Tenancy laws: Title claim – On facts, land leased out to one in 1924 for thirty years under the 1895 Act, who sold it to predecessor-in-interest of the respondents vide sale deed of 1947 and thereafter the land was recorded in his name and on his death his successor, and they are continuously recorded as Bhumidhar of the said land – Different set of legal proceedings which proceeded in parallel – Issues pertaining to sale of ownership rights or leasehold rights to the respondents; status of the respondents under the applicable tenancy law and if the status entitled them for ownership of the suit land; if the leasehold rights validly transferred under the 1924 lease deed; determination of the 1924 lease deed, breach of the condition of prior approval and expiry of initial lease deed period; and was it possible for predecessor of respondents to be accorded the status of ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 Act, which resulted in them being subsequently accorded the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification – On appeal, held: High Court while deciding the issue of ownership in favour of the respondents on the strength of the Sale Deed, have come to different conclusions as such to the nature of the instrument – Both these parallel findings by the High Court have been without any serious examination of the nature of the Sale Deed itself – Reasoned finding on both the nature of Sale Deed as well as whether the same was violative of conditions of the 1924 Lease Deed very important, because of which the issue of determination of lease remains unanswered – High Court made sweeping remarks in respect of the tenancy status without any serious consideration as to whether the same were legally tenable or not – No reference is made to any proceedings wherein the status as an occupancy tenant was ever granted to the predecessor of the respondent and, if so, how and when the same culminated into the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification – Thus, there are compelling circumstances which have been left unanswered by the courts below, because of which determination of several factual issues have been left in limbo – In dearth of appropriate records, ownership rights in respect of an immovable property cannot be decided casually – Thus, the Court is reluctant to give a final opinion on the matter until the Court is satisfied on the basis of the entirety of documents – Matters remanded to the High Court for a fresh adjudication on the issues formulated, even though pending before this Court for more than 15 years – Government Grants Act of 1895 – U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court while deciding the issue of ownership in favour of Respondents on the strength of the Sale Deed, have come to different conclusions as such to the nature of the instrument. Respondents in the plaint filed by them in 1983 Injunction Suit, the respondents claim to tenure holders who were later accorded the status of ‘Bhumidhar’ on the basis of Zamindari Notification. On the other hand, in the Second Writ Petition, the respondents stated that the Sale Deed was actually in respect of the title per se. The recitals of the Sale Deed highlight that the relationship between JV and ML seemed more akin to that of a vendor vendee in a title sale than that of the sale of leasehold rights. [Paras 37 and 38][965-B-C; 966-E]
1.2 In respect of the two parallel findings given by the High Court, the respondents for the first time before this Court have given up the finding which treated the Sale Deed as a sale of title. However, it is noted that both these parallel findings by the High Court have been without any serious examination of the nature of the Sale Deed itself. The High Court erred in respect of these findings and as the same was essential to determine the present dispute on merit, it is deemed to be a fit case to exercise the power of remand. Additionally, despite these findings being a serious lacuna to reach a conclusive decision, the appellants have raised no serious objection to the modified stand taken by the respondents wherein they stated that the Sale Deed was in respect of leasehold rights only. [Paras 39 and 40][966-F-H]
1.3 It can be safely deduced that the appellants did contend the issue of prior approval from the initial stage itself. Apart from the said eviction suit, two other proceedings need to be highlighted, i.e. consolidation proceedings which occurred between 1959–1960 and acquisition proceedings for a portion of land initiated by the military authorities in 1963. In respect of the consolidation proceedings, the stand taken by State cannot be deduced as no document or order in respect of the same has been produced. However in respect of the acquisition, order dated 22.11.1965 passed by the concerned Land Acquisition Officer, which granted compensation to the predecessor of respondents has been brought on record wherein it must be noted that compensation was granted on the basis of revenue entries and without any serious examination of the validity of the same. Hence, both these proceedings cannot be treated as an admission of validity of revenue entries or as accepting the waiver of breach of the condition in respect of prior approval from the Deputy Commissioner. [Para 42][968-B-D]
