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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI
DELHI
Reserved on: 27.01.2026
Date of decision: 12.02.2026
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AT NEW
RFA(OS) 89/2015
AMAR N GUGNANI
.....Appellant
Through:
Mr. Manish Kumar, Mr. Rehan Bhasin
& Ms. Aparajita Jha, Advs.
versus
NARESH KUMAR GUGNANI (SINCE DECEASED THR LRS)
SUNITA GUGNANI & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Pravir Kumar Jain & Mr. Arjav Jain,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
1.
The present appeal has been preferred by the Appellant under Section 96
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Section 10 of the Delhi High
Court Rules, assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 30.07.2015, passed by
learned Single Judge, (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Order”), whereby
the Suit of the Appellant was dismissed being barred by the provisions of
Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Benami Act”).
2.
Briefly stated facts are that the Appellant, presently a resident of United
States of America (USA), instituted a Civil Suit being CS (OS) No. 478 of
2004 seeking, inter alia, reliefs of declaration, eviction, recovery of damages,
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rendition of accounts and permanent and mandatory injunctions in respect of
property bearing No. 33, Uday Park, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the
suit property”).
3.
It is the case of the Appellant that he left India in the year 1962 for
higher studies and thereafter pursued his education and career in the USA.
During the course of his stay abroad, he remitted substantial funds to India and
entrusted the same to his father, late Shri Jai Gopal Gugnani, for being held and
utilized for the benefit of the Appellant. Subsequent thereto, on the suggestion
of his father, the Appellant decided to purchase a plot of land in New Delhi for
construction of a residential house. Acting on this advice, and as the Appellant
was based abroad and unable to manage his affairs in India, it was agreed that
the plot would be acquired in the name of his father, who would hold the same
for and on behalf of the Appellant. Pursuant thereto, a perpetual lease deed
dated 09.05.1973 in respect of the suit property measuring approximately
425.25 sq. mts., was executed by the Delhi Development Authority in favour of
the Appellant’s father and was registered on 21.08.1974.The Appellant
categorically pleaded in his plaint that the entire consideration for purchase of
the plot, as also the funds for construction raised thereon, were provided by
him. After completion of construction, the property was let out and was
managed by the Appellant’s father, for and on behalf of the Appellant.
4.
Thereafter, disputes arose with the tenant on account of non-payment of
rent and legal proceedings for eviction were initiated. In June 1990, the
Appellant’s father suffered a stroke and he subsequently passed away on
28.04.1992.
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5.
After the demise of his father, as the Appellant was residing in the USA,
he executed a Power of Attorney in favour of his younger brother (the
Respondent, since deceased), authorising him to pursue eviction proceedings
and manage the property. Disputes thereafter arose between the Appellant and
his younger brother regarding management of the suit property and rendition of
accounts. The Appellant revoked the Power of Attorney and, upon failure of the
Respondent to comply with the demands raised in the legal notice dated
05.05.2003, instituted the subject suit in the year 2004.
6.
Upon service of summons, the Respondent filed a written statement
denying the Appellant’s claim and raised a preliminary objection that the suit
was barred under the provisions of the Benami Act. The Appellant filed
replication controverting the said objection.
7.
On completion of pleadings, the learned Single Judge, by order dated
11.08.2008, framed issues, including Issue No. 1 as to whether the suit was
barred by the provisions of the Benami Act, and placed the onus of the said
issue upon his younger brother, the respondent.
8.
During cross-examination of the Appellant, questions were raised
regarding his financial capacity at the time of acquisition of the suit property.
The Appellant sought to rely upon certain documents in support thereof. As the
documents were not already on record, objections were raised, and the
Appellant thereafter filed an application under Order VII Rule 14 CPC seeking
leave to place the documents on record. The Appellant also filed an application
under Section 151 CPC seeking amendment of the list of witnesses, as one of
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the witnesses had expired and his replacement by the architect involved in
construction was sought.
9.
Both such applications were dismissed by the learned Joint Registrar by
Orders dated 29.05.2015. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant preferred Chamber
Appeals being OA Nos. 265–266 of 2015.
10.
