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Form No. J(2)
In the High Court at Calcutta
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present:
The Hon‟be Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya
And
The Hon‟ble Justice Sandip Kumar De
F.M.A.T 392 of 2026
Miss Aarti Khanna and another
Vs.
Saurav Chatterjee and others
For the appellants
:
For the respondent no.14
Mr. Krishnaraj Thakker, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Shashwat Nayak
Mr. Aayush Sharma
Mr. Abdul Zahid
:
Mr. Ratnanko Banerjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Siddhartha Banerjee
Ms. Sristhi Burman
Mr. Shaunak Mukhopadhyay
Mr. Samriddha Sen
Ms. Rishika Goel
For the proposed intervenors:
Mr. Rachit Lakhmani
Mr. Aditya Chakraborty
Ms. Pooja Sah
Ms. Debarati Roy
Heard on
:
21.09.2026 and 22.09.2026
Judgment on
:
22.09.2026
Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.:1.
Affidavit-of-service filed in court today be kept on record.
2.
The present appeal has been preferred against the refusal of a
prayer
for
ad
interim
injunction
in
a
suit
filed
by
the
plaintiffs/appellants for several reliefs, on the foundational
allegation that there are several irregularities in the Register of
members of the defendant/respondent no.14-Club, which is a
Company incorporated under Section 8 of the Companies Act,
2013.
3.
The appellants claim to be members of the said Club.
4.
During arguments, it transpires that the appellant no.2 is also
participating as a candidate in the upcoming elections of the
Club, to be held on September 27, 2026.
5.
Learned senior counsel for the appellants argues that the
learned Trial Judge failed to take into consideration the specific
allegations in the plaint and the injunction application as to the
provisions of Articles of the Club having been flouted by the
respondents.
6.
It is pointed out that the Register of members of the Club is to
be maintained and updated, which has not been done in the
present case.
7.
It is also contended that the Register has not been duly settled
and several persons have been included in the voters‟ list, who
are otherwise not eligible to vote as per the Articles as well as
the governing Rules.
8.
For example, learned senior counsel cites the example of 30
members, who have allegedly been admitted as members to the
Club on reciprocal basis with another Club, without going
through the paraphernalia of a period of probation which,
according
to
the
appellants,
is
a
necessary
stage
to
be
undergone before acquiring a permanent membership.
9.
Learned senior counsel also alleges on the premise of the
allegations made in the plaint that at least 25 persons have been
admitted on probationary basis, in violation of Article 4.1 of the
Articles of Association and other applicable provisions. It is
alleged that the said persons, if permitted to vote in the
upcoming elections, would bring about a travesty of the Articles
of the Association.
10. Previously, during arguments, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants had contended that the appellants were never
supplied with a copy of the voters‟ list.
11. At this, although learned senior counsel for the respondents
categorically objected and submitted that a copy of the voters‟
list was duly circulated among the contestants in the upcoming
election, the Court directed the respondents to furnish such list
to
the
learned
Advocate-on-record
for
the
appellants
nonetheless.
12. Premised on such list, learned senior counsel for the appellants
points out that several members who find place in the voters‟ list
have
been
marked
as
“inactive”
which,
according
to
the
appellants, clearly shows that they have failed to clear the dues
of the membership fees of the Club.
13. As per the Articles of the Club, the defaulter members are not
eligible to vote.
14. As such, it is submitted that the large number of such inactive
members who find place in the voters‟ list itself indicates the
irregularity in preparing the same.
15. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contends
that in order to ensure that free and fair elections are held in
accordance with the Articles of the Club, either an independent
person
ought
to
be
appointed
as
Special
Officer
or
the
Scrutinizer already appointed should be entrusted to supervise
the entire nomination process and undertake a scrutiny as to
proper settlement of the electoral roll, e-voting, physical voting,
etc. to ensure that the voters‟ list is prepared otherwise in
consonance with the Articles.
16. Unless such exercise is undertaken, it is submitted that the
election would be premised on an irregular Register of members,
which would render the elections farcical.
17. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents contends
that the allegation of the appellants of not having been
circulated with a copy of the Register of members is not tenable
in the teeth of the provisions of the Articles of the Club.
18. Under Clause 20(vi) of the Articles, it is provided that a Register
of Members shall be maintained, containing their names,
addresses and occupations, the date of admission and of
cessation of membership, which Register will be kept open for
inspection by the members of the society on requisition.
19. Again, Sub-Clause (viii) of Clause 20 stipulates that the books of
accounts and other statutory books of the Club shall also be
similarly kept at the registered office of the Club and also shall
be open to inspection by the members at such time and place as
the General Committee directs on a written request made by any
member.
20. Learned senior counsel points out that within the four corners of
the plaint, it has not been alleged that the appellants have either
resorted to such inspection or, having so resorted to, were
refused such inspection.
21. Keeping in view such fact, it is argued that the suit and the
injunction application have been filed just on the verge of the
elections, with the oblique purpose of stalling the same, despite
the appellants having prior knowledge of the members‟ Register
or at least having ample opportunity to inspect the same .
Moreover, it is submitted, appellant no. 2 being a candidate in
the upcoming election, has been supplied with a copy of the
voters‟ list in any event.
22. It is pointed out that the apprehensions expressed by the
appellants, even otherwise, are not supported by facts.
23. Insofar as
the
30 members who have been inducted on
reciprocal basis, it is clarified by learned senior counsel for the
respondents that such reciprocal members are actually 39 in
number and they do not have any voting rights as per the
Articles of the Club.
24. Insofar
as
the
allegation
that
there
are
probationary
members, learned senior counsel furnishes a list indicating that
there are 19 members at present who have probationary status
and they are not eligible to vote in the coming elections to be
held on September 27, 2026 either.
25. Insofar as one member is concerned, he is a “sports member”,
which category of members is also ineligible to vote under the
Articles of the Club.
26. There are only five corporate members among the 25 allegedly
provisional members, who have been converted from corporate to
permanent.
27. Learned
senior
counsel
submits
that,
contrary
to
the
contentions of the appellants, the provisions in the Articles for
induction of probationary members is an aberration to the
general rule that the Club has the discretion to admit any
member as permanent upon due satisfaction of the necessary
formalities.
28. By placing reliance on Clause 3(i) of the Articles, it is pointed
out that the objective of the category of probationary members
(coming under the broad head “Temporary Members”), is to
introduce an additional screening stage before an individual is
granted permanent membership.
29. Thus, it is not provided in the Articles that in order to become a
permanent member, a person necessarily has to undergo the
procedure of first being inducted as a probationary member and
thereafter being elevated to „permanent‟ status.
30. It is submitted that it is entirely at the discretion of the Club
management whether to admit a member as a permanent
member or to subject a person seeking membership to the
additional screening stage of probationary membership.
31. Hence, per se, there is no bar to the conversion of a corporate
member directly to permanent membership without undergoing
any intermediate and additional screening stage of being a
probationary member.
32. Hence, insofar as the apprehensions expressed by the appellants
are concerned, it is submitted that those are utterly unfounded.
33. Learned senior counsel next submits that despite having made
allegations in the plaint with regard to the Register of members
and in view of the Articles providing for inspection of the same
by any member, new grounds of challenge are being sought to be
canvassed before this court in appeal, which were never a part of
the plaint or the pleadings before the learned Trial Judge.
34. Since the plaintiffs/appellants were already aware of the voters‟
list and having been notified of the scheduled date for the
election long back, it is submitted that the allegations now
sought to be advanced at the eleventh hour are intended to delay
the election and beyond the scope of the suit itself and ought not
to be entertained by this court.
35. Despite the same, in answer to a query of court, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondents submits on instruction
that the term “inactive”, which finds place against some of the
members in the voters‟ list, does not necessarily mean that such
members have failed to meet their dues but might signify several
factors, such as the said members residing abroad or not being
active participants in the activities of the Club.