1.4 The order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the
Commissioner, Kumaon, in the mutation proceedings makes it apparent that the approval from the appropriate authority as per the lease deed, i.e. Deputy Commissioner was granted only on 06.12.1948 which is more than a year later than the Sale Deed. On the contrary, as per the recitals contained in the Sale Deed, it is mentioned that due permission was obtained and the consequent mutation was effected in the office of Superintendent, Tarai and Bhabar, Nainital before its execution. Hence, this abovementioned recital leads to immense confusion as to whether any approval was ever granted at the first instance. Even if such approval was granted, no indication is given as such to actually who granted the approval and if it is assumed that a subordinate authority granted the approval, no statutory instrument is produced to highlight whether this delegation was possible or not. The subordinate courts as well as the High Court have merely relied on the order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner, Kumaon to come to a sweeping conclusion that a valid approval existed in favor of the predecessor of the respondents despite glaring contradictions which were on the face of the record. Consequently, on this issue of breach of the conditions of the 1924 Lease Deed, this Court fails to arrive at a decisive conclusion as neither the original record nor its true copies have been placed on record of this Court or the High Court as well as the other forums. Finally, while the respondents argued that until there existed an express refusal by the Deputy Commissioner for sale of leasehold rights, the sale was valid especially in light of post facto approval granted by the Deputy Commissioner as has been recorded in order dated 07.08.1980 passed by the Commissioner. [Paras 43-45][968-H; 969-A-F]
1.5 It is settled law that any contractual term or condition is to be interpreted as per the natural and ordinary meaning appended to the language used by the parties unless the same leads to absurdity. In the present case, condition (e) of the 1924 lease deed makes it clear that no rights in the Suit Land are allowed to be transferred or created “without the written approval of the Deputy Commissioner of Nainital” which bears the crystal clear requirement of the prior assent needed from the Deputy Commissioner. This interpretation is also supported from the fact that leases under the Government Grants Act of 1985 are to be strictly constructed as per the terms of the grant, regardless of any other provisions of the law. Even otherwise, the High Court and other authorities have proceeded on the premise of a valid approval. They are completely silent on whether the post facto approval could be granted and if so, who granted such approval. Again, no records are produced and its not known whether any approval was ever actually granted and when or by whom. [Paras
46 and 48][970-F-G; 971-A, E-F]
1.6 A reasoned finding on both the nature of Sale Deed as well as whether the same was violative of conditions of the 1924 Lease Deed goes to the heart of the present dispute, because of which the issue of determination of lease remains unanswered. Hence, in light of the same, the respondents’ claim on the strength of doctrine of holding over or through doctrine of acquiescence as well as the reliance on the conduct of appellants, remains in doldrums as the same are hinged on the finding in respect of determination of lease. It is also highlighted that decades have passed in litigation, and it would be extremely iniquitous to remand the case to revenue authorities at such a belated stage. [Para 49][971-G; 972-A-B]
1.7 Even assuming that JV was deemed to have been granted status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ under the 1939 Act, it should be noted that his status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ cannot be transferred to the predecessor of respondents in light of Section 33 of the 1939 Act. The only exception to the bar on transfer of status as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’ in the section 33 is under sub-clause (b) of clause (2) wherein reference is made to Section 251 which in turns deals with sale of occupancy rights when the tenant himself is facing the execution of a decree for arrears of rent. As no factual situation has been indicated stating that JV had suffered a decree for rent arrears, there is no surety as to how any transfer of ‘Occupancy Tenant’ status in favour of the predecessor of respondents was sustainable. This confusion further indicates that the predecessor of respondents could not have been accorded the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification on the strength of revenue entries which recorded him as an ‘Occupancy Tenant’. [Para 52][973-B, G-H; 974-A-B]
1.8 The High Court again made sweeping remarks in respect of the tenancy status without any serious consideration as to whether the same were legally tenable or not. No reference is made to any proceedings wherein the status as an occupancy tenant was ever granted to the predecessor of the respondent and, if so, how and when the same culminated into the status of ‘Sirdar’ under the Zamindari Notification. These proceedings which ultimately led to the grant of status of ‘Bhumidhar’ in favour of the predecessor of respondents for the first time, could have potentially served as the litmus test for the validity of these revenue entries. [Para 53][974-B-D]
