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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 29.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on:07.02.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 07.02.2026
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W.P. (C) 15486/2024
AMAN PRATAP SINGH
Through:
...Petitioner
Mr. Arvind Sangwan, Sr. Adv.
along with Mr. Vishal Boora,
Mr. Gaurav Deshraj, Ms. Kajal
singhal and Mr. Deepesh
Paderiya, Advs.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.
...Respondents
Through: Dhruv Rohatgi, PC along with
Ms. Chandrika Sachdev and
Mr. Dhruv Kumar, Advs. for
R1/GNCTD.
Mr. Raj Shekhar Rao, Sr. Adv.
along with Mr. Rajat Aneja,
Ms. Chandrika Gupta and Ms.
Akshna Chawla, Advs. for
R2/Delhi High Court.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
1.
The present petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, 1950 [hereinafter referred to as „Constitution‟]
assailing Notification bearing dated 10.10.2024 issued by the
Respondent No.1 [hereinafter referred to as „Impugned Notification‟]
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as also the consequential order dated 14.10.2024 [hereinafter referred
to as „Impugned Order‟] passed by the Respondent No.2 [hereinafter
referred collectively as „Impugned Actions‟], through which the
services of the Petitioner during probation period have been dispensed
with.
BRIEF BACKGROUND:
2.
In order to examine the merits of the case, the relevant facts are
required to be noticed.
3.
The Petitioner, having successfully traversed the rigours of
selection was appointed to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service (DHJS)
by way of Notification dated 28.04.2023, issued by the Respondent
No.1, placing him on probation for a period of 02 years. Pursuant
thereto, the Petitioner joined DHJS on 29.04.2023, and after
undergoing the prescribed training, was posted as Additional District
Judge-01, South-West District, Dwarka, Delhi, by way of the
Posting/Transfer Orders dated 29.08.2023, whereupon he formally
assumed charge of his Court on 01.09.2023.
4.
It is claimed by the Petitioner that, on 06.09.2024, while he was
holding Court, one litigant, in defiance of decorum commenced
making and recording a video of the ongoing proceedings without
permission, allegedly causing disruption in the Court. Upon noticing
the said misconduct, the Petitioner expressed his discomfort and raised
his voice when the litigant did not desist. This exchange, as stated,
was captured on the video conferencing system, and the recording
thereafter was selectively circulated across social media platforms,
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exposing the Petitioner to public glare and a trial by media.
5.
It is claimed by the Petitioner that, this solitary episode, became
the fulcrum of the actions that followed. According to him, the
Hon‟ble Chief Justice of this Court, on 12.09.2024, took suo moto
cognizance of the said video. Following which, an enquiry team was
also deputed; an extensive search operation ensued, which, as pleaded,
included a thorough search of the courtroom premises and
examination of the staff attached to the court of the Petitioner.
6.
In the wake of this enquiry, a Full Court meeting was convened
on 13.09.2024. As per the Petitioner, in the said meeting, a decision
was taken to dispense with his services. Consequent thereto, by a
communication dated 19.09.2024, this Court directed the Principal
District & Sessions Judge, South-West, Dwarka, New Delhi to
immediately withdraw judicial work from the Petitioner, effectively
divesting him of his judicial functions. The entire process culminated
in issuance of the Impugned Actions, formally communicating the
cessation of his engagement with the DHJS.
7.
The Respondent No.2, however, traces a different axis for the
culmination of events leading to cessation of the Petitioner‟s
engagement. It is their case that the Annual Confidential Report
(ACR) of the Petitioner for the year 2023 had been recorded by the
Inspecting
Judges‟
Committee
as
early
as
on
29.08.2024.
Subsequently, the said ACR is claimed to be placed before and
approved by the Full Court in its meeting held on 13.09.2024, the very
meeting that, as per the Petitioner, also considered the fallout of the
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viral video of the Petitioner.
8.
