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2026:HHC:19020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
Civil Revision No. 4/2025
Reserved on: 07.05.2026
Decided on: 21.05.2026
Anjan Mahajan
…..Petitioner
Versus
Binta Devi & Ors.
…Respondents
______________________________________________________________
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Petitioner:
Mr. Sudhir Thakur, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
Somesh Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. Malay Kaushal, Advocate.
Romesh Verma, Judge
The present petition
arises
out of the order dated
20.11.2024, as passed by the learned Additional Principal Judge,
(Additional District Judge), Family Court Chamba, District
Chamba, whereby an application under Section 151 CPC for
DNA test, filed by the present petitioner, has been rejected.
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner/plaintiff
filed a suit for declaration to the effect that neither defendant
1Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
No.1 is his wife nor defendants No. 2 to 4 are his children. As
per
the
averments
as
respondents/defendants
No.
made
to
in
the
plaint,
are
children
of
respondent/defendant No.1, who have no interest in the matter,
hence they are being sued through respondent/defendant No.1
being
their
mother
and
natural
guardian.
The
respondent/defendant No.1 is already married to one Anil. When
respondent/defendant No.1 became pregnant, she visited PHC
Brangal along with her husband Anil, where she disclosed name
of her husband
as Anil. At that time,
Anil, who was also
accompanying
her, signed consent letter for abortion of
defendant No.1 vide OPD slip No. 4201. It was averred that in
the presence of first marriage of respondent/defendant No.1 with
Anil, she was not competent to solemnize second marriage with
the petitioner/plaintiff. Hence, the alleged marriage of defendant
No.1 with the petitioner/plaintiff, if any, is illegal, void and not
sustainable in the eyes of law.
As per case set up by the petitioner/plaintiff,
respondent/defendant No.1 filed
an application under Section
125 Cr.P.C. against the petitioner/plaintiff before learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, wherein she, while appearing as
RW1,
disclosed that
her marriage
was solemnized
at
Bharmour Temple, but she failed to disclose name of Purohit,
who got the marriage solemnized.
In the absence of rites,
ceremonies
alleged
and
custom,
the
marriage
with
petitioner/plaintiff is illegal, void and does not confer any right
upon respondent/defendant No.1 or her children. The findings
returned by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, vide
order dated 16.4.2010 to the effect that respondent/defendant
No.1
is
legally
wedded
respondents/defendants
wife
No.
of
petitioner/plaintiff
and
are
petitioner/plaintiff, as affirmed by the learned
children
and
of
Additional
Sessions Judge (FTC) Chamba, vide judgment dated 20.04.2011,
are
wrong,
illegal,
void
and
not
binding
upon
the
petitioner/plaintiff.
Therefore, the petitioner/plaintiff
filed a suit for
declaration that respondent/defendant No.1 is not his legally
wedded wife nor respondents/defendants No. 2 o 4 are his
children;
the findings returned by the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Chamba,
in Criminal Case No. 189/IV/2007 vide
order dated 16.4.2010, as affirmed by the learned
Additional
Sessions Judge (FTC) Chamba, in Criminal Revision No. 3/10,
vide judgment dated 20.04.2011, are wrong, illegal, void and not
binding upon the petitioner/plaintiff with mandatory injunction,
thereby directing respondent/defendant No.1 not to claim herself
as wife and respondents/defendants No. 2 to 4 as children of the
plaintiff.
The suit was contested by respondents/defendants
No. 1 to 4 by raising preliminary objections with respect to
maintainability,
estoppel
non-joinder
etc.
On
of
merits,
necessary
it
party,
was
limitation,
stated
that
respondent/defendant No.1 hails from village society and is
governed
by custom in the matter of marriage, which is
prevalent from the time immemorial in District Chamba. It was
stated that respondent/defendant No.1 is legally wedded wife of
the plaintiff. Both of them lived and cohabited together as
husband and wife at Village Chulihara and at Mohalla Charpat
and defendants No. 2 to 4 were born out of the said wedlock. It
was averred that in the proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C.,
the petitioner/plaintiff failed to produce said Anil as his witness
in order to corroborate or substantiate his case.
