Universities – Vice-Chancellor – Re-appointment of – Challenge to – Calcutta University Act, 1979 – ss. 8 and 60 – High Court allowed petition u/Art.226 seeking a writ of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor (VC) of Calcutta University – The High Court held that the State government had no authority to appoint or re-appoint the VC under s.8 of the Act, or by taking recourse to the residuary provisions of s.60 of the Act – As a consequence, the order issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal re-appointing the incumbent VC of Calcutta University was set aside – The High Court held that the scheme of s.8 empowers only the Chancellor to appoint, re-appoint, temporarily appoint or remove the VC; and s.60 to which recourse was taken by the State government provides only for the removal of difficulties arising in giving effect to the provisions of the statute – Apart from the reasoning based on the provisions of the Act, the High Court also held that the UGC Regulations envisage that the appointment of a VC can be made only by a Visitor / Chancellor, and this came in the way of the State government making the appointment – On appeal, held: There is neither an express provision nor a necessary intendment by which it could be inferred that the power which is entrusted to the Chancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in the case of reappointment – A re-appointment is the appointment of an existing incumbent who fulfils the conditions of eligibility – The power of appointment including of reappointment is entrusted to the Chancellor and not the State Government – The amended provisions of s.8(2)(a) of the Act cannot be construed to mean that the power of reappointment has been taken away from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government – Where there is a specific provision, as in the present case s.8(2)(a), it was not open to the State government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties – The State government chose the incorrect path under s.60 by misusing the “removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power of the Chancellor to make the appointment – The government cannot misuse the “removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstacles in its path which arise due to statutory restrictions – Allowing such actions would be antithetical to the rule of law – In the guise of removing the difficulties, the State cannot change the scheme and essential provisions of the Act – Even if the provisions of the Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government, it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations – The Regulations become part of the statute framed by Parliament and will prevail – The judgment of the High Court is correct in law and on fact and does not warrant interference in appeal – The State government could not have issued the order re-appointing the VC – The University Grants Commission (Minimum Qualifications for appointment of Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education) Regulations 2018 – Regulation 7.3 – Constitution of India – Art. 226.
Writs – Writ of Quo Warranto – Held: The writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment has not been made in accordance with the law – Constitution of India – Article 226 – Service Law – Appointment.
Interpretation of Statutes – Where there is a specific provision, it is not open to the State government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties – Misusing the limited power granted to make minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments in a statute for making its implementation effective, to side-step the provisions of the statute altogether would defeat the purpose of the legislation.
Interpretation of Statutes – A statute must be read to avoid a construction which would make certain provisions or terms meaningless or redundant – An effort must be made to read the provisions of the statute in a holistic manner so as to imbue it with meaning and content.
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD:1. Through a line of cases, this Court has laid out the terms on which the writ of quo warranto may be exercised. The Court has settled the position that the writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment has not been made in accordance with the law. [Paras 23 and 28][963-A; 965-F] University of Mysore v C.D. Govindra Rao, (1964) 4 SCR 575 – followed.
High Court of Gujarat v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat, (2003) 4 SCC 712; B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply & Drainage Board
Employees’ Assn. (2006) 11 SCC 731; Central
Electricity Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo (2014) 1 SCC 161 and Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka (2018) 6 SCC 162 – relied on.
2.1. The procedure for appointing a VC is prescribed in clauses (b) and (c) of Section 8(1) of the Calcutta University Act 1979. Clause (b) postulates that (i) a search committee has to be constituted by the state government; (ii) the search committee has to prepare a panel of three names in order of preference; (iii) in preparing the panel, the search committee has to give proper weightage to academic excellence, exposure to the higher education system in the country and abroad, adequate experience in academic and administrative governance; (iv) the search committee has to reflect its consideration of the above in writing while submitting the panel to the Chancellor; and (v) the search committee has to consist of three persons as stipulated in Section 8(1)(c). [Para 33][966-H; 967-A-B]
2.2. In the case of a reappointment, the unamended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) provided earlier that a VC would be eligible for reappointment for a period not exceeding four years, “subject to the provisions of this section”. The provisions of Section 8(2)(a) were substituted by the Amending Act of 2019. Section 8(2)(a) as amended stipulates that a VC shall be eligible for reappointment for another term of four years “subject to the satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of his past academic excellence and administrative success established during his term of office in the capacity of VC”. [Para 34][967-C]
2.3. Section 8(2)(a) is sought to be interpreted by the appellants as indicating that the power of reappointment is taken away from the Chancellor and is entrusted to the State government. This would be an incorrect reading of the statutory provision. Section 8(2)(a) provides for (i) the term of office of a VC; (ii) eligibility for reappointment; (iii) the term of office upon reappointment; (iv) the conditions subject to which a person shall be eligible for reappointment; and (v) the outer age limit of 70 years. The expression “subject to the satisfaction of the State government” cannot by a process of inferential reasoning be construed to vest the power of reappointment in the State government. The provisions of Section 8 envisage diverse situations. While the eligibility for appointment is indeed determined by the State government’s satisfaction, the power of making the appointment continues to vest in the Chancellor. [Paras 36 and 37][967-F-H; 968-A]
2.4. The effect of the words “subject to the provisions of this section” in Section 8(2)(a) in its unamended form was that the reappointment would have to be in a manner provided in Section 8, which obviously included Section 8(1). Deletion of those words in Section 8(2)(a), as amended, would mean that the procedure which has been prescribed for making the appointment of a VC, namely the appointment of a search committee and the preparation of a panel, would not be attracted in the case of a reappointment. In the case of a reappointment, a VC who has completed a term of four years would be eligible subject to the satisfaction of the State government and on the basis of their past academic excellence and administrative record during the term of office held as a VC. [Para 40][968-F-H; 969-A]
3. It is a settled principle of law that a statute must be read to avoid a construction which would make certain provisions or terms meaningless or redundant. An effort must be made to read the provisions of the statute in a holistic manner so as to imbue it with meaning and content. [Para 41][969-B-D]
Union of India v Hansoli Devi (2002) 7 SCC 273 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324 and Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose 1953 SCR 1 – referred to.
