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C/SCA/6580/2016(GJHC240073742016)
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Reserved On
: 02/09/2026
Pronounced On : 11/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.6580 of 2016
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
Sd/-
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
Sd/-
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
==========================================================
AJAY SURENDRA PATEL
Versus
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR S N SOPARKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH MR. JAIMIN R
DAVE(7022) & MS MANVI A DAMLE for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR DEV D PATEL(8264) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1.
By way of the present petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the order dated
31.03.2016 passed under Section 179 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for
short, “the IT Act”), whereby, in his capacity as a Director of Hirak
Biotech Limited, he has been called upon to discharge the income-tax
dues of the Company pertaining to Assessment Year (“A.Y.”) 2006-07.
2.
The present writ petition was dismissed vide CAV judgement and
order dated 23.02.2017. However, on an application filed for review
being Misc. Civil Application No.1 of 2017, the said judgement was
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
recalled vide CAV IA order dated 28.09.2018, which was assailed by the
Respondent authority by filing Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.9107 of
2019, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court vide order dated
05.04.2019 with clarification that any observations made in the judgment
and order dated 23.02.2017 shall not be treated as expression of any
opinion and this Court shall decide the petition on merits.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE :
3.
Hirak Biotech Limited (“the Company”) was incorporated as a
public limited company on 25.01.2005. At the time of its incorporation,
the Company had three Directors, namely, Shri Pranav Amratlal Shah,
Shri Pratik P. Shah and Mrs.Niketa B. Dave. The petitioner was
subsequently appointed as a director of the Company on 20.03.2005 and
continued to hold the said office until 05.09.2005, when he resigned from
the directorship.
4.
Subsequently, the Company was assessed to income tax for A.Y.
2006-07, pursuant to which additional tax liability of Rs.240.08 lakh was
determined and a demand was raised against the Company. As the
Company failed to discharge the said tax liability, proceedings under
Section 179 of the IT Act were initiated against the petitioner in his
capacity as a former director of the Company.
5.
In furtherance thereof, a show-cause notice dated 11.10.2013 under
Section 179 of the IT Act was issued to the petitioner, to which he
submitted his reply vide letter dated 17.10.2013. Thereafter, an order
dated 19.11.2013 came to be passed under Section 179 of the IT Act.
C/SCA/6580/2016(GJHC240073742016)
6.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Thereafter, on 04.09.2014, the petitioner received a further notice
under Section 179 of the IT Act calling upon him to discharge the
outstanding tax dues of the Company, failing which coercive measures
were proposed to be taken against him. The petitioner, through his
consultant, submitted a reply dated 10.09.2014 seeking time to file an
appropriate response. In response thereto, the petitioner was informed
that his reply was required to be filed by 15.09.2014, failing which the
respondent authority proposed to take steps for attachment of his bank
accounts.
7.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid notice, the petitioner approached this
Court by filing Special Civil Application No.12861 of 2014, wherein he
challenged the notice dated 04.09.2014, inter alia, on the ground that he
was neither an authorised signatory nor involved in the affairs or business
of the Company.
8.
During the course of hearing of the said petition, the respondent
authority produced a copy of the order dated 19.11.2013 passed under
Section 179 of the IT Act. The petitioner thereafter sought amendment of
the petition so as to challenge the said order as well, principally on the
ground that the same had been passed in breach of the principles of
natural justice.
9.
The aforesaid petition came to be disposed of by this Court vide
order dated 12.02.2015, whereby the order dated 19.11.2013 and the
notice dated 04.09.2014 were quashed and set aside. The Court interfered
with the said order and notice on the ground that they were issued /
passed without affording the petitioner an adequate opportunity of
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
hearing. The respondent authority was accordingly directed to undertake
the proceedings afresh and pass an appropriate order after affording due
opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
10.
Pursuant to the aforesaid directions, the respondent authority issued
a fresh show-cause notice dated 19.06.2015 under Section 179 of the IT
Act. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply thereto vide letter dated
24.07.2015, contending, inter alia, that he had never been a shareholder
of the Company, that he was neither an authorised signatory nor was he
involved in the affairs or management of the Company, and that he had
ceased to be a director thereof w.e.f. 05.09.2005.
11.
During the course of the proceedings, the respondent authority
called for various particulars and documents from the petitioner from
time to time. The petitioner duly cooperated with the proceedings and
furnished the information and documents sought by the respondent
authority.
12.
