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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of decision: 24.02.2026
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O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Digvijay Rai, Mr. Archit
Mishra, Advocates with Mr.
Yatinder Choudhary, Law
Officer.
versus
M/S RAJDEEP INDUSTRIES
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Vikas Sharma, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
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JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, being O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016, has
been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
19961, assailing the findings of the learned Arbitrator in respect of
certain limited claims adjudicated under the Arbitral Award dated
26.04.2013, read with the corrigendum dated 28.05.20132.
2.
The limited contention advanced by learned counsel for the
Petitioner, Airports Authority of India3, in the present petition is that
the grant of Claim Nos. 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 under the Impugned
Award is legally unsustainable, as the said claims are ex facie barred
A&C Act
Impugned Award
AAI
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
by limitation. It is further submitted that some of these claims pertain
to periods substantially prior to the relevant reference date, and in
certain instances relate to events alleged to have occurred as far back
as the year 1996.
3.
Learned counsel for the AAI further submits that the final bill
was raised on 16.04.1999 and was accepted under protest by the
Respondent on 28.04.1999. He relies upon the Acceptance Letter
dated 16.07.19994 of the Respondent, which reads as follows:
<RDI-ARC
The Chief· Engineer,
AAI, ARC Project,
IGI Airport, Palam,
New Delhi-110037
Subject:Construction of Composite Structure for 60 mts.
Span Hanger in Structural Steel and Abutting Two
Storyed Building on RCC Frame Work at IGI
Airport, New Delhi.
Dear Sir,
The bill prepared by the Executive Engineer (C-11) has been
accepted by us under protest. We will be shortly appealing to the
competent authority to set aside your order vide your letter no.
Engg/CE/ARC/1997/878 dated 21.06.99 wherein you have
imposed a penalty of Rs.93,916 under clause 2 of the agreement.
As till date we have not received various payments including 10
CC payments due to us, we therefore are reserving our right to
invoke arbitration and raise claims after the out come of our appeal
and receipt of the final payment i.e. last payment. The penalty
imposed by you and the appeal against your order has been
discussed with the Executive Engineer and he has assured us that
he will look into our various payments after the outcome of the
appeal.
Thanking You
Yours Faithfully,
For RAJDEEP INDUSTRIES,
Er. DEEPAK SEHGAL
(Partner)=
Acceptance Letter
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
4.
A perusal of the aforestated letter demonstrates that the protest
was expressly raised only in respect of two issues, namely, (i)
imposition of penalty of Rs. 93,916/- under Clause 2 of the
Agreement, and (ii) escalation under Clause 10CC of the Agreement.
5.
Learned counsel for the AAI further submits that no other
claims were articulated in the said letter, save for vague averments
reserving the right to invoke arbitration and raise claims after the
outcome of the appeal.
6.
Learned counsel further submits that the grant of the claims
which were never subject matter of the final bill is clearly time-barred
in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in J.C.
Budhraja vs. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd.5,
specifically Paragraph Nos. 21 and 24 thereof, which read as follows:
<21. It is now well settled that a writing to be an acknowledgment
of liability must involve an admission of a subsisting jural
relationship between the parties and a conscious affirmation of an
intention of continuing such relationship in regard to an existing
liability. The admission need not be in regard to any precise
amount nor by expressed words. If a defendant writes to the
plaintiff requesting him to send his claim for verification and
payment, it amounts to an acknowledgment. But if the defendant
merely says, without admitting liability, it would like to examine
the claim or the accounts, it may not amount to acknowledgment.
