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2026:HHC:3357
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 3002 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
Aman Rana
….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner(s)
:
For the Respondent/State:
Mr Kapil Sharma, Advocate.
Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 40 of 2025, dated 16.4.2025, registered at
Police Station, Gagret, District Una, H.P. for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 126(2), 308(4), 324(5),
351(2), 352, 62, 111(2)(B) read with Section 3(5) of Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
2026:HHC:3357
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution,
Kanwar Sandeep Singh, Proprietor of Thakur Stone Crusher,
Guglehar, filed a complaint asserting that Amrish Rana, Amit
Mankotia and two other persons came to the spot on 15.4.2025 at
about 10.00 PM in their vehicles bearing Registration No. HP-679251 and HP-72D-0695. They stopped JCB Driver Shiv Kumar
and Tipper Driver Sanjay Rana, who were loading goods on the
bank of the river Swan. They threatened the JCB Driver and the
tipper driver to take away their vehicles from the spot. Amrish
Rana had a darat in his hand, and he threatened to kill the drivers
with it. The drivers took their vehicles away from the spot.
Amrish Rana and his companions put some substance in the
engines of the vehicle and deflated their tyres. Driver Shiv Kumar
and Sanjay Rana narrated the incident to informant Sandeep
Singh, who reported the matter to the police. The police
registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The petitioner is
innocent, and he was falsely implicated. The police have filed the
charge sheet before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be
served by detaining the petitioner in custody. The petitioner
would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may
2026:HHC:3357
impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the informant, Kanwar Sandeep Singh, made a
complaint to the police stating that he had established Thakur
Store Crusher Guglehar about 03 years before the incident. He
had employed the drivers to drive the vehicles and the JCB.
Amrish Rana visited the Swan River on 12.04.2025 with his
friends and threatened the drivers. He again visited the spot on
15.04.2025 at 10:00 pm with Amit Mankotia in the vehicles
bearing registration Nos. HP67-9251 and HP72D-0695. They
threatened Shiv Kumar, the driver of the JCB and Sanjay Rana,
the driver of the tipper. Amrish Rana had a “darat”, and he
threatened to kill the drivers on failure to accompany him. The
drivers drove the vehicles to the Swan River. Amrish Rana and his
friends put something into the engine and deflated the tyres of
the tipper. Amrish Rana had already threatened the informant
and Rohit Kumar to face dire consequences on failure to pay
money to him. Police registered the FIR and investigated the
matter. It was found after the investigation that the accused had
threatened the informant Kanwar Sandeep Singh and Rohit
2026:HHC:3357
Kumar, owner of Sai Stone Crusher, for ransom. Hence, the
offence punishable under Section 111(2) of the BNS was added.
Amrish Rana and Amit Mankotia produced the vehicles bearing
registration No. HP-72D-0695 and HP-67-9251, along with
documents and the keys, which were seized by the police. Amrish
Rana did not produce his mobile phone or darat, which was used
during the incident. Amit Mankotia produced his mobile phone,
which was analyzed and it was found that it was used for calling
someone virtually. The petitioner was acquitted in FIR No.
185/2014, 216/15, and 220/15, and FIR No.37/25 is still pending
against him. The informant stated during the investigation that
Amrish Rana, Amit Mankotia and two other persons had
threatened him on 15.4.2025. Amrish Rana, Amit Mankotia and
Aman Rana named Jagpal as their accomplice. Jagpal produced a
bail order passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, and he
was released on bail in terms of the order. The charge sheet was
filed before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Amb, on 26.08.2025. As per the result of the analysis,
hydrocarbons were detected in the contents of the parcel sent for
analysis. The result of the analysis of the mobile phone is
awaited. The petitioner would indulge in the commission of a
2026:HHC:3357
similar offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard Mr Kapil Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner Aman Rana and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy
Advocate General for the respondent-State.
5.
Mr Kapil Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner
Aman Rana, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The offence punishable under Section 111 of
the BNS is not made out against the petitioner because no FIR
was registered against him or any other person in the preceding
ten years, which is a requirement of Section 111 of the BNS. The
police have filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the
custody of the petitioner is not required for the investigation. No
fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in
custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the petitioner be released on bail.