Ultimately, the respondent authority passed the impugned order
dated 31.03.2016 under Section 179 of the IT Act, holding the petitioner
liable for the outstanding tax dues of the Company. The petitioner has
challenged the said order, inter alia, on the ground that the respondent
authority failed to appreciate that the Company's default in discharging its
tax liability could not, in the facts and circumstances of the case, be
attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part
of the petitioner.
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER:
13. Learned Senior Advocate Mr.S.N.Soparkar, appearing for the
petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is wholly without
jurisdiction, inasmuch as the essential conditions precedent for invoking
Section 179 of the IT Act are not satisfied in the present case. It is
submitted that before fastening liability upon a director under Section 179
of the IT Act, the respondent authority is required to establish, firstly, that
the company in default is a private company within the meaning of the
statutory provision and, secondly, that the tax due from such company
cannot be recovered and that such non-recovery is attributable to the
gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the concerned
director.
14.
At the outset, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the
impugned order is liable to be quashed and set aside on the fundamental
ground that Hirak Biotech Limited was incorporated as a Public Limited
Company and, therefore, the very jurisdictional foundation for invoking
Section 179 of the IT Act is absent. It was submitted that the power
conferred under Section 179 of the IT Act can be exercised only in
respect of a private company and cannot be extended to a public limited
company by merely attributing to it certain characteristics of a private
company.
15.
With regard to the status of the Company, learned Senior Advocate
submitted that the findings recorded by the respondent authority to the
effect that the Company possessed the characteristics of a private limited
company are factually incorrect and legally unsustainable. It was
submitted that the respondent authority proceeded on the erroneous
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premise that there were restrictions on the transfer of shares and that the
Company was prohibited from inviting the public to subscribe to its
shares or debentures, or from inviting or accepting deposits from persons
other than its members, directors or their relatives. According to the
learned Senior Advocate, none of the statutory attributes relied upon by
the respondent authority were established against the Company.
16.
Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the respondent
authority fell into serious error in lifting the corporate veil for the purpose
of treating a company incorporated as a public limited company to be a
private limited company. It was submitted that the Company and its
directors constitute distinct legal entities, and the corporate personality of
a company cannot ordinarily be disregarded except in well-recognised
and exceptional circumstances. Such circumstances may arise, inter alia,
where the statute expressly permits the corporate veil to be lifted or where
the material on record establishes that the corporate structure has been
deliberately employed as a device to perpetrate fraud or defeat the
interests of the Revenue.
17.
In the facts of the present case, learned Senior Advocate submitted
that none of the circumstances warranting lifting of the corporate veil is
either pleaded or established on record. It was submitted that the IT Act
contains no express provision authorising the respondent authority to
disregard the corporate personality of the Company for the purpose of
determining whether a public limited company is, in substance, a private
company. The respondent authority, therefore, could not have assumed
jurisdiction under Section 179 by disregarding the Company's admitted
status as a public limited company.
C/SCA/6580/2016(GJHC240073742016)
18.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Without prejudice to the aforesaid contention, learned Senior
Advocate submitted that even on the second jurisdictional requirement
under Section 179 of the IT Act, the impugned order cannot be sustained.
It was submitted that the respondent authority has failed to establish any
nexus between the alleged non-recovery of the Company's tax dues and
any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty attributable to the
petitioner.
19.
First and foremost, it was submitted that the petitioner was a
director of the Company only for a very brief period. The petitioner was
appointed as a director on 20.03.2005 and resigned from the said office
on 05.09.2005. The said fact is borne out from Form No. 32 filed with the
Registrar of Companies, a copy whereof was duly produced before the
respondent authority during the proceedings. It was, therefore, submitted
that the petitioner had ceased to be a director much before the relevant
assessment proceedings and could not, merely by reason of his having
held the office of director for a limited period, be saddled with liability
for the subsequent non-recovery of the Company's tax dues.
20.
It was further submitted that the respondent authority has failed to
consider the aforesaid Form No.32 in its proper perspective. Despite the
document having been produced before the authority, there is no
meaningful consideration or discussion thereof in the impugned order.
The omission assumes significance, particularly when the petitioner's
liability under Section 179 of the IT Act was sought to be founded upon
his status as a director.
C/SCA/6580/2016(GJHC240073742016)
21.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Secondly, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the petitioner
had, in fact, never participated in the management or day-to-day affairs of
the Company. He was neither a signatory to any contract executed by the
Company nor a participant in its business affairs. He did not attend any
meeting of the Board of Directors, nor did he sign any board resolution.