As
per
defendants,
Magistrate, Chamba,
the
learned
Chief
Judicial
decided factum of marriage in favour of
respondent/defendant No.1 and thereafter maintenance was
granted to respondents/defendants. Though petitioner/plaintiff
filed revision petition before the learned Additional Sessions
Judge (FTC), however the said petition came to be dismissed.
Thereafter, the petitioner/plaintiff is paying regular maintenance
to the respondents/defendants by executing order of the Court.
It was averred that respondent/defendant No.1 is
only wife of the petitioner/plaintiff, which is evident from the
photographs, Voter Card etc. having been placed on record in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr. P.C. She was turned
out
from
the
the
matrimonial
house
by
the
parents
petitioner/plaintiff and was compelled to stay at
Chulihara
with
her
parents.
In
the
of
Village
meanwhile,
respondent/defendant No.2 was born, therefore, his name was
entered in the pariwar register of the concerned
Gram
Panchayat. Subsequently, names of respondents/defendants No.
2 and
3 were entered in the municipal
petitioner/plaintiff
at Chamba.
record by
the
Further, it was stated that
respondent/defendant No.1 along with her children was turned
out of the matrimonial home by the petitioner/plaintiff and his
parents and there was quarrel at Dogra Bazaar and even the
matter was reported to the police. The respondents/defendants
refuted all the averments as made in the plaint and prayed for
dismissal of the suit, as filed by the plaintiff.
The petitioner/plaintiff filed replication, whereby all
the averments as made in the plaint, were reiterated.
The learned trial court framed the issues on 2.1.2014
and thereafter, directed the parties to adduce evidence in
support of their contentions to corroborate their respective case.
After
the
conclusion
of
the
evidence,
the
petitioner/plaintiff filed an application under Section 151 CPC
for DNA test.
In
the
application,
it
was
stated
that
the
petitioner/plaintiff has no relation with respondent/defendant
No.1 from 30.3.2007 and this fact has been duly admitted by
respondent/defendant No.1 in para 8 of her application filed
under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Chamba. In the said pleadings, she averred that from
30.3.2007, she was staying at her parent house and the
petitioner/plaintiff has deserted and neglected her. It has been
averred in the application that respondents/defendants No. 2 to
4 were born when respondent/defendant No.1 was living
separately from the petitioner/plaintiff and they are not his
children. In order to prove that respondents/defendants No. 2 to
4 are not his children, the petitioner/plaintiff wants to conduct
DNA test of himself and respondents/defendants No. 2 to 4 to
confirm
and
prove
that
they
are
not
children
of
petitioner/plaintiff. Therefore, it was prayed that DNA test may
be ordered to be conducted.
The application as filed by the petitioner/plaintiff was
duly resisted
by the respondents/defendants by filing reply,
wherein it was averred that the petitioner/plaintiff had filed
similar application for DNA test during the proceedings under
Section 125 Cr.P.C. before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Chamba and the said application was dismissed vide order dated
15.3.2017. Against the said order, revision petition under Section
397 Cr.P.C. was preferred by the petitioner/plaintiff before the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Chamba,
who vide order
dated 20.11.2017 also dismissed the revision petition and
affirmed
the
findings
returned
Magistrate, Chamba. Still
by
feeling
learned
Chief
Judicial
aggrieved,
the
petitioner/plaintiff approached this Court by filing Cr.MMO
No.127/2018 challenging dismissal
of the application filed for
DNA test. The said CrMMO was listed before this Court and vide
its order, dated 24.07.2021, counsel for the petitioner withdrew
the said petition. The respondent /defendant No.1 prayed for
dismissal of the application being baseless and without merit.
The learned Additional Principal Judge, Family Court,
vide its order dated 20.11.2024 dismissed the application filed by
the petitioner/plaintiff for DNA test.
The
petitioner/plaintiff has assailed the said order
dated 20.11.2024 by filing the instant petition under Section 115
CPC.
It is contended by Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr. Somesh Sharma, Advocate, appearing
for the petitioner/plaintiff that the impugned order is erroneous
and liable to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that
the plaintiff/petitioner
has made out a case for
allowing the
application for DNA test. Therefore, after accepting the present
petition, the application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff deserves
to be allowed.