36. Thus, the expression “inactive” does not automatically render a
voter ineligible for casting a vote in the election of the Club.
37. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants also relies
on the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules,
2014 and argues that compliance of the provisions thereof, as
enumerated in Clause 3 onwards, in respect of maintenance of
Register of members and associated modalities, is required to be
ensured before a voters‟ list is prepared.
38. Although Rule 21 mandates a Scrutinizer only to start from the
stage of being provided with the Register of members and
conducting the elections, it is submitted that the Scrutinizer in
the present case ought to be directed also to ensure that the
prior provisions starting from Clause 3 onwards of the Rules
have been duly complied with, particularly in the teeth of the
allegations levelled in the suit.
39. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants clarifies
that the appellants do not have any objection as to the integrity
or the independence of the Scrutinizer who has already been
appointed for holding the upcoming election but for the sake of
ensuring that the voters‟ list contains the names of only valid
members, the Scrutinizer ought to be permitted to take the
assistance of other persons in order to undertake such exercise.
40. Upon hearing learned senior counsel for the parties, we find that
the crux of the plaint allegations is contained in paragraph no.
thereof.
Although
allegations
have
been
made
galore
throughout the plaint, paragraph no. 44 epitomizes the same
and alleges that “of direct relevance” to the forthcoming election
is the state of Register of Members and that Article 20(vi) of the
Articles requires the Register of Members to be maintained and
kept current. It further alleges that the Register has not been
duly settled, disputed admissions continue to be reflected
therein, and questions also arise as to persons in arrears and
their eligibility to vote in terms of the Articles.
41. Thus, from a plain reading of the said paragraph itself, it is
evident that the plaintiffs must have had access to the Register
in order to level the allegations.
42. If the contrary is to be accepted, the plaint ought to be rejected
at
the
threshold,
statements, since
being
the
vexatious
allegations
and
based
on
untrue
primarily pertain
to the
Register of members and could not have been levelled unless the
plaintiffs/appellants had access to the same. Notably, it is not
the case of the appellants that they were not given inspection of
the Members‟ list despite having sought such inspection.
43. Thus, the arguments of the appellants assailing the voters‟ list
produced during arguments of the present appeal cannot be
admitted at this stage to traverse beyond the pleadings in the
plaint and the injunction application. The presumption on the
premise of the plaint allegations must be that the plaintiffs were
well aware of the Register of Members prior to filing of the suit;
otherwise, the suit would be rendered ex facie vexatious and not
maintainable.
44. Looking
at
the
matter
from
such
perspective,
thus,
the
appellants cannot be permitted to raise new allegations at the
stage of the appeal, either as to some of the members of the
voters‟ list being inactive or taking new objections on other
grounds which do not find place in the plaint or the injunction
application.
45. It was for the plaintiffs to specifically make allegations in their
pleadings and to canvass such arguments in the suit itself ,
which would be a subject matter of trial on evidence.
46. At this stage, it would be premature and impermissible to
expand the scope of the appeal beyond recognition vis-a-vis that
of the pleadings made in the Trial Court.
47. Even otherwise, what the appellants now seek is, in the garb of
directions being issued to the Scrutinizer, for the Scrutinizer to
function as an independent Special Officer in the nature of a
Receiver, in order to ascertain the veracity of the Register of
Members, which is the premise of the electoral rolls of the club.
48. Thus, such prayer has to be tested on the anvil of Order XL of
the Code of Civil Procedure.
49. Seen even from such perspective, we find precious little by way
of particulars of pleadings to meet the high standards required
in law for appointment of a Special Officer/Receiver. From
paragraph 44 of the plaint and the other relevant paragraphs,
we find that the nature of allegations is extremely vague.
50. The plaintiffs merely contend that the Register “has not been
duly settled”, “disputed admissions continued to be reflected
therein” and “questions also arise as to persons in arrears and
their eligibility to vote in terms of the Articles”.