The said Chamber Appeals were listed before the learned Single Judge
on 20.07.2015, on which date the matter was posted to be heard on the issue of
maintainability. Thereafter, while hearing the parties on the issue of
maintainability, by way of the Impugned Order, the learned Single Judge
dismissed the suit as barred under the Benami Act, holding that the transaction
in question was a benami transaction and did not fall within the exception
under Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Act. Aggrieved thereof, the Appellant has
preferred the present appeal.
11.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
12.
From the record, it is evident that while hearing the Chamber Appeals,
the learned Single Judge expressly put the Appellant to notice that Issue No. 1
relating to maintainability would be heard as a legal issue. The learned Single
Judge thereafter proceeded to exercise jurisdiction akin to Order VII Rule 11
CPC and dismissed the suit on the ground of statutory bar. The relevant order
passed by the learned Single Judge reads as under:“List on 30th July, 2015. Counsel for the plaintiff is
put to notice that the issue no. l which is framed in
this case is a completely legal issue and once the
issue is a legal issue with respect to bar to the suit,
then, either under Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil
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Procedure, 1908 (CPC) or Order 12 Rule 6 CPC the
suit may no longer to be continued. Plaintiff, of
course, with respect to arguments of maintainability
of the suit will be heard on the next date of hearing
and when these OAs be also listed for hearing.”
13.
While exercising the power akin to Order VII Rule 11, by claiming the
issue one to be a legal issue, the principal reasoning adopted by the learned
Single Judge is that the suit was barred under Section 4(1) of the Benami Act,
and that such bar was apparent from the Appellant’s own pleadings. The plaint
unequivocally admitted that the suit property has been purchased in the name of
the father with consideration allegedly provided by the Appellant, and that the
father was merely a benamidar while the Appellant claimed to be the real
owner. On this admitted position, the Court held that the transaction squarely
fell within the definition of a benami transaction and the issue was a pure
question of law, capable of being decided as a preliminary issue without
evidence.
14.
The learned Single Judge further placing reliance on J.M. Kohli vs.
Madan Mohan Sahni & Anr. 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2620, held that the
Appellant could not take shelter under the exception in Section 4(3)(b) by
labelling the father as a trustee or fiduciary. It was observed that ordinary
benami transactions inherently involve an element of trust or confidence
between the parties, and permitting such a plea would defeat the very object of
the Benami Act, especially in view of Section 7 repealing Sections 81, 82 and
94 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882.
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15.
The primary objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is
that the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the suit, despite the fact that
the suit had proceeded to trial and issues had already been framed. The question
whether the transaction was barred by benami or fell within the exception under
Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Act involved mixed questions of law and fact,
requiring adjudication on the basis of the evidence led. The impugned
dismissal, therefore, amounts to deciding a contested issue of fact prematurely
and has resulted in denial of a fair opportunity to the Appellant to establish the
pleaded fiduciary relationship by leading evidence.
16.
While placing reliance on Marcel Martins v. M. Printer, (2012) 5 SCC
342, he submitted that fiduciary relationships fall within the protection of
Section 4(3)(b) and are not barred by the Benami Act. The distinction drawn by
the learned Single Judge on the basis of “compulsion” is unsupported by the
language of the statute, which does not require compulsion or breach of trust as
a pre-condition for the applicability of the exception.
17.
He further contended that the interpretation adopted by the learned
Single Judge of Sections 4(3)(b) and 7 of the Benami Act is also erroneous.
Section 7 and Section 4(3)(b) operate in distinct fields and must be
harmoniously construed; to read the repeal as nullifying the statutory exception
would render Section 4(3)(b) otiose and defeat the clear legislative intent
reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Benami Act.
18.
The principal question that thus arises for consideration is whether the
learned Single Judge was justified in treating the issue as a pure question of law
divorced from the factual matrix.
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19.
A reading of the plaint, as a whole, reveals that the Appellant specifically
pleaded the existence of a fiduciary relationship between himself and his father
and asserted that the suit property was held by the latter for the benefit of the
former. The learned Single Judge extracted portions of the plaint wherein the
Appellant described the transaction as “benami”. However, whether the
fiduciary relationship pleaded was genuine, real and pre-existing, or whether
the transaction was merely a benami arrangement clothed as a fiduciary one,
could not have been conclusively determined without permitting the parties to
lead evidence.
20.