On the other hand,
the impugned order has been
defended by Mr. Malay Kaushal, Advocate, appearing for the
respondents/defendants. He has submitted that while invoking
provisions of Section 115, scope of interference in the impugned
order is very limited. He has further submitted that in view of
the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various
cases, application for DNA test is not permissible in a routine
manner until and unless prima facie case is made out by the
petitioner/plaintiff.
I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at
length and perused the case file.
Before delving into merits of the case, it is apposite to
explain the nature and scope conferred to this Court under
Section 115 of the CPC and analyze whether this Court is
empowered to deal with the issues raised by the petitioner in the
instant case. The said provision reads as under:
“Section 115. Revision[(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case which
has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High
Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such
subordinate court appears-(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or
with material irregularity, the High Court may make such
order in the case as it thinks fit:
[Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section,
vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an
issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where
the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying
for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other
proceedings.] [(2) The High Court shall not, under this section,
vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal
lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate
thereto.] [(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or
other proceeding before the Court except where such suit or
other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.] [Explanation.-In this section, the expression "any case which has been
decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an
issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding.]”
On bare perusal of the above provision, it is clear that
the High Court can only interfere with the orders of the
Subordinate Court if the Court below has committed illegality or
material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction. It is imperative
to note that under the revisional powers, this Court cannot
attack the findings on the facts by the Subordinate Court and
can only interfere if any infirmities are found with the exercise of
jurisdiction of the Court and not when the courts erroneously
decide the cases.
The primary object of the revision powers conferred to
the High Courts is to prevent subordinate courts from acting
arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally while they exercise their
jurisdiction. The aspect related to the revision powers given to
the High Court has been extensively dealt with by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in a catena of judgments, whereby the Hon'ble
Court discussed the meaning and scope of the said provision.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in M/s D.L.F. Housing
and Construction Company (P) Ltd., New Delhi vs. Sarup
Singh and others, 1969(3) SCC 807, has considered the
provisions of Section 115 of CPC as follows:
“5. The position thus seems to be firmly established that while
exercising the jurisdiction u/s 115, it is not competent to the
High Court to correct errors of fact however gross or even
errors of law unless the said errors have relation to the
jurisdiction of the Court to try the dispute itself. Clauses (a)
and (b) of this section on their plain reading quite clearly do
not cover the present case. It was not contended, as indeed it
was not possible to contend, that the learned Additional
District Judge had either exercised a jurisdiction not vested in
him by law or had failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in
him, in recording the order that the proceedings under
reference be stayed till the decision of the appeal by the High
Court in the proceedings for specific performance of the
agreement in question. Clause (c) also does not seem to apply
to the case in hand. The words "illegally" and "with material
irregularity" as used in this Clause do not cover either errors of
fact or of law; they do not refer to the decision arrived at but
merely to the manner in which it is reached. The errors
contemplated by this Clause may, in our view, relate either to
breach of some provision of law or to material defects of
procedure affecting the ultimate decision, and not to errors
either of fact or of law, after the prescribed formalities have
been complied with. The High Court does not seem to have
adverted to the limitation imposed on its power u/s 115 of the
Code. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined,
had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different
conclusion on the question of continuing stay of the reference
proceedings pending decision of the appeal, could hardly
justify interference on revision u/s 115 of the Code when there
was no illegality or material irregularity committed by the
learned Additional District Judge in his manner of dealing
with this question. It seems to us that in this matter the High
Court treated the revision virtually as if it was an appeal.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.5622
of 2025, titled as P. Kumarakurubaran vs, P. Narayanan &
others, held as under:-
14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically
averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of
attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of
constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There
is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit
property to any person without the appellant’s consent and
knowledge. Yet, the appellant’s father executed a sale deed in
favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the
power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of
authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be
rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a
cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold.
Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to
reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to
proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional
jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have
interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or
perversity in the trial court’s order. Rejecting the plaint where
substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and
the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally
unsustainable.”
