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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
#
CNR No. DLHC010474142026
+
W.P.(C) 14593/2026, CM APPLs. 68290/2026 & 68291/2026
ADESH TYAGI
.....Petitioner
Through:
Dr. Subhash Vijayran, Adv.
versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC with
Mr. Nitesh Kumar Singh, Adv. for GNCTD
Mr. Ravinder Agarwal, Mr. Manish Kumar
Singh, Mr. Vasu Agarwal and Mr.
Emmanuel Benny, Advs. for UPSC
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
05.10.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1.
This writ petition arises out of judgment dated 22 September
2026 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal1 in OA
3608/2026, preferred by the petitioner before the Tribunal. The prayer
clause in the OA read as under:
“In view of the above premises, the applicant prays for the
following relief(s):
(1)
Declare and direct that the requirement of
qualification of B.Ed. for direct recruitment to the posts of
"Vice-Principal" and "Principal" under Respondent No.2, as
1 “Tribunal” hereinafter
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advertised by UPSC (Respondent No.3) in the impugned
Special Advertisement No. 51/2026 (Annexure: A-1), shall
not apply to in-service Trained Graduate Teachers (TGT)
and Post Graduate Teachers (PGT) of Computer Science
(which includes the Applicant).
(2)
Declare and direct that the requirement of
qualification of B.Ed. for direct recruitment to the posts of
"Vice-Principal" and "Principal/Deputy Education Officer"
under Respondent No.2, as notified by: (1) Delhi Gazette
Notification dated 9th October, 2018, published on 15th
October, 2018 (Annexure: A-4); (2) Delhi Gazette
Notification dated 30th January, 2023, published on 30th
January, 2023 (Annexure: A-10): respectively; shall not
apply to the in-service Trained Graduate Teachers (TGT)
and Post Graduate Teachers (PGT) of Computer Science,
(which includes the Applicant).
(3)
Direct Respondents 1 and 2 to make the necessary
amendments in Delhi Gazette Notifications (Annexures: A4 and A-10) relaxing the requirement of B.Ed. for posts of
"Vice-Principal" and "Principal /Deputy Education Officer"
for teachers employed as TGT/PGT in Computer Science,
under the schools of Govt. of NCT of Delhi.
(4)
Pass any other or further order(s) as this Tribunal
may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, in
the interest of justice and to meet the ends of justice.”
2.
Before the Tribunal, the petitioner placed reliance on an earlier
decision of the Tribunal, rendered on 21 August 2026 in OA
3201/20262.
3.
The respondent GNCTD contended, before the Tribunal, that
the last date for the submission of the online application form for
recruitment as Vice-Principal/Principal was 14 August 2026 and that
the examination for the said recruitment was to be held on 1
November 2026. It was, therefore, submitted that no permission could
2 Amit and Ors v. GNCTD and Ors.
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be granted, at that stage, to the petitioner, to participate in the
selection.
4.
The Tribunal has, in para 6 of its judgment, accepted this
contention of the GNCTD and has held that, as the last date for
submission of online applications was 14 August 2026 and the
examination itself was to be held on 1 November 2026, the petitioner
could not be permitted provisionally to appear in the selection process.
5.
Apropos the petitioner’s submission that the specification of the
qualification of B.Ed., as one of the essential qualifications for direct
recruitment as Vice-Principal or Principal deserved to be set aside, the
Tribunal without entering into the merits of the issue, directed the
respondents to take a decision on the petitioner’s representation.
6.
It is against this order that the petitioner has approached this
Court by means of this writ petition.
7.
We have heard Dr. Subhash Vijayran, learned Counsel for the
petitioner and Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, learned Standing Counsel for the
GNCTD.
8.
Dr. Vijayran submits that relegating the petitioner to the
respondents on the aspect of the validity of the stipulation of B. Ed.3
as an essential qualification would be a futile exercise, and we agree.
He, therefore, requests this Court to take a view on the issue.
3 Bachelor of Education
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9.
