Service Law – Departmental enquiry – First respondentSuperintendent of Police allegedly violated administrative orders of the Inspector General of Police for disbanding “Gunda Squad” constituted, operated and supervised by the first respondent, and a person interrogated by the Squad died in custody – Magisterial enquiry was conducted and the report submitted contained observations against the first respondent – Departmental enquiry subsequently convened against the first respondent and charge sheet was issued – Tribunal quashed the charge-sheet on grounds that there was a delay of nearly two years in concluding the disciplinary enquiry; and that the charges were ambiguous – Affirmation of the order, by High Court – Held: Not justified – Charges against the first respondent were neither vague nor ambiguous – The charge-sheet, together with the statement of imputations, contains detailed elaboration of the allegations against the first respondent – Tribunal quashed the charge-sheet purportedly on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by denial of opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings – This line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous – Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated – Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case – Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise – Chargesheet was issued to the first respondent while he was in service, and hence the disciplinary enquiry can proceed to its logical conclusion – Disciplinary enquiry directed to be concluded expeditiously. Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1. On the basis of the material placed on the record, it was impossible to come to the conclusion that the charge against the first respondent is vague or ambiguous. The charge-sheet, together with the statement of imputations, contains a detailed elaboration of the allegations against the first respondent and does not leave the recipient in a measure of doubt or ambiguity over the nature of the case he is required to answer in the disciplinary enquiry. The finding that the charge is vague is palpably in error. The Tribunal declined to quash the charge-sheet by its initial order dated 28 July 2016. However, by a subsequent order dated 5 January 2018, it proceeded to do exactly what it had declined to do by its previous order. The Tribunal purportedly did so on the basis that prejudice had been caused to the first respondent by the denial of an opportunity for deputation or for promotion as a result of the pendency of the proceedings. The line of reasoning which weighed with the Tribunal is plainly erroneous. The Tribunal would have been justified in directing the expeditious conclusion of the enquiry, but instead, it proceeded to quash the enquiry in its entirety. This was clearly impermissible. Every delay in conducting a disciplinary enquiry does not, ipso facto, lead to the enquiry being vitiated. Whether prejudice is caused to the officer who is being enquired into is a matter which has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances of each case. Prejudice must be demonstrated to have been caused and cannot be a matter of surmise. Apart from submitting that the first respondent was unable to proceed on deputation or to seek promotion, there is no basis on which it could be concluded that his right to defend himself stands prejudicially affected by a delay of two years in concluding the enquiry. The High Court, therefore, has clearly failed to properly exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by simply affirming the judgment of the Tribunal. The judgment of the Tribunal suffered from basic errors which go to the root of the matter and which have been ignored both by the Tribunal as well as by the High Court. [Para 13][152-C-H; 153-A]
2. The chargesheet was issued to the first respondent while he was in service, and hence the disciplinary enquiry can proceed to its logical conclusion. The disciplinary enquiry should be concluded expeditiously, preferably by 31 July 2022. [Para 14][153-B]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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