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2026:HHC:37901
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
AT SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 14 of 2026
Decided on: 3.9.2026
Anku @ Mahesh Sharma
… Petitioner
Abhinandan & others
Versus
…Respondents
_____________________________ ______________
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
___________________________________________________
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Y.P. Sood, Advocate.
For the Respondents :
Mr. Nitin Thakur, Advocate, for
respondents No. 1 and 2.
Virender Singh, Judge (oral)
Petitioner Anku @ Mahesh Sharma has filed the
present petition, under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, against the order dated 1.11.2025, passed by the
Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Court No. 1, Shimla,
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in Civil Suit
No. 63-1 of 2013, titled as, ‘Abhinandan versus Shivam
& others’.
2.
By way of order dated 1.11.2025, the learned
trial Court has allowed the application, filed under
2026:HHC:37901
Section 151 of the CPC, read with Section 65 of Indian
Evidence Act, enabling the plaintiffs to prove the Will,
dated 15.6.2007, by way of secondary evidence.
3.
For the sake of convenience, parties to the lis are
hereinafter referred to, in the same manner, in which,
they were referred to, by the learned trial Court.
4.
Necessary
facts,
as
borne
out
from
the
documents, annexed with the petition, may be summed
up, as under:
Plaintiffs have filed the suit for declaration with
the consequential relief of injunction, under Sections 34,
36 and 38 of the Specific Relief Act, on the ground, that
the land comprised in Khata/Khatauni No. 189/231,
Khasra Nos. 57, 58, 59 and 528 Kitas 4, measuring 3-15
bighas, situated at mauza Dhalli Hadbust No. 350,
Tehsil and Distt. Shimla (HP) was owned and possessed
by the Grand Father/common ancestor/predecessor-ininterest of the plaintiffs and defendants, namely Sh.
Prabhu Dayal Sharma S/o Sh. Beli Ram Sharma.
4.1
After the settlement, now, the Khata/Khatauni
numbers have been changed to Khata/Khatauni No.
2026:HHC:37901
265/428 and Khasra Numbers aforesaid, have been
changed to Khasra Nos. 1026, 1030, 1030/1, 1047,
1048, 1050, 1029, 1032, 1028, 1027, 1031, 1034, 1033,
1046 Kitas 14 measuring 2894-17 S Meters (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the suit land’).
4.2
It is the further case of the plaintiffs that Prabhu
Dayal Sharma had six sons and four daughters. He,
during his life time, executed a legal and valid will, duly
registered, vide Registration No. 266/2007, dated 15-062007 with the Sub-Registrar Shimla. Prabhu Dayal
Sharma
expired on 13-04-2010. After the death of
Prabhu Dayal Sharma, the said land was succeeded by
the plaintiffs and defendants, in equal shares i.e. 1/ 8 th
share, each.
4.2
Mutation, on the basis of Will, was attested on
29.6.2010, in which, estate of Prabhu Dayal was
mutated in favour of the beneficiaries, stripe wise,
instead of equal shares, whereby, both the plaintiffs,
being sons of same father, were jointly given one share,
whereas, as per the true spirit of the Will, all the
beneficiaries were to get one share each, thereby,
2026:HHC:37901
causing a very grave and illegal/unlawful damage/loss
to the plaintiffs, who jointly got 1/7 th share instead of
1/8thshare each, illegally against the specification, in the
will, thereby, causing a tremendous damage to their
legal rights.
4.3
On the basis of above facts, the plaintiffs have
sought declaration to the effect that mutation No. 153,
passed on 29.6.2010, and the subsequent revenue
entries thereof, on the basis of this mutation, are illegal,
null and void ab-initio, and the plaintiffs are owners in
possession of 1/8th share, each, out of the bequeathed
land, as per the Will dated 15.6.2007.
5.
The said suit was contested by defendant No. 1,
by taking preliminary objections that the suit is not
maintainable in the present form; the suit is barred by
the principles of estoppel and acquiescence, and the
plaintiffs are barred to file the present suit, due to their
own acts and conduct, the suit is not properly valued for
the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction; the Court has
no pecuniary jurisdiction to try and maintain the
2026:HHC:37901
present suit; the suit is barred by limitation; and the
plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the present suit.