51. Yet, there is not a single instance or specific particulars given as
to the exact nature of the irregularity or lacunae in the
settlement of the Register, if any, and/or which persons are in
arrears but still featuring in the Register of Members, despite
being ineligible to vote.
52. Also, the prayer for a direction that the elections may be held
and the Register of Members be prepared “in terms of the
Articles” is as vague as can be.
53. There is no reason as to why a presumption ought not to be
attached to the correctness of the actions taken by the club in
preparation of the members‟ list and the electoral rolls, unless
rebutted by cogent materials.
54.
Even if the court were to pass a blanket injunction or an
interim protective order directing the election to be held or the
Register of Members to be prepared “in terms of the Articles of
the Club”, it would be impossible to implement such an order,
since the implementation of the Articles would involve an
independent judicial enquiry as to whether the terms of the
Articles
have
been
violated
in
fact
and
in
law,
which
adjudication vests totally within the domain of the Civil Court
itself in the suit filed by the appellants.
55. It is beyond the power of this Court to delegate the powers of
adjudication vested in a Civil Court to a Special Officer
appointed by the Court.
56. Such an order would be incapable of implementation, being
ambiguous
and
subject
to
interpretation
of
the
Articles
themselves vis-a-vis the action alleged subsequently; thus, law
prohibits grant of such an injunction, which is not possible for
the court to supervise or implement.
57. Insofar as the allegation of 30 members being inducted on
reciprocal basis is concerned, since it has been categorically
submitted by the respondents that the 39 members inducted on
reciprocal basis are not eligible for voting, which is also borne
out by the Articles, as are the present probationary members,
the said allegations do not form any valid basis for apprehending
that the election shall not be held in proper manner.
58. Even otherwise, we do not find any pleadings or materials having
been produced by the plaintiffs/appellants before the learned
Trial Judge on the date of refusal of the ad-interim injunction,
sufficient for the learned Trial Judge to grant the reliefs as now
sought from this court.
59. Even otherwise, if at the last moment, immediately prior to the
election date, the court directs a supervision of the nomination
process and preparation and settlement of the electoral rolls
afresh, it would tantamount to reopening the entire process of
preparation of the Register of Members, which would be a
Herculean task, having the effect of stalling the election and
serve no other useful purpose at this stage.
60. The said adjudication is best left for the learned Trial Judge to
undertake at the final hearing of the suit, upon trial on
evidence, of course, subject to clear and specific pleadings with
regard to the alleged irregularities being made.
61. On a composite consideration of the aforesaid circumstances, we
do not find any reason to grant the reliefs as sought before the
learned Trial Judge, at least at the ad-interim stage.
62. We would be failing in our duty if we do not take note of Rule 21
of the 2014 Rules, which have been cited by the appellants,
which clearly delineates the functions of a Scrutinizer for the
purpose
of
elections.
The
said
provision
is
reproduced
hereinbelow:“21.
Manner in which the Chairman of meeting shall get the
poll process scrutinized and report thereon.- (1) The Chairman of a
meeting shall ensure that(a) The Scrutinisers are provided with the Register of Members,
specimen signatures of the members, Attendance Register and
Register of Proxies.
(b) The Scrutinisers are provided with all the documents received by the
Company pursuant to Sections 105, 112 and Section 113.
(c) The Scrutinisers shall arrange for Polling papers and distribute them
to the members and proxies present at the meeting; in case of joint
shareholders, the polling paper shall be given to the first named
holder or in his absence to the joint holder attending the mee ting as
appearing in the chronological order in the folio and the Polling
paper shall be in Form No. MGT.12.
(d) The Scrutinisers shall keep a record of the polling papers received in
response to poll, by initialling it.
(e) The Scrutinisers shall lock and seal an empty polling box in the
presence of the members and proxies.
(f) The Scrutinisers shall open the Polling box in the presence of two
persons as witnesses after the voting process is over.
(g) In case of ambiguity about the validity of a proxy, the Scrutinisers
shall decide the validity in consultation with the Chairman.