In the interregnum, the Petitioner submitted a Mercy Petition
dated 08.10.2024 through the Principal District & Sessions Judge,
South-West,
Dwarka,
Delhi,
inter
alia
requesting
that
the
communication dated 19.09.2024, whereby his judicial work had been
withdrawn, be reconsidered and set aside. However, by the time the
Mercy Petition was submitted, the Impugned Notification having been
issued, the said Mercy Petition, as stated, was not acceded to, and
remained unanswered in substance.
9.
Pursuant to the Full Court meeting held on 13.09.2024, this
Court by its communication dated 19.09.2024, directed the Principal
District & Sessions Judge, South-West, Dwarka, New Delhi, to
immediately withdraw judicial work from the Petitioner.
10.
Aggrieved by the dispensing with of services of the Petitioner
and the preceding actions culminating in the issuance of Impugned
Notification and the Impugned Order, he has approached this Court by
way of the present proceedings.
11.
We have heard learned senior counsels for the parties and with
their able assistance have perused the paperbook as well as the
compilation of judgments filed.
12.
Before adverting to the arguments raised by the parties, this
Court deems it appropriate to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the
present petition, along with the relevant rule of Delhi Higher Judicial
Service Rules, 1970 [hereinafter referred to as „Rules of 1970‟], which
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forms the basis of their argumentsPetition
“5.
That during the Court hours on 06.09.2024, the Petitioner
was in the middle of a hearing in the case titled as “Eminent Officers
Welfare Society (Regd.) Vs. Mukesh Kumar Singh” bearing case no.
“C.S. 700/2024” during which, one litigant, unexpectedly started
making/recording video of the ongoing Court proceedings in the
Court room and since, it is illegal to record or transcribe Court
proceedings by any person other than the one authorized by the Court,
the Petitioner asked the said litigant to stop the illegal act and seized
his mobile phone. Further on being enquired about the reason of such
illegal act from the said litigant, the litigant started shouting at the
Petitioner and addressed the court arrogantly. That the said litigant
spoiled the decorum of the Court to which the Petitioner stood up
from his chair and spoke in a slightly higher pitch than usual and
asked the name of the said litigant from the court staff. That even after
repeatedly asking his name, the litigant was not ready to answer the
same, in fact, on the contrary the said litigant created nuisance inside
the Courtroom and other litigants as well as the Court staff witnessed
the said incident. That due to the transgression of the said litigant,
petitioner stood up from his chair and called the police to arrest the
said litigant as per law. That due to the above circumstances, the
Petitioner, in order to control the situation and to bring the house in
order was forced to slightly raise his voice than the normal/usual
tone. It is relevant to mention herein that the Petitioner belongs to
Bhiwani, Haryana and due to the native accent, the voice of the
Petitioner appeared to be harsh/blunt.
6.
That the said litigant, who created ruckus in the courtroom,
apologized to the petitioner and thereafter the litigant was set free and
his mobile phone was also returned to him. The Petitioner then
immediately sent the case, in whose hearing the whole incident took
place, to the Ld. District and Sessions Judge, South-West District,
Dwarka Courts, Delhi to get the same transferred to some other court.
7.
That the whole incident mentioned above was selectively
recorded by some unknown person from the videoconferencing. It is
worthwhile to mention herein that the said recording was done in
violation of the Delhi High Court Rules for Video Conferencing for
Courts 2021 which prohibits unauthorized recording of court
proceedings. That Rule 3(vi) of Delhi High Court Rules for Video
Conferencing for Courts 2021 clearly states that:
“3 (vi) There shall be no unauthorised recording of the proceedings
by any person or entity.”
8.
That some unknown person made the above mentioned video
captioned as “Drunk Judge/Disturbing visuals from the Court of
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Aman Pratap Singh” went viral on various social media platforms
and portrayed as if the Petitioner was under the influence of alcohol
during the Court proceedings. It is pertinent to mention herein that the
video which went viral online is of 1 Minute and 15 Seconds and it
can be seen clearly that the said part of the video was recorded
selectively by not recording previous and subsequent event(s) that
occurred in the courtroom. That it is further pertinent to mention
herein that the said video was recorded and made viral thereafter with
a sole ulterior motive to tarnish the image and reputation of the
Petitioner. It can be clearly seen from the said video that the
Petitioner has not used any abusive language and in fact the
Petitioner was only saying to take the said litigant in custody
repeatedly. It is worthwhile to mention that from the said video, one
cannot say that the Petitioner was under the influence of Alcohol. Link
of Video dated 06.09.2024 dated 06.09.2024 is annexed herewith as
ANNEXURE P-1 (Pg. 38) Translated with true copy of Transcript of
Video dated 06.09.2024 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE-P-2.