5.1.
On merits, contents of the suit have been
admitted, to the extent, that the mutation was duly
attested, but, it is denied emphatically that the mutation
was attested illegally.
5.2
Defendants No. 3, 5 and 6 have filed the written
statement, by admitting the fact that Prabhu Dayal has
executed a legal and valid Will, on 15.6.2007.
5.3
Defendant No. 4 has filed the separate written
statement, in which, he has taken the plea that Prabhu
Dayal has not executed the Will, dated 15.6.2007, and
according to him, said Prabhu Dayal has executed last
Will, on 28.2.2004, whereby, he has bequeathed his
entire property, in favour of defendants No. 4 and 6.
6.
Plaintiffs have filed the replication, denying the
preliminary objections, as well as, contents of the
written statement, by virtue of which, the suit has been
contested.
2026:HHC:37901
7.
From the pleadings of the parties, the learned
trial
Court
has
framed
the
following
issues,
on
16.7.2016:
1. Whether the plaintiff entitled for the decree of the
declaration to the effect that mutation No. 153, dated
29.06.2010 and subsequent revenue entries in favour of
the defendants are illegal, null and void? OPP
2. If issue No.1 is prove in affirmative, whether plaintiff is
entitled for the declaration to the effect that they are
having 1/8th share in the suit land? OPP
3.
Whether
defendants
be
restrained
by
way
of
permanent prohibitory injunction from changing the
nature of the suit land and creating any charge over it?
OPP
4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present
form? OPD.
5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD
6. Whether this suit has not been properly valued for the
purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD
7.
8.
Relief.
When, the lis was listed for DWs, then, the
plaintiffs have filed an application, under Section 151
CPC, read with Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act,
seeking indulgence of the learned trial Court to prove the
Will, dated 15.6.2007, by way of secondary evidence.
9.
According to the plaintiffs, at the time of filing
the suit, the plaintiffs had also filed separate list of
2026:HHC:37901
documents, in support of their plaint, and some original
and verified documents have also been filed. However,
the Will, which is the document, on which, the plaintiffs
are relying upon is a Xerox copy of the original copy.
10.
It is the further case of the plaintiffs that the
original Will is not in possession of the plaintiffs, and on
the last date of hearing, it was gathered from the crossexamination of DW-5 Ravi Shankar that he saw the Will,
when, he came to his house. On the basis of said
deposition, made by DW-5, in the cross-examination, it
has been pleaded that the original Will is in custody of
DW-5, and as such, the plaintiffs could not prove the
original Will.
11.
According to the plaintiffs, Exhibit PW3/A is the
copy of the Will. The original Will could not be produced
earlier, as plaintiffs were not aware of the fact that DW-5
is in the possession of the original Will.
12.
On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been
made to allow the application.
13.
The application has been contested by defendant
No. 4 by filing the replying, denying the preliminary
2026:HHC:37901
objection that the application, at the belated stage, is not
maintainable, as at that time, the matter was listed for
arguments.
14.
According to defendant No. 4, plaintiff could not
establish the existence of the alleged Will, as such, the
plaintiff has failed to make out a case for secondary
evidence. Other contents
of
the
reply have
been
contested.
15.
The learned trial Court, after hearing learned
counsel for the parties, has allowed the application, vide
order dated 1.11.2020.
16.
Aggrieved
by
the
said
order,
the
petitioner/defendant No. 4, is before this Court, under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, where scope of
interference, by this Court, is very limited.
17.
Hon'ble Supreme Court in "K. Valarmathi & Ors.
Versus Kumaresan”, 2025 INSC 606" has elaborately
discussed the scope of interference under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India. Relevant para 9 of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:
"9. Essence of the power under Article 227 being
supervisory, it cannot be invoked to usurp the
2026:HHC:37901
original jurisdiction of the court which it seeks to
supervise. Nor can it be invoked to supplant a
statutory legal remedy under the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908. For example, existence of appellate
remedy under Section 96 of the Code operates as a
near total bar to exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227."