Dr. Vijayran has drawn our attention to the Recruitment Rules4,
dated 9 October 2018, which were under challenge before the
Tribunal. The Schedule to the RRs stipulates the qualifications for
direct recruitment to the post of Vice-Principal/Principal. An aspirant
to the post of Vice-Principal by direct recruitment is required to
possess
(i)
a Masters’ Degree from a recognized University/Institute,
(ii)
B. Ed. from a recognized University, and
(iii)
2 years’ experience as PGT or 3 years’ experience as
TGT5.
Similarly, an aspirant to the post of Principal by direct recruitment is
required to possess, as per the RRs,
(i)
a Masters’ Degree from a recognized University/Institute,
(ii)
B. Ed. from a recognized University, and
(iii)
years’
experience
of
teaching
(as
Vice
Principal/PGT/TGT) in a recognized High School/Higher
Secondary
School/Senior
Secondary
School/Intermediate
College).
In each case, the prescribed qualifications were relaxable at the
discretion of the Union Public Service Commission, for reasons to be
recorded in writing.
10.
The grievance of the petitioner is essentially with respect to the
stipulation of B. Ed. as one of the essential educational qualifications
for direct recruitment to the post of Vice-Principal or Principal, in so
far as it applies to teachers teaching Computer Science. His contention
4 “RRs” hereinafter
5 Trained Graduate Teacher
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is that the applicable RRs do not require possession of a B. Ed. as one
of the essential qualifications for a person who seeks to enter
employment with the GNCTD as a Trained Graduate Teacher6 or Post
Graduate Teacher7 in Computer Science. He further submits that, even
in respect of promotion from PGT to Vice-Principal, there is no
requirement of a B. Ed. degree, in support of which he has drawn our
attention to the eligibility stipulations for persons seeking promotion
to the grade of Vice-Principal, which read thus:
“Promotion:
Post Graduate teachers [excluding post graduate teachers (physical
education)] in level-8 rs.47,600- 1,51,100/- in pay matrix with two
years’ regular service in the grade.
Note: where juniors who have completed their qualifying
/eligibility service are being considered for promotion, their seniors
would also be considered provided they are not short of the
requisite qualifying / eligibility service, by more than half of such
qualifying / eligibility service or two years, whichever is less, and
have successfully completed their probation period for promotion
to the next higher grade alongwith their juniors who have already
completed such qualifying/eligibility service.”
Similar qualifications apply for promotion to the post of Principal.
11.
Dr. Subhash Vijayran submits that the stipulation of B. Ed. as
an essential qualification for direct recruitment to the post of Principal
is unreasonable and illegal, as it excludes Computer Science teachers
entirely from ever becoming Vice-Principal or Principal by direct
recruitment. He points out that no B. Ed. qualification is required for
being recruited as a TGT or PGT in Computer Science. There is,
6 “TGT” hereinafter
7 “PGT” hereinafter
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therefore, no justification in prescribing different qualifications for
promotion and for direct recruitment to the post of Vice-Principal or
Principal. This distinction, according to Dr. Subhash Vijayran, is
invidious and offends Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
12.
Having heard Dr. Subhash Vijayran, we regret our inability to
agree with this submission.
13.
In actual fact, the distinction is not so much between teachers
teaching Computer Science and others, for ascendancy to the post of
Vice-Principal or Principal, as between aspirants to the post of Vice
Principal, or Principal by direct recruitment vis-à-vis those who aspire
for promotion thereto. TGTs and PGTs who seek promotion to the
post of Vice-Principal or Principal are not required to possess a B. Ed.
degree, whereas persons who seek direct recruitment as Vice-Principal
or Principal are required to possess the said qualification. This applies
across the Board, irrespective of the stream or subject which the TGT
or PGT is teaching.
14.
It is immediately apparent that there is no complete block on a
PGT or TGT in Computer Science moving up to the post of VicePrincipal or Principal. It is only the avenue of direct recruitment
which is not available. A TGT or a PGT in Computer Science may
still be able to be promoted as Vice-Principal or Principal, as no
requirement of B. Ed. is required for promotion.
15.
At the highest, therefore, it is only that the chance of reaching
the post of Vice-Principal or Principal in which Computer Science
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TGTs, or PGTs are positioned differently from other TGTs or PGTs.