(Pg. 39)
9.
That on 06.09.2024, total 32 matters were in the cause list
and the unfortunate incident took place during hearing of item no.11.
That the petitioner completed entire cause list of the day, however the
video was made of the selective incident. True with typed copy of
Cause list dated 06.09.2024 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-3.
(Pg. 40-44)
10.
That on 12.09.2024, the Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court
of Delhi took suo-moto cognizance of the viral video and sent a
team/committee to enquire the truth of the said video. Thereafter, a
team consisting of Registrar General (High Court of Delhi), Registrar
Vigilance, Registrar and the Ld. District Judge, South-West District,
Dwarka Courts, Delhi was constituted. The said team conducted
search of the entire courtroom including retiring room, all almirahs
and even the washroom. However, the team/committee could not find
any incriminating substance/alcohol during the search. That
thereafter, the team/committee of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi
took the statements of entire staff working with the Petitioner in the
courtroom. That total 8 staff members were examined and from them,
the following questions were asked particularly:
• What happened on 06.09.2024 in the courtroom?
• Whether the presiding officer/petitioner of this court take
alcohol during daytime?
The staff members who were examined are:• Amit (Peon)
• N. Geeta (Stenographer)
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• Sunder Kumar (Stenographer)
• Manoj (Nazir)
• Harish (Ahlmad)
• Meenakshi (Ahlmad)
• Joginder Yadav (Reader)
It is relevant to mention herein that whole staff narrated the incident
as happened on the said date and further stated that the Petitioner has
never consumed alcohol. That the abovesaid facts can be verified from
the inquiry report made by the Ld. Registrar General, High Court of
Delhi. The whole inquiry has been conducted behind the back of the
Petitioner and copy of the enquiry report has not been provided to the
Petitioner as well.
11.
That in pursuant to the enquiry carried out by the Committee
of Registrar General, High Court of Delhi, a full court meeting was
held in the presence of all the Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of
Delhi on 13.09.2024 wherein many Hon’ble Judges were not in favour
of inflicting major penalty i.e., terminating the petitioner from his
services for the aforementioned incident. Regrettably, the decision
was made to terminate the services of Petitioner from the Delhi
Higher Judicial Services (DHJS), and this recommendation was then
forwarded to the Hon’ble Lt. Governor of the National Capital
Territory of Delhi. It is pertinent to mention herein that the said
decision was not made unanimously.
Delhi Higher Judicial Services Rules, 1970
“14. The services of a person appointed on probation are liable to be
terminated without assigning any reason.”
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES:
13.
Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, assailing the
Impugned Notification and the Impugned Order has made the
following submissions:
13.1 At the outset, relying heavily on Paragraph Nos. 5-11 of the
Petition, it has been argued by the learned senior counsel that the
circulation of the viral video featuring the Petitioner became the
determinative and proximate cause for his removal from service. It is
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argued that such removal, though couched as termination of a
probationer, is in substance a penal action founded on alleged
misconduct and therefore assumes the character of punishment,
contrary to the settled legal position governing punitive termination of
probationer, which shall be discussed hereinafter.
13.2 In the aforesaid backdrop, it has been argued that the
punishment of termination is disproportionate to the gravity of the
alleged misconduct, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 [hereinafter referred to as „Constitution‟] the doctrine of
proportionality. In support of this submission, reliance is placed on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranjeet Thakur v Union of India1,
to contend that the Impugned Actions do not satisfy the test of
proportionality in the matter of punishment.
