Assa Singh (D) by Lrs. vs Shanti Parshad (D) by Lrs. & Others

HELD: 1.1 The Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 received the assent of the President on 15.04.1953. The Act went on to introduce the concept of permissible area, which was defined in the Act. It further provided for protection of the tenant from being evicted except in certain circumstances. [Para 15][1176-A-B]

1.2 The submission of the respondent, who successfully instituted the Suit in question and prosecuted the same, is that the bar on the Section 25 will not apply, having regard to the fact that there is a dispute relating to the very existence of landlordtenant relationship; and that the ouster of the Civil Court’s jurisdiction does not apply in view of the fact that plaintiff-tenant does not admit that the appellants are his landlords. Such a question cannot be decided by the Authority in an action under Section 14A of the Act. Equally, the incompetency is applicable to the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Body, viz., the Collector and the Commissioner. In fact, the Financial Commissioner rightly opined that it is a matter for consideration by a Civil Court. [Para 21][1178-C-E]

1.3 The application for ejectment was filed by the appellants claiming to have purchased the rights of the previous landlord by way of sale deed. The dispute was whether the Mandir was the owner and the Mahant was competent in his own rights to convey the rights of the land owner. The Assistant Collector, Collector and the Commissioner repelled the contention of the respondenttenant, by holding that in view of the transfer by the sale deed dated 16.11.1956 by the Mahant, the appellants became landlords, competent to eject the respondent-tenant. The findings of the Civil Courts, on the other hand, is that the respondent-tenant has never paid rent and attorned to the appellants and the Mandir was the owner and no rights were conveyed to the appellants under the sale. [Para 22][1178-E-G]

2.1 Section 14A of the Act provides that the Assistant Collector is to proceed as provided for in sub section 2 of Section

10 of the Act and the provisions of sub section 3 of Section 10 was to apply in relation to such application. Section 10 (2) declares that on the receipt of an application the Assistant Collector after giving to the parties notice in writing and the reasonable opportunity to be heard determine the dispute summarily and shall keep a memorandum of evidence and a gist of his final order with brief reasons therefor. Section 10 (3) on the other hand provides that when an application has been made which in the context of Section 14A must be read as an application under Section 14A, any proceeding in relation to the same matter pending in any other court or before any other authority shall be stayed on receipt of information by that court or authority from the Assistant Collector that he has received an application under Section 14A. The effect of Section 10 (3) further would be that all proceedings in a court or before any authority shall lapse when the dispute has been determined by the Assistant Collector acting under the Act.There are two aspects which emerge. The first aspect is that the Assistant Collector acting under Section 14A read with Section 10 (2) must give a reasonable opportunity to the tenant and determine the dispute summarily. This is an important pointer to the nature of the power which is exercised by the Assistant Collector. In a case of a dispute raised by the tenant about the very existence of the landlord-tenant relationship, in a provision which contemplates evicting a person who is the tenant, the duty to render a summary decision appears incongruous with the imperative need for the authority to be able to unravel the many dimensions of a dispute which is genuinely raised by the tenant about there being a landlord-tenant relationship. In other words what is to be rendered is a summary decision and justice would neither be done to the nature of the power enjoyed by the Assistant Collector nor to the right of a party to seek redress in a Civil Court otherwise, unless the power of the Civil Court is preserved. [Paras 46-48][1196-C, F-H; 1197-A-D]

Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC

547:[1962] SCR 673 – referred to.