In other words, a writing, to be treated as an acknowledgment of
liability should consciously admit his liability to pay or admit his
intention to pay the debt. Let us illustrate. If a creditor sends a
demand notice demanding payment of Rs 1 lakh due under a
promissory note executed by the debtor and the debtor sends a
reply stating that he would pay the amount due, without
mentioning the amount, it will still be an acknowledgment of
liability. If a writing is relied on as an acknowledgment for
extending the period of limitation in respect of the amount or right
claimed in the suit, the acknowledgment should necessarily be in
respect of the subject-matter of the suit. If a person executes a work
and issues a demand letter making a claim for the amount due as
per the final bill and the defendant agrees to verify the bill and pay
(2008) 2 SCC 444
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
the amount, the acknowledgment will save limitation for a suit for
recovery of only such bill amount, but will not extend the
limitation in regard to any fresh or additional claim for damages
made in the suit, which was not a part of the bill or the demand
letter. Again we may illustrate. If a house is constructed under the
item rate contract and the amount due in regard to work executed is
Rs two lakhs and certain part-payments say aggregating to Rs
1,25,000 have been made and the contractor demands payment of
the balance of Rs 75,000 due towards the bill and the employer
acknowledges liability, that acknowledgment will be only in regard
to the sum of Rs 75,000, which is due. If the contractor files a suit
for recovery of the said Rs 75,000 due in regard to work done and
also for recovery of Rs 50,000 as damages for breach by the
employer and the said suit is filed beyond three years from
completion of work and submission of the bill but within three
years from the date of acknowledgment, the suit will be saved from
bar of limitation only in regard to the liability that was
acknowledged, namely, Rs 75,000 and not in regard to the fresh or
additional claim of Rs 50,000 which was not the subject-matter of
acknowledgment. What can be acknowledged is a present
subsisting liability. An acknowledgment made with reference to a
liability, cannot extend limitation for a time-barred liability or a
claim that was not made at the time of acknowledgment or some
other liability relating to other transactions. Any admission of jural
relationship in regard to the ascertained sum due or a pending
claim, cannot be an acknowledgment for a new additional claim for
damages.
***
24. In regard to the claims aggregating to Rs 95,96,616 made in the
claim statement filed before the arbitrator, only claims aggregating
to Rs 28,32,128 related to and formed part of the said pending
claim of Rs 50,15,820. The appellant did not make a claim in
regard to the remaining Rs 21,83,692. Therefore, out of the claim
of Rs 95,96,616 made by the appellant before the arbitrator, the
claim for only Rs 28,32,128 was not barred by limitation. The
remaining claims of the appellant aggregating to Rs 67,64,488 out
of the total of Rs 95,96,616 being fresh claims, were not <pending
claims= in respect of which the acknowledgment was made.
Therefore the said fresh claims aggregating to Rs 67,64,488 made
for the first time in the claim statement filed on 27-6-1986 were
clearly barred by limitation.=
7.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner-AAI further submits that, in
view of the findings of the said judgment in paragraph No.21, the
Claim Nos. 3,7,8,10,12 and 17, which never formed the subject matter
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
of any prior communication as between the parties or any action,
could not have been raised for the first time before the learned
Arbitrator and would clearly fall foul of the period of limitation. The
grant of the said claims is, therefore, unsustainable.
8.
Per Contra, Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel for the
Respondent, submits that a perusal of the Acceptance Letter, as
reproduced herein above, would reveal that although only two issues
were expressly raised therein, however, the Claim Nos. 3, 7, 8, 10, 12,
and 17 must be read as having been included within the omnibus
reservation contained in the following sentence:
<…..We therefore are reserving our right to invoke arbitration and
raise claims after the outcome of our appeal and receipt of the final
payment i.e. last payment.=
9.
Admittedly, it is not in dispute that no further communication
after the said Acceptance letter was raised until the year 2005, when
the Petitioner-AAI, by communications dated 18.01.2005 and
20.01.2005, waived the liquidated damages and released the escalation
payments payment of the escalation charges, respectively.
10.
Learned counsel for the Respondent therefore submits that since
the issues raised in the Acceptance Letter were resolved only in the
year 2005, the limitation would commence from the said date and not
from the date of the acceptance of the final bill.
11.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and, with their
able assistance, perused the material available on record.
12.