He was not authorised to operate the Company's bank accounts or to sign
cheques on its behalf. It was further submitted that even the return of
income of the Company was not signed by the petitioner.
22.
Thirdly, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the affairs and
management of the Company were, in fact, conducted by Shri Pratik P.
Shah, one of its directors and promoters. In support of this submission,
the petitioner had produced before the respondent authority an affidavit of
Shri Pratik P. Shah, wherein he unequivocally acknowledged that he was
responsible for the management and conduct of the Company's affairs
and that the petitioner had no involvement therein.
23.
It was further submitted that the aforesaid material was not duly
considered by the respondent authority. The respondent authority appears
to have discarded the affidavit merely on the ground that Shri Pratik P.
Shah had not remained present at the time of hearing. Learned Senior
Advocate submitted that such an approach was wholly erroneous,
particularly when the affidavit constituted relevant material bearing
directly upon the question whether the petitioner had any role in the
management or conduct of the Company's affairs.
24.
As regards the petitioner's alleged shareholding, learned Senior
Advocate submitted that the petitioner could not have been held liable
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
under Section 179 of the IT Act merely because a substantial percentage
of shareholding was attributed to him during a brief period. It was
submitted that the Company was incorporated on 25.01.2005 with three
directors, namely, Shri Pranav Amratlal Shah, Shri Pratik P. Shah and
Mrs.Niketa B. Dave. The petitioner was subsequently appointed as a
director on 20.03.2005. Thereafter, 29,50,000 shares of the Company
were subscribed by Fortune Gilt Private Limited, through the petitioner,
and the said investment was duly reflected in the books of account of the
Company.
25.
Learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the shares in
question were not held by the petitioner in his individual capacity. The
shareholding was in the name of Fortune Gilt Private Limited, of which
the petitioner was a Director. Consequently, the respondent authority's
description of the petitioner as personally holding 98% of the shares is
factually incorrect and cannot constitute a valid basis for fastening
liability upon him under Section 179 of the IT Act.
26.
It was also submitted that the Company had several other
shareholders who were wholly unconnected with the petitioner. The
existence of such independent shareholders itself belies the respondent
authority's theory that the Company was a mere “one-man show” of the
petitioner or that its corporate structure was, in substance, that of a private
company.
27.
Furthermore, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the
respondent authority has selectively relied upon the shareholding pattern
prevailing during the initial period of incorporation while completely
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overlooking the shareholding position in the immediately succeeding
financial year i.e. F.Y. 2006-07. The petitioner was shown to have held
approximately 98% of the shares only for a brief period immediately
following the incorporation of the Company, which was merely a
consequence of the timing of the subscription of shares. In the
immediately succeeding financial year, the shareholding attributed to the
petitioner stood at approximately 30%, which by itself demonstrates that
the alleged 98% shareholding was neither permanent nor reflective of any
continuing control over the Company.
28.
Thus, learned Senior Advocate submitted that the respondent
authority's conclusion that the Company was effectively a one-man
concern controlled by the petitioner is contrary to the material on record
and rests upon an erroneous appreciation of the Company's incorporation
status, shareholding pattern and the petitioner's actual role in its affairs.
Mere status as a Director, or even the holding of a substantial percentage
of shares for a limited period, cannot by itself satisfy the statutory
requirement of establishing gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty
so as to attract Section 179 of the IT Act.
29.
In support of his submissions, learned Senior Advocate
Mr.S.N.Soparkar, has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of M.Rajamoni Amma and Another vs. Deputy
Commissioner of Income-tax (Assessment) and Others, [1992] 195 ITR
873 (SC).
30.
While referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Radhey
Mohan Sharma vs. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (OSD) [passed
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CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
in Special Civil Application No.1921 of 2005, dated 12.02.2014]. It is
contended that it is not mandatory or compulsory to lift the corporate veil
in each and every case involving the directors of a private limited
company or a public limited company in order to invoke the provisions of
Section 179 of the IT Act.
31.
While referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Ram
Prakash Singeshwar Rungta vs. Income Tax Officer, [2015] 59
taxmann.com 174 (Gujarat), which has been followed in subsequent
decisions, learned Senior Advocate Mr.Soparkar has submitted that this
Court, while construing the provisions of Section 179(1) of the IT Act,
has held that the provisions of this section can only be invoked against
the directors if it is proved that there was gross neglect, misfeasance, or
breach of duty on their part in the non-recovery of the dues of the
company. He submitted that the respondent authority, while passing the
impugned order, have not recorded satisfaction on these three factors.