(h) The Scrutinisers shall ensure that if a member who has appointed a
proxy has voted in person, the proxy’s vote shall be disregarded.
(i) The Scrutinisers shall count the votes cast on poll and prepare a
report thereon addressed to the Chairman.
(j) Where voting is conducted by electronic means under the provisions
of Section 108 and rules made thereunder, the company shall
provide all the necessary support, technical and otherwise to the
Scrutinisers in orderly conduct of the voting and counting the result
thereof.
(k) The Scrutinisers’ report shall state total votes cast, valid votes,
votes in favour and against the resolution including the details of
invalid polling papers and votes comprised therein.
(l) The Scrutinisers shall submit the Report to the Chairman who shall
countersign the same.
(m) The Chairman shall declare the result of Voting on poll.
(n) The result may either by announced by him or a person authorized
by him in writing.
(2)
The Scrutinisers appointed for the poll, shall submit a report to
the Chairman of the meeting in Form No.MGT.13 and the report shall be
signed by the Scrutinisers and, in case there is more than one
Scrutinisers by all the Scrutinisers, and the same shall be submitted by
them to the Chairman of the meeting within seven days from the date
the poll is taken.”
63. From a bare perusal of the same, it is evident that the role of the
Scrutinizer begins after being provided with a Register of
Members by the management of the Club and revolves solely
around the conduct of the elections thereafter.
64. Thus, the Scrutinizer cannot be imposed with the task of
ensuring that the prior provisions of the Rules, starting from
Rule 3 onwards, as to the process of maintenance of Register
etc., have been duly complied with, that too, barely a few days
before the election is scheduled to be held, such date having
already been fixed at September 27, 2026. We cannot saddle the
Scrutinizer with a role which is not imposed by the statutory
rules themselves.
65. The learned Trial Judge, thus, was justified in refusing the ad
interim prayer of injunction made by the plaintiffs/appellants at
this stage.
66. During arguments, Mr. Lakhmani, learned Advocate having
instruction to appear for some of the alleged members of the
Club, seeks to intervene in the appeal on the ground that the
said
members
also
have
similar
allegations
as
the
plaintiffs/appellants in respect of the conduct of the elections.
However, we do not deem it fit to permit such intervention at
this advanced stage of final hearing of the appeal, particularly
since the said alleged members have not approached the Trial
Court for ventilating their grievances. Be that as it may, it will
be open to the proposed interveners to approach the Trial Court
for being impleaded in the suit, subject to adjudication by the
learned Trial Judge on their right to do so, or absence of the
same, in accordance with law.
67. In any event, in view of the findings rendered above, we do not
find any merit in the appeal.
68. Accordingly, FMAT 392 of 2026 is dismissed on contest, thereby
affirming the portion of the impugned order, bearing Order no. 2
dated September 9, 2026 passed by the learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division), Second Court at Alipore, District – South 24
Parganas in Title Suit no. 1368 of 2026, refusing to grant ex
parte ad-interim relief in the second injunction application
concerning independent supervision of the forthcoming election,
scrutiny and settlement of the electoral roll and supervision of
the electronic voting process.
69. We part with the expectation that the respondents shall file their
written objection to the temporary injunction application, if not
already filed, within a fortnight from date and that thereafter,
the learned Trial Judge shall endeavour to dispose of the
temporary
injunction
application
as
expeditiously
as
the
business of the said court permits.
70. We further clarify that all the above observations are tentative in
nature, arrived at for the sole purpose of adjudicating the
present appeal, arising at the ad-interim stage, and shall not
influence unduly the learned Trial Judge at any further stage of
the injunction application and/or the suit itself.
71. It will be open to the parties to raise all contentions before the
learned Trial Judge at the final hearing of the temporary
injunction application, including the question of maintainability
raised by the respondents herein.
72. There will be no order as to costs.
73. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for,
be made available to the parties upon compliance with the
requisite formalities.
(Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.)
I agree.
(Sandip Kumar De, J.)
AD-20
AK/SSS
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