In Ajit Singh & others vs. Krishan Kumar, decided
on 18th October, 2023, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court, held as
under:
“11.
The same view is reiterated in a later decision of this
Court in the case of Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan
Aeronautics Ltd. v. Ajit Prasad Tarway [(1972) 3 SCC 195]
wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through
Hegde, J. clearly stated that the High Court under Section 115
CPC had no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the first
appellate court based on facts or even involving any error of
law. It was next observed that it was not the conclusion of the
High Court that the first appellate court had no jurisdiction to
make the order that it made. The order of the first appellate
court may be right or wrong; may be in accordance with law or
may not be in accordance with law; but one thing is clear, that
it had jurisdiction to make that order. It was not the case that
the first appellate court exercised its jurisdiction either illegally
or with material irregularity. That being so, the High Court
could not have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 115 of
the Civil Procedure Code."
Now, coming to the merits of the case, record reveals
that prior to the institution of the instant application for DNA
test, the petitioner/plaintiff had filed similar application before
the
learned
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Chamba,
in
the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. wherein it was stated by
the petitioner/plaintiff
that after allowing the application,
mother of the minor daughter, Baby Kanika Mahajan be directed
to undergo DNA test in the interest of justice.
The said
application was duly resisted by minor daughter through
natural guardian, her mother,
respondent/defendant No.1.
Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chamba, vide order dated
15.5.2017
dismissed
the
application
as
filed
by
the
petitioner/plaintiff. Thereafter, the petitioner/plaintiff assailed
the said order before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Chamba,
who vide judgment dated 20.11.2017 dismissed the appeal
affirming findings of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Chamba.
Even
Cr.MMO
No.
127/2018
filed
by
the
petitioner/plaintiff against the aforesaid order and judgment was
disposed of as having withdrawn.
Pleadings, especially copy of the plaint and the
application, which has been filed in the instant case for DNA
test, show that such facts have been concealed and suppressed
by the petitioner/plaintiff. Factum of dismissal of the earlier
application, which was affirmed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, and by this Court has not been stated either in
the plaint or in the application filed
for DNA test. The
petitioner/plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean
hands. He has suppressed the material facts, therefore, relief, as
sought for by the plaintiff/petitioner in the application, has
rightly been rejected by the learned court below.
By concealing filing of the similar application earlier,
the instant petition has been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff for
DNA test on the ground that respondent/defendant No.1 is not
his legally wedded wife and respondents/defendants No. 2 to 4
are not his children. In the plaint, it has been averred that he is
not having any relationship with the respondent/defendant No.1
since 30.3.2000 and the said fact has been pleaded by
respondent/defendant No.1 in the petition under Section 125 Cr.
P.C.,
whereby
she
has
categorically
pleaded
that
since
30.3.2007, she is residing at her parental house and the
petitioner/plaintiff has deserted and neglected her. In reply to
the said averments in the application, it has been categorically
stated that
that the respondent/plaintiff has nowhere
that
did
he
not
have
any
respondent/defendant No.1 while
physical
relation
stated
with
her stay in her parental
house. It has been admitted that respondent/defendant No.1
gave birth to defendants No. 2 to 4 while staying at her parental
house. Further it has been averred that the plaintiff used to visit
her parental house frequently. The respondent/defendant No.1
has vehemently and specifically denied the averments that after
30.3.2007, there was no access
between the parties. She has
categorically stated that the petitioner/plaintiff used to visit her
parental house frequently and children were born out of his
lions. The petitioner/plaintiff has failed to prove that there was
no access between the parties.
In order to prove paternity of respondents/defendant
No. 2 to 4, it was incumbent upon the petitioner/plaintiff to
have demonstrated
from the record by leading independent
witnesses that there was no access between the parties and
children were not born out of lions of the parties.
The petitioner/plaintiff filed suit before the learned
Civil Judge (Senior Division), Chamba, in the month of June
2011.
Respondents/defendants
filed
written
statement
on
17.1.2013 and the replication was filed by the petitioner/plaintiff
on 1.6.2013. Admittedly, the issues were framed in the matter on
2.1.2014 when the matter was fixed for final arguments, the
application at hand was filed by the petitioner/plaintiff in order
to conduct DNA test.