32.
Reference is also made to the decision of this Court in case of
Pravinbhai M. Kheni vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central
Circle-2&2, (2012) 28 taxmann.com 111 (Gujarat) and has submitted that
the reliance placed by the respondent, while passing the impugned order
on this decision is misconceived, since the facts of the case disclose that
the assessees and the Directors of the public limited company had formed
the company for their personal gains in order to utilize the funds, assets of
the public limited company for their own benefit, for creation of the huge
assets in their own name, and all the directors and shareholders were
members of the family and such the public limited company was used as
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a conduit for generating unaccounted wealth, which is missing in the
present case.
33.
While referring to the assessment order of the company, Hirak
Biotech Limited, it is submitted that the same does not in any manner
reflect that the company was formed for providing accommodation entry.
He has submitted that the assessment order refers to the inadmissible
expenses under Section 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act, which refers to the
deduction of TDS but not depositing in the government and accordingly,
such expenses have been disallowed by the Assessing Officer. Further, it
is submitted that the claim of depreciation is held to be wrong and
excessive and has been disallowed. He has also submitted that the
assessment order also deals with unexplained investment in fixed assets
and the cash credit which is deposited after the petitioner had resigned as
a Director.
34.
Thus, it is urged that the receipt of money in cash by the company
cannot be held against the petitioner, since the Revenue has failed to
examine or give a finding to that extent that such amount has been
utilized by the petitioner for his personal gains.
35.
It is also submitted that the assets were sold in the year 2009,
which cannot be attributed to the petitioner as it was beyond his tenure as
a Director, as he resigned on 05.09.2005.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
36. In response to the petition, an affidavit-in-reply came to be filed on
behalf of the respondent authority. It was submitted that, though Hirak
Biotech Limited was incorporated and registered as a public limited
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company, the factual circumstances surrounding its incorporation,
shareholding and management warranted lifting of the corporate veil for
the purpose of determining the petitioner's liability under Section 179 of
the IT Act.
37.
With regard to the shareholding pattern, it was submitted that, upon
the petitioner being inducted as a director of the Company on 20.03.2005,
he subscribed to 29,50,000 equity shares out of the total 30,00,000 shares
of the Company. The remaining 50,000 shares were held by the other
promoters/directors, namely, Shri Pratik P. Shah, who held 44,000 shares,
and Ms. Niketa B. Dave, who held 1,000 shares, along with the remaining
shareholders. Thus, according to the respondent authority, there was a
period during the relevant financial year when the petitioner held
approximately 98.33% of the total shareholding of the Company.
38.
It was further submitted that, upon lifting the corporate veil, the
actual nature and functioning of the Company became apparent.
According to the respondent authority, as on 31.03.2005, the share capital
of the Company in the form of equity shares was only Rs.5,00,000/-.
However, upon the induction of the petitioner as a director, the share
capital of the Company increased substantially to approximately Rs.7
crore, predominantly by way of equity shares held through the petitioner.
Out of the total 30,00,000 equity shares, 29,50,000 shares were attributed
to the petitioner, while the remaining shares were held by other persons
who were either directors or beneficiaries.
39.
On the basis of the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent
authority submitted that the Company was, in substance, completely
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controlled and managed by the petitioner and was effectively a “one-man
show”. It was further contended that the public was not substantively
involved in the affairs or ownership of the Company and that,
notwithstanding its registration as a public limited company, its actual
constitution and functioning bore the characteristics of a private
company.
40.
As regards the statutory provision, it was submitted that Section
179 of the IT Act fastens joint and several liability upon every person
who was a director of a private company at any time during the relevant
previous year in respect of the tax due from such company, unless such
director establishes that the non-recovery of the tax cannot be attributed
to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation
to the affairs of the company.
41.
In the aforesaid context, the respondent authority submitted that the
petitioner could not absolve himself of liability merely on the ground that
he was not aware of the tax demand at the time when it came to be raised.
According to the respondent authority, the petitioner, having held
approximately 98% of the shareholding during the relevant period,
exercised substantial control over the Company and, therefore, could not
disclaim responsibility for its tax liability merely by relying upon the
Company's status as a public limited company.
42.
With regard to the petitioner's contention that he was neither an
authorised signatory nor involved in the day-to-day affairs of the
Company, learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent
authority submitted that such a contention was wholly untenable. It was
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submitted that a person holding more than 98% of the shareholding of a
company could not reasonably contend that he had no involvement in its
affairs. According to the respondent authority, the appointment of another
person as an authorised signatory, despite the petitioner's alleged
substantial control over the Company, was itself indicative of an
arrangement intended to conceal the petitioner's actual role and thereby
constituted a circumstance warranting lifting of the corporate veil.
