Contempt of the Courts Act, 1971 – ss. 14, 17 – The Contempt of Courts (C.A.T) Rules, 1992 – rr. 13, 15 – Contempt Proceedings – Denial of right to trial by Tribunal – Appellant made certain submissions in his capacity as the counsel for the party before the Tribunal – Same were found to be contemptuous by the Tribunal – Charges were framed – Appellant denied charges – However, appellant was convicted by the CAT u/s. 14 of the Contempt of the Courts Act, 1971 – Appellant urged that the Tribunal had erred in denying the appellant the right to be tried for the charge leveled against him – Held: On facts, denial of a right of trial which is contemplated also u/s. 14(1)(c) of the Act as also Rule 15 of the Rules has resulted in miscarriage of justice – The procedure under the Act and in the Rules which related to adducing of evidence when there is a denial of the charge, was not followed – Therefore, impugned order set aside.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The question, however, which pointedly arises for consideration of this Court, in the facts of this case, is whether, after framing a charge, it was necessary that there should be a trial and whether the charge should be supported with any evidence. As far as the light shed by Section 14 goes, Section 14(1)(c) appears to indicate that the proceedings include taking of evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and thereafter, to determine the matter of the charge. Sub-Section (2) of Section 14 contemplates the situation where in regard to the Supreme Court or the High Court, the alleged contemnor seeks to have the matter be heard by another Judge, in which case, the application is to be allowed if the Court is of the opinion that it is practical to do so and in the interest of proper administration of justice. In such eventuality, section 14(3) contemplates that it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have committed to appear as a witness and it is sufficient if the statement of the judge is placed before the Chief Justice which is then to be treated as evidence. The Tribunal, by the impugned order, has only noticed in keeping with the charge that the appellant did make the statement in the Court that he had something to say about the Chairman which he wished to communicate to him in the chamber. This is disputed by the appellant. The charge indeed is on the lines as found by the Tribunal. But the charge was denied by the appellant. [Paras 12,
13 & 16][29-G-H; 30-A-C, G-H]
2. Therefore, this is not a case where this Court can proceed on the basis that the appellant has admitted his guilt to the charge that appellant made a statement in the open Court that he had certain things to say about the Chairman which, however, he would reveal only in the chamber. This is the crux of the matter. His version is as noticed in the counter affidavit, which he filed to the charge. It is another matter that this Court may agree with the view of the Tribunal if the appellant had indeed made the allegations against the Chairman in the form of an insinuation that he had something to say about the Chairman which he would reveal only in chamber and what is more, he maintained silence which is eloquent when he was called upon to say whatever he had to say in the open Court. If that were the position, this Court would have little difficulty in upholding the conviction. [Para 18][31-F-H; 32-A]
3. The appellant denied charges. What is more, he specifically staked the claim to have a trial conducted on the charge framed against him. No trial at all was conducted. In other words, no evidence was taken. The findings have been rendered after framing of the charge on 10.02.2020. The only day on which the case stood listed before the pronouncement of the judgment is 18.03.2020. This Court has noticed all that took place on 18.03.2020. On the said day, different submissions were made. On the one hand, the Additional Solicitor General told the Tribunal that the trial may not be necessary in view of the judgment in Leila David. The appellant, on the other hand, joined issue and insisted that the trial must be conducted. [Para 24][35-B-C]
4. In the facts of this case, denial of a right of trial which is contemplated also under Section 14(1)(c) of the Act as also Rule
15 of the Rules has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appellant must succeed. This appeal is being allowed only on the ground that the procedure under the Act and in the Rules which related to adducing of evidence when there is a denial of the charge, was not followed. This Court would undoubtedly have had no reservation in upholding the order if there was evidence to support the charge as framed against the appellant. Subject to these observations, the appeal is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. Needless to say the direction to forward the case to the Bar Council of India will also perish. The impugned order will stand set aside. [Paras
26 & 28][35-E-F, G-H; 36-A-B]
Leila David v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 337 : [2009] 15 SCR 317 - referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.