13.3 It is further argued that the Impugned Actions are both punitive
and stigmatic in nature and that, prior to taking of any such action, the
Petitioner was required to be afforded with a reasonable opportunity
of being heard, thereby adhering to the fundamental principle of
Natural Justice, i.e., Audi Alteram Partem. However, it is argued, the
denial of such opportunity, vitiates the action as being in derogation of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
13.4 In this context, it has also been argued that the ACR dated
29.08.2024, came to be communicated to the Petitioner only on
07.10.2024, thereby depriving him of any meaningful opportunity to
represent or respond. While emphasising that even a probationer is not
1987 (4) SCC 611
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bereft of basic procedural safeguards, learned senior counsel
places reliance on VP Ahuja v State of Punjab & Ors.2, to contend
that a probationer cannot be subjected to punitive termination without
adherence to principles of natural justice.
13.5 Relying upon Ratnesh Kumar Choudhary v. Indira Gandhi
Institute of Medical Sciences, Patna, Bihar & Ors.3, it is submitted
that this Hon‟ble Court must lift the veil and examine the true nature
of the employer‟s action. Though the Impugned Actions are styled as
termination simpliciter, the factual matrix reveals that a fact-finding
exercise was undertaken in relation to the viral video incident, behind
the back of the Petitioner and without notice or participation. Since the
termination follows such inquiry into alleged misconduct, the
misconduct constitutes the foundation of the action and not a mere
motive, rendering the Impugned Actions stigmatic and punitive in
nature and unsustainable in law, notwithstanding the probationary
status of the Petitioner
13.6 In support of the aforesaid proposition, a reliance has been
placed on Chandra Prakash Shahi v State of U.P. & Ors.4, wherein it
was held that where there are specific allegations of misconduct, an
inquiry is held to ascertain the truth of such allegations, and an order
of termination follows on the basis of that inquiry, such order is
punitive in nature. Further reliance has also been placed on Sarita
Choudhary v High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.5
2000 (3) SCC 239
(2015) 10 SCALE 740
(2000) 5 SCC 152
2025 INSC 289
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13.7 Further, it has been argued that the Petitioner has been removed
from service on the ground of alleged misconduct without a regular
inquiry and without being afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself, which, in effect, amounts to removal from service within the
meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution, rendering the Impugned
Actions unsustainable for non-compliance with the safeguards
embodied therein.
13.8 Attention of this Court is also drawn to the communication
dated 14.07.2025, issued by the Public Information Officer (PIO),
Delhi High Court, wherein, in response to the Petitioner‟s request for
an attested copy of the Inquiry Report allegedly submitted by the team
headed by the Registrar General, Shri Kanwaljeet Arora, to the
Hon‟ble Chief Justice on 12.09.2024, it has been stated that no such
information is available. This, it is argued, reinforces the contention
that an undisclosed inquiry was conducted and acted upon, without
transparency or participation of the Petitioner.
14.
Per contra, learned senior counsel for the Respondent has made
the following submissions:
14.1 At the outset, it is the case of the respondents that the
termination of the Petitioner, and the prior steps taken in relation to
his service, are not a consequence of the video featuring the Petitioner
having gone viral. It is their case that the Petitioner‟s ACR was
recorded by the Inspecting Judges‟ Committee as far back as on
29.08.2024.
14.2 Further, reliance is placed on the remarks of the Inspecting
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Judges‟ Committee dated 29.08.2024, wherein, under Serial No.2, in
the column relating to impression during inspection (covering, inter
alia, how the officer conducts court, his behaviour with advocates and
litigants, clarity in understanding and appreciating arguments, and
ability to dictate orders in court), it is recorded that the officer needs to
improve his behaviour in court, as he has been reported to be
extremely rude to advocates at times. Further, under Serial No.5, the
Petitioner‟s judgments and orders have been graded as „Below
Average‟. On the strength of the aforesaid, it has been submitted that
the Petitioner was found unsuitable for further retention in the DHJS
and his services were terminated on that ground.
14.3 Further reliance has been placed on Rule 14 of the Rules of
1970, which permits termination of the services of a probationer
without assigning any reason, thereby recognising the discretion of the
employer to assess the overall suitability of a probationer for
continued employment.