43.
It was further submitted that the aforesaid arrangement constituted
a device adopted by the major stakeholder, namely, the petitioner, to
defeat the legitimate interests of the Revenue. On that basis, the
respondent authority contended that the petitioner's conduct, as a director
during the relevant period, amounted to gross negligence in relation to the
discharge of the Company's tax liability.
44.
Learned Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent authority also
submitted that the petitioner could not seek to avoid liability by
contending that Shri Pratik P. Shah was exclusively looking after the
affairs of the Company. According to the respondent authority, if the
petitioner was in fact holding approximately 98% of the shareholding, he
could not have remained completely oblivious to the manner in which the
Company was being managed. It was submitted that the petitioner's
failure to raise any objection before any forum against the manner in
which Shri Pratik P. Shah was conducting the affairs of the Company
demonstrated that the petitioner had extended his support to the
management of the Company.
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45.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Turning to the Company's dealings with the general public, learned
Senior Standing Counsel for the respondent authority submitted that,
although the Company was registered as a public limited company, it had
not issued its shares to the general public for subscription. According to
the respondent authority, substantially all the shares during F.Y. 2005-06,
relevant to A.Y. 2006-07, were held by the petitioner, which
demonstrated that the Company did not, in substance, have any
meaningful public participation.
46.
It was further submitted that the Company had also alienated a
substantial portion of its immovable properties, including properties
which were subsequently dealt with by the bank and the Department,
leaving the Revenue with no effective avenue for recovery by way of
attachment of the Company's remaining assets. According to the
respondent authority, these circumstances further demonstrated the
necessity of proceeding against the petitioner under Section 179 of the IT
Act.
47.
Finally, learned advocate for the respondent authority submitted
that the mere description of the Company as a “public limited company”
in its certificate of incorporation could not, in the facts of the present
case, be regarded as conclusive of its true character and functioning. It
was contended that the petitioner had deliberately caused the Company to
be incorporated with the description of a public limited company,
whereas, in substance, its affairs and shareholding were structured in a
manner characteristic of a private company. The respondent authority,
therefore, submitted that the corporate veil was rightly lifted and that the
petitioner, being a director during the relevant previous year and
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exercising substantial control over the Company, was liable for the
outstanding tax dues under Section 179 of the IT Act.
ANALYSIS AND OPINION :
48.
We have heard learned advocates appearing for the respective
parties.
49.
The following facts are established from the record:
(A)
The company - Hirak Biotech Limited, was incorporated on
25.01.2005 as a public limited company.
(B)
Initially, three directors, namely Shri Pranav Amratlal Shah, Shri
Pratik P. Shah and Mrs.Niketa B. Dave, were the Directors.
(C)
On 20.03.2005, the petitioner herein was introduced as a Director
of Hirak Biotech Limited and he continued to remain as a Director of the
said company till 05.09.2005, the day on which he resigned.
(D)
For the A.Y. 2006-07, the assessment of the company was
undertaken and it appears that under the assessment proceedings,
additional income tax of Rs.240.08 lakhs was assessed in the hands of the
company and demand was raised.
(E)
A show cause notice under Section 179 of the IT Act dated
11.10.2013 was served upon the petitioner, to which he replied vide letter
dated 17.10.2013. On 04.09.2014, he was called upon to pay the
outstanding tax dues of the company. The petitioner replied to the same.
50.
On 15.09.2014, the petitioner preferred a writ petition, being
Special Civil Application No.12861 of 2014, challenging the notice dated
04.09.2014.
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51.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
During the pendency of the petition, the respondent passed an order
dated 19.11.2013 passed under Section 179 of the IT Act, which was also
challenged by amending the writ petition.
52.
By the order dated 12.02.2015, this Court quashed and set aside the
order dated 19.11.2013 and notice dated 04.09.2014, and remanded the
matter to the respondent to pass fresh order.
53.
This Court has reserved liberty in favour of the respondent to
examine the status of the company, whether it is a private limited or
public limited, by lifting of the corporate veil, and thereafter to take steps,
if any available, in accordance with law under Section 179 of the IT Act.
54.
Thereafter, the petitioner was issued show cause notice on
19.06.2015 under Section 179 of the IT Act, to which the petitioner filed
his reply on 24.07.2015. Ultimately, the respondent passed an impugned
order dated 31.03.2016 under Section 179 of the IT Act.