6.
Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner had
threatened the informant on the previous occasion for ransom.
The petitioner was involved in the commission of similar
2026:HHC:3357
offences earlier, and he would indulge in the commission of a
similar offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
2026:HHC:3357
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the
antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while
on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of
evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis
supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is
a genuine case against the accused and that the
prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence
in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
2026:HHC:3357
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted
as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this
Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from
case to case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a
guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the
same should always be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is
one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the
more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of
rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the
factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
2026:HHC:3357
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application for bail
are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual
order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat
2857) of the High Court granting bail to the accused,
observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar,
2026:HHC:3357
(2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para
35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given
to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis
the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
As per the prosecution, the petitioner and the co-
accused, including Jagpal Singh Rana and Amit Mankotia, had
intimidated the informant and other persons. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court released Jagpal Singh Rana on pre-arrest bail in
Criminal Appeal No.4609 of 2025 arising out of the SLP CRL No.
(11389 of 2025) titled Jagpal Singh Vs. State of HP, decided on
27.10.2025. Learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Una released
Amit Mankotia in Bail Application No.293 of 2025, titled Amit
2026:HHC:3357
Mankotia Vs. State of HP, decided on 8.9.2025. Petitioner had
applied for bail before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I,
Una, but his application was dismissed on the ground that he had
criminal antecedents. The offences alleged against them were
grave, involving violence and risk to public peace. Therefore, he
could not be released on bail.
11.
of
The police have registered the FIR for the commission
offences
punishable
under
Sections
126(2)
(wrongful
restraint), 308(4) (extortion), 324(5) (mischief), 351(2) (criminal
intimidation), 352 (intentional insult), 62 (attempt to commit
offence punishable with imprisonment) and 111 (organized
crime). The FIR did not mention that Amrish Rana, Amit
Mankotia or any other person had threatened the informant or
any other person before the incident for ransom. A statement
was made during the pendency of the investigation to this effect.
Therefore, prima facie, it is doubtful that such an offence had
been committed because had it been so, the matter would have
been reported to the police at the earliest or at least while
registering the present FIR.
12.
as follows:
The police have also added Section 111 of BNS. It reads
2026:HHC:3357
“111. Organised Crime. “(1) Any continuing unlawful
activity including kidnapping, robbery, vehicle theft,
extortion, land grabbing, contract killing, economic
offence, cyber-crimes, trafficking of persons, drugs,
weapons or illicit goods or services, human trafficking for
prostitution or ransom, by any person or a group of
persons acting in concert, singly or jointly, either as a
member of an organized crime syndicate or on behalf of
such syndicate, by use of violence, threat of violence,
intimidation, coercion, or by any other unlawful means to
obtain direct or indirect material benefit including a
financial benefit, shall constitute organized crime.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this sub-section,—
(i) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of
two or more persons who, acting either singly or
jointly, as a syndicate or gang, indulge in any
continuing unlawful activity;
(ii) “continuing unlawful activity” means an
activity prohibited by law which is a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment of three
years or more, undertaken by any person, either
singly or jointly, as a member of an organised crime
syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate in respect
of which more than one charge-sheets have been
filed before a competent Court within the preceding
period of ten years and that Court has taken
cognizance of such offence, and includes economic
offence;
(iii) “economic offence” includes criminal breach of
trust, forgery, counterfeiting of currency notes,
bank notes, bank-notes and Government stamps,
hawala transaction, mass-marketing fraud or
running any scheme to defraud several persons or
doing any act in any manner with a view to defraud
any bank or financial institution or any other
institution organization for obtaining monetary
benefits in any form.
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(2) Whoever commits organised crime shall—
(a) If such offence has resulted in the death of any
person, be punished with death or imprisonment for
life, and shall also be liable to a fine which shall not
be less than ten lakh rupees;
(b) In any other case, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a
fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
(3) Whoever abets, attempts, conspires or knowingly
facilitates the commission of an organised crime, or
otherwise engages in any act preparatory to an organised
crime, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
(4) Any person who is a member of an organised crime
syndicate shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than five years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
a fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees.
