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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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ARB.P. 1080/2024
ADITYA BIRLA FINANCE LIMITED
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Mahip Datta Parashar,
Mr.Aman Vasisth and Mr.
Akshat Nayyar, Advocate
versus
GSK INDUSTRIES AND ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Ms. Ridi Bansal, Advocate
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
ORDER
12.01.2026
1.
The present Petition, under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, seeks the appointment of an Arbitrator in
respect of various disputes that have arisen as a result of the Facility
Agreement as well as the Guarantee Agreement between the parties,
herein.
2.
The material on record indicates that the Petitioner is a Non-
Banking Financial Services Company. Further, Respondent No.1 is a
partnership firm, represented through its partners, i.e., Respondent
Nos. 3 and 4. Respondent No.1, along with Respondent No.4,
approached the Petitioner for availing financial facilities, pursuant to
which a loan of Rs.1,15,00,000/- was sanctioned in its favour.
3.
Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 executed Facility Agreements and
Deeds of Guarantee, both of which were dated 13.11.2019 and
25.05.2021, in favour of the Petitioner to secure the said financial
facilities. The Respondents committed default in the payment of
ARB.P. 1080/2024
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equated monthly instalments for a period exceeding 90 days. As a
result, the said loan account was classified as a Non-Performing Asset
on 16.04.2022, in accordance with the Reserve Bank of India
guidelines.
4.
Owing to the continuing defaults, the Petitioner issued a
statutory demand notice dated 19.05.2022 under Section 13(2) of the
SARFAESI Act, 2002, demanding an outstanding amount of
Rs.1,32,65,891.96/- as on 09.05.2022. Despite receipt of the said
notice, the Respondents failed to discharge their liability or regularise
the loan account.
5.
Consequently, the Petitioner issued a notice dated 12.12.2022
invoking the arbitration in terms of Clause 25 of the Deeds of
Guarantee and Clause 25.17 of the Facility Agreements.
“Clause 25 of the Deeds of Guarantee:
25. That all claims or disputes arising out of or in relation to this
Guarantee shall be settled by arbitration. The arbitration tribunal
shall consist of a sole arbitrator to be appointed by Lender. All
parties to this Guarantee hereby expressly consent to Lender being
the sole appointing authority. Any vacancy created in the
arbitration tribunal, for any reason whatsoever, shall also be filled
only by Lender acting as the sole appointing authority. The place
of arbitration shall be as mentioned in the Schedule I Part C
hereinbelow. Parties agree that the courts as mentioned in the
Schedule l Part C hereinbelow shall have the exclusive jurisdiction
to exercise all powers under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,
1996.
Clause 25.17 of the Facility Agreements
Arbitration: All claims or disputes arising out of or in relation to
this Agreement shall be settled by arbitration. The arbitration
tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator to be appointed by Lender.
All parties to this Agreement hereby expressly consent to Lender
being the sole appointing authority. Any vacancy created in the
arbitration tribunal, for any reason whatsoever, shall also be filled
only by Lender acting as the sole appointing authority. The place
of arbitration shall be Delhi. Parties agree that the courts in Delhi
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction to exercise all powers under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
ARB.P. 1080/2024
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Notwithstanding anything contained hereinabove, in the event the
legal status of the Facility Provider changes or in the event of the
law being made or amended so as to bring the Facility Provider
under The Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 (the "DRT Act"), to proceed to recover dues
from the Borrower(s) under the DRT Act, the arbitration provisions
hereinbefore contained shall, at the option of the Facility Provider,
cease to have any effect and if arbitration proceedings are
commenced but no arbitral award is made, then at the option of the
Facility Provider such proceedings shall stand terminated and the
mandate of the arbitrator shall come to an end from the date of the
making of the law or the date when amendment becomes effective
or the date when the Facility Provider exercises the option of
terminating the mandate of arbitrator, as the case may be. Provided
that neither a change in the legal status of the Facility Provider nor
a change in law as referred to in this sub paragraph above, will
result in invalidating an existing award passed by an arbitral
tribunal constituted pursuant to the provisions of this Agreement.”
6.
The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. This Court as well in the order dated 24.04.2025 in case of
ARB.P. 145/2025 titled as Pradhaan Air Express (P) Ltd. v. Air
Works India Engineering (P) Ltd1 has extensively dealt with the
scope of interference at the stage of Section 11. The Court held as
under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 & the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re has held that scope of inquiry at the
stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent of
prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no.114 in the case
of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd that observations made in
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., and adopted in NTPC
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022
ARB.P. 1080/2024
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Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re:
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no.114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd reads as under:“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re: Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is
limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the
arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this
reason, we find it difficult to hold that the
observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and
adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the
jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re: Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd., however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated
such as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim
through arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the
limited scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the
interest of the parties who might be constrained to participate in
the arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be
borne by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have
abused the process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to
the other parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent and
malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts of
Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 : 2024 INSC 532] ,
ARB.P. 1080/2024
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frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section
11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent
to adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under
Section 11 must not be misused by parties in order to
force other parties to the arbitration agreement to
participate in a time consuming and costly arbitration
process. This is possible in instances, including but
not limited to, where the claimant canvasses the
adjudication of non-existent and mala fide claims
through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of
judicial interference of the referral courts with the
interests of the parties who might be constrained to
participate in the arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral
Tribunal may direct that the costs of the arbitration
shall be borne by the party which the Tribunal
ultimately finds to have abused the process of law and
caused unnecessary harassment to the other party to
the arbitration. Having said that, it is clarified that the
aforesaid is not to be construed as a determination of
the merits of the matter before us, which the Arbitral
Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to the
extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of
the referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act
and further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural
safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial
threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent
enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk
undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a
preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must,
therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the
merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within
the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen
that the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in
ARB.P. 1080/2024
This is a digitally signed order.
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The Order is downloaded from the DHC Server on 15/01/2026 at 11:48:49
nature. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S.
Patel”.
7.
Learned counsel for the parties jointly submit that the disputes
between the parties may be referred to arbitration under the aegis of
Delhi International Arbitration Centre [“DIAC”].
8.
Accordingly, Ms. Neelima Tripathi, Senior Advocate
(Mobile No.9810099919) who is empanelled with the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre [“DIAC”], is hereby appointed as
the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the parties.
9.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the DIAC
and would abide by its rules and regulations. The learned Arbitrator
shall be entitled to fees as per the Schedule of Fees maintained by the
DIAC.
10.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering of
reference.
11.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
12.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
13.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties.
14.
Accordingly, the present Petitions, along with pending
application(s), if any, stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms and
ARB.P. 1080/2024
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directions.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 12, 2026/rk/her/jk
ARB.P. 1080/2024
This is a digitally signed order.
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