55.
During the financial year 2005-06 and during the period the
petitioner acted, as a Director, he was having 98% shareholding.
56.
The petitioner is roped in in the proceedings under Section 179 of
the IT Act primarily for the reason that after the petitioner was inducted
as an Additional Director of the Company, he subscribed 29,50,000
shares out of this total shares held by the company at 30 lakhs and
remaining 50,000 shares were held by the Promoters / Directors of the
Company, that is Shri Pratik P. Shah, Mrs.Niketa B. Dave and hence, it
is alleged that the petitioner was owning 98.33% shares during the year
under consideration and hence, by applying the principles of lifting of
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corporate veil, the public limited company Hirak Biotech Ltd., in fact,
was a private limited company.
57.
It is also alleged that as on 31.03.2005, the share capital of Hirak
Biotech Limited in form of equity share was only Rs.5 lakh, but on
induction of the petitioner as a Director, the share capital of company
increased to Rs.7 crores. Thus, it was alleged that the company was fully
controlled and managed by the petitioner, as he had substantial
shareholding in the company and it was a one-man show and as per the
provisions of Section 3(1)(iii) of the Companies Act, 1956 the public
limited company Hirak Biotech Limited is held to be a private limited
company.
58.
From the impugned order, it is also noticed by us that the
respondent has also questioned the disposal of the assets of the company
vide transfer deed dated 25.02.2009.
59.
It is case of the respondent Revenue that despite making honest and
sincere efforts to realize the demand, since none of the Directors cooperated, it was necessary to invoke the provisions of Section 179 of the
IT Act against the Directors including the present petitioner, as there has
been gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty on his part in relation
to the affairs of the company in payment of taxes.
60.
While passing the impugned order, the respondent has relied upon
the statement of one of the directors - Shri Pratik P. Shah, which was
recorded on 01.05.2013, wherein he has explained the modus operandi to
provide accommodation entries. The entire reply has been incorporated in
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the impugned order, and ultimately, it has been concluded by the
respondent authority that the company was formed only to provide
accommodation entries in the form of bogus share capital and share
premium, which satisfies the directions issued by this Court vide
judgment dated 12.02.2015.
61.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner was never called upon in the
show cause notice to deal with the statement of Shri Pratik P. Shah, on
which the reliance is placed by the respondent to conclude that the
company was formed only to provide accommodation entries. The
assessment order dated 29.12.2008 also does not whisper about the
allegations that the unexplained introduction of share capital and cash
credit were only made for providing accommodation entries. Hence, on
this count, the impugned order suffers from violation of principles of
natural justice, and non-application of mind since the petitioner was never
called upon to deal with the statement of Shri Pratik P. Shah.
62.
Additionally, at this stage, we may refer that, in fact, Shri Pratik P.
Shah had filed an affidavit dated 23.07.2015, which was produced by the
petitioner, in which he has not whispered about the accommodation
entries. The said affidavit has been discarded by the respondent for the
reason that Shri Pratik P. Shah did not appear before him. Thus, on one
hand, the respondent has placed reliance on the statement of Shri Pratik
P. Shah recorded on 01.05.2013 for holding against the petitioner that the
company was formed to provide accommodation entries, whereas the
affidavit sworn by Shri Pratik P. Shah, which was produced by the
petitioner before the respondent clarifying that neither he nor the director
of the company has diverted the funds received from the debtors, etc. has
been ignored.
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63.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
We may now deal with the primary reason cited by the respondent
for invoking the provisions of Section 179 of the IT Act. At this stage, we
may notice the statutory provisions contained in section 179 of the IT Act
which reads as under:
“Liability of Directors of Private Company :
179. [(1)] Notwithstanding anything contained in the Companies Act, 1956 (1
of 1956), where any tax due from a private company in respect of any income
of any previous year or from any other company in respect of any income of
any previous year during which such other company was a private company
cannot be recovered, then, every person who was a director of the private
company at any time during the relevant previous year shall be jointly and
severally liable for the payment of such tax unless he proves that the nonrecovery cannot be attributed to any gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of
duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company.
[(2) Where a private company is converted into a public company and the tax
assessed in respect of any income of any previous year during which such
company was a private company cannot be recovered, then, nothing contained
in sub-section (1) shall apply to any person who was a director of such private
company in relation to any tax due in respect of any income of such private
company assessable for any assessment year commencing before the 1st day
of April, 1962,]”
64.