(5) Whoever, intentionally, harbours or conceals any
person who has committed the offence of an organised
crime shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than three years but which may
extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine which shall not be less than five lakh rupees: Provided
that this sub-Section shall not apply to any case in which
the harbour or concealment is by the spouse of the
offender.
(6) Whoever possesses any property derived or obtained
from the commission of an organised crime or proceeds of
any organised crime or which has been acquired through
the organised crime, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to imprisonment for life
2026:HHC:3357
and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than
two lakh rupees.
(7) If any person on behalf of a member of an organized
crime syndicate is, or at any time has been in possession
of movable or immovable property which he cannot
satisfactorily account for, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
three years but which may extend to imprisonment for ten
years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less
than one lakh rupees”.
13.
A bare perusal of the section shows that a person
should indulge in a specified activity either singly or jointly as a
member of an organised crime syndicate in respect of which
more than one charge sheet has been filed before a Court within
the preceding period of ten years, and the Court has taken
cognisance of such offence.
14.
This section was explained by the Karnataka High
Court in Avinash vs. State of Karnataka (11.03.2025 - KARHC):
MANU/KA/0938/2025 as under:
1. The primary intent behind introducing Section 111 of
BNS, 2023, is to provide a targeted and effective
mechanism to dismantle organised crime syndicates.
From a reading of the said provision of law, it is manifest
that for the purpose of invoking Section 111 of BNS, 2023,
there are certain basic parameters, and if it is found that
the accused comes within the said parameters, the offence
punishable under Section 111 of BNS, 2023 can be invoked.
The said parameters are as follows:
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(a) the offences enlisted in the Section must have
been committed;
(b) accused should be a member of an organised
crime syndicate;
(c) he should have committed the crime as a
member of an organised crime syndicate or on
behalf of such a syndicate.
(d) he should have been chargesheeted more than
once before a competent Court within the preceding
period of ten years for a cognizable offence
punishable with imprisonment for three years or
more, and the Court before which the chargesheet
has been filed should have taken cognisance of such
offence, including an economic offence.
(e) the crime must be committed by using violence,
intimidation, threat, coercion or by any other
unlawful means.
15.
It was laid down by the Kerala High Court in Mohd.
Hashim v. State of Kerala, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 5260, where no
charge sheet was filed against the accused in the preceding ten
years, he cannot be held liable for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 111 of the BNS Act. It was observed:
“10. Section 111 (1) explicitly stipulates that to attract the
offence, there should be a continuing unlawful activity, by
any person or group of persons acting in concert, singly or
jointly, either as a member of an organised crime
syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate. The material
ingredient to attract the above provision, so far as the
present case is concerned, is that there should have been a
continuing unlawful activity committed by a member of
an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such
syndicate.
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11. Explanation (i) and (ii) of sub-section (1) of Section 111
of BNS define an organised crime syndicate and a
continuing unlawful activity, respectively.
12. Continuing unlawful activity under explanation (ii) of
Section 111(1) of the BNS means an activity prohibited by
law, which is a cognizable offence punishable with
imprisonment of three years or more, undertaken by any
person, either singly or jointly, as a member of an
organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate
in respect of which more than one charge-sheet has to be
filed before a competent Court within the preceding period
of ten years and that Court has taken cognizance of such
an offence. Furthermore, an organised crime syndicate
under Explanation (i) of sub-section (1) of Section 111 of
the BNS means a group of two or more persons who,
acting either singly or jointly as a syndicate or gang,
indulge in any continuing unlawful activity.
