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(2026:JHHC:13223)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
C.M.P. No. 1216 of 2025
Ankur Kumar, aged about 37 years, son of Mr. Kishore Sah, resident of
1604, Shell Tower, Runwal Pearl, Behind R-Mall, Manpada, P.O. &
P.S.-Manpada, Dist.-Thane, State-Maharashtra
....
Petitioner
Versus
Snigdha Kumar @ Snigdha Chourasia, daughter of Shri Ashok
Chourasia, aged about 36 years, presently residing at Aamore Hotel
and Resort Chanchani Colony, P.O. & P.S.-Bhelatand, Dist.-Dhanbad,
premanent resident of House No. 22/23, HIG Housing Colony, Near
Bus Stand, Bartand, P.O. & P.S.-Dhanbad, Dist.-Dhanbad
….
Opp. Party
PRESENT
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY
For the Petitioner
For the Opposite Party
…..
: Mr. Kashish Tiwary, Advocate
: Mr. Akhouri Awinash Kumar, Advocate
: Mr. Sudershan Srivastava, Advocate
: Mr. Manoj Kumar No.3, Advocate
: Mr. Pratyush, Advocate
…..
By the Court:-
I.A. No.5924 of 2026
1.
Heard the parties.
2.
This interlocutory application has been filed with the prayer for
early hearing of this civil miscellaneous petition.
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
3.
Since, hearing of this civil miscellaneous petition is taken up
today, hence, this interlocutory application is disposed of being
infructuous.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
C.M.P. No. 1216 of 2025
1.
Heard the parties.
2.
Vide order dated 17.02.2026 in this civil miscellaneous petition
notice was issued to the opposite party keeping the issue of
maintainability open.
3.
At the outset, the learned counsel for the opposite party
submitted that the issue of maintainability be decided first before
further proceeding with the case.
4.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite party that
since the power has been exercised vide the impugned order
either under Section 7 or under Section 25 of Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890 so, in view of Section 47 of Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890 an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order
made by a Court under Section 7 or under Section 25 of the Act.
5.
It is next submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite party
that in view of the specific remedy of the appeal, it is not open for
this Court to exercise the power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India and in this respect, the learned counsel for
the opposite party relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohamed Ali vs. V. Jaya &
Ors. reported in (2022) 10 SCC 477, wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
Court of India relied upon its own judgment in the case of
Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai vs.
Tuticorin Educational Society reported in (2019) 9 SCC 538,
wherein, it was observed and held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
of India that whenever the proceedings are under the Code of
Civil Procedure and the forum is the civil court, the availability of
a remedy under CPC will deter the High Court and therefore, the
High Court shall not entertain a revision under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India especially in a case where a specific remedy
of appeal is provided under the CPC itself and went on to hold in
paragraph no.19 as under:“19. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decision to the facts of the case on hand, the High Court ought
not to have entertained the revision petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India against the ex parte judgment and
decree passed by the learned trial court in view of a specific
remedy of appeal as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure
itself. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in
entertaining the revision petition under Article 227 challenging
the ex parte judgment and decree passed by the learned trial
court and in quashing and setting aside the same in exercise of
powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.”
6.
In this respect, the learned counsel for the opposite party also
relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India
in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. vs. Rajendra Shankar
Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court of India has summarized the principles on the exercise of
the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India in paragraph no.49 of which reads as under:-
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
“49.
On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be
formulated:
(a)
A petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution is different from a petition under
Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by
the High Court under these two articles is also
different.
(b)
In any event, a petition under Article 227
cannot be called a writ petition. The history of
the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High
Courts is substantially different from the
history of conferment of the power of
superintendence on the High Courts under
Article 227 and have been discussed above.
(c)
High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in
exercise of its power of superintendence under
Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with
the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it.
Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a
court of appeal over the orders of the court or
tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an
alternative statutory mode of redressal has been
provided, that would also operate as a restrain
on the exercise of this power by the High Court.
(d)
The parameters of interference by High Courts
in exercise of their power of superintendence
have been repeatedly laid down by this Court.
In this regard the High Court must be guided
by the principles laid down by the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh [AIR
1954 SC 215] and the principles in Waryam
Singh [AIR 1954 SC 215] have been repeatedly
followed by subsequent Constitution Benches
and various other decisions of this Court.
(e)
According to the ratio in Waryam Singh [AIR
1954 SC 215] , followed in subsequent cases,
the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of
superintendence can interfere in order only to
keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it,
“within the bounds of their authority”.
(f)
In order to ensure that law is followed by such
tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction
which is vested in them and by not declining to
exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in
them.
(g)
Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f),
High Court can interfere in exercise of its
power of superintendence when there has been a
patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals
and courts subordinate to it or where there has
been a gross and manifest failure of justice or
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(l)
(m)
(n)
the basic principles of natural justice have been
flouted.
In exercise of its power of superintendence High
Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of
law or fact or just because another view than
the one taken by the tribunals or courts
subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other
words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly
exercised.