14.4 Reliance is also placed on the Brief Note of complaints received
against the Petitioner that was placed before the Full Court. Out of
five complaints, two were closed, while three were detailed in nature.
It is emphasised that the Petitioner, having been appointed on
probation to the DHJS, was at all times subject to assessment of his
work and conduct. Upon review of his overall performance, the
Hon‟ble Full Court, in its meeting held on 13.09.2024, opined that he
was not suitable for retention in service.
14.5 It is further submitted that the Petitioner‟s case is essentially
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founded on Paragraph No.10 of the writ petition, wherein he seeks to
suggest that the video clip forms the basis of the impugned action.
However, in this regard no formal inquiry has been conducted. It is
argued that even assuming that, upon the Hon‟ble the Chief Justice
being apprised of the incident and the public reaction, some factfinding interaction was directed, this does not constitute the
foundation of the impugned action. The answer to the Petitioner‟s
allegation lies in the video clip itself and the attendant record, which
demonstrate that the decision is rooted in the overall service
assessment of a probationer rather than in any specific charge of
misconduct.
14.6 Controverting the reliance placed by the petitioner on V.P.
Ahuja (Supra), the respondents submit that the said decision, in fact,
underscores the distinction between an administrative termination
based on non-suitability of a probationer and a punitive order founded
on established misconduct. It is further contended that an inquiry or
fact-finding exercise undertaken to assess the suitability of a
probationer, even if it emanates from a particular incident, does not,
by itself, render the eventual termination punitive or stigmatic in
nature.
14.7 Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, it is urged
that the termination of the Petitioner is in the nature of an
administrative decision reflecting a broader evaluation of his
professional suitability for continuance in the DHJS. It is not
predicated on any finding of misconduct or disciplinary infraction, but
on an assessment of his unsuitability to continue as an Additional
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District Judge.
ANALYSIS & REASONING:
15.
Having noticed the rival submissions made by the parties, the
issue which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the
Impugned Actions terminating the services of the Petitioner, a
probationer under the Rules of 1970, are in truth punitive and
stigmatic, as contended by the Petitioner, or whether they are orders of
termination simpliciter founded on an assessment of overall suitability
during probation, as urged by the Respondents.
16.
The Petitioner while setting out its case, has sought the Court to
embark on the journey of an enquiry into the alleged „real‟ motive
behind the termination, by placing the viral video incident at the heart
of the matter. The Respondents, on the other hand, emphasise the preexisting service record, in particular the ACR dated 29.08.2024 and
the complaints considered by the Full Court along with the specific
statutory framework of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1970, to contend that
the decision is in the nature of an administrative discharge of a
probationer on grounds of non-suitability and as such the Impugned
Actions merely qualify as a simpliciter order of termination.
17.
The legal position governing termination of probationers is
well-settled. A long line of decisions of the Supreme Court in
Parshottam Lal Dhingra v Union of India6, and seven judge bench
decision in Samsher Singh v State of Punjab7, has repeatedly
AIR 1958 SC 36
AIR 1974 SC 2192
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underscored that while a permanent government servant has a right to
hold the post and cannot be removed or dismissed without adherence
to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, a probationer or temporary
employee has no such right and may be discharged from service on
the ground of general unsuitability, provided that the order is not
founded upon a finding of misconduct.
18.
The distinction between an order of termination simpliciter and
a punitive or stigmatic order has been consistently drawn with
reference to three broad tests: (i) the form of the order, i.e. whether the
language
used
is
stigmatic;
(ii)
the
distinction
between motive and foundation, i.e., whether complaints or inquiries
merely prompt the employer to reassess suitability, or culminate in
definitive findings of misconduct which form the basis of the action;
and (iii) whether there was a full-scale formal inquiry into allegations
of misconduct resulting in findings of guilt, in which event the order,
irrespective of its form, is treated as punitive.
19.
In Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of
Medical Sciences8, the Supreme Court explained that an order of
termination of a Probationer will be held punitive only if it satisfies a
threefold test, namely, (a) if there was a full-scale formal inquiry; (b)
into allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct; and (c) if
such inquiry culminated in a finding of guilt. While laying down the
aforestated test, it was observed by the Supreme Court that in the
absence of either of these three elements, the order of termination is to
be treated as simpliciter, even if preceded by some form of assessment
(2002) 1 SCC 520
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or preliminary inquiry.
20.
Similarly, in Chandra Prakash Shahi (Supra), the Court held
that where there are specific allegations of misconduct and an inquiry
is held to ascertain their truth, and termination follows on the basis of
findings in that inquiry, the order is treated as punitive; however,
where the inquiry is directed only to assess suitability of a probationer,
without recording findings of misconduct, the termination remains
non-punitive.
21.
The
distinction
between motive and foundation
has
been clarified in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries
Corporation Ltd.9,wherein the Supreme Court observed that even
where a charge-sheet has been issued and an inquiry officer has been
appointed, if the inquiry is not taken to its logical conclusion and no
findings of guilt are returned, the employer may still validly exercise
its contractual or statutory right to terminate the services of a
probationer by a simpliciter order. In such circumstances, the prior
allegations and the inquiry remain only the motive and not the
foundation, of the order, thereby failing to attract Article 311(2) of the
Constitution.
22.
A similar approach has also been adopted in State Bank of
India & Ors. v. Palak Modi & Anr.10, where the Court while relying
upon Chandra Prakash Shahi (Supra), Union of India v Mahaveer C
Singhvi11, Dipti Prakash Banerjee v Satyendra Nath Bose National
(1999) 2 SCC 21
(2013) 3 SCC 607
(2010) 8SCC 220
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Centre for Basic Sciences12 and similarly place judgments, reiterated
that an employer may, for the purpose of assessing suitability,
undertake a fact-finding exercise, and the mere existence of such
exercise will not, by itself, convert a simpliciter termination into a
punitive one, unless the findings of misconduct form the basis of the
order.
23.
In the specific context of judicial officers on probation, the
Supreme Court in H.F. Sangati v. Registrar General, High Court of
Karnataka13, upheld the discharge of two probationary Munsifs on the
basis of their confidential records and overall assessment of
performance. The order of termination merely stated that they were
„unsuitable to hold the post of Munsifs‟. Whereas the relevant Rules
empowered the High Court to discharge a probationer on account of
unsuitability. Against the said factual matrix, it was held that such an
order, based on the service record and unaccompanied by any findings
of misconduct, was one of termination simpliciter and did not attract
Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
24.
Turning now to the facts of the present case, this Court is of the
opinion that certain salient features merit emphasis at the threshold.
Notably, the Petitioner was appointed to the DHJS as a probationer for
a period of two years under Notification dated 28.04.2023, and was,
therefore, squarely governed by Rule 14 of the Rules of 1970, which
authorises termination of the services of a probationer without
assigning any reason. The said Rules vests in the employer, namely,
(1999) 3 SCC 60
(2001) 3 SCC 117
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the High Court in the present case, the discretion to assess, during the
period of probation, the probationer‟s overall suitability for continued
retention in service.
25.
Secondly, it is also of significance that even prior to the viral
circulation of the video clip dated 06.09.2024, the Petitioner‟s ACR
for the year 2023 had already been recorded by the Inspecting Judges‟
Committee on 29.08.2024. In the column relating to “impression
during inspection” covering parameters such as conduct of court
proceedings, behaviour with advocates and litigants, clarity in
appreciating arguments, and ability to dictate orders, it was
specifically noted that the Petitioner needed to improve his behaviour
in Court and had been reported to be „extremely rude‟ to advocates on
certain occasions, Further, under Serial No.5, his judgments and
orders were graded as „Below Average‟. These remarks under the
ACR, bear importance upon the core attributes of judicial
temperament and quality of adjudicatory work, both of which are
central to an assessment of suitability for continuation in the DHJS.
26.