TGTs or PGTs teaching computer science can become Vice Principal
or Principal only by promotion, whereas TGTs and PGTs teaching
other subjects would also have the chance of becoming Principal or
Vice-Principal by way of direct recruitment, provided, of course, that
they have a B.Ed. degree to their credit.
16.
Also, there is no embargo on a person who possesses a B. Ed.
degree being recruited as TGT or PGT in Computer Science. It is not,
therefore, that no Computer Science TGT or PGT holds a B. Ed.
qualification. It is only that B. Ed. is not an essential qualification for
such recruitment. If, therefore, a TGT or PGT in Computer Science is
a holder of a B. Ed. degree, then she, or he, would be able to ascend to
the post of Vice-Principal or Principal even by direct recruitment.
17.
The reduction in chances of becoming Vice-Principal or
Principal by direct recruitment, therefore, is unavailable only to PGTs
or TGTs who are teaching Computer Science and those who are not in
possession of a B. Ed. degree. Such persons would not be able to
become Vice-Principal or Principal by direct recruitment but would be
able to become a Vice-Principal or Principal by promotion.
18.
Does such a distinction offend Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India?
19.
On the aspect of whether there can be a distinction between the
educational qualifications prescribed for promotion to a higher post,
vis-à-vis
the
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educational
qualifications
prescribed
for direct
recruitment, so as to create a distinction between the two categories of
persons who are already holding the feeder post, the locus classicus is
considered to be the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of
Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa8, from which we may
reproduce the following paragraphs:
“8.
The case of the respondents as disclosed in their petition
was that under the Rules of 1939, Assistant Engineers were entitled
to be promoted to the higer cadre on the basis of their merit and
record and no distinction was made between degree-holders and
diploma-holders for the purposes of such promotion. The
discrimination made by the impugned rules between degreeholders and diploma-holders was arbitrary and capricious because
academic or technical qualifications could be germane only at the
time of recruitment. For purposes of promotion, efficiency and
experience alone must count. Respondents further contended that
once the Government appointed candidates with different academic
or technical qualifications to the same cadre, having the same pay
scale and similar duties, such candidates would form one class and
they cannot be further classified for purposes of promotion on the
basis of their educational qualifications. The impugned Rules,
according to the respondents, brought about a reduction in rank,
deprived them of equal opportunity in the matter of promotion and
were violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Finally, the respondents contended by their petition that it was not
competent to the Government to change the service conditions
unilaterally to the disadvantage of its employees so as to deprive
them of their vested right of promotion by giving retrospective
effect to the Rules.
*****
16.
An argument which found favour with Mufti Bahauddin J.,
one of the learned judges of the Letters Patent Bench of the High
Court, and which was repeated before us is that the “retrospective”
application of the impugned Rules is violative of Articles 14 and
16 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate this argument and
impossible to accept it. It is wrong to characterise the operation of
a service rule as retrospective for the reason that it applies to
existing employees. A rule which classifies such employees for
promotional purposes, undoubtedly operates on those who entered
service before the framing of the Rule but it operates in future, in
8 (1974) 1 SCC 19
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the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who
are already in service. The impugned Rules do not recall a
promotion already made or reduce a pay scale already granted.
They provide for a classification by prescribing a qualitative
standard, the measure of that standard being educational
attainment. Whether a classification founded on such a
consideration suffers from a discriminatory vice is another matter
which we will presently consider but surely, the Rule cannot first
be assumed to be retrospective and then be struck down for the
reason that it violates the guarantee of equal opportunity be
extending its arms over the past. If rules governing conditions of
service cannot ever operate to the prejudice of those who are
already in service, the age of superanuation should have remained
immutable and schemes of compulsory retirement in public interest
ought to have foundered on the rock of retroactivity. But such is
not the implication of Service Rules nor is it their true description
to say that because they affect existing employees they are
retrospective. It is well settled that though employment under the
Government like that under any other master may have a
contractual origin, the Government servant acquires a “status” on
appointment to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are
liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority
which, for its exercise, requires no reciprocal consent. The
Government can alter the terms and conditions of its employees
unilaterally and though in modern times consensus in matters
relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved,
consent is not a pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the
contractual origin of the service notwithstanding.
