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2026:MLHC:716-DB
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Date of Hearing: 03.07.2026
Date of Decision: 15.07.2026
WA No.85 of 2024
1. Shri. Aban Momin,
S/o (L) Welson Sangma,
R/o Rongrekgiri, P.O. & P.S. Williamnagar,
East Garo Hills, Meghalaya.
2. Smti Jostina R. Marak,
W/o Shri Aban Momin,
R/o Rongrekgiri, P.O. & P.S. Williamnagar,
East Garo Hills, Meghalaya.
…..Appellants
-VERSUS1. Garo Hills Autonomous District Council, Tura
Represented by the Secretary to the Executive
Committee, GHADC, Tura.
2. The Executive Member, I/C Land & Revenue
GHADC, Tura.
3. The Chief Executive Member, GHADC, Tura.
4. Smti Nerinjinjing R. Sangma,
W/o (L) Withing Marak,
R/o Rongrekgiri, P.O. & P.S. Williamnagar,
East Garo Hills, Meghalaya.
…..Respondent
2026:MLHC:716-DB
Coram:
Hon’ble Mrs. Justice Revati Mohite Dere, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. K.C. Gautam, Adv with
Mr. J.M. Sangma, Adv
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. S. Dey, Adv with
Ms. M. Nayang, Adv(R:1-3)
Mr. P. Nongbri, Adv with
Ms. T. Sutnga, Adv (R:4)
Judgment and Order
Per. B. Bhattacharjee, Judge:
1.
This intra court appeal is filed against the impugned Judgment dated
04.10.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.171 of 2021 by
which the prayer of the appellants/writ petitioners to quash and set aside the
order dated 17.12.2019 of the Executive Member (EM) and the order dated
16.10.2020 of the Chief Executive Member (CEM), Garo Hills Autonomous
District Council (GHADC) was rejected and the writ petition was dismissed
being devoid of merit.
2.
The controversy involved in the present matter is with regard to the
succession and appointment of Nokma of Rongrekgiri A’king land. While
the appellants contention is that the Rongrekgiri A’king solely belongs to the
Raksam clan and the appellants are the only legitimate Nokmas of the
A’king, the case of the respondent No.4 is that the Rongrekgiri A’king
belongs jointly to the Rongmuthu clan and the Raksam clan and there has
always been two joint Nokmas of the said A’king appointed one each from
the respective clan. The respondent No.4 is the last appointed Nokma from
the Rongmuthu clan.
3.
It appears that the dispute between the appellants and the private
2026:MLHC:716-DB
respondent No.4 came to fore after an application seeking appointment of
the respondent No.4 and her husband, Shri. Withing Marak (now deceased),
as Nokma of the Rongrekgiri A’king was allowed by order dated 22.08.1997
of the learned EM, GHADC. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed an appeal
before the learned CEM, GHADC, which was dismissed vide order dated
23.09.2003. The orders dated 22.08.1997 and 23.09.2003 were further
challenged by the appellants before the erstwhile Gauhati High Court,
Shillong Bench in WP(C) No.340(SH) 2005. The High Court by order dated
31.07.2006 set aside both the impugned orders and remanded back the
matter to the learned EM, GHADC for fresh consideration after affording
opportunity to both the parties to adduce evidence and make submissions.
4.
On remand of the matter, the learned EM proceeded afresh and by
order dated 23.07.2012 passed in GDC-REV/AC No.94 of 2006 allowed the
appellants to continue as Nokma of the Rongrekgiri A’king by rejecting the
claim of the respondent No.4. On appeal, the learned CEM, by order dated
19.12.2013 reversed the finding of the learned EM and directed the
respondent No.4 to continue as Nokma of the Rongrekgiri A’king, since the
A’king belonged jointly to the Raksam clan and the Rongmuthu clan as per
the record. The decision of the learned CEM came to be challenged again in
WP(C) No.26 of 2012 before this High Court by the appellants. This High
Court by Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2018 set aside the order dated
19.12.2013 of the learned CEM, and remitted back the matter for
reconsideration by the learned EM within one month from the date of receipt
of the copy of the Judgment and Order. Similarly, the learned CEM was also
directed by the High Court that in the event of filing of any appeal, the same
should be decided within one month from the date of filing of the appeal.
5.
Subsequent to the passing of the Judgment and Order dated
08.03.2018, the learned EM took up the entire matter for reconsideration and
by order dated 17.12.2019 passed in GHADC Rev Appeal Case No.21 of
2018 ordered the respondent No.4 to continue as Nokma of the Rongrekgiri
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A’king representing the Rongmuthu clan. The appeal preferred against the
said order dated 17.12.2019 by the appellants was dismissed by the learned
CEM by order dated 16.10.2020 passed in Rev-Appeal No.12 A/C/ of 2020.
The appellants, being aggrieved, approached this High Court again by way
of WP(C) No.17 of 2024 praying for quashing and setting aside of the
aforesaid orders dated 17.12.2019 and 16.10.2020 and for referral of the
matter to the court of the learned Judge, GHADC for proper adjudication.