The petitioner/plaintiff in order to corroborate his
case has examined himself as PW3, PW1 Dr. Akshay Sharma,
PW2 Dr. Vipin Thakur,
PW4 Beli Ram, Panchayat Secretary,
G.P. Bhakatpur, PW5 Punjab Singh, Record Keeper, CJM Court,
Chamba.
On
the other
hand,
respondent/defendant No.1
appeared as DW1 and also examined her mother PW2 Dhano.
The issues were framed way back in the year 2014
and till date, trial has not concluded.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
DNA test cannot be conducted in a routine manner. The
petitioner has to carve out
a case for conducting
DNA test.
There is no averment or material placed on record to show that
there was no access between the parties. In the application,
which was filed for DNA test, a categorical stand has been taken
by respondent/defendant No.1 that the petitioner/plaintiff used
to
visit
her
parental
house
frequently,
therefore,
the
petitioner/plaintiff under the garb of the instant application
cannot be allowed to avail undue and unfair advantage.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held
that DNA
testing cannot be ordered as a matter of course and must be
subject to stringent safeguards to protect the dignity of
individuals and the legitimacy of children born during the
wedlock. The power to direct such tests must be exercised with
utmost circumspection and only when the interests of justice
imperatively demand such an intrusive procedure. Court must
remain vigilant against fishing inquiries masquerading as
legitimate requests for scientific evidence. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Goutam Kundu vs. State of West Bengal (1993) 3
SCC 418 has laid down the following parameters:“26. From the above discussion it emerges— (1) that courts
in India cannot order blood test as a matter of course;
(2) wherever applications are made for such prayers in
order to have roving inquiry, the prayer for blood test
cannot be entertained.
(3) There must be a strong prima facie case in that the
husband must establish non-access in order to dispel the
presumption arising under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.
(4) The court must carefully examine as to what would be
the consequence of ordering the blood test; whether it will
have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and the
mother as an unchaste woman.
(5) No one can be compelled to give sample of blood for
analysis.”
These parameters have been subsequently followed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sharda v. Dharmpal, (2003)
4 SCC 493
and Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Orissa State
Commission for Women (2010) 8 SCC 633. In these cases, it
was held that DNA tests may be ordered, only if a strong prima
facie case of non-access is made out, with sufficient material
placed before the court to arrive at a decision.
The Court has to consider whether directing a DNA
test would serve the best interests of the parties involved or
whether it would occasion undue harm. The balance of interests
must account for the rights and welfare of all the stakeholders—
the petitioner/plaintiff, the children and respondent/defendant
No.1 herself.
The contours of the right to privacy, as an intrinsic
facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, were elaborated upon by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in K.S. Puttaswamy and Another
vs. Union of India and Others (2017) 10 SCC 1, para 325
thereof, read as under:
“325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental
freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and
personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute
right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to
withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on
fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion
of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which
stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable.
The law must also be valid with reference to the
encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article
21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the
threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the
existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate
State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational
nexus between the objects and the means adopted to
achieve them.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ivan Rathinam vs.
Milan Jospeh, 2025 INSC 115 has held that it is wellestablished that access and non-access under Section 112 of the
Indian Evidence Act do not require a party to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that they had or did not have sexual
intercourse at the time the child could have been begotten.
‘Access’ merely refers to the possibility of an opportunity for
marital relations. To put it more simply, while parties may be on
non-speaking terms, engaging in extra-marital affairs, or residing
in different houses in the same village, it does not necessarily
preclude the possibility of the spouses having an opportunity to
engage in marital relations. Non-access means the impossibility,
not merely inability, of the spouses to have marital relations with
each other. For a person to rebut the presumption of legitimacy,
they must first assert non-access which, in turn, must be
substantiated by evidence. It shall be apposite to reproduce
relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment, which read as under:“27. Before delving into the analysis, it is pertinent to
elucidate Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872:
“112. Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.
The fact that any person was born during the continuance
of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or
within two hundred and eighty days after its dissolution,
the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof
that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be
shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to
each other at any time when he could have been begotten.”