Thirdly, a Brief Note concerning five complaints received
against the Petitioner, of which two had been closed and three were
detailed in nature, was placed before the Full Court. At this stage, it
becomes pertinent to highlight that the Petitioner, as a probationer,
was at all material times, subject to continuous evaluation of both his
work and conduct. The Full Court, in its meeting held on 13.09.2024,
upon a holistic consideration of the service record and overall
performance of the Petitioner, formed the opinion that he was not
suitable for retention in service. It is in the wake of this collective
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institutional assessment that the judicial work was withdrawn from the
Petitioner on 19.09.2024, followed by the Impugned Actions.
27.
The Petitioner has sought to place the episode of 06.09.2024 at
the very centre of the controversy, contending that a litigant recorded
and circulated a video of the court proceedings, and the subsequent
steps taken on 12.09.2024 by Hon‟ble the Chief Justice in deputing a
team to obtain a situational understanding, constituted the real basis of
his termination. However, the material on record does not support this
narrative, it is undisputed that no formal charge-sheet was ever issued
to the Petitioner in relation to the said incident; no regular
departmental inquiry, involving the recording of evidence or
culminating in findings of proved misconduct, was conducted; and the
impugned termination order does not refer to any such inquiry report
or findings of guilt. At the highest, the exercise initiated on
12.09.2024 can be characterised as a fact-finding or situational
assessment, which may have provided contextual background to the
Full Court, but which never crystallised into the kind of formal
inquiry into misconduct contemplated in Pavanendra Narayan
Verma (Supra) and Chandra Prakash Shahi (Supra), so as to
transform a discharge during probation into a punitive removal.
28.
On these facts, the case at hand aligns more closely with the
category of cases considered in Radhey Shyam Gupta (Supra) and
Palak Modi (Supra). In the said decisions, the Supreme Court
recognised that the preliminary inquiries, exploratory exercises or
background verifications may legitimately be undertaken to assist the
employer in forming an opinion on suitability; yet, where the ultimate
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decision to terminate is ultimately rested on a general and overall
assessment of the employee‟s performance and conduct, and not upon
definitive findings of misconduct, the order retains its character as
termination simpliciter.
29.
In Radhey Shyam Gupta (Supra), as noticed earlier, the
Supreme Court held that where an inquiry is abandoned before
conclusions are reached, and the employer falls back upon its
contractual right or statutory right to terminate a probationer
simpliciter, the mere existence of an incomplete or exploratory inquiry
does not, by itself, render the termination punitive. Similarly, in Palak
Modi (Supra), the Court emphasised that the decisive test lies in
whether the order is founded upon misconduct established in an
inquiry, or whether the alleged misconduct merely colours the
employer‟s decision to form an overall opinion on suitability.
30.
Examined through this settled judicial lens, this Court finds no
material to conclude that the Petitioner‟s termination was founded
upon established misconduct. The termination order does not contain
any stigmatic language or refer to any finding of guilt; it is explicitly
casted as a termination during probation. The contemporaneous record
reveals that the ACR with adverse remarks on work and behaviour,
along with complaints placed before the Full Court, formed the
substratum of its institutional opinion regarding the non-suitability. In
the considered view of this Court, the limited fact-finding said to have
followed the viral video incident, lacked the essential attributes of a
formal inquiry and not culminated in recorded conclusions, and,
therefore, cannot be elevated to the status of the foundation of the
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action so as to attract the safeguards of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution.
31.
The Petitioner‟s reliance on V.P. Ahuja (Supra) and Ratnesh
Kumar Choudhary (Supra) is equally misplaced. In V.P. Ahuja
(Supra), the termination order itself recited that the probationer had
„failed in the performance of his duties administratively and
technically‟, which the Supreme Court held to be stigmatic on its face,
thereby necessitating compliance with natural justice before imposing
what was, in substance, a penalty. Whereas, in Ratnesh Kumar
Choudhary (Supra), the termination was based squarely upon an ex
parte vigilance report containing detailed and conclusive findings of
misconduct. Accordingly, the Court, lifting the veil, found that the
order, though clothed as termination simpliciter, was punitive, thereby
attracting Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Therefore, both these
decisions, stand on materially distinct factual foundations, namely, the
presence of either a stigmatic order or a conclusive finding of
misconduct forming the basis of the action, either of which is
conspicuously absent in the present case.