The WP(C) No.17 of 2024 was dismissed by the impugned Judgment dated
04.10.2024 which resulted in filing of the present writ appeal.
6.
Assailing the impugned Judgment, Mr. K.C. Gautam, learned counsel
for the appellants submits that the learned Single Judge has failed to
appreciate the fact that the order dated 17.12.2019 of the EM and the order
dated 16.10.2020 of the CEM were not passed strictly in accordance with the
Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2018 of the High Court. He submits that
there is nothing on record to show that the witnesses were cross-examined as
per the direction of the High Court. He also contends that no reason has been
assigned in the orders of the EM and the CEM as to why registration of the
private respondent No.4 as Nokma has been upheld. He further contends that
the orders passed by the EM and the CEM do not show that there was
consideration of the relevant official records dating back to the year 1918
and other evidences adduced during the course of the proceedings. He
submits that the earlier order dated 23.07.2012 of the EM which was not
interfered with by the High Court in its Judgment and Order dated
08.03.2018 was still in force at the time of reconsideration of the matter by
the EM and the CEM and it was improper on their part to ignore the said
order dated 23.07.2012 while passing the orders dated 17.12.2019 and
16.10.2020. He submits that the learned Single Judge also erred in not
considering the above aspect of the matter and thereby came to a wrong
conclusion. He, therefore, submits that the impugned Judgement dated
04.10.2024 is not tenable in the eye of law and prays that the same may be
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set aside and quashed.
7.
In contrast, Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
Nos. 1, 2 & 3 supports the impugned Judgment and submits that there is no
illegality or infirmity in the decision of the learned Single Judge. He submits
that the issue raised in the writ petition stood settled way back in the year
1927 on the basis of a report dated 12.12.1927 filed before the then Deputy
Commissioner showing the purchase of Rongrekgiri A’king jointly by Sanna
Nokma of the Raksam clan and Khaman Nokma of the Rongmuthu clan in
the year 1917. He submits that the prayer made by the appellants in the writ
petition for interference with the ex parte order dated 16.10.2020 was
rejected correctly by the learned Single Judge in view of the fact that the
order was not an ex parte order. He further submits that the prayer of the
appellants in the writ petition for referral of the matter to the Judge, District
Council for proper adjudication is also not legally tenable in view of the bar
posed by Section 11 of the Garo Autonomous District (Social Customs and
Usages) Validating (Amendment) Act, 1972. He submits that since the year
1927, the management of Rongrekgiri A’king has been jointly run by the
Nokmas of the Raksam clan and the Rongmuthu clan and hence, any order
passed at this stage at the instance of the appellants would unsettle the
settled position resulting in unjust outcome. He, thus, prays for dismissal of
the writ appeal.
8.
Mr. P. Nongbri, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.4
endorses the submission made on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1, 2 & 3 and
additionally submits that the appellants have failed to point out any
perversity in the order dated 17.12.2019 of the EM and the order dated
16.10.2020 of the CEM. In absence of any absolute perversity, he submits,
concurrent findings arrived at by three adjudicating authorities cannot be
interfered with as a matter of course and in support of his contention places
reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Sukhbiri Devi & ors v. Union
of India & ors, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1322.
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9.
Upon hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties
and on perusal of materials on record it appears that this is the third round of
litigation between the parties before the High Court. In both the earlier
occasions, the matter was remitted back for reconsideration by the EM and
the CEM. The claim of the appellants and the respondent No.4 over the
Rongrekgiri A’king are based on the historical background dating back to
the year 1918. According to the appellants, the Rongregiri A’king was
purchased in the year 1918 for a sum of Rs.800/- by Sanna Nokma and Jimra
Nokma and since then the Raksam clan has been in exclusive posession and
management of the A’king. The respondent No. 4, on the other hand, claims
that the Rongrekgiri A’king was purchased in the year 1917 for an amount
of Rs.400/- each contributed equally by Sanna Nokma of the Raksam clan
and Khaman Nokma of the Rongmuthu clan and the then Deputy
Commissioner of Garo Hills by order dated 25.04.1938 had confirmed that
Sanna and Khaman are Nokmas of the Rongrekgiri A’king.
10.
Perusal of the order dated 17.12.2019 of the EM and the order dated
16.10.2020 of the CEM show that the orders were passed on the basis of the
official records and the depositions of the witnesses recorded during the
course of the proceeding. The description and details of the official records
on which both the authorities came to their respective findings have been
specifically indicated. The order dated 17.12.2019 of the EM clearly
indicates that the finding as to the payment of Rs.400/- each by Sanna
Nokma and Khaman Nokma for purchase of the Rongrekgiri A’king was
recorded on the basis of a report by J.M. David, Mouzadar IV, which was
approved by the then Deputy Commissioner, G.D. Walker, Garo Hills on
12.12.1927. Furthermore, the CEM in his order dated 16.10.2020 concurred
with the view of the EM by holding that the findings dated 25.04.1938
passed by the then Deputy Commissioner in Misc.A’king Case of 1937-38
unambiguously stated that though originally in 1918, the A’king in question
was purchased by Sanna and Jimra, the two brothers-in-law, for Rs.800/Page 6 of 10
2026:MLHC:716-DB
(Rs. 400/- each), but Jimra failed to pay his share and one Khaman paid the
purchase amount and subsequently his name was registered as joint male
Nokma representing the Rongmuthu clan. Further, the order dated
16.10.2020 categorically recorded that the EM had allowed cross
examination of witnesses (four in numbers). Therefore, the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants that there was no consideration of official
records dating back to the year 1918 and the witnesses were not cross
examined do not find support from the materials on record.