2.2 The other aspect which emerges is that Section 10(3) which contemplates proceedings in relation to the same matter in any other court or authority being stayed, when such court or authority is informed by the Assistant Collector of having received an application under Section 14A read with Section 10. The law giver has however provided that the Assistant Collector must proceed with the application but determine the dispute summarily. Upon the dispute being determined by the Assistant Collector the proceedings which were stayed by the court or any other authority would lapse. This sub section gives the impression that the powers of the Assistant Collector are meant to be exhaustive. [Para 49][1197-E-F]

2.3 An application for ejectment of a tenant is to be made before the Assistant Collector under Section 14A. Such an application is to be decided after giving notice and it is to be decided summarily. Since the exclusive power to decide the application to evict the tenant has been conferred on the Assistant Collector, the law giver has further contemplated that after receipt of such an application by the Assistant Collector no other court or authority is to proceed with ‘any case relating to the same matter’ upon being informed by the Assistant Collector of the receipt of the application under Section 14A. What is more such proceeding is to lapse after the determination of the dispute by the Assistant Collector. The law giver no doubt does contemplate an exclusive and expeditious remedy for the landlord to seek eviction brooking no over lapping of jurisdiction by exercise of power by any other court or authority on a parallel basis. However, this provision cannot mean that when the very existence landlordtenant relationship is brought under a cloud by the tenant raising a dispute then the very premise on which the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Assistant Collector is not overturned. In other words, the law giver has proceeded on the basis that the Assistant Collector is clothed with the power to decide a matter relating to eviction in a summary fashion. This would be inconsistent with scenario where the very existence of the landlord-tenant relationship is disputed. The law giver in other words proceeds on an assumption that the application made by the landlord is against a person who is indeed the tenant. [Para 50][1197-G-H; 1198-A-D]

2.4 What is contemplated is that during the pendency of the proceeding before the Assistant Collector even a suit in a civil court where the title of the landlord is questioned or in other words there is a challenge thrown to the very existence of the landlord-tenant relationship is not permitted. Even in such a scenario after the conclusion of the proceeding, in the light of the decisions of this court starting with Magiti Sasamal’s case, Raja Durga Singh’s case and Richpal Singh’s case, would apply and the bar under Section 25 would not available. The Civil Court would have the power in a case where without it being a frivolous challenge to the landlord tenant-relationship, in a genuine dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship, the orders passed by the authorities under the Act can be found to be null and void for the reason that transgressing the power conferred, the authorities proceed to decide the matter, (which again it must be remembered under Section 10 (2) is to be a summary decision) which is the vexed issue relating to the very existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. [Para 51][1198-D-G]

Magiti Sasamal v. Pandab Bissoi AIR 1962 SC 547 : [1962] SCR 673; Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others AIR 1963 SC 361 : [1963] SCR 693; Richpal Singh and others v. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 : [1988] 1 SCR 93 – referred to.

2.5 The words used in Section 25 of the Act, is that except in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the validity of any proceeding or Order, taken or made under the Act, cannot be questioned in any Court or before any other Authority. In other words, an Order passed under Section 14A, could be challenged by way of an Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in the Tenancy Act, adverted to in Section 24 of the Act. This explained, the question perseveres, however, as to whether the validity of proceeding or Order passed, is beyond challenge in a Civil Court, under circumstances analogous to that obtaining, with reference to a proceeding under Section 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act. In other words, Section 77 of the Tenancy Act, inter alia, provided for seeking eviction of a tenant before the Revenue Officer. Section 14A of the Act, similarly, confers powers upon the Revenue Officer, to entertain an application for evicting a tenant. [Para 52][1198-G-H; 1199-A-C]

