Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Properties Act, 1952:
Requisition under – Continuation of occupation of the Union Government, even after lapse of the Act – Refusal to hand back the possession – High Court by impugned order despite holding that the Union claim has no merit, did not issue any direction to release the lands in question – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: Acquisition under the Act is temporary – State’s occupation ceased to be lawful, with the lapse of the Act in the year 1987 – Right to property though not fundamental, is a valuable constitutional right ensuring guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty – Court’s role is to act as the guarantor and protector of the people’s liberties – It is not open to the State to claim that the law or the Constitution can be ignored or complied at its convenience – Permitting the State to assert its indefinite or overriding right to continue occupying one’s property, bereft of lawful sanction, would be condoning lawlessness – The State is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to the appellants.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The legal effect of requisitioning immovable property is that temporarily- i.e. for the period the requisition order is in operation, the owner loses her possessory rights, even though the title remains undisturbed. Since the deprivation of possession is through authority of law, in keeping with fair procedure, the law (in this case, the Requisitioning Act) provides for payment of compensation in accordance with predetermined principles. Yet, the taking of property by definition is finite: it cannot result in expropriation or deprivation of title altogether, unless another process for acquiring it, is initiated. [Para 18][989B-D] Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra (1994)
4 SCC 192 : [1994] 3 SCR 746 – followed.
Rajendra Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P (1997) 4 SCC
511 : [1997] 1 SCR 1056 – relied on.
2. Although the right to property is not a fundamental right protected under Part III of the Constitution of India, it remains a valuable constitutional right. The decisions of this court, and the history of the right to property show that though its pre-eminence as a fundamental right has been undermined, nevertheless, the essence of the rule of law protects it. The evolving jurisprudence of this court also underlines that it is a valuable right ensuring guaranteed freedoms and economic liberty. The phrasing of Article 300-A is determinative and its resemblance with Articles
21 and 265 cannot be overlooked- they in effect, are a guarantee of the supremacy of the rule of law, no less. [Paras 21 and 26][993B; 998-B-C] Delhi Airtech Services Pvt Ltd v. State of U.P (2011) 9 SCC 354 : [2011] 12 SCR 191; State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata (2005) 12 SCC 77 : [2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 1; K. T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2011) 9 SCC 1 : [2011] 13 SCR 636; T. Vijayalakshmi v. Town Planning Member (2006) 8 SCC 502 : [2006]
7 Suppl. SCR 534; D. B. Basnett v. Land Acquisition Officer (2020) 4 SCC 572; State of U.P. v. Manohar (2005) 2 SCC 126 : [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 911;
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517; Shrirampur Municipal Council v. Satyabhamabai Bhimaji Dawkher, (2013) 5 SCC 627 : [2013] 2 SCR
664 – relied on.
Chairman, Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. (2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6 SCR 799; Ramchandra Ravindra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal Corporation (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9 SCR 373; M. C. Mehta v Union of India (2020) SCC Online (SC) 658 – referred to.
3. It is not open to the State: in any of its forms (Executive, State Agencies or Legislature) to claim that the law – or the Constitution can be ignored, or complied at its convenience. [Para 26][998-B]
Superintendent Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Corpn. of Calcutta [1967] 2 SCR 170 – relied on. Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta [1961] 1 SCR 158 – stood overruled.
4. The Union asserted that it had acquired at least some parts of the suit lands; these were examined by the High Court on two occasions, and in arbitration proceedings under the Requisitioning Act, on three occasions. Each time, the factual findings went against the Union. The Union’s occupation ceased to be lawful, with the lapse of the Requisitioning Act, in 1987. Yet, it has implacably refused to hand back possession, each time asserting that it has some manner of rights over it. The High Court, while noticing that the Union’s claim had no merits (in both its appeal, which was dismissed, as well as in the impugned judgment, disposing of the writ petition), nevertheless refused to issue any direction for the release of the suit lands. The rationale given was that the adjoining areas had been acquired and were used by the Union for defense purposes. The impugned judgment granted indefinite time to the Union to take steps to acquire the suit lands. The Union has not chosen to do so these last 12 years. These facts paint a stark, even sordid picture. [Para 24][996-F-H; 997-A]
5. To permit the State: whether the Union or any State Government to assert that it has an indefinite or overriding right to continue occupying one’s property (bereft of lawful sanction)– whatever be the pretext, is no less than condoning lawlessness. The courts’ role is to act as the guarantor and zealous protector of the people’s liberties: be they assured through the freedoms, and the right to equality and religion or cultural rights under Part III, or the right against deprivation, in any form, through any process other than law. Any condonation by the court is a validation of such unlawful executive behavior which it then can justify its conduct on the anvil of some loftier purpose, at any future time-aptly described as a “loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” [Para 26][998-C-F]
Korematsu v. United States 323 US 214 (1944) – referred to.
6. The impugned judgment committed an error in refusing relief to the appellants. 33 years (based upon cessation of the Union’s legal possession) is a long enough time, even in India, to be kept away from one’s property. The respondent Union is directed to hand back possession of the suit lands to the appellants, within three months. Furthermore, it is open to the appellants to seek compensation based on fresh fixation of capital value and recurring annual value, based on the different fiveyear periods for the last 20 years. Such a claim shall be referred to arbitration, within four weeks of receipt of the reference. The arbitrator shall proceed to pronounce the award within six months of receipt of the reference. This is independent of the Union’s obligation to vacate and hand over peaceful possession of the suit lands within three months. [Para 27][999-A-C] Special Military Estates Officer v. Munivenkataramiah and Anr. [1990] 1 SCR 4; Union of India v. B. M. Krishnamurthy 1995 (4) KarLJ 607; Vidya Devi v. State of H.P. (2020) 2 SCC 569; State of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar (2013) 1 SCC 353 : [2012] 13 SCR 29 –
referred to.
As published in the Supreme Court Reports, Supreme Court of India. Text from the Indian Supreme Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs), CC BY 4.0.
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