11.
It appears from the impugned Judgment that the relevant records of
the EM and the CEM were placed before the before the learned Single
Judge, whereupon, it was found that the appellant Shri. Aban Momin had
filed his hazira indicating his presence before the CEM on 16.10.2020. The
learned Single Judge, therefore, rejected the contention of the appellants that
they were never heard by the learned CEM on the date of the hearing of the
appeal. We do not see a reason to interfere with the said finding as nothing
has been placed before us by the appellants to dislodge the same.
12.
The contention of the appellants that the earlier order of the EM dated
23.07.2012 was still in force as the same was not interfered by the High
Court in its judgment and order 08.03.2018 appears to be totally misplaced
as the judgment and order dated 08.03.2018 specifically contained the
direction for reconsideration of the entire matter by both the EM and the
CEM. Once a direction for reconsideration of the entire matter by both the
authorities was passed, by no stretch of interpretation, it can be said that the
said order dated 23.07.2012 was still in force after passing of the judgment
and order dated 08.03.2018 by this High Court. As a matter of fact, the
appellants themselves appeared before the EM after passing of the judgment
and order dated 08.03.2018 for reconsideration of their case. The plea, as
such, has no legal footing to stand and is hereby rejected.
13.
Section 11 of the Garo Hills Autonomous District (Social Customs
and Usages) Validating Act, 1958 (as amended by the 1972 Act) bars civil
2026:MLHC:716-DB
courts from entertaining any suits or proceedings concerning disputes over
the appointment or succession of Nokmas. The prayer of the appellants in
the writ petition for referral of the matter to the Judge, District Council, is
not legally tenable as the Judge, District Council, discharges judicial
function in terms of the related provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the
Constitution
of
(Administration
India
of
and
Justice)
the
Garo
Rules,
Hills
Autonomous
which
District
includes
civil
cases/proceedings. The Judge, District Council Court, therefore, is a civil
court within the meaning if Section 11 of the Act, 1958 (as amended by the
1972 Act).
14.
Insofar as the present case is concerned, the EM and the CEM have
taken concurrent view relying on the materials available in the official
records reflected in their respective orders and also other evidences. In
matters of this nature, where a factual dispute involving succession and
appointment of Nokma is concerned, the High Court in exercise of its power
of judicial review normally should not interfere with the decision of the
competent body insofar as the factual determination is concerned, until and
unless such decision is marked by absolute perversity. Determination of
factual aspect, right or wrong, would not entitle the High Court to invoke its
certiorari jurisdiction to correct all errors that may have been committed by
the authority concerned.
15.
In Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, (1976) 2 SCC 868, the Apex
Court while dealing with the extent of interference under certiorari
jurisdiction with regard to finding of facts held: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to
notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of
the High Court in writ proceedings under article 226. It is well-settled
that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors
of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts of tribunals. A writ of
certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction
which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The court exercising
special jurisdiction under article 226 is not entitled to act as an
2026:MLHC:716-DB
appellate court. As was pointed out by this court in Syed Yakoob's
case. [Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477].
“this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact
reached by the inferior court or Tribunal as a result of the
appreciation of evidence cannot be re-opened or questioned in
writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face
of the record can be corrected by a writ but not an error of fact,
however, grave it may appear to be.”
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a
writ of Certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding the
tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has
refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported
by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an
error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends, only to cases where orders
are passed by inferior courts or Tribunals in excess of their
jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction
vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of
their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.”
16.
Similarly, in State of Andhra Pradesh & ors v. Chitra Venkata Rao,
(1975) 2 SCC 557, it was held as under: “23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari under article
226 a supervisory jurisdiction. The court exercises it not as an
Appellate Court. The findings of fact reached by an inferior court or
Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence are not re-opened
or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent
on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error
of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of
fact recorded by a Tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is shown that in
recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to
admit admissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Again, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be
regarded as error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged on the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal is insufficient or inadequate to sustain a
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
2026:MLHC:716-DB
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”
17.
In the present case, nothing has been pointed out by the appellants to
project any jurisdictional error committed by the EM and/or the CEM. No
example of violation of any principle of natural justice has been cited. The
appellants also failed to show any perversity in the view taken by the EM
and the CEM, either in law or in appreciation of the evidence. Moreover, no
finding of the learned Single Judge has been challenged by the appellants on
the ground that the same was recorded without there being any materials on
record or by travelling beyond the record.
18.
For what has been discussed above, there is no merit in the present
writ appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
(Revati Mohite Dere)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
15.07.2026
“Shrity,PS”
CH MOMIN
Date: 2026.07.15 16:23:42 IST
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