Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971: ss. 2(a), 2(f), 3, 6 and 8 – Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 – ss. 2(47) and 81 – Private forests – Meaning of – Nature of land – Determination of, by Taluk land Board – Evidentiary value of – Held: Where the Land Board arrives at a determination about the character of lands, under the Act of 1963, that becomes a piece of evidence for the purposes of the Vesting Act – Unless a contrary state of affairs shown to exist, the Board’s order to be given due weight – On facts, rounds of litigation between the State and the respondent – Respondent claiming that they were owner of 1534.40 acres of land which was acquired by sale, and forest authorities attempted to take possession of large areas of land occupied by the respondent on the ground that they were private forests and were vested in the State – Draft statement by the Taluk Land Board, wherein respondent shown to hold 1576 acres of land, of which 1537 acres fell under the exempted category, and that respondent was eligible to retain the balance extent within the ceiling area; and that there was no surplus land to be surrendered to the State – High Court correctly invoked the Board’s order and held that an area of slightly over 100 hectares and 155.90 acres was forest land that vested in the State, and the rest of the 1534.40 acres land had to be treated as plantation, and thus, belonged to the respondent – High Court placed reliance on preliminary and final report by the Commissioner, draft statement of the land, respondent’s auditor’s balance sheet, agricultural income tax, sales tax return, and employees provident fund – All these materials, support the conclusions of the High Court, based on plausible (and not an unreasonable) inference of the overall analysis of the evidence on the record – Thus, the order of the High Court does not call for interference – Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949. Constitution of India: Art. 136 – Discretionary Jurisdiction – Exercise of – Held: Where two plausible views on the conclusions that can be drawn from facts on the record exist – View taken by the High Court being a plausible one, interference with the findings of the High Court is not called for.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Section 2(f)(1) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 defines “private forest”, in relation to Malabar District. Section 2(f)(1)(i) says that “private forest” means any land to which the Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 applied immediately before the appointed day, viz., 10.05.1971. It thereafter, enacts that certain lands are excluded from the definition of “private forest” falling under sub-clauses (A) to (D). Lands, which are gardens or nilams (defined in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963), are excluded from the definition of “private forest” under the Vesting Act under sub-clause (A). Likewise, lands used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market are excluded from the definition of “private forest” by reason of sub-clause (B). Explanation to Section 2(f)(1)(I)(B) further showed that lands used for the purpose of construction of office buildings, go-downs, factories, quarters for workmen, hospitals, schools and playgrounds were deemed to be lands used for purposes ancillary to the cultivation of such crops. Therefore, Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) evidences that lands used principally for cultivation of certain crops and lands used for construction of buildings for the purpose of running and maintaining a plantation are excluded from the definition of “private forest”. Under Section 3 of the Vesting Act under which private forests were to vest in the Government. [Para 29][563-D-H]
State of Kerala v Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing and Weaving Co. 1974 (1) SCR 671; Parameswara Sastrigal K.S. v. State of Kerala & Ors 2008 2 ILR 371; Bhawani Tea & Produce Co. Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors. 1991 (2) SCC 463 : [1991] 1 SCR 550; Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Ltd v. The Custodian of Vested Forests, Palghat & Anr. 1990 (Supp) SCC 785;
Malankara Rubber & Produce Co. v. State of Kerala & Ors. [1973] 1 SCR 399; State of Kerala v. Pullangode Rubber & Produce Co. Ltd. (1999) 6 SCC 92 : [1999]
3 SCR 1163 – referred to.
1.2 The State’s contention that as the respondents had mentioned in its petition that a certain area was forest (since it was so, by virtue of provisions of the Madras Act) therefore, does not preclude the latter’s contention that no vesting could take place; whether the lands were “forest” or cultivated plantations or estates, for the purposes of Section 2(f)(1)(i)(B) of the Vesting Act, especially whether they stood excluded from operation of that Act, had to be considered independently. [Para 34][567-F]
1.3 The judgment in Kunjanam Antony’s case enunciated the rule that where the Land Board arrives at a determination about the character of lands, under the KLR Act, that becomes a piece of evidence for the purposes of the Vesting Act. Therefore, it is no longer open for the State to argue that the Board’s determination or order, had little or no evidentiary value. In view of the judgments of this Court, including Popular II’s case, the enunciation of the principle that “unless a contrary state of affairs” were shown to exist, the Board’s order “would have to be given due weight” had to apply, and was correctly invoked by the High Court. [Para 35, 36][567-G; 568-D-E]
Kunjanam Antony v. State of Kerala (2003) 3 SCC 221 : [2003] 1 SCR 967; State of Kerala v. Mohammed Basheer (2019) 2 SCC 260; State of Kerala v. Popular Estates (2004) 12 SCC 434 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 943 – relied on.