13. While interpreting the analogous provisions of
the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999,
which mandates the existence of at least two charge
sheets in respect of a specified offence in the preceding
ten years, the Honourable Supreme Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Shiva
alias
Shivaji
Ramaji
Sonawane [(2015) 14 SCC 272] has unequivocally held as
follows:
“9. It was in the above backdrop that the High Court
held that once the respondents had been acquitted for
the offence punishable under the IPC and Arms Act in
Crimes No. 37 and 38 of 2001 and once the Trial Court
had recorded an acquittal even for the offence
punishable under Section 4 read with Section 25 of
the Arms Act in MCOCA Crimes No. 1 and 2 of 2002 all
that remained incriminating was the filing of charge
sheets against the respondents in the past and taking
of cognizance by the competent court over a period of
ten years prior to the enforcement of the MCOCA. The
filing of charge sheets or taking of the cognisance in
the same did not, declared the High Court, by itself
2026:HHC:3357
constitute an offence punishable under Section 3 of the
MCOCA. That is because the involvement of
respondents in previous offences was just about one
requirement, but by no means the only requirement,
which the prosecution has to satisfy to secure a
conviction under MCOCA. What was equally, if not more
important, was the commission of an offence by the
respondents that would constitute “continuing unlawful
activity”. So long as that requirement failed, as was the
position in the instant case, there was no question of
convicting the respondents under Section 3 of the MCOCA.
That reasoning does not, in our opinion, suffer from any
infirmity.
10. The very fact that more than one charge sheet had
been filed against the respondents, alleging offences
punishable with more than three years' imprisonment,
is not enough. As rightly pointed out by the High Court,
commission of offences before the enactment of MCOCA
does not constitute an offence under MCOCA. Registration
of cases, filing of charge sheets and taking of cognisance by
the competent court in relation to the offence alleged to
have been committed by the respondents in the past is but
one of the requirements for invocation of Section 3 of the
MCOCA. Continuation of unlawful activities is the second
and equally important requirement that ought to be
satisfied. Only if an organised crime is committed by the
accused after the promulgation of MCOCA, he may, seen in
the light of the previous charge sheets and the cognisance
taken by the competent court, be said to have committed
an offence under Section 3 of the Act.
11. In the case at hand, the offences which the
respondents are alleged to have committed after the
promulgation of MCOCA were not proved against them.
The acquittal of the respondents in Crimes Nos. 37 and
38 of 2001 signified that they were not involved in the
commission of the offences with which they were
charged. Not only were the respondents were acquitted
of the charge under the Arms Act, but they were also
2026:HHC:3357
acquitted in Crimes Case Nos. 1 and 2 of 2002. No
appeal against that acquittal had been filed by the
State. This implied that the prosecution had failed to
prove the second ingredient required for completion of
an offence under MCOCA. The High Court was, therefore,
right in holding that Section 3 of the MCOCA could not be
invoked only on the basis of the previous charge sheets for
Section 3 would come into play only if the respondents
were proved to have committed an offence for gain or any
pecuniary benefit or undue economic or other advantage
after the promulgation of MCOCA. Such being the case,
the High Court was, in our opinion, justified in
allowing the appeal and setting aside the order passed
by the Trial Court”.
14. Subsequently, the Honourable Supreme Court in State
of Gujarat v. Sandip Omprakash Gupta [2022 SCC OnLine SC
1727], while interpreting the analogous provisions of the
Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act,
2015, clarified the ratio in Shivaji alias Shivaji Ramaji
Sonawane (supra) by observing thus:
“52. It is a sound rule of construction that the
substantive law should be construed strictly so as to
give effect and protection to the substantive rights
unless the statute otherwise intends. Strict
construction is one that limits the application of the
statute by the words used. According to Sutherland,
‘strict construction refuses to extend the import of
words used in a statute so as to embrace cases or acts
which the words do not clearly describe’.
53. The rule as stated by Mahajan C.J. in Tolaram
Relumal v. State of Bombay, (1954) 1 SCC 961: AIR 1954
SC 496, is that “if two possible and reasonable
constructions can be put upon a penal provision, the
court must lean towards that construction which
exempts the subject from penalty rather than the one
which imposes a penalty. It is not competent to the
court to stretch the meaning of an expression used by
the legislature in order to carry out the intention of the
2026:HHC:3357
legislature.”