32.
Likewise, the Petitioner‟s reliance on Sarita Choudhary
(Supra) is distinguishable on account of distinct factual matrix. In this
case, the Court examined the termination of two judicial officers, with
reference to detailed ACRs, Assessment Charts and complaints
against them. By and large, upon a holistic evaluation of the officers‟
service records over the years, the Court found that the complaints did
not impinge upon their capability or suitability for judicial office. On
the contrary, the record placed before the Court, reflected undoubted
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integrity, sound interpersonal conduct and high rates of disposal.
Further, with respect to the observation made in the Assessment Chart,
it was observed that, it selectively recorded adverse aspects while
omitting the civil points earned by the respective judicial officer.
Whereas in respect of the second judicial officer, it was observed that
the adverse ACRs were either belatedly communicated or not
reconsidered
despite
explanations,
and
contained
internal
contradictions, failing to show the consistent poor performance,
contrary to the assertion made by the High Court.
33.
However, in the present case, there exists no Assessment Chart
or any equivalent document recording findings of guilt. The material
placed before the Full Court consisted only adverse but non-stigmatic
gradings and remarks in the ACR, along with complaints relevant to
an assessment of overall suitability. It is also not the case that there
were multiple ACRs reflecting either a progressive decline or
improvement in the Petitioner‟s performance; rather, the ACR only
exists for the year 2023, in which he was found to be unsuitable.
Moreover, the decision of the Full Court, taken in exercise of its
powers under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1970, reflects an institutional
assessment of unfitness for continuation in service, and not the
imposition of a punitive measure founded on allegations of
misconduct.
34.
In the opinion of this Court, once the Impugned Action is
correctly characterised as an administrative decision of termination
simpliciter of a probationer on grounds of non-suitability, founded
upon the Petitioner‟s ACR and overall service record, the derivative
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arguments based on violation of the principles of natural justice and
Article 311(2) of the Constitution, and the invocation of the doctrine
of proportionality, necessarily fade. The doctrine of proportionality, as
enunciated in Ranjeet Thakur (Supra), primarily operates in the
domain of penalties imposed upon civil servants who possess a right
to hold the post. It has limited application to decisions concerning the
continuation of probationers, once it is accepted that the decision is
not punitive but reflects an assessment of fitness for retention.
35.
Resultantly, we are unable to accept the Petitioner‟s contention
that the Impugned Notification and the Impugned Order are vitiated as
being punitive, stigmatic or founded on a clandestine inquiry into the
viral video incident. On the facts as they emerge from the record, the
termination of the Petitioner‟s services constitutes a legitimate
exercise of the High Court‟s power under Rule 14 of the Rules of
1970, grounded in an adverse ACR, complaints bearing upon
suitability, and a considered Full Court assessment of the nonsuitability of a probationary judicial officer. Tested against the settled
principles as enumerated in the judgments rendered by the Supreme
Court, the Impugned Actions clearly fall on the side of termination
simpliciter of a probationer for unsuitability, and not punitive removal
for misconduct.
CONCLUSION:
36.
In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is satisfied that
the Impugned Notification and the Impugned Order represent a lawful
exercise of the Rules of 1970, to discontinue the services of a
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probationer found unsuitable for retention. The decision is founded
upon an overall assessment of the Petitioner‟s performance, conduct,
and service record, including the adverse ACR and complaints placed
before the Full Court, and does not rest upon any established or
adjudicated misconduct.
37.
The termination, being simpliciter in nature, is neither punitive
nor stigmatic, and does not attract the safeguards of Article 311(2) of
the Constitution or the principles of natural justice applicable to
disciplinary proceedings.
38.
Consequently, the challenge laid to the Impugned Actions is
devoid of merit.
39.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed, with no order as to
costs.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
FEBRUARY 07, 2026
s.godara/hr
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