*****
20.
Respondents have assailed the classification in the clearest
terms but their challenge is purely doctrinaire. “Academic or
technical qualification can be germane only at the time of initial
recruitment; for purposes of promotion, efficiency and experience
alone must count” — this is the content of their challenge. The
challenge, at best, reflects the respondent's opinion on promotional
opportunities in public services and one may assume that if the
roles were reversed, respondents would be interested in
implementing their point of view. But we cannot sit in appeal over
the legislative judgment with a view to finding out whether on a
comparative evaluation of rival theories touching the question of
promotion, the theory advocated by the respondents is not to be
preferred. Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the
statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and
conditions of service; and if, looked at from the standpoint of the
authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a
reasonable basis, it has to be upheld.
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21.
Our reason for saying this is to emphasize that the
respondents ought to have furnished particulars as to why,
according to them, the classification between diploma-holders and
degree-holders is not based on a rational consideration having
nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In order to establish
that the protection of the equal opportunity clause has been denied
to them, it is not enough for the respondents to say that they have
been treated differently from others, not even enough that a
differential treatment has been accorded to them in comparison
with others similarly circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence
of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee
of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. It was
therefore incumbent on the respondents to plead and show that the
classification of Assistant Engineers into those who hold diplomas
and those who hold degrees is unreasonable and bears no rational
nexus with its purported object. Rather than do this, the
respondents contented themselves by propounding an abstract
theory that educational qualifications are germane at the stage of
initial recruitment only. Omission to furnish the necessary
particulars was construed by this Court in two cases as indicating
that the plea of unlawful discrimination had no basis. [(a) Katra
Educational Society v. State of U. P.9, (b) Probhudas Morarjee
Rajkotia v. Union of India10. Such an infirmity in pleadings led
this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar
Industries Ltd11 to remand the matter to the High Court in order to
enable the petitioner therein to amend its petition.
*****
28.
But then Mr Setalvad contends that if the nature of duties
and responsibilities of the post of Executive Engineer has
undergone no significant change, there would be no justification
for restricting the field of choice to graduates. Talent and efficiency
could be found in the ranks of diploma-holders in an equal measure
and it is urged that rather than display a mere fancy for graduates
and restrict its choice, the State should have, in the interest of an
efficient service, laid the promotional chances open to both the
ranks on the basis of talent, experience and efficiency.
*****
30.
Since the constitutional code of equality and equal
opportunity is a charter for equals, equality of opportunity in
matters of promotion means an equal promotional opportunity for
persons who fall, substantially, within the same class. A
9 AIR 1966 SC 1307
10 AIR 1966 SC 1044
11 AIR 1964 SC 1179
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classification of employees can therefore be made for first
identifying and then distinguishing members of one class from
those of another.
31.
Classification, however, is fraught with the danger that it
may produce artificial inequalities and therefore, the right to
classify is hedged in with salient restraints; or else, the guarantee of
equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as
laws meant to govern well marked classes characterized by
different and distinct attainments. Classification, therefore, must be
truly founded on substantial differences which distinguish persons
grouped together from those left out of the group and such
differential attributes must bear a just and rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved.
32.
Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the
consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable
basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot
extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the
basis of classification, for were such an inquiry permisible it would
be open to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of
the legislature or the Rule-making authority on the need to classify
or the desirability of achieving a particular object.
33.
Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to
accept the respondents' submission that the classification of
Assistant Engineers into degree-holders and diploma-holders rests
on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classification, according
to the appellants, was made with a view to achieving administrative
efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the
classification is clearly co-related to it, for higher educational
qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental
equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can
be achieved only through the medium of those possessing
comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is beside
the point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved here is
not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of
inequalities and the classification cannot be characterized as
arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can
extend.
*****
35.