In State
of
Jharkhand v. Ambay
Cements, (2005) 1 SCC 368, this Court held that it is a
settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is
penal in character, it must be strictly construed and
followed. The basic rule of strict construction of a penal
statute is that a person cannot be penalised without a
clear reading of the law. Presumptions or assumptions
have no role in the interpretation of penal statutes.
They are to be construed strictly in accordance with the
provisions of law. Nothing can be implied. In such
cases, the courts are not so much concerned with what
might possibly have been intended. Instead, they are
concerned with what has actually been said.
54. We are of the view and the same would be in tune with
the dictum as laid in Shiva alias Shivaji Ramaji
Sonawane (supra) that there would have to be some act or
omission which amounts to organised crime after the 2015
Act came into force i.e., 01.12.2019 in respect of which, the
accused is sought to be tried for the first time in the special
court.
55. We are in agreement with the view taken by the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay in the case
of Jaisingh (supra) that neither the definition of the
term ‘organised crime’ nor of the term ‘continuing
unlawful activity’ nor any other provision therein
declares any activity performed prior to the enactment
of the MCOCA to be an offence under the 1999 Act nor
the provision relating to punishment relates to any
offence prior to the date of enforcement of the 1999
Act, i.e., 24.02.1999. However, by referring to the
expression ‘preceding period of ten years' in Section 2(1)
(d), which is a definition clause of the term ‘continuing
unlawful activity’ inference is sought to be drawn that in
fact, it takes into its ambit the acts done prior to the
enforcement of the 1999 Act as being an offence under the
1999 Act. The same analogy will apply to the 2015 Act.
56. There is a vast difference between the act or
activity, which is being termed or called an offence
2026:HHC:3357
under a statute and such act or activity being taken into
consideration as one of the requisites for taking action
under the statute. For the purpose of organised crime,
there has to be a continuing unlawful activity. There
cannot be continuing unlawful activity unless at least
two charge sheets are found to have been lodged in
relation to the offence punishable with three years'
imprisonment during the period of ten years.
Indisputably, the period of ten years may relate to the
period prior to 01.12.2019 or thereafter. In other words,
it provides that the activities, which were offences
under the law in force at the relevant time and in
respect of which two charge sheets have been filed and
the Court has taken cognisance thereof, during the
period of the preceding ten years, then it will be
considered as continuing unlawful activity on
01.12.2019 or thereafter. It nowhere by itself declares
any activity to be an offence under the said 2015 Act
prior to 01.12.2019. It also does not convert any activity
done prior to 01.12.2019 to be an offence under the said
2015 Act. It merely considers two charge sheets in
relation to the acts which were already declared as
offences under the law in force to be one of the
requisites for the purpose of identifying continuing
unlawful activity and/or for the purpose of an action
under the said 2015 Act.
57. If the decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court
in
the
case
of Shiva
alias
Shivaji
Ramaji
Sonawane (supra) is looked into closely along with
other provisions of the Act, the same would indicate
that the offence of ‘organised crime’ could be said to
have been constituted by at least one instance of
continuation, apart from continuing unlawful activity
evidenced by more than one chargesheets in the
preceding ten years. We say so, keeping in mind the
following:
2026:HHC:3357
(a) If ‘organised crime’ was synonymous with
‘continuing unlawful activity’, two separate
definitions were not necessary.
(b) The definitions themselves indicate that the
ingredients of the use of violence in such activity
with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefit
are not included in the definition of ‘continuing
unlawful activity’, but find place only in the
definition of ‘organised crime’.
(c) What is made punishable under Section 3 is
‘organised crime’ and not ‘continuing unlawful
activity’.
(d) If ‘organised crime’ were to refer to only
more than one chargesheets filed, the
classification of crime in Section 3(1)(i) and 3(1)
(ii) resply on the basis of consequence of
resulting in death or otherwise would have been
phrased differently, namely, by providing that ‘if
any one of such offence has resulted in the
death’, since continuing unlawful activity
requires more than one offence. Reference to
‘such offence’ in Section 3(1) implies a specific
act or omission.
