Council of Architecture vs Mr. Mukesh Goyal & Ors.

Architects Act, 1972 – Whether a Government Post titled or styled using the term ‘Architect’ can be held by individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture – The High Court held that the ‘mere nomenclature’ of a particular post will not violate the prohibition on the use of ‘title and style’ of architect u/s. 37 – On appeal, held: s.37 prohibits unregistered individuals from designating themselves or referring to themselves as ‘Architects’ – If a Government Post is titled ‘Architect’ or ‘Associate Architect’, such a person certainly uses the title and style of ‘Architect’ and consequently there is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by the Act – To promote an individual who does not possess a degree in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled ‘Architect’, ‘Associate Architect’ or of a similar style using the title or style of ‘Architect’ would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of title contained in s. 37 of the Architects Act – The text of s.37 makes no distinction between government employees and private individuals – Thus, authorities cannot promote or recruit individuals who do not hold a degree in architecture recognised by the Architects Act to a post that uses the title or style of ‘Architect’ – The view of the High Court is disapproved.

Interpretation of Statutes – The first and best method of determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen by the legislature to have the force of law – In other words, the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute itself – However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole.

Delegated Legislation – Primary Legislation – It is well established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra vires other primary legislation – Where the provisions of a primary legislation (The Architect Act, 1972) are contradictory to the provisions of a delegated legislation (The Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail.

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. Does Section 37 of the Architects Act prohibit individuals not registered as architects under the Architects Act from practicing the activities undertaken by architects, including the design, supervision and construction of buildings.

1.1 The text of Section 37 uses the phrase “no person shall … use the title and style of architect”. Therefore, on a plain reading of the section, the legal prohibition created is on the use of the “title and style of architect”. Title and style are distinct from practice. While a prohibition on the use of a title merely restricts an individual from attaching the said title to their name in referring to or representing themselves to others, a prohibition on practice creates a bar on the actual undertaking of specific actions. The most compelling evidence that the two concepts are materially distinct is the varied usage of the two phrases by the legislature. [Para 26][912-F-H]

1.2 In making a distinction between individuals registered under the statute and those not registered, the Advocates Act clearly stipulates that unregistered individuals cannot “practice” the profession of law. This stands in stark contrast to the text of the Architects Act which merely states that unregistered individuals cannot “use the title and style of architect”. Therefore, a plain reading of Section 37 clearly supports the proposition that the Architects Act prohibits individuals not registered with the Council of Architecture from using the title and style of “Architect” and does not prohibit unregistered individuals from practicing the activities undertaken by architects such as the design, supervision and construction of buildings. [Para 26][933D-F]

1.3 It is well settled that the first and best method of determining the intention of the legislature is the very words chosen by the legislature to have the force of law. In other words, the intention of the legislature is best evidenced by the text of the statute itself. However, where a plain reading of the text of the statute leads to an absurd or unreasonable meaning, the text of the statute must be construed in light of the object and purpose with which the legislature enacted the statute as a whole. Where it is contended that a particular interpretation would lead to defeating the very object of a legislation, such an interpretative outcome would clearly be absurd or unreasonable. [Para 28][934B-D]

1.4 The legislature created two classes of individuals: the first class consisted of registered architects satisfying these minimum qualifications and a second class of unregistered individuals who did not satisfy these minimum qualifications. This is the effect of Sections 2(a), 17, 23 and 35 of the Architects Act. Crucially, the legislature chose to define an “architect” as an individual registered under the Architects Act and not as an individual practicing architecture or any cognate activities. Thus, the legislature limited the regulatory regime created by the Architects Act to the first class of individuals. In protecting the public from the risk of the second class, untrained individuals, the legislature had two options: first it could bar this second class of individuals from engaging in the profession altogether (as it had done with physicians and advocates); or alternatively it could prevent this second class of individuals from calling themselves “Architects”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that the legislature chose the second option and in fact went to great lengths to clarify that choice. The legislature stated that with the passing of the legislation, it shall be unlawful for an unregistered individual to “designate himself” as an architect. Further, it is expressly stated that the legislation protects the “title” of architect but does not grant registered architects an exclusive right to undertake the design, supervision and construction of buildings. Other cognate professions or unregistered individuals may continue to carry out these activities provided that they do not refer to themselves as “Architects”. [Para 29][935-E-H][936-A]

1.5 It is evident that the legislature did not intend to create a prohibition on the practice of architecture and associated activities by unregistered individuals. As opposed to the case of physicians or surgeons under the Indian Medical Council Act or advocates under the Advocates Act, the legislature consciously chose to employ a less stringent measure in the case of architects, merely prohibiting unregistered individuals from using the “title and style” of architect. It is not for this Court to delve into why the legislature made this choice. [Para 30][936-B-C]