Educational qualifications have been recognized by this
Court as a safe criterion for determining the validity of
classification. In State of Mysore v. P. Narasing Rao12, where the
12 AIR 1968 SC 349
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cadre of Tracers was reorganized into two, one consisting of
matriculate Tracers with a higher scale of pay and the other of nonmatriculates in a lower scale, it was held that Articles 14 and 16 do
not exclude the laying down of selective tests nor do they preclude
the Government from laying down qualifications for the post in
question. Therefore, it was open to the Government to give
preference to candidates having higher educational qualifications.
In Ganga Ram v. Union of India13, it was observed that “The
State which encounters diverse problems arising from a variety of
circumstances is entitled to lay down conditions of efficiency and
other qualifications for securing the best service for being eligible
for promotion in its different departments.” In Union of India v.
Dr (Mrs.) S.B. Kohli14a Central Health Service Rule requiring that
a professor in Orthopaedics must have a post-graduate degree in
the particular speciality was upheld on the ground that the
classification made on the basis of, such a requirement was not
“without reference to the objectives sought to be achieved and
there can be no question of discrimination”. The argument that a
degree qualification was not the only criterion of suitability was
answered laconically as “strange”.
*****
49.
In Mervyn Coutinho v. Collector of Customs, Bombay15,
no question arose in regard to the validity of a classification based
on educational qualifications. The question there was whether a
rotational system for fixing seniority was discriminatory if the
recruitment was partly by promotion and partly directly. It was
held that there is no inherent vice in such a system if the service is
composed in fixed proportion of direct recruits and promotees. The
rotational system could therefore be adopted in fixing seniority in
the cadre of Appraisers, to which recruitment was in actual practice
made directly and by promotion in the ratio of 50: 50. But different
considerations were held to arise when the same system was
applied for fixing seniority in the cadre of Principal Appraisers
because there was only one source from which the Principal
Appraisers were drawn, namely Appraisers. The ratio of the
judgment is: “The rotational system cannot ... apply when there is
only one source of recruitment”. This is the principle within which
Roshan Lal16 was expressed to fall. Neither the one nor the other
of the two cases was concerned with the question which arises for
consideration before us. The classification of which we have to
determine the validity is not made in relation to the source of
recruitment. Therefore cases like Roshan Lal, Mervyn Coutindo
13 (1970) 1 SCC 377
14 (1973) 3 SCC 592
15 AIR 1967 SC 52
16 Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889
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and S. M. Pandit v. State of Gujarat17 fail in a class apart. The
case last mentioned is a typical instance of that class, where
directly appointed Mamlatdars were accorded a favoured treatment
qua the promotee Mamlatdars in the matter of promotion to the
post of Deputy Collector. Mamlatdars, whether appointed directly
or by promotion, constituted one class and therefore it was held no
reservation could be made in favour of the directly appointed
Mamlatdars for promotion to the cadre of Deputy Collectors.”
22.
The subsequent, and more recent decision of the Supreme Court
in Chandan Banerjee v. Krishna Prosad Ghosh18, which in fact
referred to Triloki Nath Khosa as the locus classicus on the point,
once again examined the issue of whether there could be a difference
in the educational qualification prescribed for promotion and direct
recruitment to a higher post, among persons holding the feeder post.
23.
The relevant passages from Chandan Banerjee may be
reproduced thus:
“18. The locus classicus on the question whether educational
qualifications can be used as a criteria for classification between
persons integrated into one class for the purpose of promotion is
the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of J&K
v. Triloki Nath Khosa, In this case, the post of an Assistant
Engineer in the Engineering Service branch of the appellants was
filled by way of direct recruitment or through promotion from the
cadre of Subordinate Engineering Service. A rule was introduced
in 1970 restricting the promotion to the next higher post of an
Executive Engineer only to those Assistant Engineers who
possessed a degree in Engineering or held the qualification of
AMIE and had put in seven years of service. The respondents, who
were diploma-holders and serving as Assistant Engineers,
challenged the rule on grounds of discrimination. The Constitution
Bench dealt with the question of whether persons recruited from
different sources, that are integrated into one class, can then be
classified to permit preferential treatment to some persons on the
basis of their educational qualifications.
