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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 11.03.2026
Date of decision: 12.05.2026
Uploaded on: 12.05.2026
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W.P.(C) 7096/2007
ALLAHABAD BANK
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Rajat Arora, Mr. Niraj
Kumar and Mr. Sourabh,
Advocates
versus
R.S.SAINI
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Ankit Bhadaria, Mr Umesh Singh
and Ms. Karishma, Adv. with
respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1.
The present Petition has been filed by the Petitioner under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, challenging the Findings dated 28 th March,
2007, passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II ("CGIT-II" or "the learned Tribunal") in
Labour Court Application No. 17 of 2003 ("LCA No. 17/2003"), whereby
the learned Tribunal allowed the claim of the Respondent and directed the
Petitioner-Bank to pay a sum of Rs. 16,500/- (Rupees Sixteen Thousand and
Five Hundred only) to the Respondent as Travelling Allowance ("TA").
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2.
The present Petition arises from a claim preferred by the
Respondent/Workman under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 ("the Act"), seeking payment of TA/DA for attending departmental
enquiry proceedings in his capacity as a Defence Assistant ("DA"). The
dispute centres on whether the Respondent remained entitled to such
payments after the cessation of his employment with the Petitioner/Bank.
3.
The Petitioner Bank, aggrieved by the Findings dated 28th March,
2007, passed by the learned Tribunal allowing the claim of the Respondent,
has filed the present Writ Petition seeking quashing of the impugned
Findings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4.
The brief factual background leading to the filing of the present
Petition is set out hereunder:
A.
The Petitioner is a bank constituted under the Banking
Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act,
1980, with branches across India.
B.
The Respondent/Workman was an employee of the
Petitioner/Bank
and
was
subjected
to
disciplinary
proceedings, pursuant to which two punishments were
imposed upon him vide Orders dated 29th November, 2001.
C.
It is stated that the Petitioner/Bank had also issued
Charge Sheets to two other employees, namely Sh. A.S.
Arora (Computer Operator) and Sh. B.S. Verma (Head
Cashier). The Respondent acted as a Defence Assistant for
the said employees during the course of departmental
enquiry proceedings.
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D.
At the time of initiation of the said enquiry
proceedings, the Respondent was in the employment of the
Petitioner/Bank. He had been attending the enquiry
proceedings as a Defence Assistant in the matter of the
departmental enquiry initiated against Sh. A.S. Arora
(Computer Operator) and Sh. B.S. Verma (Head Cashier),
with the due permission of the Disciplinary Authority in
each case. However, during the pendency of these enquiry
proceedings, the Respondent retired from service on 30th
November, 2001.
E.
The
Respondent
continued
to
be
paid
TA/DA/conveyance for some time following his retirement,
and thereafter, without any formal communication, the
Petitioner ceased to make such payments.
F.
Aggrieved by the non-payment of TA/DA following
his superannuation, the Respondent filed a claim under
Section 33C(2) of the Act in LCA No. 17/2003 before the
CGIT-II,
Delhi,
claiming
amounts
towards
TA/DA/conveyance for attending the enquiry proceedings
as a Defence Assistant. The total amount claimed before the
learned Labour Court was Rs. 14,280/- (Rupees Fourteen
Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty only).
G.
The Petitioner/Management contested the said claim
by filing a Written Statement, contending, inter alia:
a.
that the Respondent was not entitled to
TA/DA in view of the Memorandum of Settlement
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dated 10th April, 2002, which provided that a
Defence Representative hailing from the same State
as the place of enquiry shall not be entitled to
TA/DA; and
b.
that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of
the Act were not maintainable, as they are in the
nature of execution proceedings requiring the preexistence of a recognised right.
H.
The Petitioner further contended that since the
Respondent was no longer in employment, no employeremployee relationship subsisted, and consequently, no
obligation to pay TA/DA/conveyance survived after
superannuation.
I.
The parties led evidence before the learned Tribunal
and filed Written Submissions in support of their respective
cases. Upon consideration of the material on record, the
learned Tribunal vide its Findings dated 28th March, 2007
allowed the claim of the Respondent/Workman and directed
the Petitioner/Bank to pay a sum of Rs. 16,500/- (Rupees
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred only).
J.
