Administrative Law:
Bias – FIR against appellants (holders of licence for selling liquor) – For commission of offences under Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949 – Sealing of liquor shops of the licencees – Licencing authority by interim order directed de-sealing – The appellate authority (Commissioner State Excise) stayed the order of de-sealing – Thereafter, Licencing authority, by final order directed the licencees to pay Rs. 50,000/- as compounding fee – The appellate authority ex-parte stayed the operation of final order – Writ petition by licencees – High Court quashed the order of sealing and also the exparte stay order of the appellate authority and directed the appellate authority to decide the case on merit – High Court also made adverse remarks against the appellate authority – Appeal by the licencees taking the plea that in view of the adverse remarks against the appellate authority High Court should have transferred the case to another appellate authority – Appeal also filed by appellate authority seeking expunction of adverse remarks – Held: Licencees have failed to make out any case of bias against the appellate authority – Therefore, there is no justification in transferring the case to another appellate authority – The appeals of licencees dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000/- – Adverse remarks and strictures against the appellate authority were unnecessary in the facts of the present case, nor were they germane for deciding the lis between parties – The remarks are expunged and stand deleted from records.
Bias – Allegation of – Against quasi-judicial authority – Permissibility – Held: Plea of alleged bias is permissible in law to impugn the action/order of quasi-judicial authority – However, such plea has to be founded on substantial material – If the lis can be decided on other legal grounds, such plea should not be entertained – Every adverse order passed against a litigant is injurious to a losing party – However, that does not give a right to attack the adverse order by attributing bias against the authority.
Jurisdiction:
Jurisdiction of writ court – Held: Writ Court does not hold inquiry on disputed facts.
Adverse Remarks/Strictures:
Adverse remarks by higher judiciary – Against judicial/administrative officer while examining their action/order impugned in the judicial proceedings – Held: Higher judiciary must avoid as far as possible from making such remarks.
Judgment/Order:
Stay of order in anticipation – Propriety of – High Court while disposing of writ petition, directed appellate authority to decide the appeals on merit – Also directed that if the appellate authority passed the order adverse to the writ petitioners, such orders were not to take effect for a particular period – Held: A Court can stay or quash only these orders which are impugned in the lis before it – Court cannot stay or quash the orders in anticipation – Such order is interference with the judicial independence of an appellate authority – It is only after the order is passed, the aggrieved has legal right to take recourse to legal remedy.
Disposing of the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The High Court has rightly declined to transfer the pending appeals from the Commissioner State Excise to any other Commissioner State Excise or any other competent appellate authority under the Act. [Para 36][322-B]
1.2 The reasoning assigned by the Courts to strike down or uphold the action/order impugned in the lis must always be confined to legal grounds, and none else. There was, therefore, no need nor any occasion, much less necessity for the High Court to have travelled beyond their legal reasoning assigned and made adverse remarks, and pass strictures against the appellate authority i.e. the Commissioner State Excise and direct her to act and behave in a particular manner in discharge of her duties and dealing with the case. [Para 37][322-C-D]
1.3 The Commissioner State Excise being an appellate authority under the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, 1949 had exercised the appellate powers and had passed an ex-parte interim stay order. The exercise of such appellate power was required to be tested only in the light of relevant legal parameters and not beyond it. [Para 38][322-E]
1.4 Merely because the writ petitioners made allegations of personal bias to impugn the orders, apart from raising legal grounds, the High Court ought to have seen as to whether in the facts of the case, it was really necessary to examine the plea of “bias” for striking down the impugned orders, and, if so, whether there is adequate material to sustain such a plea. The plea of bias, as is clear from the pleadings, was founded essentially on an inference, which the Writ Petitioners were trying to draw by pointing out the manner in which the Commissioner State Excise is alleged to have issued some oral directions to her subordinates and had passed two ex-parte interim stay orders in the appeals against the appellants in relation to the subject-matter. [Paras 39-40][322-F-G]
1.5 A litigant in order to seek relief in a court of law is entitled to raise several grounds. These grounds are usually based on facts and law governing the subject, out of which, some are relevant and some are vexatious. It is for the Court to decide as to which ground is legally tenable, and it be made the basis to decide the lis between the parties one way or the other. [Para 41][322-H; 323-A]