17 AIR 1972 SC 252
18 (2022) 15 SCC 453
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*****
21.
The dictum in Triloki Nath Khosa was further expounded
on by a subsequent decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court
in Mohd. Shujat Ali v. Union of India19. In Mohd. Shujat, the
Court was faced with a challenge to a quota reserved in promotion
to the higher post of Assistant Engineers for the graduate
Supervisors as opposed to the non-graduate Supervisors. P.N.
Bhagwati, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was), speaking for
the Bench, held that:
“28. … But from these decisions it cannot be laid down as
an invariable rule that whenever any classification is made
on the basis of variant educational qualifications, such
classification must be held to be valid, irrespective of the
nature and purposes of the classification or the quality and
extent of the differences in the educational qualifications. It
must be remembered that “life has relations not capable
always of division into inflexible compartments”. The
moulds expand and shrink. The test of reasonable
classification has to be applied in such case on its peculiar
facts and circumstances. It may be perfectly legitimate for
the administration to say that having regard to the nature of
the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose
of achieving efficiency in public service, only degreeholders in Engineering shall be eligible for promotion and
not diploma or certificate holders. That is what happened in
State of J&K v. Triloki Nath Khosa and a somewhat
similar position also obtained in Union of India v. S.B.
Kohli. But where graduates and non-graduates are both
regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is
difficult to see how, consistently with the claim for equal
opportunity, any differentiation can be made between them
by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving
preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in
the matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation
of quota of promotion for each of the two categories of
Supervisors would be that when a vacancy arises in the post
of Assistant Engineer, which, according to the quota is
reserved for graduate Supervisors, a non-graduate
Supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he
is senior to all other graduate Supervisors and more suitable
than they. His opportunity for promotion would be limited
only to vacancies available for non-graduate Supervisors.
That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity to
him. …
19 (1975) 3 SCC 76
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*****
… But even so, we do not think we can be persuaded to
strike down the Andhra Pradesh Rules insofar as they make
differentiation between graduate and non-graduate
Supervisors. This differentiation is not something brought
about for the first time by the Andhra Pradesh Rules. It has
always been there in the Engineering Services of the
Hyderabad and the Andhra States. The graduate
Supervisors have always been treated as a distinct and
separate class from non-graduate Supervisors both under
the Hyderabad Rules as well as the Andhra Rules and they
have never been integrated into one class. Under the
Hyderabad Rules, the pay scale of graduate Supervisors
was Rs 176-300, while that of non-graduate Supervisors
was Rs 140-300 and similarly, under the Andhra Rules, the
pay scale of non-graduate Supervisors was Rs 100-250, but
graduate Supervisors were started in this pay scale at the
stage of Rs 150 so that their pay scale was Rs 150-250.
Graduate Supervisors and non-graduate Supervisors were
also treated differently for the purpose of promotion under
both sets of rules. In fact, under the Andhra Rules a
different nomenclature of Junior Engineers was given to
graduate Supervisors. The same differentiation into two
classes also persisted in the reorganised State of Andhra
Pradesh. The pay scale of Junior Engineers was always
different from that of non-graduate Supervisors and for the
purpose of promotion, the two categories of Supervisors
were kept distinct and apart under the Andhra Rules even
after the appointed day. The common gradation list of
Supervisors finally approved by the Government of India
also consisted of two parts, one part relating to Junior
Engineers and the other part relating to non-graduate
Supervisors. The two categories of Supervisors were thus
never fused into one class and no question of
unconstitutional discrimination could arise by reason of
differential treatment being given to them. Contention E
cannot, therefore, prevail and must be rejected.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court observed that the service rules for the Engineering
Department had consistently maintained a differentiation between
graduate Supervisors and non-graduate Supervisors and they were
never merged into one class.
22.