(e) As held by this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah (supra)
continuing unlawful activity evidenced by more
than one chargesheets is one of the ingredients
of the offence of organised crime and the
purpose thereof is to see the antecedents and not
to convict, without proof of other facts which
constitute the ingredients of Section 2(1)(e) and
Section 3, which respectively define commission
of offence of organised crime and prescribe
punishment.
(f) There would have to be some act or omission
which amounts to organised crime after the Act
came into force, in respect of which the accused
2026:HHC:3357
is sought to be tried for the first time, in the
Special Court (i.e. has not been or is not being
tried elsewhere).
(g) However, we need to clarify something
important.
Shiva
alias
Shivaji
Ramaji
Sonawane (supra) dealt with the situation where a
person commits no unlawful activity after the
invocation of the MCOCA. In such circumstances, the
person cannot be arrested under the said Act on
account of the offences committed by him before the
coming into force of the said Act, even if he is found
guilty of the same. However, if the person continues
with the unlawful activities and is arrested, after the
promulgation of the said Act, then such a person can
be tried for the offence under the said Act. If a
person ceases to indulge in any unlawful act after
the said Act, then he is absolved of the prosecution
under the said Act. But, if he continues with the
unlawful activity, it cannot be said that the State has
to wait till he commits two acts of which cognisance
is taken by the Court after coming into force. The
same principle would apply, even in the case of the
2015 Act, with which we are concerned.
58. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced
that the dictum as laid by this Court in Shiva alias
Shivaji Ramaji Sonawane(supra) does not require any
relook. The dictum in Shiva alias Shivaji Ramaji
Sonawane (supra) is the correct exposition of law”.
16. Section 111 (1) of the BNS in respect of organised crime
is, in essence, analogous to the provisions of the
Maharashtra Control of Organised Control Act and the
Gujarat Control of Terrorism and Organised Crime Act.
The legal principles laid down by the Honourable Supreme
Court in its interpretation of organised crime as defined by
the above two state legislations are applicable on all fours
to Section 111 (1) of the BNS. Thus, it is not necessary to
have a further interpretation of the above analogous
provision.
2026:HHC:3357
17. In view of the above discussion, to attract an offence
under Section 111 (1) of the BNS it is imperative that a
group of two or more persons indulge in any continuing
unlawful activity prohibited by law, which is a cognizable
offence punishable with imprisonment of three years or
more, undertaken by any person, either singly or jointly,
as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf
of such syndicate in respect of which more than one
charge-sheet has to be filed before a competent Court
within the preceding period of ten years and that Court
has taken cognizance of such an offence.
18. In the present case, it is undisputed that no charge
sheet has been filed against the petitioner in any court in
the last ten years. Therefore, prima facie, the offence
under Section 111(1) is not attracted. Nevertheless, these
are matters to be investigated and ultimately decided after
trial. Additionally, the petitioner has been in judicial
custody for the last 57 days, and recovery has been
effected.
16.
This judgment was followed in Pesala Sivashankar
Reddy v. State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine AP 5422, wherein it was
held:
“8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Maharashtra v. Shiva Alias Shivaji Ramaji Sonawane 2015
SCC OnLine SC 648 was dealing with the Maharashtra
Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (MCOC) Act and the
offence of organised crime under the said act. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that only if an organised crime is
committed by the accused after the promulgation of the
MCOCA Act, that he may be seen in the light of the
previous charge sheet, which is taken cognisance by the
competent court, would have committed an offence under
Section 3 of the Act.
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the matter of Mohamad
Iliyas Mohamad Bilal Kapadiya v. State of Gujarat 2022 Live
2026:HHC:3357
Law (SC) 538, held that to invoke the provisions of the
Gujarat Control of terrorism and Organised Act Crime,
2015, in respect of an act of organised crime, more than
one charge sheet should be filed in the preceding ten
years. Section 111 of B.N.S. is analogous to the organised
crime acts of various states, which were dealt with by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court.
