shimla, H.P. for the
appointment of present petitioner as guardian of Ms. Sonika
Gupta and Mr. Pankaj Gupta, who are mentally ill.
6.
During the pendency of the petition,
the
petitioner
preferred an application under Order 26 Rule 9 read with
Section
of
CPC
for
the
appointment
of
Local
Commissioner i.e. Doctor of Psychiatric Department of IGMC,
Shimla, H.P for the purpose of ascertaining the
mental
illness/extent of the infirmity of the aforesaid persons. During
the pendency of this application,
the impugned order has
been passed by the learned Additional District Judge, ShimlaI, Shimla.
7.
Feeling dissatisfied, the petitioner has approached this
Court
by
assailing
the
order
dated
05.09.2025.
On
26.09.2025, this Court had issued notice for the service of
General Public by way of publication in two newspapers
widely circulated in the area concerned. The respondent were
duly served through publication, as per report of the Registry
dated 06.11.2025. Consequently, the General Public is
proceeded against ex-parte.
8.
It is contended by Sh. Deepak Gupta, learned counsel
for the petitioner that the impugned order passed by the
learned Additional District Judge-1 Shimla is erroneous and
liable to be quashed and set aside. He submits that the
learned Court below has misinterpreted provision of Section 9
of the Act, especially, Section 9 sub Section (1) (2) (3). He
has taken this Court to the provision of Section 9, of the
Guardian Wards Act, 1890 which reads as follows:“9. Court having jurisdiction to entertain application.—
(1) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of
the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District
Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor
ordinarily resides.
(2) If the application is with respect to the guardianship of
the property of the minor, it may be made either to the
District Court having jurisdiction in the place where the
minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having
jurisdiction in a place where he has property.
(3) If an application with respect to the guardianship of
the property of a minor is made to a District Court other
than that having jurisdiction in the place where the minor
ordinarily resides, the Court may return the application if
in its opinion the application would be disposed of more
justly or conveniently by any other District Court having
jurisdiction.”
9.
Section 9 (1) deals with the application for the
guardianship of a person and the same shall be made with
the District Court, having jurisdiction in place where the minor
ordinarily resides.
10.
Section 9 (2) provides that the application shall be filed
to the District Judge, having the jurisdiction in the place where
the minor ordinarily resides or to a District Court having the
jurisdiction in the place where he has property.
11.
While interpreting the said provisions, the Appellate
Court has relied upon the alleged admission as made by the
petitioner in the application which was filed under Order 26
Rule 9 CPC, which is part and parcel of the present case
file. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention
of this Court to para 2 of the said application, which reads as
follows:“That in order to prove the assertions made by the
applicant/petitioner, it is expedient that the aforesaid
persons who are presently residing in village Rihada,
Tehsil Nihari may be mentally examined by the
Doctor, Psychiatric Department, I.G.M.C. Shimla and
thereafter to submit his report to this Hon’ble Court.
Since the doctor is an expert in the field to assess
the mental disability of the aforesaid persons, as
such, the appointment of local commission in the
facts and circumstances of the case is necessary
and expedient in the interest of justice. The
applicant/petitioner is ready and willing to deposit the
fees, as would be assessed by this Hon’ble Court.”
12.
On perusal of the averments as made in the
application, it is clear that it has been stated therein that the
aforesaid persons, who are mentally ill, are presently residing
in Village Rehada, Tehsil Nihari, and that they may be
medically examined by a doctor from the Psychiatric
Department, IGMC. The learned Court below treated the said
statement as an admission on the part of the petitioner and,
relying upon the provisions of Section 9, came to the
conclusion that the petition filed by the present petitioner was
liable to be returned, with liberty to file the same before the
competent jurisdiction, i.e., the District Court, Mandi.
13.
The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon
the judgment of the Apex Court in AIR 2011 SC 1952, titiled
Ruchi Majoo vs. Sanjeev Majoo, decided on 13.05.2011.
the relevants paras of the same read as under:13. Section 9 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890
makes a specific provision as regards the jurisdiction of
the Court to entertain a claim for grant of custody of a
minor. While sub- Section (1) of Section 9 identifies the
court competent to pass an order for the custody of the
persons of the minor, sub-sections (2) & (3) thereof
deal with courts that can be approached for
guardianship of the property owned by the
minor. Section 9(1) alone is, therefore, relevant for our
purpose. It says :
"9. Court having jurisdiction to entertain application - (1)
If the application is with respect to the guardianship of
the person of the minor, it shall be made to the District
Court having Jurisdiction in the place where the minor
ordinarily resides."
14. It is evident from a bare reading of the above that
the solitary test for determining the jurisdiction of the
court under Section 9 of the Act is the `ordinary
residence' of the minor. The expression used is "Where
the minor ordinarily resides". Now whether the minor is
ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a
question of intention which in turn is a question of fact.
It may at best be a mixed question of law and fact, but
unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted it can never
be a pure question of law, capable of being answered
without an enquiry into the factual aspects of the
controversy. The factual aspects relevant to the
question of jurisdiction are not admitted in the instant
case. There are serious disputes on those aspects to
which we shall presently refer. We may before doing so
examine the true purpose of the expression `ordinarily
resident' appearing in Section 9(1) (supra). This
expression has been used in different contexts and
statutes and has often come up for interpretation. Since
liberal interpretation is the first and the foremost rule of
interpretation it would be useful to understand the literal
meaning of the two words that comprise the
expression. The word `ordinary' has been defined by
the Black's Law Dictionary as follows:
"Ordinary (Adj.) :Regular; usual; normal; common; often
recurring; according to established order; settled;
customary; reasonable; not characterized by peculiar or
unusual circumstances; belonging to, exercised by, or
characteristic of, the normal or average individual."