1.6 Architecture undoubtedly constitutes a highly specialised profession requiring the possession of minimum educational qualifications. However, architects are by and large engaged by means of a contract for services. In other words, architects provide a set of specialised services towards the larger goal of construction. Architects are not embarking on construction independently of other actors. By virtue of the Architects Act, anybody engaging the services of an individual calling themselves an “Architect” is assured that such an individual possesses statutorily recognised educational qualifications and is competent to complete the task at hand. It is in this manner that the legislature protects the common person from untrained individuals. [Para 32][937-C-E]

2. Whether a post titled “Architect”, “Associate architect” or any other similar title using the term or style of “Architect” can be held by a person not registered as an architect under the Architects Act.

2.1. If an individual is appointed to a post titled “Associate Architect”, “Architect” or “Senior Architect”, they undoubtedly refer to themselves and are referred to by others as “Architects”. Holding a post using the term “Architect” has the real-world consequence of being referred to as an architect. This is not a matter of mere nomenclature. As architecture is a specialised field of study. Crucially, the scheme of the Architects Act provides a direct nexus between the minimum educational qualifications required to be obtained, registration as an architect under the Act and the prohibition against the use of the title of “Architect” by those not registered under the Act. If a government post is titled “Architect” or “Associate Architect”, such a person certainly uses the title and style of “architect” and consequently there is a reasonable assumption that such a person is registered under the Architects Act and holds a degree in architecture recognised by the Act. This assumption finds statutory backing in Section 35 of the Architects Act which provides that any reference to an architect in any other law shall be deemed to mean an architect registered under the Architects Act. To promote an individual who does not possess a degree in architecture recognised by the Act to a post titled “Architect”, “Associate Architect” or of a similar style using the title or style of “architect” would effectively violate the prohibition on the use of title contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act. [Para 36][938D-H]

2.2. In the present case, this Court recognises the power of NOIDA to provide and modify the minimum eligibility criteria for promotion of candidates to the posts of Associate Town Planner and Associate Architect. This Court further recognises that the authority has significant discretion in how it chooses to title the various posts under its supervision. However, to permit NOIDA to continue to title a post that includes individuals who are not registered architects under the Architects Act as “Associate Architect” would result in a violation of Section 37 of the Architects Act. In the case of Tulya Gogoi the High Court of Gauhati expressly held that the prohibition on the use of title and style of architect contained in Section 37 of the Architects Act applies to both private individuals and government employees. The reasoning of the High Court on this issue commends itself for our acceptance. The text of Section 37 makes no distinction between government employees and private individuals. [Para 37][939-A-C]

3. The U.P. Industrial Area Development Act provides NOIDA with the power to make rules for the management of its internal affairs. In exercise of this power, NOIDA formulated the Service Regulations of 1981. Rule 16 of the Service Regulations sets out the ‘Sources of Recruitment’ for posts under NOIDA’s authority. By clause (iv) of Rule 16 NOIDA has the power to modify the sources of recruitment for posts under its supervision. It is in exercise of this power that NOIDA formulated the Promotion Policy of 2005 which sets out the sources and qualifications for recruitment in its various departments. It is well established that delegated legislation is susceptible to invalidity on the grounds of being ultra vires its parent legislation but also ultra vires other primary legislation. Where the provisions of a primary legislation (the Architects Act) are contradictory to the provisions of a delegated legislation (the Promotion Policy 2005), the provisions of the primary legislation must prevail. This principle is well established and has received articulation by this Court on several occasions. [Para 38][939-C-F]

Tulya Gogoi v. Association of Architects (1999) 3 Gau LR 179 – approved.

Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 : [1985] 2 SCR 287 – relied on.

Mukesh Kumar Manhar v. Sri Ram Singh Ahirwar 2006

(1) MPLJ 238; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kumar Bhardwaj (1980) 18 DLT 283; Om Prakash

Mittal v. Council of Architecture AIR 1983 Del 223; Premendra Raj Mehta v. National Building Construction Corporation Limited (W.P. (C) 2106 / 2012 in the High Court of Delhi); Sudhir Vohra v. Registrar of Companies (W.P. (C) 934/2012 and C.M. No. 18315/2014 in the High Court of Delhi); Council of Architecture v. Manohar Krishnaji Ranade (2020) 16 SCC 476;

Council of Architecture v. Indian Institute of Architects (2020) 16 SCC 475 – referred to.