The relevant portion of the Impugned Award dealing with the
aforesaid issue is Paragraph Nos. 44 and 45. The same are reproduced
herein under for ready reference:
<44. To support his arguments Mr. Vivek Chib drew my attention
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Panchu Gopal
Bose v. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta, (1993) 4 SCC 338,
wherein their Lordships observed that <period of limitation for the
commencement of an arbitration runs from the date on which, had
there been no arbitration clause, the cause of action would have
accrued … = In view of the observation made by the Supreme
Court in the said case question arises when did the claimant
acquired the right to arbitration. According to Mr. Chib right
accrued to the claimant when his appeal was finally decided in
January 2005 and payment under clause 10 CC was made in
August 2007.
Similarly in the case of Major (Retd.) Inder Singh Rekhi v. Delhi
Development Authority (1988) 2 SCC 338, apex court observed <
the question for consideration is when did the dispute arise = It
further observed <in order to be entitled to ask for a reference
under Section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement
of money but there must be a difference or dispute that must arise=.
Admittedly, on completion of work a right to get payment normally
arise but where the final bill is prepared and when the assertion of
claim is made there is non-payment, the cause of action would
arise on that date. Same reasoning was applied by the Delhi High
Court in Prem Power Construction (Pvt.) Ltd. v. National
Hydroelectric Power Corp. Ltd., Manu/DE/1887/2008, wherein it
is held that < even though the construction work was completed on
10.06.2001 and the final bill was prepared only in August 2001,
therefore, the date on which the cause of arbitration accrued to the
petitioner, that is the date from which the limitation period would
start running =.
In the present case the alleged final bill was signed by the claimant
on 28.04.1999 under protest but that would not be the date from
which period of limitation has to be counted. Relying on the
observation of Supreme Court in the case of Hari Shankar
Singhania v. Gaur Hari Singhania, (2006) 4 SCC 658 and Union of
India v. Simplex Concrete Piles India(P) Ltd., 108 (2003) DLT
732, he contended that even though claimant signed the alleged
final bill under protest, he did not raise all the claims as he awaited
decision on his appeal against imposition of penalty and non
payment of the 10 CC escalation, therefore, till such time appeal
was decided the alleged bill could not have been treated as final
bill. Moreover vide letter dated 16.07.1999 claimant had made it
absolutely clear by using the word < as till date we have not
received various payments including 10 CC payments due to us,
we therefore, are reserving our right to invoke arbitration and raise
claims after the out come of our appeal and receipt of the final
payment i.e. last payment =. This shows claimant had reserved the
right to make other claims after appeal was decided because much
depended on the decision of waiver of penalty. To support his
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
arguments he relied on the decision of Delhi High Court in the case
of Ram Nath Mehra & Sons v. Union of India, AIR 1982 Delhi
164, where it is observed that when the Govt. withheld the payment
of a certain amount from the final bill due to a delay in the
completion of the work, the period of limitation would commence
only from the date of the last payment. Last payment in this case
was made in August 2007. Therefore, invocation of arbitration in
October 2007 is well within time.
45. From the arguments of counsel for the parties and facts which
have come on record, it is clear that escalation of the undisputed
period was also not made in the alleged final bill. Escalation was
worked out only in January 2005 and paid in August 2007 whereas
undisputed period for the purpose of calculation of escalation was
from 01.04.1998 to 19.04.1998. Payment of escalation for
undisputed and extended period was made in August 2007 which is
reflected in Ex. R-19. Therefore, I am of the considered view that
there was no finalization of the final bill till January 2005 because
after the penalty imposed by the respondent was waived or set
aside till then it cannot be said that the bill had been finalized on
28th April 1999. It is only when the escalation was paid and
penalty waived that the bill became final. To my mind, bill become
final in January 2005. Hence claims made by the claimant in
October 2007 cannot be said to be time barred. Even otherwise
claimant vide letter dated 16.07.1999 had made it clear that some
payments had not been reflected/paid, therefore acceptance of the
43rd bill alleged to be final bill under protest would not deprive the
claimant to raise other claims as 43rd bill has not attain finality.=
13.
A careful perusal of the extracted portion of the Impugned
Award demonstrates that the learned Arbitrator, upon examination,
has arrived at, inter alia, the following factual conclusions, which
reflect the core findings on the aspect of limitation:
(a). Although the claimant signed the alleged final bill on
28.04.1999 under protest, such signing did not mark the
commencement of limitation because, according to the learned
Arbitrator, all claims had not yet crystallized.
