Alok Kumar Verma vs Union of India & Anr.

Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 – s.4A and s.4B – Legislative intent of – Held: The clear legislative intent in bringing s.4A and s.4B to the statute book is for the purpose of ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI from all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for upholding the integrity and independence of the institution of the CBI as a whole – If the legislative intent would have been to confer in any authority of the State a power to take interim measures against the Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the legislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effect and consequently would have been differently worded and drafted – Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.

Disposing of the Writ petitions and IAs, the Court HELD: 1. There is no manner of doubt that the enactment of the CVC Act, 2003 and the amendments made by the said enactment, inter alia, in the DSPE Act (by Section 26 of the CVC Act, 2003) are a sequel to the operative directions of this Court in paragraph 58 of Vineet Narain. The mode and manner of appointment of Central Vigilance Commissioner and Vigilance Commissioners as well as that of the Director, CBI as spelt out by this Court in Vineet Narain has been scrupulously followed by Parliament. Parliament has also on its own in amending Section 4A of the DSPE Act by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Act No. 1 of 2014) has gone a step further to give effect to the directions of this Court made in Vineet Narain inasmuch as the object for change of the Committee for making recommendations for appointment of the Director, CBI has been stated to be the necessity “to provide a High Power Selection Committee for selection of Director of the Delhi Special Police Establishment”. [Para 32][123-F-H; 124-A-B]

Vineet Narain and others v. Union of India and another (1998) 1 SCC 226 : [1997] 6 Suppl. SCR 595 – relied on.

2. The clear legislative intent in bringing Section 4A and Section 4B of the DSPE Act to the statute book are for the purpose of ensuring complete insulation of the office of the Director, CBI from all kinds of extraneous influences, as may be, as well as for upholding the integrity and independence of the institution of the CBI as a whole. If the legislative intent would have been to confer in any authority of the State a power to take interim measures against the Director, CBI thereby affecting his functioning, surely, the legislation would have contained enabling provisions to that effect and consequently would have been differently worded and drafted. It is against this backdrop that the words “transferred except with the previous consent of the Committee” mentioned in Section 4B(2) of the DSPE Act has to be understood. If the word “transferred” has to be understood in its ordinary parlance and limited to a change from one post to another, as the word would normally convey and on that basis the requirement of “previous consent of the Committee” is understood to be only in such cases, i.e. purely of transfer, such an interpretation would be self-defeating and would clearly negate the legislative intent. In such an event it will be free for the State Authority to effectively disengage the Director, CBI from functioning by adopting various modes, known and unknown, which may not amount to transfer but would still have the same effect as a transfer from one post to another, namely, cessation of exercise of powers and functions of the earlier post. This is clearly not what the legislature could have intended. The long history of evolution has shown that the institution of the CBI has been perceived to be necessarily kept away from all kinds of extraneous influences so that it can perform its role as the premier investigating and prosecuting agency without any fear and favour and in the best public interest. The head of the institution, namely, the Director, naturally, therefore, has to be the role model of independence and integrity which can only be ensured by freedom from all kinds of control and interference except to the extent that Parliament may have intended. Such intendment would require all Authorities to keep away from intermingling or interfering in the functioning of the Director. In a situation where such interference may at all be called for, public interest must be writ large against the backdrop of the necessity. The relevance and adequacy of the reasons giving rise to such a compelling necessity can only be tested by the opinion of the Committee constituted under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act in whom the power to make recommendations for appointment of the Director has been vested by Parliament. This alone can provide an adequate safeguard to ensure the independence of the office keeping in view the legislative intent. The status of the Committee having undergone an upward movement by the amendment brought in by the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (Act No.1 of 2014) it cannot but be said that the legislative intent in shielding and insulating the office of the Director from any kind of extraneous influence has been foremost in the mind of Parliament which intent found manifestation in the changes in law brought about. [Paras 34, 36][125-C-D; 126-B-H; 127-A-B]

3. Orders dated 23rd October, 2018 of the CVC divesting the powers, functions, duties, supervisory role, etc. of ‘AKS’ as Director, CBI; of the Government of India divesting ‘AKS’, Director, CBI of his functions, powers, duties and supervisory role with immediate effect and until further orders; of the Government of India by which one MNR, IPS, Joint Director, CBI has been asked to look after the duties and functions of Director, CBI with immediate effect is set aside. The matter will now be considered by the Committee under Section 4A(1) of the DSPE Act, 1946 which may be so done at the earliest. A meeting of the Committee may be accordingly convened by the competent authority. As the issue of divestment of power and authority of the Director, CBI is still open for consideration by the Committee, it is deemed proper to direct that the petitioner, Director, CBI, upon reinstatement, will cease and desist from taking any major policy decisions till the decision of the Committee permitting such actions and decisions becomes available within the time frame indicated. The role of the Petitioner as the Director, CBI during the interregnum and in terms of this order will be confined only to the exercise of the ongoing routine functions without any fresh initiative, having no major policy or institutional implications. [Paras 39-41][127-G-H; 128-A-F]

Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 : [1991] 2 SCR 567; Jai Singh Dalal and others v. State of Haryana & another (1993) Supp. 2 SCC 600 : [1992]

3 Suppl. SCR 816; Prakash Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 1 : [2006] 6 Suppl. SCR 473 – referred to.