28. The language of the provision makes it abundantly clear
that there exists a strong presumption that the husband is
the father of the child borne by his wife during the
subsistence of their marriage. This section provides that
conclusive proof of legitimacy is equivalent to paternity. The
object of this principle is to prevent any unwarranted
enquiry into the parentage of a child. Since the presumption
is in favour of legitimacy, the burden is cast upon the
person who asserts ‘illegitimacy’ to prove it only through
‘non-access.’
30. It is only when such an assertion is made, that the court
can consider the question of ordering a DNA test to
establish paternity……
47. First and foremost, the courts must, therefore, consider
the existing evidence
to assess the presumption of
legitimacy. If that evidence is insufficient to come to a
finding, only then should the court consider ordering a DNA
test. Once the insufficiency of evidence is established, the
court must consider whether ordering a DNA test is in the
best interests of the parties involved and must ensure that
it does not cause undue harm to the parties. There are thus,
two blockades to ordering a DNA test: (i) insufficiency of
evidence; and (ii) a positive finding regarding the balance of
interests.”
It has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that forcefully undergoing a DNA test would subject an
individual’s private life to scrutiny from the outside world.
Scrutiny, particularly when concerning matters of infidelity, can
be harsh and can eviscerate a person’s reputation and standing
in society.
Usually in cases concerning legitimacy, it is the
child’s dignity and privacy that have to be protected. The effects
of social stigma surrounding an illegitimate child make their way
into the parents’ lives as there may be undue scrutiny owing to
the alleged infidelity.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in K. S. Puttanswamy
(supra) has held that if even one of these conditions fails, it is
considered
an
unwarranted
invasion
of
privacy
and
consequently, of life and personal liberty as embodied in Article
21 of the Constitution.
The Court must
analyze and consider
existing
evidence to assess presumption of the legitimacy. In case
evidence is insufficient only then, should the Court consider
ordering a DNA test. Thus, two parameters as laid down by the
Hon’ble
Supreme
Court for ordering DNA test
are – (i)
insufficiency of evidence; (ii) a positive finding regarding
the
balance of interests, are pari material.
The law infers a presumption in favour of a marriage
when a man and woman have continuously cohabitated for a
long spell. No doubt, the said presumption is rebuttable and can
be rebutted by leading unimpeachable evidence. When there is
any circumstance that weakens such a presumption, courts
ought not to ignore the same. The burden lies heavily on the
party who seeks to question the cohabitation and to deprive the
relationship of a legal sanctity.
It is no longer res integra that if a man and woman
cohabit as husband and wife for a long duration, one can draw a
presumption in their favour that they were living together as a
consequence of a valid marriage. This presumption can be drawn
under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:
“114. The Court may presume the existence of any fact
which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had
to the common course of natural events, human conduct
and public and private business, in their relation to the
facts of the particular case.”
In this above context, it would be apposite to refer
to Andrahennedige Dinohamy and Another vs. Wijetunge
Liyanapatabendige Balahamy and Others 1927 SCC OnLine
PC 51, wherein the Privy Council has observed thus:
“…..where a man and woman are proved to have lived
together as man and wife, the law will presume, unless the
contrary be clearly proved, that they were living together in
consequence of a valid marriage and not in a state of
concubinage.
xxx xxx xxx
The parties lived together for twenty years in the same
house, and eight children were born to them. The husband
during his life recognized, by affectionate provisions, his
wife and children. The evidence of the Registrar of the
District shows that for a long course of years the parties
were recognized as married citizens, and even the family
functions and ceremonies, such as, in particular, the
reception of the relations and other guests in the family
house by Don Andris and Balahamy as host and hostess—
all such functions were conducted on the footing alone that
they were man and wife. No evidence whatsoever is
afforded of repudiation of this relation by husband or wife
or anybody.”