In Roop Chand Adlakha v. DDA20 , a two-Judge Bench of
this Court dealt with the question of whether different conditions of
20 1989 Supp (1) SCC 116
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eligibility for promotion could be provided between diplomaholders and degree-holders. In the facts of the case, the initial
recruitment to the cadre of Junior Engineer in the Public Works
Department of the respondent was made from two different
sources—that is degree-holders with no experience and diplomaholders having two years of experience or more. For promotion to
the cadre of Assistant Engineers, Junior Engineers holding a degree
were required to have three years of experience, while Junior
Engineers holding a diploma were required to have eight years of
experience.
23.
Following the decision of this Court in Triloki Nath Khosa,
M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
observed that:
“29. In Triloki Nath case diploma-holders were not
considered eligible for promotion to the higher post. Here,
in the present case, the possession of a diploma, by itself
and without more, does not confer eligibility. Diploma, for
purposes of promotion, is not considered equivalent to the
degree. This is the point of distinction in the situations in
the two cases. If diploma-holders — of course on the
justification of the job requirements and in the interest of
maintaining a certain quality of technical expertise in the
cadre — could validly be excluded from the eligibility for
promotion to the higher cadre, it does not necessarily
follow as an inevitable corollary that the choice of the
recruitment policy is limited to only two choices, namely,
either to consider them “eligible” or “not eligible”. State,
consistent with the requirements of the promotional posts
and in the interest of the efficiency of the service, is not
precluded from conferring eligibility on diploma-holders
conditioning it by other requirements which may, as here,
include certain quantum of service experience. In the
present case, eligibility determination was made by a
cumulative criterion of a certain educational qualification
plus a particular quantum of service experience. It cannot,
in our opinion, be said, as postulated by the High Court in
Kimti Lal Kathuria v. DDA21, that the choice of the State
was either to recognise diploma-holders as “eligible” for
promotion or wholly exclude them as “not eligible”. If the
educational qualification by itself was recognised as
conferring eligibility for promotion, then, the
superimposition of further conditions such as a particular
period of service, selectively, on the diploma-holders alone
to their disadvantage might become discriminatory. This
21 1987 SCC OnLine Del 475
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does not prevent the State from formulating a policy which
prescribes as an essential part of the conditions for the very
eligibility that the candidate must have a particular
qualification plus a stipulated quantum of service
experience. It is stated that on the basis of the “Vaish
Committee” report, the authorities considered the infusion
of higher academic and technical quality in the personnel
requirements in the relevant cadres of Engineering Services
necessary. These are essentially matters of policy. Unless
the provision is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, or to
bring about grossly unfair results, judicial policy should be
one of judicial restraint. The prescriptions may be
somewhat cumbersome or produce some hardship in their
application in some individual cases; but they cannot be
struck down as unreasonable, capricious or arbitrary. The
High Court, in our opinion, was not justified in striking
down the rules as violative of Articles 14 and 16.”
(emphasis supplied)”
24.
From a reading of the law as declared by the Supreme Court in
the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that an intelligible differentia exists
between persons who are aspiring for direct recruitment to a higher
post, vis-à-vis those who seek to ascend to that post by promotion. The
considerations which govern these two categories of persons is
different. A promotee would already have behind her, or him, a
number of years of service in the same organization as TGT or PGT,
unlike a direct recruit, who may be from outside. The experience
gained in the same organization might well, in the perception of the
authorities, suffice to compensate the lack of a B. Ed. qualification.
The fact that a minimum number of years as TGT or PGT is also
stipulated for direct recruitment cannot efface this distinction, as that
experience need not be in the same organization.
25.
In any event, the question of the desirable educational
qualifications for a person to be directly recruited to the post of Vice
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Principal or Principal would rest with the authorities, and, absent any
clear and patent arbitrariness or discrimination resulting therefrom,
Courts must desist from declaring such stipulations to be arbitrary.
26.
We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not possible for us to
hold that, in prescribing B.Ed. as an educational qualification for
direct recruitment to the post of Vice-Principal or Principal, any
invidious discrimination, as would offend Articles 14 and 16 of the
Constitution of India, vis-à-vis those who seek to become VicePrincipal or Principal by way of promotion, exists.
27.
We, therefore, regret that we are unable to come to the aid of
the petitioner.
28.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
NIVEDITA ANIL SHARMA, J.
OCTOBER 5, 2026/aky
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