1.4 The two reports: preliminary and final, filed by the Commissioner, in the first proceeding (instituted by the respondent in 1974 by two applications) were the nearest in point of time, to the appointed date. The preliminary report, (filed on 15.01.1976) discloses widespread cultivation of coffee, cardamom, rubber, areca nut, etc. The two reports are part of the record. The final report dated 12.09.1977 by the Commissioner recorded that the Forest Range Officer, after inspection stated that “only disputed portions in Bit Nos. 1 to 7 had been demarcated and that the other areas were cultivated”. The respondents contention was that this reflected the true factual position, coupled with the Range Officer’s memorandum filed before the Commissioner on 01.09.1977. [Para 37][567-F-G]
1.5 A combined reading of the materials, leads to the inference that a detailed inspection of the area took place. Only those areas that vested with the government were demarcated by the survey party, attached with the Superintendent, Land Records. It was in these circumstances that the respondent successfully urged before the High Court that what was demarcated was only 100 hectares and the others were not demarcated since they were cultivated. This was borne out by the final report. The possession with respect to 100 hectares of uncultivated forest lands was also covered by draft statement of land furnished to the Board in proceedings under the KLR Act, which was the foundation for the Board’s order dated 04.11.1980. Both these documents confirmed that 100 hectares was vested forest. The respondent had submitted that 533 acres was under cardamom cultivation; 120 acres under rubber plantation; 257 acres under coffee plantation and that 155.9 acres was forest land; and 17.5 acres of were comprised of roads and buildings. These arguments found favour with the High Court. There is no glaring error in the impugned judgment, having regard to these circumstances. [Para 38][569-A-D]
1.6 The tribunal entirely rejected the evidence of PW-1, the Forest Range Officer, who gave the memorandum to the Commissioner on 01.09.1977. The tribunal wholly discredited and brushed aside the evidence of this officer and viewed it with suspicion. This is clear from the repeated use of the phrase “magic money” suggesting that PW-1 was devious and had been bribed. A reading of his deposition shows no such suggestion to him; no material was placed on record that he was prosecuted for an offence, nor were departmental proceedings initiated, for misconduct. [Para 39][569-E]
1.7 The other materials on record-the auditor’s balance sheets, the evidence of the auditor (PW-4), the deposition of the manager of the respondent (PW-5), who had worked since 1969 onwards reinforce the respondent’s contentions that the largest part of the area was cultivation for plantation crops. The tribunal unreasonably discarded these materials. The other documents, Settlement arrived at between the respondents and its workers after closure on 25.6.1982 reveal that it had 80 permanent workers and 29 temporary workers on its rolls. Likewise, copies of income tax returns for various dates showed that income from these estates was consistently reported, along with expenditure. For the year ending on 31.3.1968 income was reported as ` 81,319; for the year ending 31.3.1969 it was ` 95,707/-; the year ending 31.3.1970 it was ` 1,12,524; and for the year ending 31.3.1971 it was ` 1,38,918. The respondent was apparently depositing agricultural income tax and employees provident fund. It had produced correspondence with these statutory authorities, as well as sales tax returns. [Para 40, 41][569-F-H; 570-A-B]
1.8 The title deeds of the predecessor-in-interest of the partners of the respondents who had acquired the lands in 1963, show that large areas were shown as cardamon plantation. The respondents had filed agricultural income returns and even in 1970, it was producing coffee, rubber and cardamom. The fact that it had some labour trouble also supported its contention that the respondents’ plantation activities were on in full scale. All these materials, support the conclusions of the High Court, which are based on plausible (and not an unreasonable) inference of the overall analysis of the evidence on the record. This court has carefully considered the findings of the High Court while setting aside the order of the tribunal. The reasons which led the High Court to conclude that the tribunal’s findings called for interference are merited and in accord with the material evidence on record. This Court is therefore of the opinion that no interference with the impugned judgment of the High Court is called for. [Para 42, 45][570-C-D; 572-A]
1.9 Where two plausible views on the conclusions that can be drawn from facts on the record exist, this Court, in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of the High Court. [Para 43][570-E]
Pritam Singh v. The State 1950 SCR 453; Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 5 SCC 1 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 494; Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214 : [2004] 1 SCR 483; Union of India v. Gangadhar Narsingdas Agarwal & Anr (1997) 10 SCC 305; Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) & Ors (2000) 5 SCC 141 : [2000] 3 SCR 1128; Taherakhatoon (D) By Lrs. v. Salambin Mohammad (1992) 2 SCC 635;
Popular Plantation v. State of Kerala 1991 Supp (2) SCC 720; State of Kerala v ACK Rajah 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 250 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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