18.
In a recent decision in "Nandi Infrastructure
Corridor Enterprises Ltd. & Anr. Versus B. Gurappa
Naidu & Ors.”, 2026 INSC 434", the scope of interference
has again been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
Relevant paragraph 35 of the judgment, is reproduced,
as under:"35. In short, the principles laid down in the above
matters is as follows:
a) The power of superintendence under Article 227
is not to be exercised unless there has been an (a)
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction, not vested
in Court or tribunal, or (b) gross abuse of
jurisdiction or (c) an unjustifiable refusal to
exercise jurisdiction vested in Courts or tribunals.
b) It is also well settled that the High Court while
acting under this. Article cannot exercise its power
as an appellate court or substitute its own
judgment in place of that of the subordinate court
to correct an error, which is not apparent on the
face of the record.
c)
The
High
Court
exercising
supervisory
jurisdiction does not act as a court of first appeal
to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts upon
2026:HHC:37901
which the determination under challenge is based.
Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every error
of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding is
justified or can be supported. The High Court is
not to substitute its own decision on facts and
conclusion, for that of the inferior court or
tribunal."
19.
In view of above decision, this Court can interfere
with the findings of the learned trial Court, only in the
eventuality, if the learned trial Court has passed the
order, without having the jurisdiction to decide the
same, or has exceeded its jurisdiction, while passing the
order. The findings can only be interfered with, if the
same falls within the definition of ‘perverse findings’.
20.
The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another
Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and
Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases
206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment
are reproduced, as under:“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of the
trial court and the impugned judgment of the High
Court. The trial court very minutely examined the
entire evidence and all documents and exhibits on
record. The trial court's analysis of evidence also
seems to be correct. The trial court has not deviated
from the normal norms or methods of evaluation of
2026:HHC:37901
the evidence. By no stretch of imagination, we can
hold that the judgment of the trial court is based on
no evidence or evidence which is thoroughly
unreliable and no reasonable person would act
upon it and consequently the judgment of the trial
court is perverse.
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that the
discussion and appreciation of the evidence of the
trial court is so outrageously defies logic as to suffer
from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of
being perverse and the findings rendered by the
trial court are against the weight of evidence. The
law is well settled that, in an appeal against
acquittal, unless the judgment of the trial court is
perverse, the Appellate Court would not be justified
in substituting its own view and reverse the
judgment of acquittal.
24. The expression `perverse' has been dealt with in
number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead) through LRs.
& Others v. Hanuman Prasad (Dead) through LRs.
& Others, this Court observed that the expression
`perverse' means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta ) Employees' Union v. Parry
& Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed
that `perverse finding' means a finding which is not
only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise, Cochin, the
Court observed that this is not a case where it can
be said that the findings of the authorities are
based on no evidence or that they are so perverse
that no reasonable person would have arrived at
those findings.
26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma &
Another, the Court observed that any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law is a
perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the Court
observed that a perverse verdict may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In
Godfrey v. Godfrey, the Court defined `perverse' as
turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the
right; turned away or deviating from what is right,
proper, correct etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by
various dictionaries in the following manner:
2026:HHC:37901
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English Sixth Edition
Perverse: Showing deliberate determination to
behave in a way that most people think is wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English –
International Edition
Perverse: Deliberately departing from what is
normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English - 1998
Edition
Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of
law.
4. New Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edition)
Perverse: Purposely deviating from accepted or
expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases, Fourth Edition
Perverse: A perverse verdict may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight
of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of
U.P., the Court observed thus:
"8. … We are of the opinion that the trial
court was quite justified in acquitting the
appellants of the charges as the view taken
by it was reasonable one and the order of
acquittal cannot be said to be perverse. It is
well settled that appellate court would not
be justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High
Court has committed an error in interfering
with the order of acquittal of the appellants
recorded by the trial court as the same did
not suffer from the vice of perversity."