In Mohabbat Ali Khan vs. Muhammad Ibrahim
Khan And Others, 1929 SCC OnLine PC 21, it was again
observed by the Privy Council that:
“….The law presumes in favour of marriage and against
concubinage when a man and a woman have cohabited
continuously for a number of years……”
Similarly, in Badri Prasad vs. Dy. Director of
Consolidation and Others, (1978) 3 SCC 527,
the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as follows:
“…….A strong presumption arises in favour of wedlock
where the partners have lived together for a long spell as
husband and wife. Although the presumption is rebuttable,
a heavy burden lies on him who seeks to deprive the
relationship of legal origin. Law leans in favour of
legitimacy and frowns upon bastardy…..”
In S.P.S. Balasubramanyam vs. Suruttayan alias
Andali Padayachi and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 460, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:
“4. What has been settled by this Court is that if a man and
woman live together for long years as husband and wife
then a presumption arises in law of legality of marriage
existing
between
the
two.
But
the
presumption
is
rebuttable. (see Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari, (1952) 1
SCC 713).
It is true that there would be a presumption in favour
of the wedlock if the partners lived together for a long spell as
husband and wife, but, the said presumption is rebuttable
though heavy onus is placed on the one who seeks to deprive the
relationship of its legal origin to prove that no marriage had
taken place (refer: Tulsa and Others vs. Durghatiya and
Others, (2008) 4 SCC 520).
A similar view has been taken by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Madan Mohan Singh and Others vs. Rajni Kant and
another (2010) 9 SCC 209, Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
(2013)
SCC
and
Dhannulal
And
Others
vs.
Ganeshram and another (2015) 12 SCC 301.
In Gokal Chand v. Parvin Kumari alias Usha
Rani, (1952) 1 SCC 713, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
observed thus:
“……Continuous cohabitation of man and woman as
husband and wife and their treatment as such for a
number of years may raise the presumption of marriage,
but the presumption which may be drawn from long
cohabitation is rebuttable and if there are circumstances
which weaken and destroy that presumption, the court
cannot ignore them.”
In Kattukandi Edathil Krishnana and anoterh vs.
Kattukandi Edathil Valsan & ors., 2022 SCC OnLine SC
737, citing the above said decisions and relying on Section
114 of the Evidence Act, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in
the facts of the said case that there was a presumption of the
marriage between the parents of the plaintiffs on the ground of
their long cohabitation status, entitling their offspring to claim
their share in the suit schedule property.
The learned Court below has rightly relied upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Aparna Ajinkya
Firodia vs. Ajinkya Arun Firodia 2024 (7) SCC 773, wherein
it has been held that
the child cannot be used as a pawn to
show that the mother of the child was living in adultery. It is
always open to the respondent-husband to prove by other
evidence, the adulterous conduct of the wife, but the child’s right
to identity should not be allowed to be sacrificed.
In
the
present
case,
onus
lies
upon
the
petitioner/plaintiff to prove that respondent/defendant No.1 is
not his legally wedded wife and respondents/defendants No.2 to
4, children, are not born out of the lions of the parties. Said fact
has been highly disputed by respondent/defendant No.1 and all
these questions are to be determined in trial by leading
respective evidence by the parties. The parties have led their
evidence and now the case is fixed for final arguments of the
parties. In the absence of any evidence or corroboration in the
instant application that there was no access between the parties,
the application in hand has rightly been rejected by the learned
Court below. It seems that the instant petition has been filed in
order to circumvent the orders, which have been passed by the
competent
courts
below
under
Section
Cr.P.C.
The
petitioner/plaintiff in order to wriggle out from the payment of
maintenance, as has been awarded by the courts below, has filed
the application for DNA test to get out of the same. This is not
the
first
application
which
has
been
filed
by
the
petitioner/plaintiff.
As observed above, earlier application, which has
been filed by the petitioner/plaintiff for DNA test in the
proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., was dismissed by the
learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the said order was
confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. Even
though the petitioner/plaintiff
approached this Court by filing
Cr.MMO, however, the same was also withdrawn.
Now, again
the petitioner/plaintiff cannot be permitted to file the instant
application that too in absence of any ground for DNA test. There
is nothing on record to show or prove or indicate that there was
no access between the parties.
For the reasons stated hereinabove and in view of
exposition of law (supra), the instant petition being devoid of
merit, is liable to be dismissed with costs. Ordered accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
21.05.2026
(pankaj)
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
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