Amar Singh and others v. Dalip (1981) ILR 3 P&H

582 – referred to

2.6 The principles relating to exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction are well-settled. Ouster of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not readily inferred. In the scheme of the Tenancy Act also, an Order under Section 77 could be subjected to Appeal, Review and Revision, as provided in the Act. Section 77(3) of the Tenancy Act, purported to confer exclusive power on the Revenue Court to decide certain disputes and ousted jurisdiction of courts. This included the proceeding to evict the tenant. In other words, Civil Court could not entertain the application to evict a tenant. It is in this statutory framework that this Court has stated the view that if a landlord-tenant relationship is disputed, despite the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Revenue Court, to even Order eviction of a tenant, the Civil Court would still retain jurisdiction in a case where there is a dispute relating to landlord-tenant relationship. The Act was enacted in 1953. Section 14A of the Act, provided for the eviction of a tenant notwithstanding anything contained in any other law. Therefore, apart from the fact that it became an exhaustive catalogue of circumstances, entitling the landlord to launch proceedings for eviction and also further designating the Statutory Authority, before which, it could be filed, it provided for a bar to challenge the validity of the orders passed, except by way of the remedies provided under the Tenancy Act. There would not be any justification for revisiting the principle laid down that when the relationship between landlord and tenant is contested, the Civil Court continue to have the jurisdiction despite the bar under Section 25 of the Act. There is no reason to hold that the validity of the Order passed by the Assistant Collector, as may be upheld in Appeal, Review or Revision, cannot be questioned in a Civil Court, if the expression “validity” is conflated with legality. In other words, if an Order is illegal, it would be invalid. The illegality of an Order can arise out of various causes. An Order may be illegal, and therefore, invalid, on the ground that the Author of the Order, in this case, the Authorities designated under Section 14A, did not have the power to decide the issue. In this case, the concern is with illegality due to absence of power. This Court is not called upon to decide the position, where the Authority, under the Act, violates the fundamental procedure relating to natural justice and the Civil Court is invited to sit in Judgment over the same. It is found that the expression “validity of the decision or the Order” in Section 25 of the Act, would not include a case where, despite a dispute projected, that there was no landlordtenant relationship, the Authority decides the said issue in the course of the Order of Eviction, under Section 14A, after brushing aside the tenant’s objection relating to his position, viz., that he is not a tenant. In such a situation, the validity is tied-up with the fundamental aspect of absence of power of the Authority to decide on the question of landlord-tenant relationship. Therefore, the validity of the orders under Section 14A is open to scrutiny in a Civil Court, in a situation, when the tenant denies and disputes the case of the landlord that there is a landlord-tenant relationship. However, a mere plea by the tenant, should not lead, without anything more, to render the Authorities helpless and bereft of power to order eviction. In a situation, where, the Authority finds the plea of the tenant to be completely frivolous and mere attempt at blocking the proceedings, the validity enacted under Section 25, cannot be diluted. The position must be understood as that the power to decide, cannot be assigned to the Authorities under the Act, of the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship. [Para 53][1199-C-H; 1200-A-F]

3. The case of the appellants is that of failure to pay rent by the respondent-tenant. The tenant claims to be a tenant under the Mandir, which has been found to be the owner of the property. Appellants claim under an assignment made by the Mahant, who has been found to be without Authority to convey any right to the appellants. In such circumstances, the submission of the appellants is meritless. [Paras 54, 55][1200-F-G] Shankar Singh Etc. v. Mangal Singh Etc. AIR 1973 P&H 307; State of Punjab (now Haryana) and others v. Amar Singh and another (1974) 2 SCC 70 : [1974] 3 SCR 152; Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929; Kamla Devi Widow of Hans Raj, etc. v. Financial Commissioner (Appeals), Punjab and others (2013) SCC Online P&H 7911; Bhagwat Sharan (Dead

Through Legal Representatives) v. Purushottam and others (2020) 6 SCC 387; Heman and another

Appellants v. Tulsi Ram R.S.A. No. 1511 of 1970; Chandu Lal v. Kalia and Goria Civil Revision No. 849 of 1973; Kul Bhushan etc. v. Faquira and others L.P.A. No. 35 of 1974; Ramzani v. Abad Shah R.S.A. No. 1975 of 1971; Jia Lal and another v. State of Haryana and others Writ Petition No. 1785 of 1968; Jaswant Rai and another v. Bhagwan Dass and another R.S.A. No. 1120 of 1963; Raja Ram and another v. Raghubir Singh and another Civil Writ No. 1288 of 1967; Khazan Singh another v. Dalip Singh and another L.P.A. No. 623 of 1968; Om Prakash Gupta v. Dr. Ratan Singh and

another (1964) 1 SCR 259 – referred to