(b). The claimant was awaiting the outcome of his appeal
concerning the imposition of penalty and the non-payment of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
escalation under Clause 10CC, and until the appeal was
decided, the bill could not be treated as final.
(c). By letter dated 16.07.1999, the claimant expressly reserved his
right to invoke arbitration after the decision on the appeal and
upon receipt of the final payment, thereby indicating that, in the
view of the learned Arbitrator, the bill had not attained finality.
(d). The waiver of penalty and payment of escalation were
considered material components of final settlement, and until
these aspects were resolved, the final bill could not be said to
have been finalized in April 1999.
(e). In the present case, escalation was worked out only in January
2005 and was paid in August 2007, including for the undisputed
and extended period.
(f). Consequently, the bill effectively attained finality only after the
waiver of penalty and payment of escalation, and at the earliest
in January 2005.
(g). Since arbitration was invoked in October 2007, the claims were
held not to be barred by limitation.
(h). Acceptance of the 43rd bill under protest did not, according to
the learned Arbitrator, deprive the claimant of the right to raise
further claims, as the bill had not attained finality and material
disputes remained pending.
14.
As is evident from the above, the learned Arbitrator concluded
that since the appeal had not been finalized and the penalty and
escalation were waived only in January 2005, the final bill attained
finality only at that stage, and consequently, the period of limitation
would run from such date.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
15.
This Court, however, in its considered view, finds the aforesaid
finding to be erroneous and is unable to agree with the conclusion so
reached. The final bill was raised on 16.04.1999 and was accepted
under protest on 20.04.1999. The subsequent letter dated 16.07.1999,
being the Acceptance Letter, clearly delineated the Respondent’s
reservations, which were expressly confined to the two issues referred
to above, namely, the penalty and escalation under Clause 10CC.
16.
The claims, namely, Claim Nos. 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17, were
never articulated in the letter dated 16.07.1999 or at any time
thereafter until payments were eventually released on 18.01.2005 and
20.01.2005. In the opinion of this Court, the final bill is necessarily
the bill raised in 1999. Merely because certain objections in respect of
penalty and escalation were subsequently resolved in the year 2005, it
cannot be held that the limitation stood extended in respect of claims
which were never raised, reserved, or acknowledged.
17.
While limitations may stand extended in respect of claims
expressly reserved, the same cannot apply to claims which were never
articulated at all, at least from 1999 till 2005. Such claims are wholly
time-barred, being far beyond the limitation period of three years from
the date of accrual of the cause of action under the Limitation Act,
1963.
18.
The learned Arbitrator’s conclusion that these claims were
within limitation is not supported by any evidence demonstrating
acknowledgment, reservation, or extension of limitation in respect
thereof. The finding, therefore, proceeds on no evidence on the aspect
of limitation and yet the claims have been allowed on merits. Such a
finding is perverse in law.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
19.
Consequently, the Award, insofar as it relates to Claim Nos. 3,
7, 8, 10, 12 and 17, falls foul of Section 34(2)(b)(ii) of the A&C Act,
as it stood prior to 23.10.2015, being in conflict with the public policy
of India, as elucidated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Associate
Builders v. DDA6. In the said decision, the Apex Court held, inter
alia, as under:
“31. The third juristic principle is that a decision which is perverse
or so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the
same is important and requires some degree of explanation. It is
settled law that where:
(i) a finding is based on no evidence, or
(ii) an Arbitral Tribunal takes into account something
irrelevant to the decision which it arrives at; or
(iii) ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision,
such decision would necessarily be perverse.
32. A good working test of perversity is contained in two
judgments. In Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing
Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , it was
held : (SCC p. 317, para 7)
<7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the
finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse,
then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.=
In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999
SCC (L&S) 429] , it was held : (SCC p. 14, para 10)
<10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be
maintained between the decisions which are perverse and
those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and
no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would
be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which
is acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever
compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.=
33. It must clearly be understood that when a court is applying the
<public policy= test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a
court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected.