The High Court's power of superintendence
under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any
statute. It has been declared a part of the basic
structure of the Constitution by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra
Kumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 577] and therefore
abridgment by a constitutional amendment is
also very doubtful.
It may be true that a statutory amendment of a
rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the
Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure
Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and
cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's
power under Article 227. At the same time, it
must be remembered that such statutory
amendment does not correspondingly expand
the
High
Court's
jurisdiction
of
superintendence under Article 227.
The power is discretionary and has to be
exercised on equitable principle. In an
appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo
motu.
On a proper appreciation of the wide and
unfettered power of the High Court under
Article 227, it transpires that the main object of
this article is to keep strict administrative and
judicial control by the High Court on the
administration of justice within its territory.
The
object
of
superintendence,
both
administrative and judicial, is to maintain
efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of
the entire machinery of justice in such a way as
it does not bring it into any disrepute. The
power of interference under this article is to be
kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of
justice does not come to a halt and the fountain
of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order
to maintain public confidence in the
functioning of the tribunals and courts
subordinate to the High Court.
This reserve and exceptional power of judicial
intervention is not to be exercised just for grant
of relief in individual cases but should be
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
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(o)
7.
directed for promotion of public confidence in
the administration of justice in the larger public
interest whereas Article 226 is meant for
protection of individual grievance. Therefore,
the power under Article 227 may be unfettered
but its exercise is subject to high degree of
judicial discipline pointed out above.
An improper and a frequent exercise of this
power will be counterproductive and will divest
this extraordinary power of its strength and
vitality.
Learned counsel for the opposite party next relied upon the
judgment of a Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Dr.
Geetanjali Aggarwal vs. Dr. Manoj Aggrawal reported in (2024)
4 High Court Cases (Del) 451, wherein, the Full Bench was
constituted to consider whether an order under Section 12 of the
Guardians and Wards Act passed during the pendency of
proceedings before the Family Court would be an interlocutory
order and would consequently, not be appealable under Section
19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “FC
Act”). The Full Bench of the Delhi High Court considered that
since the provisions of the Family Court Act has an overriding
effect over and above the other statutes including the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890 and the word interlocutory order has not
been defined anywhere in the Family Court Act and also taking
into consideration that Section 20 of the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890 (hereinafter referred to as “GW Act”) not only impact
the rights of the parties, but also have a huge impact on the minor
child and further such orders can be passed by the Family Court
only after examining the merits of the rival submissions of the
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
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parties and are, therefore, necessarily adjudicatory in nature and
also considering the fact that the impact of the orders passed
under Section 12 of the GW Act can have on the parties as also on
the minor child; went on to hold that FC Act cannot be controlled
by the provisions of GW Act, accordingly the description of an
order as an interlocutory order under section 12 of the GW Act,
cannot, be a ground to treat the said order as an interlocutory
order for the purposes of the FC Act. In that case, the Delhi High
Court also relied upon the observation made by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Amar Nath vs. State of
Haryana reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137, in paragraph no.6, which is
to the effect that interlocutory orders merely denotes orders of a
purely interim or temporary nature, which do not decide or touch
the important rights or the liabilities of the parties and went on to
hold that merely because the order despite affecting the vital
rights of the parties, is labelled as an interlocutory order under a
particular statute, cannot imply that the same must always be
treated as an interlocutory order and went to purposively
interpret Section 19 of the FC Act to include within its ambit all
those orders which touch upon matters of moment and have
trappings of finality and thus, went on to hold that earlier decision
of the Delhi High Court in the case of Ramesh Pal Singh vs.
Sugandhi Aggarwal reported in (2019) SCC OnLine Del 12380
wherein, it was held that the order passed under Section 12 of GW
Act would not be appealable under Section 19 of FC Act, does not
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
laid down correct law and answered the reference by holding that
orders passed under Section 12 of GW Act would be appealable
under Section 19 of FC Act.
8.
Learned counsel for the opposite party drawing attention of this
Court to voluminous petitions of interlocutory application upon
which the order was passed and the original interlocutory
application is about 40 pages consisting of chronological 79
paragraphs and as the petition has become so voluminous, that
the chronology of the paragraphs could not be maintained
thereafter by the petitioner and after paragraph no.79 again, the
paragraph no. 4 starts and it went up to paragraph no. 9 and the
said voluminous petition was further supplemented by filing
application of the petitioner for additional interim relief which
again goes to 27 pages consisting of 27 paragraphs and numerous
sub paragraphs and adjudication of such a nature cannot be
termed as an interlocutory order. It is further submitted that once
it is held that the impugned order is not an interlocutory order,
this application urging upon this Court to exercise the power
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable
more so in view of this specific remedy of appeal provided under
Section 47 (a) and (c) of the GW Act. Hence, it is submitted that it
be held that this petition is not maintainable.
9.