1.6 Every adverse order passed against a litigant is injurious to a losing party. However, that does not give him a right to attack the adverse order by attributing bias against authority/Court qua him. An adverse order, if it is found bad in law, is liable to be set-aside on legal grounds. However, when there is also an allegation of bias, it has to be supported by adequate substantial material. [Para 45][325-D-E]
1.7 The plea of alleged “bias” against the appellate authority is a plea permissible in law to impugn the action/order. However, such a plea has to be founded on substantial material qua the officer concerned who acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. If the lis can be decided on other legal grounds, such plea should not be entertained, much less upheld. [Paras 43, 44][325-C-D]
1.8 The writ court does not hold an inquiry on disputed facts. Such issues, could be decided properly and in accordance with law by a fact finding body where the parties would have got an opportunity to lead evidence and explain the reasons. The High Court should have refrained from recording any finding, much less make adverse remarks against the Commissioner State Excise and her subordinates. [Paras 52, 53][324-C]
1.9 Since the two impugned interim orders passed by the Inspector Excise and the Commissioner State Excise were otherwise held legally unsustainable, and set-aside by the High Court on other grounds, there was no need to go into the question of “bias” and “oral instructions”. [Para 54][324-D]
1.10 An appellate authority/Court is empowered in law to grant or refuse ex-parte stay, or/and set aside or/and affirm the order impugned in the appeal. In such an eventuality, an aggrieved person, in the first instance, has a remedy to apply to the same appellate authority/Court for setting aside the ex-parte grant of interim stay passed against him, or approach to the higher judicial fora to challenge its legality. The appellate authority or higher forum is empowered to either vacate the interim stay or continue or modify as the case may require. It depends upon the nature of reliefs claimed, injury pleaded, urgency shown, damage likely to suffer if the ex-parte interim stay is not granted etc. It would, therefore, vary from facts of each case. [Para 56][324-F-G]
1.11 There is no material to infer the existence of bias against the Commissioner State Excise, except placing reliance on the manner in which she passed the ex-parte interim orders and oral instructions against the appellants. [Para 57][324-H; 325-A]
1.12 Merely because some observations were made by the High Court in the past in some other case against the Commissioner State Excise, when she was holding a different post, can hardly be a ground to sustain a plea of bias qua the appellants. The case relied on was entirely a different case and is still pending in appeal before this Court. [Para 60][325-D]
1.13 The appellants (writ petitioners) have failed to make out any case of bias against the Commissioner State Excise qua them. In this situation there is no justification in transferring of the pending appeals from the Board of the Commissioner State Excise to any other appellate authority. Their appeals thus fail and are dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000/- payable to the State of Maharashtra. [Paras 61, 62][325-E-F]
2. The higher judiciary must avoid as far as possible from making any disparaging harsh remarks and strictures against any judicial/administrative officer while examining their action/order impugned in the judicial proceedings. The disparaging remarks/strictures coupled with the directions of how one should behave and pass orders was unnecessary in the facts of the present case, and nor they were germane for deciding the lis between the parties. Such remarks/strictures, therefore, should not have been made. All the adverse and disparaging remarks made, and strictures passed by the High Court against the Commissioner State Excise are expunged. [Paras 65, 68][326-B; 327-B] Awani Kumar Upadhyay v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 392 : [2013] 3
SCR 416 – relied on.
3.1 The High Court while disposing of the Writ Petitions and directing Commissioner State Excise to decide the appeals on merit also directed that in the event she passed any orders adverse to the writ petitions then such orders shall not take effect for a period of four weeks from the date they were communicated to the writ petitioners. The High Court ought not to have issued directions of this nature. [Paras 71, 72][327-D, 328-A-B]
3.2 The High Court by issuing such directions which are essentially passed in anticipation of the order being passed by an appellate authority, interfered with the judicial independence of an appellate authority in deciding the appeals in accordance with law. It is the sole discretion of the appellate authority under the Act to decide the appeal based on the facts involved in the appeal, and legal provisions which eventually result in passing a judicial order. It is only after the order is passed, that the aggrieved person has a legal right to take recourse to a legal remedy available in law against such order by approaching to a higher forum and pray for grant of appropriate relief against such order. The Court can stay or quash only those orders, which are impugned in the lis before it. A fortiori, the Court cannot stay or/and quash the orders in anticipation, before they are passed. Therefore, such writ/directions issued by the High Court, cannot be upheld. [Paras 72, 73 and 74][328-A-E]
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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