1.9 The High Court held that predecessor of respondents was rightly accorded the status of ‘Sirdars’ under the Zamindari Notification on the ground that they were leaseholders governed by the Government Grants Act of 1895. However, this finding again appears unsustainable because there is no proper factual analysis as to when the 1924 Lease Deed stood determined or whether the same subsisted after the initial period of thirty years. [Para 54][974-D-E]
1.10 Initially the 1939 Act was not applicable to the Suit Land as the concerned area where it is situated was excluded from the purview of the 1939 Act, as it was specifically included in the First Schedule. Any future application of the 1939 Act in respect of the Suit Land was supposed to be through a separate notification, but the same has again not been produced in these proceedings or before any forum, which further dissuades from rendering any final opinion at this stage. The same aspect has been highlighted by the appellants who contend that the area in which the Suit Land is situated was governed by the Kumaon Tenancy Rules of 1918. On the other hand, the respondents have produced on record a G.O. No. 5678/ 1-B-1212~B-19 dated the 30.04.1948 which indicates the possibility of hereditary rights being accrued on predecessor of Respondents under the 1939 Act but again, this Court constrained to give any finding on the same because of the lack of proper documents on record to ascertain the tenancy status of the Respondents. Hence, on this ground also the instant appeals are liable to be remanded back so that the relevant statutory notifications, original records can be placed before the High Court to enable it to determine the applicable tenancy law and their impact on the alleged rights of the respondents. [Paras 55 and 56][974-F-H; 975-B-D]
1.11 These appeals have been pending before this Court for more than 15 years. In normal circumstances, this Court would have ventured to decide the issues but in light of the abovementioned observations and dearth of appropriate records, ownership rights in respect of an immovable property cannot be decided casually. The hands are further tied because of the fact that the ownership of certain portions of the Suit Land has apparently changed hands on account of subsequent sale by the respondents. Furthermore, the value of the Suit Land has increased exponentially during the entire period of litigation and the relevant parties have also done certain valuable developments. Any decision now cannot be based on conjectures and surmises or on the basis of mere guesswork. Hence, the Court is reluctant to give a final opinion on the matter until the Court is satisfied on the basis of the entirety of documents which showcase how the ownership or possessory rights were created on the Suit Land. [Paras 57 and 58][975-D-G]
1.12 There are indeed compelling circumstances which have been left unanswered by the courts below, because of which determination of several factual issues have been left in limbo. Therefore, in light of the peculiar situation, it is expedient to remand the appeals back to the High Court for fresh adjudication on the issues formulated. In light of the long-drawn pendency of these disputes, the High Court is requested to take up these matters at the earliest and dispose of the same as early as possible. The impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside, and the matters are remanded to the High Court for a fresh adjudication. It is made clear that casual findings/observations made by Revenue Authorities or the Civil Court shall not be accepted at their face value unless the High Court is satisfied on a thorough inspection of the original or certified copies of the relevant record. The parties are directed to keep status quo until the matters are decided afresh by the High Court. [Paras 59-61][975-H; 976-A-E]
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd. (1995) 3 Supp SCC 456 : [1995]
3 SCR 729; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4 SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663; State of Kerala v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambir Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (1996)
1 SCC 435 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 139; Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla v. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1997)
3 SCC 443 : [1997] 2 SCR 152; State of U.P. v. Zahoor Ahmad (1973) 2 SCC 547 : [1974] 1 SCR 344; M.O.H. Uduman v. M.O.H. Aslum (1991) 1 SCC 412 : [1990] 2 Suppl. SCR 663; Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd. (1986) 1 SCC 264 : [1985] 3 Suppl. SCR 909; Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Workmen AIR 1961 SC 860 : [1961] SCR 204 – referred to.
Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956] 1 All ER 855; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd vs. West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 All ER 98 – referred to.
Shambhu Dayal Singh, The Law of Tenancy in U.P. (3rd edn, Empire Press, 1949) 131 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.