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of
Police & Others, the Court while dealing with the
scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution
observed as under:
"9. Normally the High Court and this Court
would not interfere with the findings of fact
2026:HHC:37901
recorded at the domestic enquiry but if the
finding of "guilt" is based on no evidence, it
would be a perverse finding and would be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be
maintained between the decisions which are
perverse and those which are not. If a
decision is arrived at on no evidence or
evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the
order would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable and
which could be relied upon, howsoever
compendious it may be, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the
findings would not be interfered with."
30. The meaning of `perverse' has been examined
in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cumAssessing Authority, Karnal & Others v. Gopi
Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this Court observed
as under:
"7. In the present case, the stage at and the
points on which the challenge to the
assessment in judicial review was raised and
entertained was not appropriate. In our
opinion, the High Court was in error in
constituting itself into a court of appeal
against the assessment. While it was open to
the respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether the
denial of relief under the proviso to Section
39(5) was proper or not, it was not open to
the High Court re-appreciate the primary or
perceptive facts which were otherwise within
the domain of the fact-finding authority
under the statute. The question whether the
transactions were or were not sales exigible
to sales tax constituted an exercise in
recording secondary or inferential facts
based on primary facts found by the
statutory authorities. But what was assailed
in review was, in substance, the correctness
as
distinguished
from
the legal
permissibility - of the primary or perceptive
facts themselves. It is, no doubt, true that if
a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if the
2026:HHC:37901
finding so outrageously defies logic as to
suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring
the blame of being perverse, then, the
finding is rendered infirm in law."
21.
Similar view has again been taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of
India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court
Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment
is reproduced, as under:“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court
can be held to be perverse if the findings have
been arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant
material
or
by
taking
into
consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible
material. The finding may also be said to be
perverse if it is “against the weight of
evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on the
basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would act
upon it, the order would be perverse. But if
there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon,
the conclusions would not be treated as
perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with. (Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra
v. Delhi Administration, Kuldeep Singh v.
Commissioner of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala
Koteswara Rao & Ors. v. State of Andhra
Pradesh thr. Secretary and Babu v. State of
Kerala).”
22.
Being guided by the aforesaid decisions, this
Court would now ascertain the fact whether the learned
trial Court has wrongly exercised the jurisdiction, vested
2026:HHC:37901
in it, while allowing the application, filed under Section
151 CPC, read with Section 65 of the Indian Evidence
Act, permitting the plaintiffs to lead secondary evidence
to prove the Will, and the order, so passed by the learned
trial Court, falls within the definition of ‘perverse
findings’?
23.
As stated above, the very basis of the case of the
plaintiffs, in the present case, is the Will executed on
15.6.2007, by Prabhu Dayal Sharma, in favour of parties
to the lis. Defendant No. 4, in the present case, has set
up the Will, in his favour, which was allegedly executed
by Prabhu Dayal Sharma, on 28.2.2004.
24.
Plaintiff No. 1, Abhinandan Sharma, appeared in
the witness box, as PW-1 and has categorically stated
that his grand father had executed the Will, on
15.6.2007, in favour of his grand-sons and daughter
Savitri Devi, in equal shares. He has proved the copy of
the Will, as Mark-A.
25.
It is not the case of PW-1 that the original Will,
allegedly executed by his grand-father was not in his
possession or the same was in possession of DW-5. In
2026:HHC:37901
relation to this, the plaintiffs have examined PW-2 Rohit
Kumar, from the office of Sub-Registrar, Office (Rural)
Shimla, who has proved the copy of Will, dated
15.6.2007, as mark-A. He has categorically stated that
mark-A is not the correct copy of original Will.
26.
The plaintiffs have examined Kuldeep Guleria,
who has scribed the Will, dated 15.6.2007 and proved
the same, as Ext. PW3/A.
27.