15. The word `reside' has been explained similarly as
under:
"Reside: live, dwell, abide, sojourn, stay, remain, lodge.
(Western- Knapp Engineering Co. V. Gillbank, C.C.A.
Cal., 129 F2d 135, 136.) To settle oneself or a thing in
a place, to be stationed, to remain or stay, to dwell
permanently or continuously, to have a settled abode
for a time, to have one's residence or domicile;
specifically, to be in residence, to have an abiding
place, to be present as an element, to inhere as quality,
to be vested as a right. (State ex rel. Bowden v. Jensen
Mo., 359 S.W.2d 343, 349.)"
19. In Kuldip Nayar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
2006 (7) SCC 1, the expression "ordinary residence" as
used in the Representation of People Act, 1950 fell for
interpretation. This Court observed:
"243. Lexicon refers to Cicutti v. Suffolk County Council
(1980) 3 All ER 689 to denote that the word "ordinarily"
is primarily directed not to duration but to purpose. In
this sense the question is not so much where the
person is to be found "ordinarily", in the sense of
usually or habitually and with some degree of
continuity, but whether the quality of residence is
"ordinary" and general, rather than merely for some
special or limited purpose.
244. The words "ordinarily" and "resident" have been
used together in other statutory provisions as well and
as per Law Lexicon they have been construed as not to
require that the person should be one who is always
resident or carries on business in the particular place.
245. The expression coined by joining the two words
has to be interpreted with reference to the point of time
requisite for the purposes of the provision, in the case
of Section 20 of the RP Act, 1950 it being the date on
which a person seeks to be registered as an elector in
a particular constituency.
246. Thus, residence is a concept that may also be
transitory. Even when qualified by the word "ordinarily"
the word "resident" would not result in a construction
having the effect of a requirement of the person using a
particular place for dwelling always or on permanent
uninterrupted basis. Thus understood, even the
requirement of a person being "ordinarily resident" at a
particular place is incapable of ensuring nexus between
him and the place in question.
24. It is evident from the statement and the pleadings of
the parties that the question whether the decision to
allow the appellant and Kush to stay back in Delhi
instead of returning to America was a voluntary
decision as claimed by the appellant or a decision
taken by the respondent under duress as alleged by
him was a seriously disputed question of facts, a
satisfactory answer to which could be given either by
the District Court where the custody case was filed or
by the High Court only after the parties had been given
opportunity to adduce evidence in support of their
respective versions.”
14.
The perusal of the exposition of law as laid down by
the Hon’ble Apex Court clearly states that a bare reading of
the Act shows that the solitary test for determining the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 9 of the Act is the
ordinary residence of the minor. The expression used is
“where the minor ordinarily resides.” Whether the minor is
ordinarily residing at a given place is primarily a question of
intention, which, in turn, is a question of fact. Further, it has
been held that it may, at best, be a mixed question of law and
fact, but unless the jurisdictional facts are admitted, it cannot
be answered without an inquiry into the factual aspects of the
controversy.
15.
The exposition of law as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex
Court is very specific and clear. In the present case, it is the
case of the present petitioner that the aforesaid persons,
namely, Ms. Sonika Gupta and Mr. Pankaj Gupta, are
ordinarily residing at Shimla. However, at the time of filing of
the application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC, it was averred in
the application that Ms. Sonika Gupta and Mr. Pankaj Gupta
were presently residing in Village Rihada. Therefore, the
Court below has wrongly interpreted the provisions of Section
9 of the Act, which is in conflict with the judgment passed by
the Hon’ble Apex Court.
16.
The averments and assertions made in the application
as well as in the petition are questions of fact, which are yet
to be proved by the present petitioner.
17.
Therefore, whether the minor ordinarily resides at a
given place is primarily a question of intention, which, in turn,
is a question of fact. Hence, the Court below has erred in
passing the impugned order. The Court below ought to have
granted an opportunity to the petitioner to lead evidence and
satisfy the conscience of the Court as to where the aforesaid
persons ordinarily reside.
18.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has held in the judgment
rendered (supra) that since liberal interpretation is the first
and foremost rule of interpretation, it would be useful to
understand the literal meaning of the two words that comprise
the expression. In the said judgment, it has been held by the
Apex Court that residence is a concept that may also be
transitory. Even when qualified by the word “ordinarily,” the
word “resident” would not result in a construction having the
effect of requiring a person to use a particular place for
dwelling always or on a permanent and uninterrupted basis.
Thus understood, even the requirement of a person being
ordinarily resident at a particular place is incapable of
ensuring a nexus between him and the place in question.
19.
Consequently, the impugned order as passed by the
learned Court below is not sustainable in the eyes of law, and
this Court has no other option but to quash and set aside the
same by reviving the petition filed by the present petitioner,
bearing Petition No. 1-S/2 of 2022, and restoring it to its
original number, with a direction to the Court below that, after
restoration of the said petition, an opportunity be granted to
the petitioner to lead evidence in order to demonstrate
whether the aforesaid persons are residing in Shimla or
Mandi.
20.
At this stage, Mr. Deepak Gupta, learned counsel for
the petitioner, has submitted that he has filed an application
under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for the appointment of an expert
doctor in order to verify the mental condition of Ms. Sonika
Gupta and Ms. Pankaj Gupta. It is directed that the learned
Court below shall decide the application under Order 26 Rule
9 CPC before proceeding further in the matter. The petitioner
is directed to remain present before the Court below on
18.06.2026.
21.
Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed of, in
the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
May 19, 2026 (Nisha)
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