Aggrieved by the said Findings, the Petitioner has filed
the present Writ Petition seeking the following reliefs:
“a. Issue a writ of certiorari or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction quashing the
findings dated 28th March, 2007, passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, CGIT-II, Delhi in LCA
No. 17/2003;
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5.
b. Call for the records of the case; and
c. Pass such other or further orders as this Hon’ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case.”
In addition to the foregoing, the following grounds have been urged
by the Petitioner in support of the reliefs claimed:
I.
That the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal are
contrary to the Settlement dated 10th April, 2002, which
specifically provides that TA/DA is not payable where the
Defence Assistant is from the same State as the place of the
enquiry proceedings. In this regard, the finding of the
learned Tribunal that Clause 19.12(d) of the Bipartite
Settlement is not applicable to the Respondent is also
erroneous, inasmuch as the said clause applies squarely to
the facts of the present case, the Respondent being based in
Delhi and the proceedings having been conducted in Delhi.
Further, the Settlement reached at the industry level is
binding upon both the Respondent and the Union, and the
Respondent cannot be permitted to resile from or
circumvent its terms.
II.
That under the provisions of the Bipartite Settlement, a
delinquent employee is entitled to be represented by a
Defence Assistant who is an employee of the Bank. Since
the Respondent had ceased to be an employee of the
Petitioner-Bank upon his superannuation, he was not
entitled to prefer the claim as sought by him in LCA No.
17/2003. In any event, the Respondent had already been
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paid all amounts to which he was eligible, and no further
payment is due or owing to him.
III. That the claim of the Respondent was wholly
unsupported by evidence. The Respondent failed to place on
record any proof, whether in the form of TA/DA bills,
vouchers, or attendance records, to demonstrate that he had
in fact attended the enquiry proceedings on the specific
dates alleged by him, or that he had actually incurred the
expenditure claimed. The grant of relief by the learned
Tribunal is, therefore, founded on conjecture and surmise,
and the impugned Findings cannot be sustained in the
absence of any cogent material on record.
IV. That the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are in the nature of execution
proceedings and are premised upon the existence of a preexisting,
adjudicated
right.
Since
the
Respondent's
entitlement to TA/DA post-superannuation was itself
disputed and had never been formally recognised or
adjudicated upon by the Petitioner-Bank, the claim was not
maintainable under the said provision.
V.
That the Respondent, in his claim statement filed
before the learned Tribunal, had claimed a sum of Rs.
14,280/- (Rupees Fourteen Thousand Two Hundred and
Eighty only), whereas the learned Tribunal proceeded to
award a sum of Rs. 16,500/- (Rupees Sixteen Thousand and
Five Hundred only), an amount in excess of the relief
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prayed for. Such an award is contrary to law and liable to be
set aside.
VI. That the impugned Findings, if allowed to stand,
would gravely prejudice the Petitioner-Bank, inasmuch as
other similarly situated retired employees would be
emboldened to approach the Bank with analogous claims,
thereby creating significant difficulties in the administration
of the Bank.
6.
In turn, the stand of the Respondent/Workman before this Court is as
follows:
I.
That the Respondent was duly authorised by the
Disciplinary Authority to act as Defence Assistant on behalf
of Sh. A.S. Arora and Sh. B.S. Verma at the commencement
of the enquiry proceedings, and such authorisation was
neither revoked nor withdrawn at any point during the
pendency thereof. His continuation in that role after
superannuation was, therefore, a lawful extension of a
formally sanctioned appointment and not an irregular or
unauthorised act.
II.
That the Respondent, being an office bearer of the
registered Trade Union, is expressly protected by the
Explanation to Section 22(2) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926,
which provides that a retired employee holding union office
shall not be construed as an "outsider." By virtue of this
statutory protection, the Respondent retained the legal
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capacity to continue representing the charge-sheeted
employees as their Defence Assistant notwithstanding his
retirement.
III. That the Petitioner-Bank's own conduct of continuing
to pay TA/DA to the Respondent for a period after his
retirement amounts to an unequivocal acknowledgement of
his entitlement. The subsequent cessation of such payments,
effected verbally, without any formal order, and without
affording the Respondent any opportunity to be heard, was
arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
IV. That the learned Tribunal, upon due consideration of
the evidence on record and the applicable provisions of the
Bipartite Settlement, rightly concluded that the Respondent
was entitled to the amounts claimed. The impugned
Findings are well-reasoned and call for no interference
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
7.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the following
contentions were urged on behalf of the Petitioner/Management to
strengthen their claim.
a.
Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner,
in the first instance, stated that the Respondent/Workman
superannuated on 30th November, 2001 and, therefore,
ceased to be an employee of the Petitioner-Bank, and that,
having
continued
as
Defence
Representative
after
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superannuation, the claim for TA/DA for that period is
unsustainable.
b.
Further, the learned Counsel contended that Clause
19.12(d) of the relevant Bipartite Settlement specifically
provides that TA/DA is not payable where the Defence
Representative is from the same State as the place of the
enquiry proceedings, and the Respondent, being based in
Delhi and attending enquiry proceedings in Delhi, fell
squarely within this exclusion.
c.
The learned Counsel also contended that the Bipartite
Settlement as well as the applicable Circular dated 10th
April, 2002, apply only to persons who are in active
employment. Since no employer-employee relationship
subsisted post-superannuation, the Respondent was not
entitled to any amounts from the Bank.
d.
Moreover, the learned Counsel stated that the
Respondent did not place on record any proof, including
attendance
records,
TA/DA
bills,
or
vouchers
to
demonstrate that he had actually attended the enquiry
proceedings on the specific dates alleged by him and that
the relief granted by the learned Tribunal was based on
conjecture, unsupported by evidence.
e.
Also, the Respondent claimed Rs. 14,280/- before the
learned Labour Court, yet the Tribunal directed payment of
Rs. 16,500/-. This excess award, beyond the claim itself, has
been contended as contrary to the law.
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f.
Learned Counsel stated that the proceedings under
Section 33C(2) of the Act are in the nature of execution
proceedings and are maintainable only where a pre-existing,
adjudicated right is in place and that since the Respondent's
entitlement to TA/DA post-retirement was itself in dispute
and had not been adjudicated upon previously, the claim
under Section 33C(2) was not maintainable.
g.
Reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on the
decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak & Anr., (1995) 1
SCC 235 and State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brijpal
Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 58, in support of the foregoing
contentions.
h.
Lastly, learned Counsel contended that the Industry-
level Settlement binds both the Respondent and his Union,
and the Respondent cannot seek to circumvent its terms.
8.
Upholding their contestation, the Respondent-Workman advanced the
following submissions.
a.
Learned
Counsel
appearing
on
behalf
of
the
Respondent submitted that the Respondent was duly
authorised to act as a Defence Assistant by the Disciplinary
Authority and continued to do so in accordance with the
provisions of Para 19.12 of the Bipartite Settlement, which
permits a charge-sheeted employee to be represented by a
representative of a registered Trade Union of bank
employees.
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b.
Further, it was submitted that the Respondent was an
office bearer of the Union at the relevant time. Under the
Explanation to Section 22(2) of the Trade Unions Act, 1926,
a retired employee holding office in a registered Trade
Union shall not be construed as an "outsider" for the
purposes of such office. Accordingly, it was stressed by the
learned Counsel that the Respondent retained the legal
capacity to act as a Defence Assistant on behalf of the
charge-sheeted employees notwithstanding his retirement.
c.
Moreover, it was contended that the Respondent was
discharging his duties as Defence Assistant when he was in
employment; his retirement during the pendency of the
enquiry did not extinguish the entitlement to TA/DA that
had already accrued, nor did it put an end to the authority
granted to him by the Disciplinary Authority to continue as
Defence Assistant.
d.
It was also submitted on behalf of the Respondent that
the denial of TA/DA/conveyance post-retirement was
arbitrary, illegal, and unsustainable in law, and that, in no
way, was it possible for the Respondent to attend the
enquiry proceedings repeatedly using his own resources.
The Bank, having permitted him to continue as Defence
Assistant, was obligated to reimburse his actual expenditure.
e.
Lastly, the learned Counsel reiterated that the learned
Tribunal rightly allowed the claim, and the impugned
Findings call for no interference in the exercise of the
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extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
ISSUES INVOLVED
9.
In light of the facts and grounds noted hereinabove, the questions that
arise for consideration before this Court are set out hereunder:
I.
Whether the claim preferred by the Respondent under
Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was
maintainable in the absence of a pre-existing and
adjudicated right to TA/DA post-superannuation?
II.
Whether the Respondent, having superannuated from
service, continued to be entitled to TA/DA/conveyance for
attending departmental enquiry proceedings as a Defence
Assistant?