The said contention of the opposite party is countered by the
learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
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Gujarat High Court in F.A. No. 3311 of 2023 dated 06.09.2023 in
the case of Rajan Ankleshwaria vs. Vinni Ankleshwaria
wherein, in the facts of that case in a petition seeking interim and
temporary injunction filed invoking the jurisdiction of the Family
Court under Section 7, 17 and 25 of the GW Act, Section 13 of the
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act read with Section 7 of the
Family Court Act as well as under Order XXXIX of Code of Civil
Procedure; the Family Court on 04.07.2023 passed order allowing
the application in part holding that applicant-father shall have
visitation rights every Sunday of each calendar month for four
hours and the opponent-mother shall handover the custody of the
minor son to the applicant-father during visiting hours and the
applicant shall return the custody of the minor son to the
opponent-mother after completion of visiting hours. The Gujarat
High Court formulated the issue that whether the said order
dated 04.07.2023 is to be construed as interlocutory or interim
order and whether the same is amenable to Section 96 of Code of
Civil Procedure or Section 19 of the Family Court Act to prefer
First Appeal.
10.
The Gujarat High Court relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of V.C. Shukla vs State
reported in AIR 1980 (SC) 962 as well as the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Madhu Limaye vs.
State of Maharashtra reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 as also the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
Honnaiah T.H. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. reported in 2022
LiveLaw (SC) 672 and went on to hold that so long as the relief of
seeking return of the child is not finally decided by virtue of
impugned order, the same cannot be said to be an interim order,
but is merely an interlocutory order; since the said impugned
order has neither finally decided the right of the applicant about
custody nor terminating the main application and since that be the
situation, it is not possible to construe the impugned order as not
an interlocutory order. The Gujarat High Court has also referred
to the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Ramesh Pal
Singh vs. Sugandhi Aggarwal (supra) as by that time the
judgment of larger Bench i.e. the Full Bench had not come and
went on to hold that first appeal is not maintainable and
dismissed the first appeal.
11.
It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that since
the main application filed under GW Act has not been
pronounced so, all the orders till such final order is passed is to be
treated as interlocutory order; therefore, it is submitted that the
impugned order being the interlocutory order, this application
urging upon this Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India is maintainable. Hence, it is
submitted that the order be passed on the merits of the petition.
12.
On being asked by this Court to the learned counsel for the
petitioner as to under which provision of law the impugned order
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
has been passed, the learned counsel for the petitioner candidly
submits that it is an order passed under Section 25 of GW Act.
13.
Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going
through the materials available in the record, it is pertinent to
mention here that the word ‘Court’ has been defined in Section
4(5) of GW Act which reads as under:Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is something
repugnant in the subject or context,—
(5) “the Court” means—
(a) the District Court having jurisdiction to
entertain an application under this Act for an
order appointing or declaring a person to be a
guardian; or
(b) where a guardian has been appointed or
declared in pursuance of any such
application—
(i) the Court which, or the Court of the
officer who, appointed or declared the
guardian or is under this Act deemed
to have appointed or declared the
guardian; or
(ii) in any matter relating to the person of
the ward the District Court having
jurisdiction in the place where the
ward for the time being ordinarily
resides; or
(c) in respect of any proceeding transferred under
Section 4-A, the Court of the officer to whom
such proceeding has been transferred;
14.
Section 7 of FC Act confers the jurisdiction upon the Family
Court to have and exercise all jurisdictions exercisable by any
District Court or any civil court under any law for the time being
in force in respect of suits and proceedings of the nature referred
to in the explanation and clause (g) of the explanation refers to the
statute in relation to guardianship of a person or the custody of, or
access to, any minor.
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
15.
So, in the considered opinion of this Court after enactment of FC
Act, the provisions of FC Act is to be read in conjunction with the
provisions of the GW Act.
16.
Section 47 of Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 which reads as
under :“47.
Orders appealable.—An appeal shall lie to the
High Court from an order made by a 29[* * *] Court,—
(a) under Section 7, appointing or declaring or
refusing to appoint or declare a guardian; or
(b) xxxxx
(c) under Section 25, making or refusing to make
an order for the return of a ward to the custody
of his guardian; or
Xxxxx
has in no uncertain manner has defined the orders appealable and
provides that the appeal shall lie to the High Court from the order
made by a Court under Section 25 making or refusing to make an
order for the return of a ward to the custody of his guardian.
17.
The undisputed fact remains that the impugned order is an
order as has been referred to under Section 47 of the GW Act. It
has fairly been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner
that the said order is an order passed under Section 25 of GW Act.
Under such express provision under Section 47 of GW Act, this
Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned order is an
appealable order hence, an appeal shall lie. So, once, this Court
holds that an appeal will lie in view of the judgment of Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of Mohamed Ali vs. V. Jaya &
Ors. (supra), this Court has no hesitation in holding that an
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
(2026:JHHC:13223)
application for exercise of the power under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is not maintainable.
18.
Accordingly, this civil miscellaneous petition is dismissed being
not maintainable.
(Anil Kumar Choudhary, J.)
High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi
Dated the 4th May, 2026
AFR/Gunjan/Uploaded on 07/05/2026
C.M.P. No.1216 of 2025
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