A possible view by the arbitrator on facts has necessarily to pass
(2015) 3 SCC 49
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
muster as the arbitrator is the ultimate master of the quantity and
quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral
award. Thus an award based on little evidence or on evidence
which does not measure up in quality to a trained legal mind would
not be held to be invalid on this score [ Very often an arbitrator is a
lay person not necessarily trained in law. Lord Mansfield, a famous
English Judge, once advised a high military officer in Jamaica who
needed to act as a Judge as follows:<General, you have a sound
head, and a good heart; take courage and you will do very well, in
your occupation, in a court of equity. My advice is, to make your
decrees as your head and your heart dictate, to hear both sides
patiently, to decide with firmness in the best manner you can; but
be careful not to assign your reasons, since your determination may
be substantially right, although your reasons may be very bad, or
essentially wrong=.It is very important to bear this in mind when
awards of lay arbitrators are challenged.] . Once it is found that the
arbitrators approach is not arbitrary or capricious, then he is the last
word on facts. In P.R. Shah, Shares & Stock Brokers (P)
Ltd. v. B.H.H. Securities (P) Ltd. [(2012) 1 SCC 594 : (2012) 1
SCC (Civ) 342] , this Court held : (SCC pp. 601-02, para 21)
<21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of
an Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the
evidence. An award can be challenged only under the
grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The
Arbitral Tribunal has examined the facts and held that
both the second respondent and the appellant are liable.
The case as put forward by the first respondent has been
accepted. Even the minority view was that the second
respondent was liable as claimed by the first respondent,
but the appellant was not liable only on the ground that the
arbitrators appointed by the Stock Exchange under Byelaw 248, in a claim against a non-member, had no
jurisdiction to decide a claim against another member. The
finding of the majority is that the appellant did the
transaction in the name of the second respondent and is
therefore, liable along with the second respondent.
Therefore, in the absence of any ground under Section
34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the facts
to find out whether a different decision can be arrived at.==
(emphasis supplied)
20.
Now, turning to the question of severability of the Arbitral
Award insofar as the present challenge pertains to Claim Nos. 3, 7, 8,
10, 12 and 17, leaving the remaining claims undisturbed, it becomes
necessary to advert to the principles governing partial setting aside of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
arbitral awards. In this regard, reliance is placed on paragraphs 33, 34
and 35 of the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gayatri
Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited7, which
elucidates the doctrine of severability. The said paragraphs are
reproduced hereinunder for ready reference:
<33. We hold that the power conferred under the proviso to Section
34(2)(a)(iv) is clarificatory in nature. The authority to sever the
<invalid= portion of an arbitral award from the <valid= portion,
while remaining within the narrow confines of Section 34, is
inherent in the court’s jurisdiction when setting aside an award.
34. To this extent, the doctrine of omne majus continet in se
minus4the greater power includes the lesser4applies squarely.
The authority to set aside an arbitral award necessarily
encompasses the power to set it aside in part, rather than in its
entirety. This interpretation is practical and pragmatic. It would be
incongruous to hold that power to set aside would only mean
power to set aside the award in its entirety and not in part. A
contrary interpretation would not only be inconsistent with the
statutory framework but may also result in valid determinations
being unnecessarily nullified.
35. However, we must add a caveat that not all awards can be
severed or segregated into separate silos. Partial setting aside may
not be feasible when the <valid= and <invalid= portions are legally
and practically inseparable. In simpler words, the <valid= and
<invalid= portions must not be inter-dependent or intrinsically
intertwined. If they are, the award cannot be set aside in part.=
21.
In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that Claim
Nos. 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 are barred by limitation. There exists no
legal impediment in severing the findings in respect of these claims
from the remainder of the Award, as they are distinct and independent.
Accordingly, the present Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent,
and the findings concerning Claim Nos. 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 as
recorded in the Impugned Award are set aside.
22.
The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
2025 SCC OnLine SC 986
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
stands disposed of.
23.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 24, 2026/rk/va/her/dj
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:27:23
O.M.P. (COMM) 204/2016
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