10. The Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in the matter
of Mohammed Hashim v. State of Kerala 2024 SCC OnLine
Ker 5260. The learned Judge of the Kerala High Court has
emphasised that Section 111 can be invoked only if more
than one charge sheet has been filed for such offences in
the preceding ten years before a competent court, and
such charge sheets are taken cognisance of by the court.
11. This Court agrees with the observations of the Kerala
High Court, and admittedly, no charge sheet has been filed
against the petitioner for similar offences in any court of
law in the preceding ten years; as such, a cause for
invocation of Section 111 of B.N.S. has to be dealt
appropriately by the investigating officer during the
course of investigation of the crime.”
17.
It was held in Suraj Singh vs. State of Punjab
(25.09.2024 - PHHC): MANU/PH/4288/2024 that the police must
gather legally admissible evidence to connect the accused with
the commission of a crime punishable under Section 111 of the
BNS Act. It was observed:
“15. To bring an offence into the four corners of an
organised crime, the offence must fall under a category
described in S. 111 of BNS, 2023. The prima facie evidence
must be legally admissible to constitute any continuing
unlawful activity to constitute an organised crime as
defined in S. 111 BNS. Without legally admissible prima
facie evidence, the State cannot make any suspect undergo
2026:HHC:3357
custodial interrogation to hunt for such evidence against
the suspect or others. The evidence must be gathered first
to make out a prima facie case within the scope of S. 111 of
BNS, and such evidence alone would justify custodial
interrogation to carry out further investigation. Without
legally admissible accusations, allegations, or evidence,
the State cannot arrest a suspect to fish evidence against
them or use such a suspect as custodial bait by any hook,
line, and sinker to bring the case into the fold of S. 111 of
BNS. Prima facie evidence must be admissible, and if such
evidence is deemed inadmissible, the entire foundation
will collapse.”
18.
In the present case, the only allegation of the
petitioner indulging in organised crime is based upon the fact
that he and other co-accused had threatened the informant and
another person for ransom, which, as stated above, is highly
doubtful because of the absence of any such allegation in the FIR.
The status report also does not show that the petitioner was part
of a syndicate against which cognisance was taken in the
preceding ten years. Therefore, the material on record does not
prima facie connect the petitioner to the commission of a crime
punishable under Section 111 of BNS.
19.
The other offences alleged against the petitioner are
not so serious as to justify his pre-trial detention. The police
have already filed the charge sheet before the Court, and the
petitioner’s custody is not required for investigation.
20.
2026:HHC:3357
The police asserted that the petitioner would indulge
in the commission of a similar offence and would intimidate the
witnesses in case of release on bail. These apprehensions are
without any basis and can be removed by imposing the
conditions. Therefore, this apprehension is not sufficient to deny
bail to the petitioner.
21.
It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he should not be released on bail. The Learned
Trial Court was also influenced by this consideration while
denying bail. Mere criminal antecedents without the prima facie
involvement of the petitioner in the commission of a heinous
offence are not sufficient to deny bail to him. Since prima facie
involvement of the petitioner in any heinous offence is not
established in the present case. Therefore, the bail cannot be
denied to the petitioner on the ground that he has criminal
antecedents.
22.
The police have not asserted that the petitioner had
absented in the previous cases; rather the police reported that
the petitioner was acquitted in some of the cases registered
against him, which means that the petitioner had faced the trial,
2026:HHC:3357
and there is no material to conclude at this stage that the
petitioner would not attend the trial if released on bail.
23.
In view of the above, the present petition is allowed,
and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following
conditions:
(i)
The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will
he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever.
(ii)
The petitioner shall attend the trial and will not seek
unnecessary adjournments.
(iii)
The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing the
address of the intended visit to the concerned Police
Station and the Court.
(iv)
The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social
media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by
the summons/notices received from the Police/Court
through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of
any change in the mobile number or social media
accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court
within five days from the date of the change.
24.
2026:HHC:3357
It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
25.
The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Superintendent of District Jail, Una at
Bangarh, H.P., and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
26.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on
the case's merits.
23rd January, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
Digitally signed
CHANDER
CHANDER by
SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date: 2026.01.23
16:49:21 +0530
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