Service Law:
Termination of service – On account of finding irregularities in the selection process of the employees including that of the respondent – One of the terminated candidates was granted relief of continuation of his service – Thereafter respondent filed writ petition challenging termination of his service – Writ Petition was allowed by Single Judge of High Court holding that the respondent’s case was squarely covered by the case of the other employee who was granted relief by the Court – Special appeal by the employer was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Termination order cannot be said to be nonreasoned – Termination order of the respondent could not have been set aside drawing parity from the case of another employee, as the case of another employee was decided on equitable grounds – Equity acts in personam and not in rem – Equity. Limitation:
Limitation in filing writ petitions – Held: Limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings u/Ars. 32 or 226 of the Constitution – However, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time – Writ Courts ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to foster – However, such principles do not apply to the judgments delivered in-rem – In the present case, the judgment granting relief to the other employee in setting aside his termination order, does not have the ingredient of a judgment inrem, hence cannot come to respondent’s rescue. Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. The impugned order of the High Court is legally untenable. The Division Bench’s finding that “no reason has been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the respondent”, is vividly erroneous. Termination of another candidate was held legal only on account of pending litigation and interim directions of courts that he had spent 17 years in employment of UPPCL-employer. Paying heed to these equitable considerations, and not as a matter of any legal right, the High Court had urged the employer to sympathetically consider the case of that employee for retention in employment. This conclusion of the High Court has undoubtedly attained finality. Whereas that employee had remained in service for over seventeen years (except a brief period between August to November in 1978) and had fought his case tooth and nail, the respondent has not been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978. The fact-situation in that case was unique and altogether different from that of the respondent and there arises no reason to seek or grant parity. Even otherwise, it is a settled canon of common law that equity acts in personam and not in rem. Hence, there could be no extension of parity between them. [Paras 10, 11, 12 and 13][519-D-F; 520-A-E]
2.1 Services of the respondent were terminated within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the respondent made a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990). The prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. [Para 14][520-F-G]
2.2 Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence-sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. These principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in-rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected in such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. The order passed by the High Court for retention of another employee in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in-rem. The above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the respondent’s rescue. It has neither been pleaded nor is it apparent from the material on record that the respondent was unable to approach the court-of-law in time, on account of any social or financial disability. Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. [Paras 16, 18 and 19][521-E-G; 522-E; 523G-H; 524-A] State of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava (2015) 1 SCC 347 : [2014] 12 SCR 193 – relied on. P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 152 : [1975] 2 SCR 356; SS Balu v. State of Kerala (2009) 2 SCC 479 : [2009] 1 SCR 196; Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India (2012) 7 SCC 610 : [2012] 6 SCR 128 – referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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