It is the case of the respondent that the petitioner, when he was a
Director and for the year under consideration, was holding a shareholding
capacity of 98.33%, and after his induction as a Director in the company,
the share capital increased from Rs.5 lakhs to Rs.7 crores. On this count,
the status of the company as a public limited company has been doubted,
and it has been recorded that in fact, since it was a one-man show by the
petitioner, the company can be said to be a private limited company.
65.
In our considered opinion, the status of public limited company
cannot be doubted and held to be a private limited company by mere
holding of substantial numbers of equity shares by a director. Neither can
it be held that since the shares were not offered to the public the company
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becomes a private limited company. The Company - Hirak Biotech
Limited was an unlisted public company, which is statutory recognized
under the Companies Act and, was undertaking its business that has
issued equity shares not traded on any stock exchange. There are various
factors which statutorily differentiate an unlisted public limited company
and private limited company. Even if one of the director holds majority or
substantial number of shares, such holding of shares cannot be construed
that a public limited company can be said to be a private limited
company. The Companies Act, 2013 or other regulations such as SEBI
rules does not recognize that the status of the company which is
registered as a public limited company has to be treated as private limited
company in case one of its director holds substantial number of shares. A
company's classification as public or private depends on its Memorandum
of Association (MoA) and Articles of Association (AoA), not the
concentration of its shareholding. The respondent in the impugned order
has placed reliance on the provisions of Section 3(1)(iii) of the
Companies Act, 1956 for determining the status of the Hirak Biotech
Limited. We are of the opinion, that while fixing the liability of directors
under the provisions of section 179 of the IT Act, the authority cannot
venture into the examine the status of the company on the basis of
definition of private company under the Companies Act, without
examining or ignoring that the company in question was registered as
public limited company.
66.
For invoking the provisions of Section 179 of the IT Act, and
roping in the Directors of a public limited company by applying the
principle of lifting the corporate veil, a stringent exercise is required to be
undertaken by the Revenue. The principle envisaged in the decision of
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this Court in the case of Pravinbhai M. Kheni (supra) cannot be blindly
applied. The facts of the said case would determine that the factors which
had weighed upon the Coordinate Bench of this Court to apply the
principle of lifting the corporate veil were egregious. The facts suggest
that the Memorandum of Association of the company before the
coordinate Bench in the said case and the Directors and shareholders who
were seven in number, belonged to and were family members related to
one M. Kantilal's family. The main object of the company was to take
over the business and undertaking and to deal with the business of
manufacturing, dealing, buying, selling, etc., of gems and diamonds and
right from the inception of the company, it was run as a family business
and huge undisclosed income and the creation of huge assets were done
by the Directors of the company, and the unaccounted income of the
company was utilized for acquiring such properties by the Directors. A
categorical finding was recorded that the company was used as a conduit
for generating unaccounted wealth, the shares of the company were not
offered to the general public for subscription and all shares were held by
the directors only. These combined factors had impressed the Court to
apply the principles of lifting the corporate veil. In the present case, the
impugned order does not reflect that the income of the company was
siphoned and utilized for acquiring properties by the petitioner, and no
finding has been recorded by the respondent in the impugned order.
67.
Thus, the legal precedent set by this Court in the case of
Pravinbhai M. Kheni (supra) cannot be thoughtlessly applied to each
and every case wherein the status of a company has been questioned by
applying the principles of lifting the corporate veil in an exercise
undertaken under the provisions of Section 179 of the IT Act.
C/SCA/6580/2016(GJHC240073742016)
68.
CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 11/09/2026
Unless three factors, as reiterated in the decision of this Court in
the case of Maganbhai Hansrajbhai Patel vs. Assistant Commissioner of
Income-tax and Anr., [2013] 353 ITR 567 (Guj.), which are found in the
aforesaid provisions of Section 179(1) of the IT Act, such as gross
negligence, Misfeasance or breach of duty, are established, due to which
the authority was unable to recover the payment of tax dues, the director
of a private limited company cannot be fastened with the liability of
recovery. It is held thus:
“20 To our mind, the authority completely failed to appreciate in proper
perspective the requirement of section 179(1) of the Act. We may recall that
said provision provides for a vicarious liability of the director of a public
company for payment of tax dues which cannot be recovered from the
company. However, such liability could be avoided if the director proves that
the non recovery cannot be attributed to any gross negligence, misfeasance or
breach of duty on his part in relation to the affairs of the company. It is ofcourse true that the responsibility of establishing such facts is cast upon the
director. Therefore, once it is shown that there is a private company whose tax
dues have remained outstanding and same cannot be recovered, any person
who was a director of such a company at the relevant time would be liable to
pay such dues. However, such liability can be avoided if he proves that the
non recovery cannot be attributed to the three factors mentioned above. Thus
the responsibility to establish such facts are on the director. However, once
the director places before the authority his reasons why it should be held that
non recovery cannot be attributed to any of the three factors, the authority
would have to examine such grounds and come to a conclusion in this respect.