At this stage, it becomes imperative to refer to the case of Marcel
Martins (supra), which while interpreting the definition of fiduciary
relationship and manner of deciding the existence of fiduciary relationship,
held as under:
37. We may at this stage refer to a recent decision of
this Court in CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay [(2011)
8 SCC 497] , wherein Raveendran, J. speaking for the
Court in that case explained the terms “fiduciary”
and “fiduciary relationship” in the following words :
(SCC pp. 524-25, para 39)
“39. The term ‘fiduciary’ refers to a person
having a duty to act for the benefit of another,
showing good faith and candour, where such other
person reposes trust and special confidence in the
person owing or discharging the duty. The term
‘fiduciary relationship’ is used to describe a situation
or transaction where one person (beneficiary) places
complete confidence in another person (fiduciary) in
regard to his affairs, business or transaction(s). The
term also refers to a person who holds a thing in trust
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for another (beneficiary). The fiduciary is expected to
act in confidence and for the benefit and advantage of
the beneficiary, and use good faith and fairness in
dealing with the beneficiary or the things belonging
to the beneficiary. If the beneficiary has entrusted
anything to the fiduciary, to hold the thing in trust or
to execute certain acts in regard to or with reference
to the entrusted thing, the fiduciary has to act in
confidence and is expected not to disclose the thing or
information to any third party.”
It is manifest that while the expression “fiduciary
capacity” may not be capable of a precise definition,
it implies a relationship that is analogous to the
relationship between a trustee and the beneficiaries
of the trust. The expression is in fact wider in its
import for it extends to all such situations as place
the parties in positions that are founded on
confidence and trust on the one part and good faith
on the other.
38. In determining whether a relationship is based
on trust or confidence, relevant to determining
whether they stand in a fiduciary capacity, the court
shall have to take into consideration the factual
context in which the question arises for it is only in
the factual backdrop that the existence or otherwise
of a fiduciary relationship can be deduced in a given
case. Having said that, let us turn to the facts of the
present case once more to determine whether the
appellant stood in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis the
respondent-plaintiffs.
(emphasis added)
21.
In view of the aforesaid, the issue as to the applicability of the exception
carved out under Section 4(3)(b) of the Benami Act is, therefore, a mixed
question of law and fact. Once issues had been framed and the suit had
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proceeded to trial, the learned Single Judge erred in short-circuiting the
adjudicatory process by dismissing the suit on the ground of maintainability,
particularly when the onus to prove the bar under the Benami Act had been
placed on the Respondent and the parties were in process of leading the
evidence.
22.
The mere use of the expression “benami” in the plaint could not, by
itself, extinguish the statutory exception under Section 4(3)(b), especially when
foundational facts constituting a fiduciary relationship were specifically
pleaded. The correctness or otherwise of the Appellant’s claim that his father
held the suit property in a fiduciary capacity, and that the transaction falls
within the protective umbrella of Section 4(3)(b), can only be adjudicated upon
a full appreciation of the pleadings and evidence.
23.
Furthermore, the reliance placed on J.M. Kohli is misplaced and clearly
distinguishable both on facts and in law. In J.M. Kohli, the suit was rejected at
the threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the basis of plaint averments
alone, which disclosed a classic benami transaction resting merely on payment
of consideration and a vague plea of familial trust, coupled with an independent
bar of limitation apparent from the plaintiff’s own pleadings. In the present
case, however, issues had already been framed, the onus to establish the
statutory bar under the Benami Act was cast upon the respondent, and the suit
had progressed to trial. The plaint herein contains specific and categorical
pleadings of a pre-existing fiduciary relationship, including entrustment of
funds, management of the property for and on behalf of the Appellant, and
holding of the property in a fiduciary capacity, matters requiring adjudication
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on evidence. Unlike J.M. Kohli, where the plea of trust was held to be a mere
incident of a benami transaction barred by statute, the present case raises a
mixed question of law and fact falling within the ambit of Section 4(3)(b) of the
Benami Act, thereby rendering summary dismissal impermissible.
24.
In view of the foregoing, the Impugned Order cannot stand and is,
accordingly, set aside. The present appeal is allowed. The parties, through their
counsels, are directed to appear before the learned Single Judge on 25.02.2026.
25.
Accordingly, the present appeal, along with pending applications, stands
disposed of.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
RENU BHATNAGAR
(JUDGE)
FEBRUARY 12, 2026/kp/tr
RFA(OS) 89/2015
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