Chandra Prakash Mishra vs Flipkart India Private Limited & Ors.

1.2 Even when all the findings of the High Court in the principal part of order dated 29.02.2016 are accepted, they would only lead to the result that the impugned actions in drawing up ex parte assessment orders and then seeking to enforce recovery as also the impugned action in rejecting the application for registration of change of place of business did not meet with the approval of the High Court. Such disapproval of the High Court had been essentially based on its interpretation of the applicable rules as also its analysis of the factual aspects concerning the issues involved in the writ petition. [Para 12][889-F-H]

1.3 Having examined the matter in its totality, even if the High Court found that the impugned actions of the authorities concerned, particularly of the appellant, had not been strictly in conformity with law or were irregular or were illegal or even perverse, such findings, by themselves, were not leading to an inference as corollary that there had been any deliberate action or omission on the part of the Assessing Authority or the Registering Authority; or that any ‘tactics’ were adopted, as per the expression employed by the High Court. Every erroneous, illegal or even perverse order/action, by itself, cannot be termed as wanting in good faith or suffering from malafide. [Para 13][889H; 890-A-B]

1.4 In the instant case, when admittedly the respondent No. 1 itself had applied for registration of the change of place of business nearly 11 months after the alleged event; and at the time of drawing up the assessment orders, the appellant as the Assessing Authority had no other registered address of the respondent No. 1 on record, his actions of passing ex parte assessment orders could not have been termed as being deliberate or wanting in good faith, particularly in view of the facts that attempts were indeed made from his office to get the notices served on the respondent No. 1 at its registered address and even at its alleged changed address at Ghaziabad. Even if such attempts, of serving notices, were held to be illegal or irregular by the High Court, its deduction that the impugned actions were deliberate or lacking in good faith is difficult to be endorsed. [Para 14][890-C-E]

1.5 The appellant, while functioning as an Assessing Authority could not have kept the assessment proceedings pending for an indefinite length of time. The facts relating to shortcomings on the part of the respondent No. 1 in first of all not seeking registration of the changed business address for nearly 11 months and then, rejection of its belatedly made prayer by the competent authority (not the appellant) cannot be ignored altogether. [Para 14.1][890-E-F]

1.6 What has been observed with necessary variations, would equally apply to the later order dated 04.05.2016 passed by the appellant, in his capacity as the Assessing Authority. Though, in the face of the order dated 29.02.2016, the appellant could have waited for consideration of the application for change of address, as directed by the High Court or could have taken instructions from the Commissioner but, in any case, even such mistakes or errors or omissions on his part cannot be considered as carrying the elements of malice or want of good faith. [Para 15][890-F-H]

1.7 For imputing motives and drawing inference about want of good faith in any person, particularly a statutory authority, something more than mere error or fault ought to exist. Nothing concrete is available on record to impute motives in the appellant, even if his actions/omissions while functioning as Assessing Authority otherwise called for disapproval. [Para 16][891-A-B]

1.8 In the questioned parts of the impugned orders, the High Court seems to have taken rather a sterner view of the matter, which was not required in the given set of facts and circumstances. Noticeably, the appellant was not impleaded personally a party in the first two writ petitions which were decided by the common order. The comments or remarks which were to operate personally against the appellant were not even called for without the appellant having been joined personally a party and having been extended an opportunity of hearing and explanation. In the third writ petition, though the appellant was personally joined as a party-respondent, when he had withdrawn the order dated 04.05.2016 immediately after registration of changed address by the registering authority and had tendered an apology before the High Court, the matter could have been closed at that; and there was no necessity of stretching the matter too far and passing further orders for imposition of costs and for departmental actions with other comments regarding competence of the appellant to discharge quasi-judicial functions. Having said that, it is appropriate to close this matter with annulment of strictures and observations against the appellant in both the impugned orders. [Para 17] [891-B-F]

1.9 As regards the amount of costs, the fair stand taken on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is appreciated. Having regard to the circumstances, it is deemed appropriate and hence it is ordered that the said amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- to be deposited by the respondent No. 1 with the Uttar Pradesh State Legal Services Authority. The remarks and observations against the appellant in the impugned orders are expunged; and the questioned parts of the impugned orders, are annulled and set aside. Any action taken or in contemplation pursuant to the said parts of the impugned orders are also rendered redundant. [Paras 18-20][891F-G; 892-A-B] V.K. Jain v. High Court of Delhi (2008) 17 SCC 538 : [2009] 11 SCR 907 – referred to.