The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
10. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the parties from approaching the learned Trial Court seeking the composition of the o昀昀ence.
11. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
Full Judgment Text
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2026:HHC:2987
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1102 of 2025
Reserved on: 1.1.2026
Date of Decision: 9.1.2026.
Ankit Thakur and others
...Petitioners
Versus
State of HP and others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No.
For the Petitioners
Ms.
Shikha
Advocate.
:
Chauhan,
For Respondents No.1&2/State :
Mr. Tarun Pathak, Deputy
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.3
Ms. Kiran Dhiman, Advocate.
:
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have 昀椀led the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 112 of 2025, dated 3.11.2025, registered for
the commission of o昀昀ences punishable under Sections 126(2),
115(2) and 351(2) read with Section 3(5) of Bhartiya Nyaya
Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) at Police Station Kandaghat, District Solan,
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
HP and consequent proceedings arising out of the FIR based on
compromise e昀昀ected between the parties.
2.
The State has 昀椀led a status report asserting that
o昀昀ence punishable under Section 117(2) of the BNS was added
after the investigation.
3.
Heard.
4.
Section 359 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (BNSS) makes the o昀昀ences punishable under Sections
126(2) and 115(2) of BNS compoundable without the permission
of the Court. Section 359(2) of BNSS makes the o昀昀ence
punishable under Section 117(2) of BNS compoundable with the
permission of the Court. Therefore, it is apparent that the
petitioner has an alternate remedy of approaching the learned
Magistrate and seeking the composition of the o昀昀ence.
5.
It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra,
(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent power should not
be exercised when a speci昀椀c remedy exists. It was observed:
At the outset the following principles may be noticed in
relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court which have been followed ordinarily and generally,
almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there
is a speci昀椀c provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.”
6.
It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High
Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138, that the jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.(corresponding to Section 528 of
BNSS) is vested in the Court to make such order as may be
necessary to give e昀昀ect to any order under the Code, prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised when a speci昀椀c
remedy is available under the other provisions of the Code. It
was observed:“8. In order to determine the question under
consideration as to what is the scope of the inherent
powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The
inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of
its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The
inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section
482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as
may be necessary to give e昀昀ect to any order under the
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482
envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to
limit or a昀昀ect the inherent powers of the High Court
exercised by it with the object of achieving the above
said three results. It is for this reason that section 482
does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers
of the High Court which are wide enough to be exercised
in suitable cases to a昀昀ord relief to an aggrieved party.
While exercising inherent powers it has to be borne in
mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to
matters speci昀椀cally covered by the other provisions of
the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C.
866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated
succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa
Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR
1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section
482 it was observed that a provision which saves the
inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express
provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting
it in another form the Court observed that if there is an
express provision in a statute governing a particular subject
there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent
powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the
provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern
the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied)
7.
It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.,
(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that
jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and
should not be exercised when speci昀椀c remedy has been provided
under the Code. It was observed:
“2. It appears that unfortunately the High Court by
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”) has
prevented the 昀氀ow of justice on the alleged contention of
the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-
called misconduct of the judicial o昀케cer. It is true that
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary
to give e昀昀ect to any order under the Code or to prevent
the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the process
of law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court and the alleged
abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be
secured in accordance with law including procedural law and
not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the nature of
extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving the
object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases where
there is no express provision empowering the High Court to
achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that inherent
power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by
speci昀椀c provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe
any speci昀椀c provision of the Code. In the present case, the
High Court overlooked the procedural law which
empowered the convicted accused to prefer a statutory
appeal against conviction of the o昀昀ence. The High Court
has intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled
the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial.
xxxxx
9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court
entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under
Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal,
erroneous and to say the least, unfortunate. It was known
to the High Court that the trial court passed proceedings
to the e昀昀ect that 昀椀nal judgment and order convicting the
accused were pronounced by the trial court. It was also
recorded by the trial court that as the accused were
absent, the Court had issued non-bailable warrants. In
such a situation, instead of directing the accused to
remain present before the Court for resorting to the steps
contemplated by the law for passing the sentence, the
High Court has stayed further proceedings including the
operation of the non-bailable warrants issued by the trial
court. It is disquieting that the High Court has overlooked the
important legal aspect that the accused have a right of appeal
against the order of conviction purported to have been passed
by the trial court. In such circumstances, the High Court ought
not to have entertained a petition under Section 482 of the
Code and stonewalled the very e昀케cacious alternative remedy
of appeal as provided in the Code. Merely because the
accused made certain allegations against the trial Judge
the substantive law cannot be bypassed.
8.
It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida
v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, that the inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not
be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was
observed:
“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power
conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to
be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases
and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some
miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of
power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in
considerable
detail
in
Madhu
Limaye v. State
of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978 SC
47] and it was held as under : (SCC p. 555, para 8)
The following principles may be stated in relation to the
exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a
speci昀椀c provision in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of
the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC (Cri)
1545] after a review of a large number of earlier decisions, it
was held as under : (SCC p. 657, para 29)
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or
where interference is absolutely necessary for securing
the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised
very sparingly as cases which require interference would
be few and far between. The most common case where
inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where
criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because
they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without
jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out hereinabove fall in
this category. It must be remembered that the inherent
power is not to be resorted to if there is a speci昀椀c
provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress
of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power
should not be exercised against an express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal
Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as
against an express bar in some other enactment.”
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a
petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction
had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the
sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the
case had been stayed. In appeal, this Court set aside the
order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it
is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in
respect of any matter covered by speci昀椀c provisions of the
Code or if its exercise would infringe any speci昀椀c provision
of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court
overlooked the procedural law which empowered the
convicted accused to prefer a statutory appeal against
conviction of the o昀昀ence and intervened at an uncalled for
stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial
stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was
accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under
Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the
accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided
in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with
other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout
has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be
entertained if there is any other speci昀椀c provision in the Code of
Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could
apply for bail afresh after the o昀昀ence had been converted
into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not do
so and 昀椀led a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order to
circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have been
required to surrender as the bail application could be
entertained and heard only if the accused were in custody. It
is important to note that no order adverse to the
respondents-accused had been passed by any court nor was
there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality. In such
circumstances, the High Court committed a manifest error
of law in entertaining a petition under Section 482 CrPC and
issuing a direction to the subordinate court to accept the
sureties and bail bonds for the o昀昀ence under Section 304
IPC. The e昀昀ect of the order passed by the High Court is that
the accused after getting bail in an o昀昀ence under Sections
324, 352 and 506 IPC on the very day on which they were
taken into custody, got an order of bail in their favour even
after the injured had succumbed to his injuries and the case
had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC without
any court examining the case on merits, as it stood after
conversion of the o昀昀ence. The procedure laid down for the
grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available to the
respondents-accused, having not been availed of, the
exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC
is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it has to
be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)
9.
In the present case, the petition is silent as to why
the petitioners cannot approach the learned Trial Court for
compounding the o昀昀ence. Para-8 of the petition states that
there is no other alternative e昀케cacious remedy available to the
petitioners except the present petition. This is an incorrect
statement because the remedy of approaching the learned Trial
Court is available to the petitioners under Sections 359(1) and
359(2) of BNSS. Therefore, there is no reason to exercise the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court.
10.
In view of the above, the present petition fails and
the same is dismissed. However, this order will not prevent the
parties from approaching the learned Trial Court seeking the
composition of the o昀昀ence.
11.
The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending
miscellaneous applications, if any.
12.
The observation made herein before shall remain
con昀椀ned to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
9th January, 2026
(Chander)
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