In
this
case,
the
plaintiffs
have
sought
permission to prove the Will, by way of secondary
evidence, on the statement of DW-5. DW-5, in his crossexamination, has deposed that he does not know
whether after death of his father, from the office of
Kuldeep Guleria, the copy of the Will was delivered to
them, through registered post. Merely because DW-5 has
stated that he has seen the original Will, does not entitle
the plaintiffs to seek permission to prove the same, by
way of secondary evidence. It has not been suggested to
DW-5 that the original Will is in his possession.
28.
Onus to prove the case, as set up in the plaint,
was on the plaintiffs, and once, they have led the
2026:HHC:37901
evidence, and closed their evidence, then, on the basis of
a stray sentence, deposed by DW-5, in his crossexamination, the plaintiffs cannot seek indulgence of the
learned trial Court to permit them to prove the copy of
Will, dated 15.6.2007, by way of secondary evidence.
29.
The provisions of Section 65 of the Indian
Evidence
Act
(Section
of
Bharatiya
Sakshya
Adhiniyam), are reproduced as under:
65. Cases in which secondary evidence relating to
document may be given- Secondary evidence may be
given of the existence, condition or contents of a
document in the following cases :
(a)When the original is shown or appears to be in the
possession or power of the person against whom the
document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of
reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court, or of
any person legally bound to produce it, and when, after
the notice mentioned in section 66, such person does not
produce it;
(b)When the existence, condition or contents of the
original have been proved to be admitted in writing by
the person against whom it is proved or by his
representative in interest;
(c)When the original has been destroyed or lost, or when
the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for any
other reason not arising from his own default or neglect,
produce it in reasonable time;
(d)When the original is of such a nature as not to be
easily movable;
(e)When the original is a public document within the
meaning of section 74;
2026:HHC:37901
(f) When the original is a document of which a certified
copy is permitted by this Act, or by any other law in force
in [India] to be given in evidence;
(g)When the originals consist of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot conveniently be examined
in Court, and the fact to be proved is the general result
of the whole collection.
In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the
contents of the documents is admissible.
In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
In case (e) or (f), a certified copy of document, but no
other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
In case (g), evidence may be given as to the general result
of the documents by any person who has examined
them, and who is skilled in the examination of such
documents.
30.
If the contents of the application are examined,
in light of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, as
reproduced above, then, this Court is of the view that the
plaintiffs
have
failed
to
probabilize
the
requisite
ingredients of Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, so
as to seek indulgence of the learned trial Court to permit
them to lead secondary evidence to prove the Will, dated
15.6.2007.
The
plaintiffs
have
not
been
able
to
demonstrate the existence of any of the conditions,
enumerated in the said provisions, which could justify
the admission of secondary evidence in proof of the Will
in question.
31.
2026:HHC:37901
The learned counsel for the plaintiffs could not
satisfy the judicial conscience of this Court as to how the
learned trial Court has concluded that the original Will is
in the custody of DW-5, who withheld it and refused to
produce the same, whereas, there is nothing on the
record to suggest that any application was moved to
direct DW-5 to produce the original Will, nor it is the
pleaded case of the plaintiffs.
32.
Considering the above facts and circumstances,
this Court is of the considered view that the learned trial
Court has exceeded its jurisdiction, while allowing the
application under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act,
as permission to lead secondary evidence, can only be
granted by the learned trial Court, once it has been
established that the original Will is in possession of DW5. In the absence of any such proof, the impugned order
is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
33.
Even otherwise, the order passed by the learned
trial Court on 1.11.2025, falls within the purview of
‘perverse findings’, as the conclusion drawn by the
learned trial Court, regarding the custody of the original
2026:HHC:37901
Will with defendant No. 5, is not borne out from the
statement of DW-5. The finding, so recorded, is devoid of
any credible evidence on record and suffers from
illegality and perversity, rendering the same liable to be
set aside.
34.
In view of above, the present petition is allowed
and the order dated 1.11.2025, (Annexure P-5), passed
by the learned trial Court is set aside. The pending
application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
35.
Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall
not be taken as an expression of opinion, on the merits
of the case, as these observations, are confined, only, to
the disposal of the present application.
36.
Record be sent back.
3.9.2026
Kalpana
(Virender Singh)
Judge
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