III. Whether the findings dated 28th March, 2007, passed
by the learned Presiding Officer, CGIT-II, Delhi in LCA
No. 17/2003 suffer from any illegality, perversity or
material irregularity warranting interference under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
ANALYSIS AND REASONING
10.
This Court has heard the learned Counsels for the respective parties
and perused the record.
11.
Before adverting to the issues framed in the present Petition, it is
apposite to observe that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an Award passed by the
Labour Court, is supervisory in nature and circumscribed in scope. It is well
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settled that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority over the
findings returned by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where
the Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or
where material evidence has been ignored.
12.
Therefore, the High Court, in writ proceedings, does not re-examine
or re-appreciate the evidence recorded by the Tribunal below, nor does it
substitute its own view for that of the adjudicatory body. The award of the
Labour Court can be set aside only if there is an error apparent on the face of
the record.
13.
Bearing these well-settled principles firmly in mind, this Court had to
examine the issues arising for determination in the present Petition.
14.
The first and foundational question that must be addressed before
examining the merits of the Respondent's claim is whether the Application
filed before the learned Tribunal under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947, was at all maintainable.
15.
The Petitioner has strenuously urged that Section 33C(2) is analogous
to execution proceedings and can be invoked only to compute or recover a
benefit whose existence is already settled and undisputed, and that since the
Respondent's entitlement to TA/DA post-superannuation was itself in
dispute, the application was not maintainable at the threshold.
16.
The jurisdictional question arising under Section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, assumes central importance in the present
case, for it goes to the very root of the competence of the learned Tribunal to
entertain and adjudicate the Respondent’s claim. The provision, though
couched in broad terms, has been consistently interpreted by the Courts as
conferring a limited, execution-like jurisdiction, distinct from the original
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adjudicatory powers exercised under Sections 10 or 2A of the Act.
17.
It is pertinent to mention that the jurisprudence governing Section
33C(2) draws a clear distinction betweena.
The computation of a benefit flowing from an existing right,
and
b.
The adjudication of the right itself.
The relevant provision reads as follows.
18.
“33C. Recovery of money due from an employer.—(2)
Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer
any money or any benefit which is capable of being
computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to
the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such
benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject
to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by
such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the
appropriate Government; 1 [within a period not exceeding
three months:]
[Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour
Court considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may,
for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by
such further period as he may think fit.]”
To appreciate its scope, it is instructive to note that Section 33C(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, enables a workman to approach the
Labour Court for computation of “any money or any benefit which is
capable of being computed in terms of money.” However, this seemingly
wide formulation has been judicially circumscribed to ensure that the
Labour Court does not transgress into the domain of adjudication of
industrial disputes.
19.
Therefore, the power conferred by Section 33C(2) is one of
computation and recovery and not of adjudication. Where the very
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foundation of the claim is in dispute, the workman must first have his
entitlement recognised by the appropriate forum, and only thereafter may he
invoke Section 33C(2) for the purpose of computing and recovering the
benefit so recognised.
20.
In furtherance, the legal position on the scope and ambit of Section
33C(2) is no longer res integra, having been conclusively settled by a
consistent line of authority of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
21.
Nonetheless, before adverting to other leading precedents on the
issue, this Court finds it apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v.
The Workmen & Anr., 1975 SCC (4) 348. In the said decision, the Court
underscored the fundamental distinction between adjudication and
execution, observing that where a claimant’s right to relief requires
investigation, such determination must be undertaken in appropriate
adjudicatory proceedings; it is only after the liability stands adjudicated that
the quantification or enforcement thereof can be carried out in execution.
This distinction was succinctly brought out in the said decision as under:
"In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against
defendant involves an investigation directed to the
determination of (i) the plaintiff's right to relief; (ii) the
corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether
the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of
the defendant's liability, if any. The working out of such
liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as
the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No.
(iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the
defendant's liability may sometimes be left over for
determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the
case with the determinations under (i) and (ii). They are
normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an
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execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under section
33C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should
follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations
(i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope, it is true
that in a proceeding under section 33 (C)(2), as in an
execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the
identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is
made if there is a challenge on that scope. But that is merely
'incidental'. To call determinations (i) and (ii) 'incidental' to
an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because
execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is
worked out are just consequential upon the determinations
(i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading
to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the
Labour Court under section 33(C)(2) that court must clearly
understand the limitations under which it is to function. It
cannot arrogate to itself the functions - say of an industrial
Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in
the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above,
or proceeded to compute the benefit by during the former as
'incidental' to its main business of computation. In such
cases, determinations (i) and (ii) are not 'incidental' to the
computation. The computation itself is consequential upon
and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage
in the process which commenced with a reference to the
industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of
Bikaner and Jaipur v. R.L. Khandelwal, (1968) L.L.J. 589,
that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an
application under section 33C(2) in respect of a matter
which is not based on an existing right and which can be
appropriately the subject-matter of an industrial dispute
which requires a reference under section 10 of the Act."
22.
Now, the locus classicus on the point is the judgment in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak & Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 235, on
which the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, after referring to a catena of decisions
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on the relevant subject matter, held the following:
“1.2. …….. The High Court has referred to some of these
decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of
these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of
the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain
benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or
recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to
entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is,
therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under
Section 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no
jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and
then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that
basis in exercise of its power under Section 33C(2) of the
Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier
adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter
for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof
some ambiguity requires interpretation that the
interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's
powèr under Section 33C(2) like that of the Executing
Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its
execution.”
23.
This position was further reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. v. Brijpal Singh, (2005) 8 SCC 58, wherein
the Hon’ble Apex Court, after referring to the case of Ganesh Razak
(supra), observed that the recourse to Section 33C(2) is permissible only
where the workman’s entitlement has been previously adjudicated or
otherwise recognised. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are extracted
hereunder.
“It is well settled that the workman can proceed under
Section 33C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a
complaint under Section 33A or on a reference under
Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not
justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the
workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages Pvt.
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24.
Ltd. Vs. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 held that a
proceeding under Section 33C(2) is a proceeding in the
nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court
calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the
employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which
is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to
compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further,
this Court held that the right to the money which is sought
to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be
computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already
adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the
course of and in relation to the relationship between the
industrial workman, and his employer. This Court further
held as follows:
"It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising
jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to arrogate to
itself the functions of an industrial tribunal and
entertain a claim which is not based on an existing
right but which may appropriately be made the
subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference
under Section 10 of the Act."”
Moreover, in the seminal decision of Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
P.S. Rajagopalan, AIR 1964 SC 743, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
distinguished between Sections 36A and 33C(2), observing that while
Section 36A pertains to the interpretation of an award upon a reference by
the appropriate Government, Section 33C(2) is concerned solely with the
implementation or execution of individual rights. It was further held that the
Labour Court, acting under Section 33C(2), exercises powers akin to an
executing court and may interpret an award or settlement only to the extent
necessary for its enforcement. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is
extracted hereunder.
"Besides, there can be no doubt that when the Labour Court
is given the power to allow an individual workman to
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25.
execute or implement his existing individual rights, it is
virtually exercising execution powers in some cases, and it
is well settled that it is open to the Executing Court to
interpret the decree for the purpose of execution. It is, of
course, true that the executing Court cannot go behind the
decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of
the decree. These limitations apply also to the Labour
Court; but like the executing Court, the Labour Court would
also be competent to interpret the award or settlement on
which a workmen bases his claim under s.33C(2).
Therefore, we feel no difficulty in holding that for the
purpose of making the necessary determination under
S.33C(2), it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the
Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement on which
the workmen's right rests."
The aforesaid position has also been clarified by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in a recent decision, namely, M/s Bombay Chemical Industries vs
Deputy Labour Commissioner & Anr. [bearing Civil Appeal No. 813 of
2022; decided February, 04 2022]. The relevant part of the Judgment is
reproduced hereunder.
“7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when
there was no prior adjudication on the issue whether
respondent No. 2 herein was in employment as a salesman
as claimed by respondent No.2 herein and there was a
serious dispute raised that respondent No.2 was never in
employment as a salesman and the documents relied upon
by respondent No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant
and it was the case on behalf of the appellant that those
documents are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour
Court ought not to have proceeded further with the
application under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. The Labour Court ought to have relegated
respondent No. 2 to initiate appropriate proceedings by way
of reference and get his right crystalized and/or adjudicate
upon. Therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court was
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KUMAR
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beyond the jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of
the Industrial
Disputes Act. The High Court has not
appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the same
without adverting to the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction
of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial
Disputes Act.”