Quebec Railway, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry, AIR 1920 PC 181 – referred to.
4.1. There is neither an express provision nor a necessary intendment by which it could be inferred that the power which is entrusted to the Chancellor to appoint a VC is taken away in the case of a reappointment. A reappointment is the appointment of an existing incumbent who fulfils the conditions of eligibility. The fulfilment of the conditions makes a person eligible for reappointment. The power of appointment including of reappointment is entrusted to the Chancellor and not to the State government. The amended provisions of Section 8(2)(a) cannot therefore be construed to mean that the power of reappointment has been taken away from the Chancellor and entrusted to the State government. Reading the provisions in such a manner, would make the provisions entrusting the power of appointment of the VC with the Chancellor redundant. [Para 42][969-D-F]
4.2. Moreover, in the present case, the State government itself made a reference to the Chancellor when the issue as regards the reappointment of the VC came up. Evidently as the State government stated before the High Court, the Chancellor was in disagreement with the State government. Therefore, it is clear that the State government was in agreement with the interpretation of the Act as laid out above. [Para 43][969-G; 970A]
5. Section 8(6) stipulates the manner in which a vacancy in the office of the VC which occurs by reason of death, resignation, expiration of the term of office, removal or otherwise shall be filled up. The provision indicates that such vacancy shall be filled up in accordance with the provisions of sub-Section (1) of Section
8. Section 8(6) has to be read in conjunction with Section 8(1) since the former expressly refers to the latter. The reference to the provisions of sub-Section (1) for filling up a vacancy on the expiration of the term of office will not obviously apply to a case of reappointment because the procedure contemplated by Section 8(1)(b) of a search committee would not attach to a reappointment. On this aspect, the High Court has correctly disagreed with the petitioner before it and noted that amended Section 8(2)(a) which provides for the re-appointment of a VC for another term does not require that the procedure prescribed in Section 8(1) has to be followed for re-appointment. [Para 46][970-F-H]
6. Faced with the view of the Chancellor, the State government attempted to get around the situation by purporting to exercise its powers under Section 60 which contemplates a situation where inter alia any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of the Act “on account of any lacunae or omission” in its provisions or for any other reason whatsoever. In such cases, the State government is empowered, as the occasion may require, to do anything which appears to it to be necessary for removing the difficulty notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in the Act or any other law. Where there is a specific provision, as in the present case Section 8(2)(a), it was not open to the State government to conjure up a lacunae or omission and purportedly exercise the power to remove difficulties. The State government chose the incorrect path under Section 60 by misusing the “removal of difficulty clause” to usurp the power of the Chancellor to make the appointment. A government cannot misuse the “removal of difficulty clause” to remove all obstacles in its path which arise due to statutory restrictions. Allowing such actions would be antithetical to the rule of law. Misusing the limited power granted to make minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments in a statute for making its implementation effective; to side-step the provisions of the statute altogether would defeat the purpose of the legislation. Accordingly, the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that “in the guise of removing the difficulties, the State cannot change the scheme and essential provisions of the Act”. [Paras 47, 48, 49 and 50][971-A, C-E; 972-C-F]
Madeva Upendra Sinai v Union of India (1975) 3 SCC
765 : [1975] 2 SCR 640 – relied on.
7. In Gambhirdan K Gadhvi case, despite the appointment being in terms of the statutory provisions of the Sardar Patel University Act 1955, the Court issued a writ of quo warranto setting aside the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by relying upon the UGC Regulations 2018. In view of the decision in Gambhirdan K Gadhvi, even if the provisions of the Act allowed the appointment of the Vice Chancellor by the State government, it would be in violation of the UGC Regulations. The Regulations become part of the statute framed by Parliament and will prevail. The judgment of the High Court is correct in law and on fact and does not warrant interference in appeal. The State government could not have issued the order re-appointing the VC. [Paras 55,
56 and 57][973-E; 974-D-E]
Gambhirdan K Gadhvi v State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC
179 - relied on.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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