Significantly, the question of lack of gross negligence, misfeasance or breach
of duty on part of the director is to be viewed in the context of non recovery of
the tax dues of the company. In other words, as long as the director
establishes that the non recovery of the tax cannot be attributed to his gross
neglect, etc., his liability under section 179(1) of the Act would not arise. Here
again the legislature advisedly used the word gross neglect and not a mere
neglect on his part. The entire focus and discussion of the Assistant
Commissioner in the impugned order is with respect to the petitioner's neglect
in functioning of the company when the company was functional. Nothing
came to be stated by him regarding the gross negligence on part of the
petitioner due to which the tax dues from the company could not be recovered.
In absence of any such consideration, the Assistant Commissioner could not
have ordered recovery of dues of the company from the director. We would
clarify that in the present case the petitioner had put forth a strong
representation to the proposal of recovery of tax from him under section 179
of the Act. In such representation, he had detailed the steps taken by him and
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the circumstances due to which non recovery of tax cannot be attributed to his
gross neglect. It was this representation and the factors which the petitioner
had put forth before the Assistant Commissioner which had to be taken into
account before the order could be passed. It is not even the case of the
department that the petitioner paid the dues of other creditors of the company
in preference to the tax dues of the department. It is not the case of the
department that the petitioner negligently frittered away the assets of the
company due to which the dues of the department could not be recovered. To
suggest that the petitioner did not oppose the GSFC's auction sale is begging
the question. GSFC had sold the property after several attempts through
auction. It is not the case of the department that proper price was not
fetched.”
69.
Thus, it is a settled legal precedent that for invoking the provisions
of Section 179(1) of the IT Act against a Director, a finding has to be
recorded that the non-recovery of the tax dues from the Company is
to be attributed to gross negligence, misfeasance or breach of duty
on the part of the Director (petitioner) once the Director places before the
authority his reasons why it should be held that non-recovery cannot be
attributed to any of the three factors. The petitioner, in his exhaustive
reply dated 24.07.2015, while referring to the decision of this Court in the
case of Maganbhai Hansrajbhai (supra) had explained that during the
period of 5 months from 20.03.2005 to 05.09.2005, he never operated
bank accounts, filed income tax returns, nor did he manage the affairs of
the Company, and he has never authorised to sign any financial or tax
documents, and was never involved in managing the affairs of the
company, and was not a signatory to the contracts of the Company, and
never operated the bank accounts of the Company nor signed any
cheques. He had also produced his affidavit to strengthen his case. It is
also not in dispute that for F.Y. 2006-07, the share holding of the
petitioner was 30%. The petitioner had also pointed out that he was not a
director of the Company when the assessment was completed under
Section 143(3) of the IT Act on 29.12.2008, whereby a demand of
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Rs.2.40 crores was raised. It is also established from the record that the
properties of the Company were sold after the assessment order passed by
the DRT under the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner also contended that
the loan and creation of mortgage in favour of Jammu and Kashmir Bank
Ltd. and Ahmedabad Peoples Co-operative Bank for securing the loan
granted to the Company was done by Shri Pratik P. Shah, which was after
the petitioner tendered his resignation, and the properties were sold by the
lender bank under the SARFAESI Act. After such explanation tendered
by the petitioner, the respondent was supposed to apply his mind to two
aspects and record the findings - (1) whether the petitioner has siphoned
off the funds and defrauded the revenue; and (2) whether the nonrecovery of the tax dues from the Company is to be attributed to gross
negligence, misfeasance or breach of duty on the part of the petitioner.
The impugned order is bereft of any such findings; and hence, the
provisions of Section 179(1) of the IT Act do not get attracted.
70.
On an overall analysis of the facts, legal precedent and the
provisions of Section 179 of the IT Act, we hereby quash and set aside
the impugned order dated 31.03.2016 passed by the respondent authority
under Section 179 of the IT Act. Accordingly, the writ petition stands
allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Sd/.
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
Sd/.
(VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)
BHAVESH-[PPS]* & MAHESH/1
***
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