[emphasis supplied]
26.
Turning to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that the
Petitioner-Bank specifically disputed the Respondent's entitlement to
TA/DA post-retirement on two distinct grounds: first, that the cessation of
the employer-employee relationship upon superannuation extinguished all
obligations to pay; and second, that the Settlement dated 10th April, 2002
expressly precluded a Defence Representative from the same State from
claiming TA/DA. These were not peripheral questions going only to the
quantum of the claim, but were primary questions going to the root of the
Respondent's entitlement itself.
27.
Tested on the aforesaid touchstone, it becomes evident that the
Respondent’s claim does not fall within the narrow confines of Section
33C(2). The entitlement to TA/DA post-superannuation is not founded upon
any prior adjudication, award, or unequivocal provision in the service rules
or settlement recognising such a right.
28.
As mentioned above, the Petitioner-Bank had specifically contested
such entitlement, asserting that no obligation survived upon cessation of
employment and that the Bipartite Settlement militated against such a claim.
29.
The Respondent’s claim, therefore, necessarily required the Tribunal
to undertake a primary adjudication on several foundational questions,
including:
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KUMAR
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I.
Whether a retired employee can claim TA/DA for acting as a Defence
Assistant;
II.
Whether such entitlement survives the cessation of the employer–
employee relationship;
III.
Whether the Bipartite Settlement permits or prohibits such a claim;
and
IV.
Whether the Respondent’s continued participation post-retirement
creates any enforceable obligation.
30.
Each of these questions is not merely incidental or interpretative, but
goes to the very genesis of the right claimed. The determination of these
issues would require a full-fledged adjudicatory exercise, involving
appreciation of evidence, interpretation of settlements, and application of
legal principles, functions which lie squarely within the domain of an
industrial adjudication under Section 10, and not within the limited ambit of
Section 33C(2).
31.
The learned Tribunal, however, appears to have proceeded on the
assumption that the Respondent’s participation as a Defence Assistant ipso
facto conferred upon him a right to claim TA/DA, and that the only task
before it was to quantify such entitlement. This assumption effectively begs
the question, for it presupposes the very right which was in dispute. By
doing so, the Tribunal inverted the statutory scheme and converted what
ought to have been a threshold jurisdictional inquiry into a mere
computational exercise.
32.
Another dimension which underscores the jurisdictional infirmity is
the absence of any prior determination, either by way of an award,
settlement, or administrative decision, recognising the Respondent’s
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KUMAR
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W.P.(C) 7096/2007
entitlement. The continuation of TA/DA payments for a limited period after
retirement, as relied upon by the Respondent, cannot be construed as a
binding recognition of a legal right. At best, it may give rise to a disputed
question as to whether such payments were made under a mistaken
understanding or as a matter of discretion, issues which themselves require
adjudication and cannot be summarily resolved under Section 33C(2).
33.
Thus, the present case exemplifies a situation where the Labour
Court has effectively assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed
industrial claim under the guise of computation, thereby transgressing the
statutory limits of Section 33C(2). Such an approach not only runs contrary
to settled law but also undermines the carefully structured scheme of the
Industrial Disputes Act, which delineates distinct forums and procedures for
adjudication and execution.
34.
In the absence of any prior adjudication, award, settlement, or
statutory provision recognising the claimed right, the Respondent’s claim
was not one of computation simpliciter, but one requiring foundational
adjudication.
35.
In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
application filed by the Respondent before the learned Tribunal was not
maintainable under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
and the learned Tribunal acted in excess of jurisdiction in entertaining and
allowing the same.
36.
In light of the above conclusion on maintainability, this Court does
not find it necessary to delve into the other issues raised by the parties,
including the effect of superannuation, applicability of the Bipartite
Settlement, or the quantification of the claim, as the Petition can be disposed
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W.P.(C) 7096/2007
of on this short ground alone.
37.
Therefore, the Findings dated 28th March, 2007, passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, CGIT-II, Delhi in LCA No. 17/2003 are hereby
quashed and set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
38.
The claim preferred by the Respondent under Section 33C(2) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, stands dismissed as not maintainable.
39.
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing discussion, the present Writ
Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs. The pending
Application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
MAY 12, 2026
PT/MM
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KUMAR
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W.P.(C) 7096/2007
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